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ABSTRACT

The Problem of Literary Development in Russian Formalism and Digital Humanities
by
Vasily Lvov (Basil Lvoff)

Advisor: Elizabeth Klosty Beaujour

The interest of this dissertation is how our understanding of literary development—as
gradual or revolutionary; self-governed or socio-politically determined; like or unlike biological
evolution—informs the status, meaning, and value of literature and literary studies. The
dissertation shows how this problem—most pressing in our post-logocentric age—was addressed
at the dawn of contemporary literary theory by the Russian Formalists. The latter are compared
with Distant Readers, i.e., the Digital Humanists from, or conducting research in dialogue with,
the Stanford Literary Lab: Franco Moretti, Matthew Jockers, Ted Underwood, William Benzon,
and others.
This dissertation argues that both Russian Formalism and Distant Reading were brought
about by a big bang of data: Big Data proper for Digital Humanities, and in the case of Russian
Formalism, the abundance of literary and linguistic facts that nineteenth-century positivists
amassed yet failed to explain through a universal linguistic or literary theory.
This study analyzes important overlaps between Russian Formalism and Distant Reading
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(mainly in chapters 1, 3, and 4)—such as their “geometrical” (distant and pattern- rather than
“content”-centered) interpretation of meaning in literary development. At the same time, the
dissertation construes some fundamental differences in the models of literary development as per
Russian Formalism and Distant Reading, culminating in the following problems: success as an
indicator of systemic change (chapter 4); humor as a challenge to any formalist reading (chapter
5); and disputed agency in literary development (chapter 6).
A major contribution of this dissertation is the critical introduction of the recently
rediscovered Formalist Boris Yarkho, who anticipated Distant Reading by decades in his
quantitative, statistics-driven, application of evolutionary biology to literature. The figure of
Yarkho makes it possible to discern fundamental discrepancies, in values and methods, within
Russian Formalism—primarily between Yarkho and the group of Viktor Shklovsky (chapters 1
and 2). These discrepancies spotlight the bifurcation points for contemporary literary
scholarship, including literary scholars grouped under the umbrella term of Digital Humanities.
To this end (differentiating the various strands of formalism), the dissertation establishes a
pattern of scholarship represented by the intermedial formalisms of Shklovsky and Marshall
McLuhan (chapter 6), distinct from both the proto-structuralist and “biostatistical” interpretations
of Yarkhovian and Jakobsonian Formalism, as well as their analogues in Distant Reading.
This comparison is not merely of abstract concern. The differences are heuristic, i.e.,
capable of enabling different kinds of literary scholarship—as with Yarkho’s specific methods of
genre analysis; Shklovsky and McLuhan’s recategorization of the significance of the person visà-vis the medium; or their deliberately partial study of media through personal involvement in
the form of essayistic writing, which leaves no theoretical inclination neutral and “vacuous,” but
endows it with a cash value (an important category of this dissertation, borrowed from William
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James).
Juxtaposing the best-known Russian Formalists of Shklovsky’s group with Distant
Readers (mainly Moretti), Yarkho, and Marshall McLuhan (regarded as a “Russian Formalist” of
the digital age), this dissertation rewrites the institutional history of Russian Formalism and gives
a history to Distant Reading. Distant Reading meets its precursors, to embrace or rebel against,
from now on compelled to deal with “the anxiety of influence.” Russian Formalism as a theory
faces a new, digital, challenge on its home field.
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INTRODUCTION
I. Prolegomena
Almost every dissertation in the humanities, including this one, duly opens with declaring
certain ideas and methods more relevant than others. This custom, however, stands in contrast to
the piety of our guild towards tradition, even with the most radical of scholars, from Feyerabend
to Derrida. We are not ready—and should we ever be?—to call our predecessors, from the
ancient theoreticians of China, India, and Greece, to the major nineteenth- and twentieth-century
thinkers—obsolete. If none are obsolete, all are relevant in one way or another, but then, with a
great many irreconcilable contradictions between the totality of theorists, any talk about
relevance appears to be irrelevant. Therein lies the difference between science and scholarship,
and literary theory usually falls into the latter category.
The difference between science and scholarship is easy to illustrate: Aristotle’s views on
biology and physics are outdated, but the ones laid out in his Poetics are not. Consequently, it
looks as though great humanities scholars do not err. True, a textual critic can still prove wrong a
predecessor who, say, considered a forged Byzantine manuscript authentic. Yet a literary theorist
who considers something or someone mistaken, can merely argue, but not demonstrate, that in
most cases. No wonder the very idea of mistake has largely been canceled out in literary theory,
especially with the idealist “subjectivization” of outlook, originating in German Romanticism
and culminating in the delusion-driven model of literary development of the Petrograd
Formalists1 or in the idea of creative misprisions as the primum movens of canonical literary
history according to Harold Bloom. Anticipating chapter one, it should be said that the Digital
1

Cf. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of
Literature in German Romanticism, trans. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1988). For the Formalist concept of delusion, cf. Viktor
Shklovsky, Energiia zabluzhdeniia. Kniga o siuzhete (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel’, 1981).
1

Humanists of today, just as their predecessor, Moscow Formalist Boris Yarkho, tried to return
falsifiability to the discipline of literature, rendering it a science. Yet the same was also true for
many Structuralist and Semiotic experiments that, unlike Yarkho’s, did enjoy long-lasting public
success. However, despite the results they yielded, these movements fell out of grace for a long
while (now they are coming back into fashion)—abandoned not because they were plain wrong,
though no theory is infallible, but because the axiological economy of the epoch that begot
Structuralism and Semiotics crumbled and the whole endeavor suddenly lost its currency.
Such vogue-like unpredictability of the humanities2 invites a very dangerous conclusion:
perhaps there is no progress in the humanities—no progress to truth, however one may interpret
the latter. If so, such a conclusion is fraught with sheer relativism, hence loss of interest and, to
use Viktor Frankl’s phrase, the will to meaning. Another, very different thinker also comes to
mind: Louis Althusser with his essay “Lenin and Philosophy.” Regardless of Althusser’s, let
alone Lenin’s, ideology, the diatribe against the tradition of Western thought, “the claim that
essentially philosophy has no real history,” apparently contains a grain of truth.3 As we observe
the alternation of theoretical movements championing the “objective” and the “subjective,”
“meaning” and “form,” “society” and its nomothetic analysis vs. the “individual” and the
idiographic analysis thereof, finally, some singular truth vs. a certain dualism or synthesis of
truths, we could ask the same questions that Althusser poses, following in Lenin’s footsteps:
What is a history which is no more than the repetition of the clash between two
fundamental tendencies? The forms and arguments of the fight may vary, but if the whole
history of philosophy is merely the history of these forms, they only have to be reduced to
the immutable tendencies that they represent for the transformation of these forms to
2

To read more about fashion as a manifestation of cultural evolution as per RF, cf. Vasily Lvov
[Basil Lvoff], “‘Peterburg’ V. Shklovskogo: Zhurnal kak fel’eton,” Mediaalmanac, vol. 64, no. 5
(2014), hereafter Lvoff, Peterburg.
3
Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 2001), 33.
2

become a kind of game for nothing.4
The problem described above is crucial to this dissertation, which argues that writing
about literary development is aimless unless we correlate the task with the development of our
discipline alongside literature (the Petrograd Formalists labeled this principle as “double
vision”—cf. 2.4). Theorizing as if in a vacuum would be tantamount to aiming at a target without
knowing the coordinates of the one shooting; to hit the target, we need both. Likewise, the author
of this dissertation had to place himself in the picture, by betting on some of the methods and
views he described and not others, having thus left the haven of distant observation and exposed
himself to criticism.
Meanwhile, such an axiological vacuum, the existence outside of the sobytie, the event,
of one’s epoch (as Mikhail Bakhtin, the Formalists’ great opponent and interlocutor called it), is
what people often christen “objectivity” and “impartiality.” This dissertation advocates a
different view: in finding out the truth about literary development (of genres, artistic movements,
etc.), no matter whether one has a bent for quantitative formalism (as with Yarkho and the
Digital Humanists) or the deductive-intuitive approach of the Petrograd Formalists—it is
important not to take oneself out of the picture. This is a variation on the paradox described by
John William Dunne, when the artist cannot put himself entirely in his own picture; accordingly,
this dissertation argues, literary scholarship cannot and probably should not attempt to remove
itself entirely from the picture it paints.5 Alternative to putative impartiality and relativistic

4

Ibid.
This is an instance of the problem of series (cf. 4.7). Also cf. J. W. Dunne, The Serial Universe
(London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1934), 29:
5

A certain artist, having escaped from the lunatic asylum in which, rightly or
wrongly, he had been confined, purchased the materials of his craft and set to work to
make a complete picture of the universe.
3

subjectivism, there is a third way. It has to do with discovering undeniable facts (a nod to
impartiality) that, nevertheless, require vindication through application, only after which can
these facts be recognized as formative, hence indispensable within the system of literature,
whose development is at issue; that is the moment when from random facts they turn into the
literary fact (Yuri Tynianov’s term).6 Without such vindication and validation, the fact will be
like the Tsar Cannon in the Moscow Kremlin: if it cannot fire, is it still a cannon? If a fact does
not “factor in,” is it still a fact? This principle is eloquently expressed in the title of
Mayakovsky’s 1926 poem “Marksizm – oruzhie, ognestrel’nyi metod. Primeniai umeiuchi metod
etot!” (“Marxism is a weapon, a firearm method. Skillfully use this method!”). The method is
relevant when fired like a rifle, and the fact is relevant as well, when fired at, so to speak. This is
one of the universal lessons of modernity, articulated by a variety of thinkers across the
ideological spectrum, not only by the Marxists with their philosophy of praxis (Althusser

He began by drawing, in the centre of a huge canvas, a very small but very finely
executed representation of the landscape as he saw it. [. . .]
On examining it, however, he was not satisfied. Something was missing. And,
after a moment's reflection, he realised what that something was. He was part of the
universe, and this fact had not yet been indicated.
The same logic has to be extrapolated to the theorist who tries to portray literature—cf. Viktor
Shklovsky, Gamburgskii shchet: stat’i—vospominaniia—esse (1914–1933) (Moscow: Sovetskii
pisatel’, 1990), 95; hereafter Shklovsky, Gamburgskii 1990:
Even if we felt the desire to “imitate nature” in the fine arts, it would be an unfit
attempt on an unfit object. [. . .] The picture is something constructed by its own laws, not
something imitative.
Now, as for form, it is common to think that, thanks to perspective, we can
reproduce the form of an object. This opinion is incorrect.
First of all, perspective, even the most academic one, is not based on descriptive
geometry. In a big picture, for example, the corners are painted as though the observer is
standing right before them, not the center of the painting. In such a way, the objects
represented in this picture are given from two viewpoints and more.i
i
6

All translations from Russian and other foreign sources are mine unless specified otherwise.
Cf. 2.4 for Boris Eikhenbaum’s juxtaposition of history with chronology.
4

advocates it as a way out of the vicious circle of abstract philosophizing), but also by Nietzsche
with his “gay science” (cf. 5.2) and the Petrograd Formalists with their particular take on it, as
well as William James with his cash-value metaphor. George Cotkin comments on the latter:
The metaphor of cash-value [. . .] proved useful [. . .] when James sought to identify the
use of an idea with the nature of a loan, or promissory note. The note is worthless when it
cannot be converted into cash, no value inheres in the note as such. So too with James’s
emphasis on cash-value “to express,” as [Jacques] Barzun phrases it, “the fact that an idea
is worthless if it cannot sooner or later be converted into the concreteness aimed at.” [. . .]
Truth in his views was something that only became apparent as the intellectual coin of the
realm was placed into circulation.7
The yardstick of cash-value is of great import for this dissertation, during the writing of
which the author kept asking himself about the cash-value of both the methods and questions put
forth by a variety of Russian and Anglophone formalists, a century ago and nowadays. At the
same time, the author of this dissertation does not take James’s deliberately provocative idea of
cash-value for granted. Different conclusions can be drawn from it, and that is why, in the
chapter devoted to literary success, the phenomenon of self-fulfilling prophecies (as used in
economics) and the observer effect (borrowed from quantum physics) are debated with regard to
the science-oriented approach (Yarkho and the Digital Humanists) as against the more avantgarde and artistic alternative (the Petrograd Formalists and Marshall McLuhan).

II. The Bipartite Structure of This Dissertation
Straight away, the author of this dissertation ought to concede that it is rather
kaleidoscopic. Its pivotal contradictions—which revolve around the Russian and Anglophone
formalists’ understanding of literature, its essence and development—recur in each chapter like
characters in a novel. This mainly applies to the second, special-purpose, part of the dissertation;

7

George Cotkin, “William James and the Cash-Value Metaphor,” Et Cetera (Spring 1985): 41.
5

unlike the first, history-centered one, the second part consists of several case studies that relate to
the main thesis like proofs to a theorem.
The author sacrificed Cartesian clarity, when the thesis is gradually stated ab ovo usque
ad mala, reluctantly so. Yet his motive was far from trying to be playful, as with those scholars,
especially the poststructuralists, who emphasize the ambiguity of their subject by writing
ambiguously—quod licet Iovi, non licet bovi. Were this dissertation devoted solely to the more
academic Moscow Formalism or any of the Digital Humanists, even Franco Moretti, this would
not have been the case. However, the deal changed when the Petrograd Formalists Viktor
Shklovsky, Yuri Tynianov, and Boris Eikhenbaum joined the game. Guilty of carnivalesque
simultaneity of forking, at times contradictory, ideas and aspirations,8 these Petrograd Formalists
were wont to do as the poet does, according to Tsvetaeva: “At play, he shuffles all the cards, / He
always cheats you on the weights, / Of other pupils in retard, / He’ll vanquish Kant with no
delay.”9 This trio of Petrograd Formalists only confused their contemporaries and subsequent
readers by a deceptively positivist insistence on making literary scholarship a rigorous discipline
8

Simultaneity is used here in the same sense as in the work of Michael Holquist, who
inaugurated Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept in American academy. Holquist uses simultaneity to
discuss the problem of the “mysterious workings of shared differences,” “namely, the
interaction, indeed the interdependence of elements quite different from each other, the complex
wholes which result from otherwise non-identical parts” (J. Michael Holquist, “The Carnival of
Discourse: Baxtin and Simultaneity,” Canadian Review of Comparative Literature / Revue
Canadienne de Littérature Comparée, no. 12 (1985): 221). As for the carnival in this particular
context, it “can be understood only in relation to a set of differences which both oppose it and, at
the same time, enable it” (ibid., 222). More is said on the carnivalesque in RF in 5.1. For a
comparison of Bakhtin and the Opoyazians with regard to the carnivalesque, cf. Aage A.
Hansen-Löve, Russkii formalizm: metodologicheskaia rekonstruktsiia razvitiia na osnove
printsipa ostraneniia, hereafter Hansen-Löve [original German title: Der russische Formalismus.
Methodologische Rekonstruktion seiner Entwicklung aus dem Prinzip der Verfremdung], trans.
S. Romashko (Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul’tury, 2001), chapter “Karnavalizatsiia kak
ostraniaiushchii printsip.”
9
Basil Lvoff, “Past Starshine, Star Signs, Planets: 4 Russian Poets Translated by Basil Lvoff,”
National Translation Month (2019), accessed March 12, 2020,
https://nationaltranslationmonth.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Basil-Lvoff-Russian.pdf.
6

(cf. chapter 2). What scholarly rigor actually meant for Shklovsky and his counterparts was
theoretical uncompromisingness, not some “classicist” “unity of action.” This also explains why
they simultaneously advocated rigorous literary scholarship and attacked the academic pedantry
of their day. Meanwhile, the stance of the Petrograd Formalists, on such key issues as the nature
and patterns of literary success, or “high” and mass literature, evolved as rapidly and abruptly as
did literature according to their historical poetics (cf. chapters 3 and 4).
Peter Steiner labeled this feature of Russian, primarily Petrograd, Formalism as “an
‘interparadigmatic stage’ in the evolution of Slavic literary scholarship.”10 The author of this
dissertation agrees with him insofar as everything is “interparadigmatic”; after all, this
corresponds to the principle of continuity (nepreryvnost’)11—one of the three fundamentals of all
organisms, according to the Moscow Formalist Boris Yarkho, a major character in this
dissertation (cf. chapter 1). However, insofar as the word “interparadigmatic” means that
Petrograd Formalism was “a transitory and immature preparation phase that was transcended by
subsequent, more robust paradigms,” the author of this dissertation begs to disagree, just as does
Tomáš Glanc, quoted just now.12 It would be more productive perhaps to conceive of Petrograd
Formalism, to repeat the image, as a kaleidoscope, or better yet a Rubik’s cube.
The other characters of this dissertation, each of them a sui generis formalist, represent
only one or two colors at most, no matter how universal or subtle their theories are, be it
Alexander Veselovsky or Ted Underwood, Boris Yarkho or Franco Moretti. The Petrograd

10

Peter Steiner, Russian Formalism. A Metapoetics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984),
269. Hereafter Steiner, RFM.
11
All bracketed Russian terms, with a few exceptions, are given in their grammatically default
forms: in the Nominative Case, as an infinitive, etc.
12
Tomáš Glanc, “The Russian Formalists as a Community,” in Marina Grishakova and Silvi
Salupere, eds., Theoretical Schools and Circles in the Twentieth-Century Humanities: Literary
Theory, History, Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2015), 3. Hereafter Glanc, RFC.
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Formalists, as this dissertation attempts to demonstrate, enjoyed the widest spectrum of colors
and with it, the greatest number of creative misprisions, to reference Harold Bloom once again.13
The function of Petrograd Formalism in this dissertation is therefore akin to that of a trickster in
a novel: to expose, or “lay bare” (obnazhit’) in Formalist lingo, the other personages, with their
stakes and strivings. That is why, just as one solves a Rubik’s cube by tackling one color at a
time, eventually to arrange all of them, the chapters of this dissertation address the problem of
literary development gradually, vis-à-vis the problems of success in “high” and mass literature,
the idiographic (individual-driven) and nomothetic (system-driven) literary development, the
problem of literary form complicated by irony and humor, and some other issues, articulated by
one theoretician or another.

Cf. Alexander Dmitriev, “Russkii ‘strakh vliianiia’? (Formal’naia shkola mezhdu istoricheskoi
poetikoi i komparativizmom,” in Nikolay Poselyagin and Mikhail Trunin, eds., Slvavisticheskii
sbornik / Review of Slavic Studies 92, Verba Volant, Scripta Manent. Festshrift k 50-letiiu Igoria
Pilshchikova (Novi sad: Matica Srpska Division of Literature and Language, 2017). Cf. Vasily
Lvov [Basil Lvoff], “Literaturnyi kanon i poniatie strannosti: Russkii formalizm i Kherold
Blum,” Zhurnalistika i kul’tura russkoi rechi, no. 2 (2012).
13

8

PART I. GENERAL
CHAPTER ONE
RUSSIAN FORMALISM IN DISTANT READING AND DISTANT READING IN
RUSSIAN FORMALISM
“We look at the present through a rear-view mirror. We
march backwards into the future.”14
—Marshall McLuhan
1.1. The Distant Readers of One Hundred Years Ago and of Today
A century ago, the Russian Formalists ushered in contemporary literary theory in
circumstances similar to those of today’s literary scholars within Digital Humanities. As Viktor
Shklovsky famously wrote, “in the alteration of literary schools, the legacy is handed down not
from father to son but from uncle to nephew.”15 This is the case with Distant Readers,16 such as
Franco Moretti, Matthew Jockers, and Ted Underwood, related through their scholarship to the
Russian granduncles thrice removed by geography, time, and technology.
Both movements emerged in the wake of a big bang of data, concomitant with the

14

Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects
(Berkley: Gingko Press, 1967), 75.
15
Viktor Shklovsky, O teorii prozy (Moscow: Federatsiia, 1929), 227. Hereafter Shklovsky,
OTP 1929.
16
Moretti coined the term “distant reading” by contrast with close reading and, by his own
admission, “as a joke,” for distant reading is not about reading proper: “[W]e know how to read
texts, now let’s learn how not to read them” (Franco Moretti, Distant Reading (London: Verso,
2013), 44; hereafter Moretti, DR). Unlike close reading, which “necessarily depends on an
extremely small canon,” a distant one focuses on large numbers of texts, hoping to discover or
(dis)prove the existence of certain regularities in the history of literature (e.g., the principle
whereby genres alternate), its sociology (e.g., the trends in the world distribution of certain
works), etc. (ibid., 48). This kind of study is possible thanks to modern technology, which
Digital Humanists employ to create and analyze databases of texts. However, this chapter argues
that a prototype of distant reading had already existed within Russian Formalism, before Moretti
minted the term. Ted Underwood, and not he alone, is of the same opinion: “[A]s Katherine
Bode has noted, the questions posed by distant readers are often continuous with the older
tradition of book history [. . .]; as Jim English has noted, they are also continuous with the
sociology of literature” (Ted Underwood, “Distant Reading and Recent Intellectual History,” in
Matthew K. Gold and Lauren F. Klein, eds., Debates in the Digital Humanities (Minneapolis and
London: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 530).
9

nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ secular concern with social laws. Distant Reading has
flourished under the aegis of Digital Humanities as a result of the ongoing information
revolution: the growing accessibility of IT and, most importantly, exponentially multiplying data,
which spurred the search for patterns and compelled a new understanding of meaning qua
information. (Consider cybernetics, consider the contributions of Shannon17 or Kolmogorov.)18
Likewise, Russian Formalism was augured, nay, necessitated by positivism: its ocean of
new facts about literature and the widespread reluctance of the positivists to fathom it.19 Yet, no
matter how groundbreaking in their discoveries, the Formalists were much indebted to the factgleaning of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century (comparative) philologists. Consider Antti
Aarne’s classification of folktales, which Vladimir Propp criticized for disregarding the functions
of the fairy tales’ motifs while still using it in his own theory. Consider, also, the work of
Alexander Veselovsky (student of Humboldt’s follower Steinthal), who investigated the formal
development of literature in his project of historical poetics.20 Shklovsky used Veselovsky’s

17

Cf. Jimmy Soni and Rob Goodman, A Mind at Play: How Claude Shannon Invented the
Information Age (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017).
18
Cf. Vladimir Uspensky, “Predvarenie dlia chitatelei ‘Novogo literaturnogo obozreniia’ k
semioticheskim poslaniiam Andreiia Nikolaevicha Kolmogorova,” Novoe literaturnoe
obozrenie, vol. 24, no. 5 (1997); hereafter Uspensky.
19
The Formalists criticized such scholars for their lack of theoretical insight (impressionistic
critics) and for their inability to theorize literature on its own, structural, terms (as in naïve
biographism, psychologism, vulgar sociologism, etc.) This does not mean, however, that the
Formalists completely ignored these facets of literature. With time, they embraced them. For
their stance on the socioeconomic aspect of literature, cf. chapter 3; for their relationship with
psychology, cf. 5.2. Also cf. Radoslav Borislavov, “Viktor Shklovskii—between Art and Life”
(PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2011), hereafter Borislavov. Cf. Ilona Svetlikova, Istoki
russkogo formalizma: Traditsiia psikhologizma i formal’naia shkola (Moscow: Novoe
literaturnoe obozrenie, 2005); hereafter Svetlikova.
20
Ilya Kliger and Boris Maslov, “Introducing Historical Poetics: History, Experience, Form,” in
Persistent Forms: Explorations in Historical Poetics, ed. Ilya Kliger and Boris Maslov (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2016), hereafter Kliger and Maslov.
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narratology (at times polemically) in O teorii prozy (Theory of Prose), and so did Jockers.21
Moreover, both Russian Formalism and Distant Reading (hereafter RF and DR) issued
new demands to literary scholarship, with an eye to the same end:22 to study literature as a
system, which functions according to certain regularities and, possibly, laws. That is the reason
why the problem of literary change is in the limelight of RF and DR—as well as at the center of
this chapter, whose aim is to map and reevaluate RF and DR vis-à-vis the question of literary
development.
The idea to compare DR and RF has been in the air for some time. In 2015, a major
conference devoted to this matter took place at Stanford.23 University courses have addressed it
(e.g., “Advanced Topics in Digital Humanities: Statistical Analysis of Poetry and Prose: from
Russian Formalism to Digital Humanities,” taught at UCLA in Winter 2017 by Igor Pilshchikov,
and “Defamiliarization and Modern Art” with Moretti’s Distant Reading on the list of the
required materials, taught in Spring 2015 by Rad Borislavov at Columbia University). Finally,
articles are being written on the matter.24 The leading Distant Readers themselves reference RF
time and again: cf. the mentions of Shklovsky by Moretti,25 as well as the fact that Jockers’s

21

Matthew L. Jockers, Macroanalysis: Digital Methods and Literary History (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2013), chapter 8; hereafter Jockers, Macroanalysis.
22
It should be noted that Distant Readers did not issue new demands to theory with the
belligerence characteristic of Shklovsky or Boris Eikhenbaum, who showed animus towards
other movements in literary scholarship. The nature of DH projects demands collegiality, but,
peacefully yet decisively, Distant Readers still went further than other Digital Humanists, chiefly
committed to the honorable task of archiving.
23
Andrei Ustinov, “The Legacy of Russian Formalism and the Rise of the Digital Humanities,”
Wiener Slavistisches Jahrbuch, vol. 4 (2016).
24
E.g. the forthcoming special issue of Russian Literature on Digital Humanities
and Russian and East European Studies. Also cf. Igor Pilshchikov, “Franko Moretti i novyi
kvantitativnyi formalism,” Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, vol. 150, no. 2 (2018).
25
Franco Moretti, Graphs, Maps, Trees: Abstract Models for a Literary Theory (New York:
Verso, 2007), 14, 16, 17, 20,63, 73, 91; hereafter Moretti, Graphs; and Moretti, DR, 31, 71, 144.
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Syuzhet Package26 for studying the narrative uses the Russian word for “plot,” introduced to
Anglophone theory through RF.
Yet this alone does not prove theoretical kinship between RF and DH. Academics are
wont to cite authorities, and it is up to Digital Humanists and the heirs of RF to decide to what
degree they really need each other. They may have a tactical alliance, which need not be
reprehensible,27 but before they cement it, it is important to answer in all honesty Pushkin’s
proverbial question: ““Whither do we sail?”28 My goal is to show that RF and DH are in the
same boat—at least for the time being—because of the direction in which the wind of history is
blowing, having yet again created an urge to study literary change, in order to understand the
principles of such a capricious and complex art as the verbal one. For the more data there are, the
greater is the necessity to bring them to a common denominator, which is theory’s task, and it is
the world of big data that we live in.
The study of change is, in effect, both a challenge and a tentative solution in RF and DH.
As literary features alter from one work to another, new genres emerge; the system of literature
never stabilizes, sustaining an ever-changing universe of facts. Yet it is this chaos that triggers
the theorist’s search for structure and meaning. Thus, the countless facts of the past—disjointed,
i.e., meaningless by themselves—impelled RF to organize them into a system of historical

26

Syuzhet Package is a code Jockers wrote for R, a program language for statistical
computing with big data. The package is open for use and is updated, partially based on the
experience of its other users. To follow this project, cf. http://www.matthewjockers.net.
27
Cf. Stanley Fish, “The Old Order Changeth,” The New York Times, December 26, 2011,
accessed March 12, 2020, https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/26/the-old-orderchangeth/. As a reaction to it, cf. Ted Underwood, “Why digital humanities isn’t actually ‘the
next thing in literary studies,’” The Stone and the Shell, December 27, 2011, accessed March 12,
2020, https://tedunderwood.com/2011/12/27/why-we-dont-actually-want-to-be-the-next-thingin-literary-studies.
28
Alexander Pushkin, “Osen’. (Otryvok),” in Sobranie sochinenii v desiati tomakh. Tom vtoroi.
Stikhotvoreniia 1823-1836. (Moscow: GIKhL, 1959), 383.
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patterns.29 Likewise, Moretti’s bewilderment at “the great unread” (as Margaret Cohen first
called it) made him and his counterparts seek order in graphs, maps, and trees (as the eponymous
title of his book has it). Change as a theoretical problem created a concern for meaning—not the
other way around. The kind of meaning that is at issue, is not that of a single work taken in and
of itself; what matters is systemic meaning: that of a single work vis-à-vis all the other works, of
a certain genre as against all others, of a national literature in comparison to Weltliteratur—
finally, of the system of literature as a whole with regard to other systems.
RF and DR reinterpreted change as a source of meaning because to understand chaos, to
study its principles, it is necessary to approach it as nonchaotic. The logic goes as follows. Along
with an array of varying data, change produces repetitions as well as specific mechanisms
responsible for the birth of such repetitions. These repetitions effect meaning by creating
continuity and difference, thereby endowing literary phenomena with structural identity.30 That
is why to register development is to register meaning. As Thomas Sebeok wrote, “the universe
began totally devoid of information, but it quickly evolved out of that initial state as a measure of
the multiform. The essence of information is change.”31 Like RF, DR shifted its focus, so to
speak, from a ripple on the water (“meaning-effect”) to the rock (“the means to meaning”). The
rest of this chapter discusses the two movements’ theoretical assumptions and methodology in
this endeavor.

29

Cf. Yuri Tynianov, Arkhaisty i novatory (Moscow: Academia, 1929) [Republ. München:
Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1967], hereafter Tynianov, Arkhaisty. Cf. Boris Eikhenbaum, Moi
vremennik. Marshrut v bessmertie (Moscow: Agraf, 2001), hereafter Eikhenbaum, Moi
vremennik.
30
This is true not only for historical analogies but also for the single text, in which we see
development and difference in a single sentence (theme and rheme), in a single stanza (metric
and rhythmic patterns), or in the composition (the plot).
31
Thomas A. Sebeok, I Think I Am a Verb: More Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs (New
York: Springer Science+Business Media, 1986), 15.
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First, however, the author of this dissertation has to lay his cards on the table and
acknowledge two major divergences between RF and DR. While it is true that RF analyzed form
in literature as something definite and susceptible of morphological analysis32 (thereby
anticipating Structuralism and later DR), RF also had an opposite tendency, displayed by the
Petrograd Formalists and leaders of the Opoyaz (The Society for the Study of the Theory of
Poetic Language): Viktor Shklovsky, Yuri Tynianov, and Boris Eikhenbaum.33 Not only did
these scholars come up with the tools and concepts that made possible a systematization of
knowledge about literature as a form—they also resisted this systematization because of their
understanding of formal change in literature as something volatile and unpredictable.34
Cf. Shklovsky, OTP 1929 for “Sviaz’ priemov siuzhetoslozheniia s obshchimi priemami
stilia.” Cf. Tynianov, “Literaturnoe segodnia” in Yuri Tynianov, Poetika. Istoriia literatury.
Kino (Moscow: Nauka, 1977); hereafter Tynianov, PILK. Cf. Boris Eikhenbaum, Melodika
russkogo liricheskogo stikha (Petrograd: OPOYAZ, 1922). Cf. Vladimir Propp, Morfologiia
skazki (Leningrad: Academia, 1928), hereafter Propp. Cf. Boris Tomashevsky, Teoriia literatury.
Poetika (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 1999). Cf. Viktor Vinogradov, O poezii Anny Akhmatovoi.
(Stilisticheskie nabroski) (Leningrad: Trudy Foneticheskogo Instituta prakt. izucheniia iazykov
pod obshchei redakts. Direktora Instit. I. E. GILLEL’SONA, 1925).
33
Even though the Opoyaz did not last until the end of the 1920s as an organization, the term,
along with its derivatives, is used in this dissertation as an appellative for Shklovsky, Tynianov,
and Eikhenbaum’s branch of RF.
Within RF, there were several major movements, different not only in their methodology
but also theoretical assumptions. Cf. Tomáš Glanc, RFC. Cf. Igor Pilshchikov, “Nasledie russkoi
formal’noi shkoly i sovremennaia filologiia,” in Vyacheslav Ivanov, ed., Antropologiia Kul’tury.
Vyp. 5. K 85-letiiu akademika RAN Vyach. Vs. Ivanova (Moscow: Institut mirovoi kul’tury
MGU, 2015). Cf. Victor Erlich, Russian Formalism: History—Doctrine (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1981), hereafter Erlich, RF. Cf. Peter Steiner, RFM. Cf. Jurij
Striedter, Literary Structure, Evolution, and Value: Russian Formalism and Czech Structuralism
Reconsidered (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1989). Cf. Hansen-Löve, RF.
Cf. Catherine Depretto, Formalizm v Rossii: predshestvenniki, istoriia, trans. V. Mil’china
(Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2015), hereafter Depretto. Cf. Serguei A. Oushakine,
ed., Formal’nyi metod: Antologiia russkogo modernizma, Tom I. Sistemy, Tom II. Materialy,
Tom III. Tekhnologii (Moscow and Yekaterinburg: Kabinetnyi uchenyi, 2016), hereafter FM. Cf.
Jan Levchenko and Igor Pilshchikov, eds., Epokha “ostraneniia”. Russkii formalizm i
sovremennoe gumanitarnoe znanie: Kollektivnaia monografiia (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe
obozrenie, 2017).
34
Cf. Peter Steiner’s musings on the “interparadigmatic” status of Opoyaz Formalism (cf.
Introduction, part II). An example of this volatility of form is the constant displacement of form
32
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Nevertheless, saying that RF and DR are in the same boat need not imply uniformity; what
matters is the similarity of their theoretical concerns.
Another substantial handicap in comparing RF and DR has to do with technology. The
very idea of DR, as articulated by Moretti, suggests that our thinking about literature alters when
we study “the ‘great unread,’” i.e., “the forgotten 99 per cent” of literary works outside the
canon.35 By analogy with macroeconomics, Jockers calls this type of scholarship macroanalysis.
In this context, the following economics-inspired metaphor from Shklovsky is telling: “To draw
a parallel with a factory, I am interested not in the state of affairs on the world cotton market, and
not in the policy of its trusts, but only in the count of yarn and the ways of weaving it.”36 Anyone
familiar with Opoyaz Formalism will be careful, of course, not to take Shklovsky’s declaration
on faith, and we shall indeed find instances when Shklovsky and his counterparts treated some
segments of “the great unread,”37 especially in their trailblazing research of the literary market,
which posed some macroanalytical questions (cf. chapter 3). Still, the abovementioned
Formalists lacked the technical means for analyzing thousands, let alone tens of thousands, of
texts. Furthermore, as the following three sections will show, they might have rejected such an
approach altogether, on the grounds of its being positivistic and too static for something as
in the history of literature according to Shklovsky’s concept of ostranenie (defamiliarization,
(b)estrangement)—cf. chapter 1 in Vasily Lvov [Basil Lvoff], “Literaturnaia kritika formal’noi
shkoly (Iu.N. Tynianov, V.B. Shklovsky, B.M. Eikhenbaum)” (PhD diss., Lomonosov Moscow
State University, 2015), hereafter Lvoff, LKF. This begins to resemble post-structuralism—for a
comparison of Shklovsky’s defamiliarization and Derrida’s différance, cf. Lawrence Crawford,
“Viktor Shklovskij: Différance in Defamiliarization,” Comparative Literature, vol. 36, no. 3
(1984); also cf. Dragan Kujundžić, The Returns of History: Russian Nietzscheans after
Modernity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), hereafter Kujundžić.
35
Moretti, DR, 67.
36
Shklovsky, OTP 1929, 5–6.
37
Cf. Tynianov’s study of Wilhelm Küchelbecker’s then-unpublished tragedy Argiviane
(The Citizens of Argos) in Tynianov, PILK 1977 or Shklovsky’s monographs about semiforgotten eighteenth-century writers, e.g., Viktor Shklovsky, Matvei Komarov. Zhitel’ goroda
Moskvy (Leningrad: Priboi, 1929), hereafter Shklovsky, Komarov.
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dynamic as literature.
The reader would have every right to be discouraged by these caveats and mistrust the
comparison of DR with RF if not for one game-changing exception: the legacy of the Moscow
Formalist Boris Isaakovich Yarkho (1889-1942), who was ahead of his time in studying literary
change through statistics and evolutionary biology in large corpora of texts. Yarkho defined his
method as “comparative-statistical, supported, as far as it is possible, by experiment.”38 What is
to follow is an analytical introduction to Yarkho, whose theory should serve as a common
denominator for the comparison of DR with RF at large, i.e., RF not being limited to the
Opoyaz.

1.2. Quantitative Formalism: Boris Yarkho and Distant Reading
The name of Boris Yarkho is still little known, if at all, even in Slavic departments.39
Yarkho’s ground-breaking oeuvre had largely remained unpublished until 2006,40 when his
voluminous magnum opus, Metodologiia tochnogo literaturovedeniia (The Methodology of
Exact Literary Scholarship), saw the light of day—prepared by Marina Akimova, Igor
Pilshchikov, and Maksim Shapir, at the behest, one may say, of Mikhail Gasparov, who humbly
called himself Yarkho’s “epigone” and did his best to promote Yarkho’s legacy.41 Unlike
38

Boris Yarkho, Metodologiia tochnogo literaturovedeniia. Izbrannye trudy po teorii literatury
(Moscow: Iazyki slavianskikh kul’tur, 2006; hereafter Yarkho, Metodologiia), 7.
39
For Yarkho’s brief biography in English, cf. Mikhail Gasparov, “Boris Yarkho’s Works on
Literary Theory,” trans. Michael Lavery and Marina Tarlinskaja, Studia Metrica, vol. 3, no. 2
(2016).
40
For a bibliography of Yarkho’s publications from 1910 to 2005, cf. Yarkho, Metodologiia,
844–868.
41
Mikhail Gasparov, Zapisi i vypiski (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2000), 330. When
the author of this dissertation was writing this, only two minor excerpts from Yarkho’s The
Methodology had been published in English: Boris Yarkho, “Methodology for a Precise Science
of Literature (draft plan),” trans. L. M. O’Toole, in L. M. O’Toole and Ann Shukman, eds.,
Russian Poetics in Translation V, Formalism: History, Comparisons, Genre (Colchester:
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Shklovsky or Mikhail Bakhtin, Yarkho did not survive into the more vegetarian years of the
Soviet era to be able to sway the new generations of academics with his presence. It was hard for
Yarkho’s work to meet the reader because of how much ahead of its epoch it was—technically
challenging to an average literary scholar due to Yarkho’s earnest use of statistics and his crossdisciplinary erudition. History had to turn full circle (on the next level of the spiral, of course), so
that now, in the context of Digital Humanities, Yarkho could come back from oblivion.
Akin to Moretti and his colleagues, Yarkho was a quantitative formalist, as they dubbed
themselves in the famous Pamphlet 1 of the Stanford Literary Lab: “Formalism, because all of
us, in one way or another, [are] interested in the formal conventions of genre; and quantitative,
because we [are] looking for more precise—ideally, measurable—ways to establish generic
differences.”42 This description fully applies to Yarkho’s work, as exemplified by his
quantitative study (a rare finished one of that kind) titled Raspredelenie rechi v piatiaktnoi
tragedii. (K voprosu o klassitsizme i romantizme) (Speech Distribution in Five-Act Tragedy:
Towards the Problem of Classicism and Romanticism). (The first of its multiple versions was
ready in 1928 and the last dates to 1941; it was included in the 2006 edition of Yarkho.)

University of Essex Press, 1978); Boris Yarkho, “The Elementary Foundations of Formal
Analysis,” trans. Michael Lavery and Igor Pilshchikov, Studia Metrica, vol. 3, no. 2 (2016).
Meanwhile, a stream of new publications, both those of Yarkho or those devoted to him, in the
first issue for 2019 of The Journal for Literary Theory, including: Frank Fischer, Marina
Akimova, Boris Orekhov, “Preface: Data-Driven Formalism,” Journal of Literary Theory, vol.
13, no. 1 (2019); Boris I. Yarkho, “Speech Distribution in Five-Act Tragedies (A Question of
Classicism and Romanticism) (1935–1938, first published 1997),” trans. Craig Saunders, Journal
of Literary Theory, vol. 13, no. 1 (2019). At the same time, new publications of Yarkho continue
to appear in Russian, among them Yarkho’s translations of Völsunga Saga and The Song of
Roland—cf. Germanskii epos Severnoi i Iuzhnoi Evropy. K 130-letiiu B.I. Yarkho, ed. V.E.
Senichev (Moscow: Veche, 2019).
42
Sarah Allison, Ryan Heuser, Matthew Jockers, Franco Moretti, Michael Wiltmore,
“Quantitative Formalism: an Experiment,” Stanford Literary Lab Pamphlet 1, January 15, 2011,
accessed March 12, 2020, https://litlab.stanford.edu/LiteraryLabPamphlet1.pdf, 6. Hereafter
Pamphlet 1.
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The big question that underlies Yarkho’s paper is the difference between Classicism and
Romanticism. (It is important to remember the argument posited in the introduction: meaning for
formalists is differential: the uniqueness of the work is defined by that which it is not.) Surely,
much had been written on the subject before Yarkho, but he sought “a scientific demarcation
between Classicism and Romanticism.”43 This, in turn, was part of a larger task, with which DR
cannot but sympathize: “the problem of big literary complexes being compared.”44
Like Distant Readers, who believe that close reading is fraught with “[c]herry-picking of
evidence in support of a broad hypothesis,”45 Yarkho asserts: “The scholar who has not made
any calculations can never prove that the [alleged] deviations [. . .] from the intuitively deduced
‘basic forms’ are exceptions or deviations proper.”46 Consequently, Yarkho takes on the task of
showing statistical discrepancies between Romantic and Classicist tragedies, and deliberately
complicates the problem by dwelling on those authors who are related to both styles (e.g.,
Schiller). Yarkho resorts to Leibniz’s Law (the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles), which
he defines as follows: “Between adjacent categories, set by our mind for extraneous objects,
there exist intermediary and mixed phenomena.”47 Yarkho applies this principle to Romantic and
Classicist tragedies as they share the same ““distinctive features”: dramatis personae, acts,
scenes, etc.48
His corpus of texts, not as a mere collection but as a “proving ground” for theory,
bespeaks an incontestable tendency towards big data, especially by the standards of his pre-

43

Yarkho, Metodologiia, 550. Where Yarkho resorted to tracking (letter-spacing), italics are
used. The same applies to all the other translations from Russian.
44
Ibid.
45
Jockers, Macroanalysis, 47.
46
Yarkho, Metodologiia, 551.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid., 552.
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digital time: one hundred fifty-three tragedies written by twenty-three authors, comprising 5755
scenes (one scene is Yarkho’s statistical unit). It is hard to imagine just one person dealing with
this number of texts, without even a primitive computer.49 To this, Yarkho adds other plays
(more than fifty, including those of Shakespeare and ancient tragedians), which lie outside of his
main object of inquiry, thus increasing the accuracy of his conclusions—Distant Readers, too,
include such “counterexamples” in their studies.
More specifically, Yarkho uses several basic measurements for comparing the scenes in
his corpus of tragedies: the range of conversations between characters (mainly, from a
monologue to a hexalogue); the mode (moda), in the statistical sense of the term (in Yarkho’s
study, this measurement has to do with the prominence of dialogue in a given tragedy); the
climax (kul’minatsiia) of the mode (Yarkho needs this measurement to tell whether all dialogues
taken together in a certain tragedy outnumber other types of communication or not); and also
“the coefficient of mobility,” i.e., the average number of the characters’ entrances and exits in a
tragedy.50 Rather than discuss these and many other technicalities (the best way to do them
justice is to read the original), let us consider the kind of conclusions that Yarkho’s method can
yield. Here are several randomly taken ones, all of them numerically corroborated and illustrated
49

Distant Readers, all and sundry, acknowledge that their work is fundamentally
collaborative. Yarkho understood this in the 1930s already and pined for a team he had never
built. Yarkho mentioned it separately when enumerating the reasons why he decided to write The
Methodology of Exact Literary Scholarship:
[T]o point out the prospects of some research projects I have managed to initiate
in my lifetime, considering my “technical solitude,” the absence of some seminar,
a working space, etc., not to mention a special institution, which I could supply
with productive work for a hundred years; not that I have ever even dreamt about
an Institut der exakten Literaturwissenschaft, bearing in mind the American rule
to get away from unrealities. Perhaps, that was a mistake as well [italicized
fragments were originally written in German and English]. (Yarkho,
Metodologiia, 5.)
50
Ibid., 561.
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(with tables and graphs).
Yarkho, for example, demonstrates that Goethe transitioned not simply from a more
moderate version of Romanticism to Classicism but, more precisely, to the kind of Classicism
more typical of the seventeenth, rather than the eighteenth, century. Elsewhere, Yarkho shows
how Shakespeare’s original range and coefficient of mobility expanded these of the Classicist
Jean-François Ducis. Moreover, Yarkho argues—by observing the same measurements through
numbers, tables, and graphs—that Catherine the Great, who followed in her imitations of
Shakespeare the mobility of the Bard’s original tragedies, turned out to be Russia’s first
Romantic dramatist (unwittingly so).51
It should be said in all fairness that not all of Yarkho’s conclusions in this work are
revelatory. He says, for example, that Romanticism and Classicism coexisted in Schiller’s work
or that Alexander Sumarokov reduced Shakespeare’s original range and coefficient of mobility
in his adaptations, whereas one can see it with a naked eye: of course, Sumarokov’s adaptations
of Shakespeare are not as lively as the originals. But it is of major import for Yarkho not only to
make new discoveries but also to substantiate that which people consider self-evident. DR is
characterized by the same logic, when the self-evidence of a certain fact is not the end result but
a pretext for experimentation—consider the following excerpt from Pamphlet 1 describing
Moretti and his colleague’s experiment: “Striking as these results were, did we think they had
produced new knowledge? The answer, of course, was No: Docuscope had corroborated what
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Yet, unlike the Opoyazians, Yarkho did not consider this from the standpoint of the social
orientation of the work or genre (cf. 3.3) or the literary everyday (cf. 3.2). In terms of the social
orientation of Catherine II, it mattered to the Opoyazians that she belonged “to the ranks of
amateur writers” (Teodor Grits, Vladimir Trenin, and Mikhail Nikitin, Slovesnost’ i kommertsiia.
Knizhnaia lavka A. F. Smirdina, eds. Viktor Shklovsky and Boris Eikhenbaum (Moscow: Agraf,
2001), hereafter Grits, Trenin, Nikitin; this very important Opoyaz book is discussed in chapter
three).
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literary scholars already knew [. . .] But that human judgment and unsupervised statistical
analysis would agree on genre classification—this was a novelty that had emerged from the
test.”52 Self-evidence is thus quantitatively reappraised and quantity, qualitatively
reconsidered—all this in the attempt to make literary scholarship more rigorous.
Nevertheless, by translating to the language of numbers such relatively obvious
observations as mentioned above, Yarkho turns them into the bricks for the new theory that he is
building. He does not want to distinguish between that which is obvious and not: he aspires to a
complete picture of literary change from the seventeenth until the nineteenth century across
Europe. Yarkho shows how moments of rupture (between eighteenth-century Classicism and the
so-called wild Romanticism) were gradually prepared by a series of mutations in the history of
literature (e.g., the growing number of monologues in the plays of Prosper Jolyot de Crébillon or
the rising range in the tragedies of Voltaire, despite Voltaire’s conservative adherence to
monologues). Yarkho tracks how the genre of the tragedy evolved, by its different properties,
sometimes due to certain authors’ deliberate attempts to modernize it and sometimes not; the
study also shows that the evolution from Classicism to Romanticism was relentless and yet had
moments of ebbing away. Here, at the end of his study, a revelation dawns on Yarkho: he
mentions the universal law of waves, typical not only of the literary system but also of all
others.53 This is exactly the problem that DR is tackling today, when turning to such concepts as
Fernand Braudel’s longue durée in the attempt to see literary history as a continuous process54 or
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Pamphlet 1, 5.
Yarkho, Metodologiia, 346.
54
Cf. Andrew Goldstone and Ted Underwood, “The Quiet Transformations of Literary Studies:
What Thirteen Thousand Scholars Could Tell Us,” New Literary History, vol. 45, no. 3 (2014):
27. Cf. Ted Underwood and Jordan Sellers, “The Longue Durée of Literary Prestige,” Modern
Language Quarterly, vol. 77, no. 3 (2016). Cf. Moretti, Graphs, 4, 13, 14, 24 and Moretti, DR,
18–19, 30, 85–87.
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the Kondratiev Waves.55
Next, it is necessary to consider the methodological underpinnings of Yarkho’s
mathematization of literary scholarship. Yarkho is led by the belief, as Gumilev put it, that “the
clever number conveys all the hues of meaning.”56 He calls the number “the most objective
category of thought” since “mathematical proof has the greatest universality.”57 Mathematical
evidence is indeed scattered all over Metodologiia; Yarkho is no less of a quantitative formalist
than the leading Distant Readers and more than some, including Moretti—suffice it to compare
their use of mathematics. Of course, living in the pre-digital age, Yarkho was doomed to his
Herculean statistical labor, but it also gave him the advantage of thinking everything through ab
ovo usque ad mala, whereas average Digital Humanists may get excessively dependent on readyfor-service programs.
Yarkho did not have many allies in his endeavor.58 It would be perhaps incorrect to count
55

Cf. Moretti, Graphs, 13.
Nikolay Gumilev, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v desiati tomakh. Tom chetvertyi.
Stikhotvoreniia. Poemy (1918-1921) (Moscow: Voskresen’e, 2001), 67.
57
Yarkho, Metodologiia, 7.
58
A question remains whether during Yarkho’s lifetime there was a scholarly
project in any way similar to his in the West. There is at least one text that comes to mind:
Joseph Schillinger’s 1943 The Mathematical Basis of the Arts. Interestingly, Schillinger was
born in the Russian Empire as Iosif Moiseevich Schillinger (on September 1, 1895, in Kharkov),
only three and a half years earlier than Yarkho, and died less than a year after him, only not in
the USSR but in New York.
For some years, before emigrating to the United States, Schillinger had been a part of the
artistic and scholarly world of post-revolutionary Russia. Below are excerpts, telling about it,
from Lisa Kaye Muth’s paper “The Schillinger System Mathematics, or Music?” (accessed
March 12, 2020, https://edoc.pub/schillinger-pdf-free.html):
56

Joseph Schillinger began to compose at the age of ten, when he commenced study
of the piano and organ.
Joseph also became interested in other artforms while growing up. Throughout his
life he studied mathematics, acoustics, physics, Slavonic mythology, Russian literature
and its history, dance, and many graphic arts, including architecture and design. In
addition to creating visual artworks and composing music, Schillinger wrote some poetry
when in his late teens. [. . .]
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in even Andrei Bely, who with his mathematically-supported study of rhythm in verse pioneered
the Russian method (as James Bailey called it), i.e., computational literary scholarship.59 The
reason for it is that Bely was against a nomenclature-based study of literature, while Yarkho
believed it was the point of mathematization: statistically to determine data, marshal them in, and
derive the patterns of literary development therefrom. Yarkho went as far as to call Bely a “an
extreme representative” of “‘inexact’ literary scholarship.”60 Yarkho saw more of an ally in the
Formalist Boris Tomashevsky, who also studied verse quantitatively (he ended up writing a

Joseph went to the St. Petersburg Imperial Conservatory in 1914, where he
remained until 1918. In 1918, at the age of twenty-three, he became a full-time teacher.
He was appointed to head the music department of the Board of Education of the
Ukraine, a position he held until 1922.
During the next six years, Schillinger held various positions as a musical authority
within the Soviet Union. [. . .]
Schillinger’s music was very successful in Russia. His Symphonic Rhapsody:
“October” was selected as the best work to emerge in the first ten years of the Soviet
Union. Soon after, the Soviet government reversed its position, revoking Schillinger’s
awards, stating his music was not “Proletarian” enough. [. . .]
The setback did not stop Schillinger. He organized and directed the first jazz
orchestra in the Soviet Union. His ensemble was interesting to say the least, combining
elements of popular and classical music. To create a classical sense, Schillinger utilized
three violins and an oboe in his ensemble. This group played many “popular” songs of the
1920’s, including music by several famous Americans who eventually became
Schillinger students.
During this time period, Joseph was the vice president of the Leningrad branch of
the International Society for Contemporary Music. It was while he served in this capacity
that he was chosen to entertain a party of American ambassadors to Russia, a group
which included John Dewey. Dewey was fascinated by the works of Schillinger, and
subsequently in 1928, Joseph was invited to the United States to lecture on his work. This
was the means for Joseph to escape the rigidities of the Soviet Union. (Muth 2–3)
59
Andrei Bely was favored by Urania as his father, Nikolai Bugaev, a reputed mathematician
and philosopher. Bely initiated quantitative experimentation as early as in the first decade of the
twentieth century. Cf. Andrei Bely, Simvolizm (Moscow: Musaget, 1910) [Republ. München,
Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1969] for “Printsipy formy v estetike” (originally in 1906), “Lirika i
eksperiment” (originally in 1909), and “Opyt kharakteristiki russkogo chetyrekhstopnogo iamba”
(originally in 1909). Among those twentieth-century researchers who continued the tradition
established by Andrei Bely are Mikhail Gasparov, Kirill Taranovsky, mathematician Andrey
Kolmogorov, and some others. To read more about it, cf. Uspensky.
60
Yarkho, Metodologiia, 31.
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textbook of poetics used to the present day); nevertheless, neither Tomashevsky’s nor any other
Russian Formalist’s project is commensurate with Yarkho’s in terms of quantification.
Yarkho’s use of numerical evidence reflected an aspiration to a science of literature
(Gauss’s definition of mathematics as the queen of sciences comes to mind). At first blush, this
aspiration was characteristic of RF in general. Thus, the Formalists of Shklovsky’s group
declared: “The Society for the Study of the Theory of Poetic Language [. . .] has made it its aim
to elaborate the problems of literary theory and a variety of linguistic disciplines as these are
essential for creating scientific poetics.”61 The problem with this, however, is that the Russian
word nauka covers both “science” and “scholarship,” which may either encourage people in the
humanities to emulate exact and natural sciences or, vice versa, make them feel exempt from the
implications one feels when writing about science in English. The latter is true of Opoyaz
Formalism (below, it is explained why). As for the Moscow Linguistic Circle, its members
(including Roman Jakobson, its first president) leaned to linguistics as a model for a more
rigorous literary scholarship,62 not to mention phenomenology-oriented Gustav Shpet.63 In this
regard, Yarkho is closer to Distant Readers, who try to make literature more scientific in the
modern English sense of the word (cf. Merriman’s discussion of Moretti’s and Jockers’s books
in the context of social sciences and data science).64
“Izuchenie teorii poeticheskogo iazyka,” Zhizn’ iskusstva, October 21, 1919. Hereafter
Izuchenie.
62
The status of linguistics had risen as a result of the shift in all the disciplines—cf. Boris
Gasparov, Beyond Pure Reason: Ferdinand de Saussure’s Philosophy of Language and Its Early
Romantic Antecedents (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), chapter 3.
63
Yarkho had a heated debate with their leader, Gustav Shpet, about the boundaries of scientific
literary scholarship. Cf. Cinzia Cadamagnani, “Polemika mezhdu B. I. Yarkho i G. G. Shpetom o
granitsakh nauchnogo literaturovedeniia v stenakh Gosudarstvennoi Akademii
khudozhestvennykh nauk,” Russkaia filologiia, vol. 24 (2013).
64
Ben Merriman, “A Science of Literature,” review The Bourgeois: Between History and
Literature, by Franco Moretti, Macroanalysis: Digital Methods, by Matthew L. Jockers, and
Literary History and Text Analysis with R for Students of Literature, by Matthew L. Jockers,
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The most striking difference is between Yarkho and the Formalists of Shklovsky’s,
Opoyaz, camp. After an explication of it here with regard to mathematization, it will be revisited
the last section of the chapter, devoted to literary development. Even though the Opoyazians
shared Yarkho’s interest in patterns, they had no faith in the applicability of mathematics to
literature. One may find some semblance of mathematization in Shklovsky’s or Eikhenbaum’s
works, such as randomly used algebraic signs.65 However, one should not be deluded by these
instances, which are merely single illustrations and not a technique of analysis. Neither should
one associate the mathematization at issue with a certain “geometricity” typical of Opoyaz texts,
i.e., thinking of literature as a construction, through geometrical images—as when Shklovsky
writes that the inn where the characters of the first volume of Don Quixote meet and where all
recognitions happen is “a geometrical place where the points of the separate lines of the novel
intersect.”66 Abundant and easily imaginable, somewhat reminiscent of Moretti’s maps (which
show how the nature of the text is reflected in the spatial organization of the narrative space, e.g.,
circular geography in English nineteenth-century village stories), such examples only prove that
Shklovsky, like any formalist, saw literature in structures.67 What matters is that nothing in
Boston Review, August 3, 2015, accessed March 12, 2020, http://bostonreview.net/booksideas/ben-merriman-moretti-jockers-digital-humanities.
65
For Shklovsky’s formulaic transcription of the plot of a fairy tale and for Eikhenbaum’s
formulaic transcription of the “constructive scheme” of Lenin’s article, cf. 2.2.
66
Shklovsky, OTP 1929, 108.
67
“Geometry” of meaning is so important to the Russian Formalists and Distant Readers
because, with it, it seems possible to bracket off, at least to some degree, the individual factor in
the study of literature and see the system behind it. Similarly, we disregard individual variations
in how a language is used to deduce the system of this language as such. Thus, “geometry”
allows DR and RF to dispense with the interpretation of single works. Instead, various instances
of change are studied—especially historical development, for it is no secret that the status of the
same artistic element hinges on a given epoch (e.g., rhyme in the medieval poetry of the French
troubadours, rhyme in nineteenth-century Russian poetry, and rhyme (largely displaced) in
today’s American poetry). Yet—as this dissertation shows—the burden of interpretation awaits
Distant Readers and the Formalists at the next level. For if they sacrifice the interpretation of
single works for the sake of the study of change, change as such needs to be interpreted,
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Opoyaz Formalism is broached or solved by means of quantification, even in the data-equipped
studies of Shklovsky, Eikhenbaum, and their students devoted to the literary market (cf. chapter
3).
Instead, there is a principled rejection of mathematization on the part of the Opoyaz
Formalists. Thus, Tynianov maintains that literary theory should not vie with mathematics,
whose object of study is, by contrast, permanent:
The theory of verbal art persistently vies with mathematics in highly dense and
self-assured static definitions, forgetting that mathematics is based on definitions
whereas in the theory of literature, not only are definitions not a basis but,
conversely, an ever-altered consequence of the evolving literary fact [i.e., the
system of literature].68
In other words, literary development, albeit a manifestation of the literary system, is so unstable
(due to the ever-shifting boundaries of that which people consider literature) that Yarkho’s kind
of systematization, according to Tynianov, would be blind to this specificity of literature.
Tynianov asserts that literary scholarship cannot be based on clear-cut definitions (this echoes
Bely’s aforementioned rejection of nomenclature)69; Yarkho, on the contrary, divided literature
into units (narrative, stylistic, phonic) and tightly defined them.
An apt example illustrating the difference between Yarkho and Tynianov is the problem
especially change across time. New questions arise. For example, where is literature headed, and
is it headed anywhere? Why and how do genres alternate, and what is a genre after all? How
accurate is our understanding of literature’s development in the past, and can we prognosticate
its development in the future? To what extent is this future development autonomous, and to
what extent does it hinge on external factors? Finally, what texts are to be considered as literary,
for it has happened more than once in history that some texts suddenly acquired an aesthetic
significance (e.g., letters) and then lost it again? The idea of the “geometry” of meaning is
development in Part II of this dissertation.
68
Tynianov, PILK, 255.
69
For a comparison of Andrei Bely with Opoyaz Formalism, cf. 5.4; also cf. Vasily Lvov [Basil
Lvoff], “Andrei Bely i Boris Eikhenbaum: Po linii zhurnal’noi nauki,” Mediaalmanakh, vol. 59,
no. 6 (2013); hereafter Lvoff, Andrei Bely i Boris Eikhenbaum. N.B. My understanding of RF
has evolved since then, and I admit to having exaggerated in that article the mathematical trend
in Opoyaz Formalism. I endeavored to rectify my exaggerations in this dissertation.
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of vers libre. Yarkho does not consider it verse, for repetitions (which, as he claims, are crucial
to poetry) are below fifty per cent in free verse70; by the same token, “the prose of Bely, made of
amphibrachs, is no longer prose but verse.”71 Tynianov’s Problema stikhotvornogo iazyka (The
Problem of Verse Language) insists on the direct opposite. Vers libre is verse because in it
“meter as a system is replaced by meter as a dynamic principle; in effect, an orientation to meter
is the equivalent of meter,” for “the unresolved orientation is also a dynamizing moment.”72 By
going against the grain of its constructive principle, verse or prose only accentuates it; in prose
especially, people feel it acutely, so that “no one will mistake Bely’s prose for verse.”73
It has to be said, in anticipation of the third part of this chapter, that the disagreement
between Yarkho and the Opoyazians had to do with a difference in how they understood
synchronic and diachronic movement in literature. The Opoyazians’ interpretation of such
movement is based on the principle of duration, which they, otherwise unwilling to borrow
anything from anyone, adopted from Henri Bergson.74 This is easy to see in the following
70

Yarkho, Metodologiia, 886.
Ibid.
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Yuri Tynianov, Problema stikhotvornogo iazyka (Leningrad: Academia, 1924; hereafter
Tynianov, Problema), 30.
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Ibid., 38.
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For a discussion of overlaps between Bergson’s ideas and Opoyaz Formalism, cf. James M.
Curtis, “Bergson and Russian Formalism,” Comparative Literature, vol. 28, no. 2 (1976),
hereafter Curtis, Bergson; cf. Mikhail Iampolski, “‘Smyslovaia veshch’ v kinoteorii Opoiaza,” in
Marietta Chudakova, ed., Tynianovskii sbornik. Tret’i Tynianovskie chteniia (Riga: Zinatne,
1988; hereafter Tynianovskii sbornik. Tret’i); cf. Jan Levchenko, “Poslevkusie formalizma:
Proliferatsiia teorii v tekstakh Viktora Shklovskogo 1930-kh godov,” Novoe literaturnoe
obozrenie, vol. 128, no. 4 (2014), hereafter Levchenko, Poslevkusie; cf. Anastasiya Osipova,
“Building Life: The Rhetoric of Vitality in Soviet Literature and Literary Theory in the 1920s
and 1930s” (PhD diss., New York University, 2017). It should also be added that the
Opoyazians’ reception of Bergson may very well have been prepared by Tolstoy, whose
influence on them is hard to overestimate, viz., by Book XI in War in Peace, in which, much like
in Bergson, the continuous and incessant motion of life is opposed to the artificial, arbitrary, and
mechanical attempts to subdivide and categorize it, thereby simplifying and failing at the task of
comprehending it. And yet it should be added that, pointing at a possible solution, Tolstoy gives
an example from calculus.
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excerpt from Shklovsky’s book Literatura i kinematograf (Literature and Cinema). First,
Shklovsky summarizes Bergson: “Human motion is a continuous magnitude.”75 Then, as Jan
Levchenko observes, he “declare[s] duration”—this “universal attribute of matter and thought”—
to be “the attribute of art.”76 Eventually, Shklovsky denies—in relation to the study of verse at
that—the approach analogous to Yarkho’s or Mikhail Gasparov’s for that matter:
The world of art, the world of continuity, the world of the continuous
word—a line of verse cannot be split up into single stresses; it has no stress points
but only a place of fracture in the lines of force.
The traditional theory of verse is a violation of discontinuity against
continuity.77
Likewise, Bergson wrote that traditional “analysis multiplies without end the number of its
points of view in order to complete its always incomplete representation” and that this sort of
analysis is “[t]he ordinary function of positive science.”78 Elsewhere, it is also by attacking such
a positivist as Herbert Spencer that Shklovsky, guided by the logic of defamiliarization, says that
rhythm in poetry, albeit detectable in its specific manifestations, can never be studied as such,
for, as an artistic device, it is fundamentally a “violation” of habitual speech and “cannot be
foreseen.”79
From the Opoyaz standpoint, what Yarkho did must have indeed looked very close to
positive science.80 Even if so, one should be wary of dismissing him on these grounds. As
Viktor Shklovsky, Literatura i kinematograf (Berlin: Russkoe Universal’noe Izdatel’stvo,
1923; hereafter Shklovsky, Literatura i kinematograf), 24.
76
Jan Levchenko, Drugaia nauka: Russkie formalisty v poiskakh biografii (Moscow: Vysshaia
shkola ekonomiki, 2012; hereafter Levchenko, Drugaia nauka), 51.
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Shklovsky, Literatura i kinematograf, 24, emphasis mine.
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Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T. E. Hulme (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1999), 24.
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Shklovsky, OTP 1929, 23. Shklovsky’s objection to Spencer is also discussed in 6.7.
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It should be noted, however, that Galin Tihanov (“Marxism and Formalism Revisited. Notes
on the 1927 Leningrad Dispute,” Literary Research / Recherche Littéraire, vol. 19, nos. 37–38
(2002), hereafter Tihanov, Marxism and Formalism) also ascribed positivistic traits to the
Opoyaz Formalists; having provisionally accepted this claim, I attempted a dialectical refutation
75

28

Marina Akimova and Maksim Shapir justly wrote in the preface to Yarkho’s Metodologiia, “are
we the ones to overcome the conscientious delusions of the positivist?”81 Moreover, if a great
fault of positivism was its pedantic procrastination of theoretical generalizations until there are
enough data (and that can never be the case, especially in the pre-digital world), then Yarkho—
given the near-cosmic scope of his theory—has every right to plead not guilty. In fact, he and the
Opoyazians can hardly end up in the same court: their systems vary drastically, as do civil and
common law, and this obstructs any verdict. The rest of the chapter will elucidate this by
juxtaposing Yarkho and the Opoyazians so as to determine their positions within RF and vis-àvis DR.

1.3. Biology as a Model: Pro et Contra
Whereas the Opoyaz understanding of the literary system has a potentially vitalist aspect
to it (because of Bergson’s influence), Yarkho sees literature as a living organism in the sense of
standard biology, which, as we shall see, is an attractive prospect to many Distant Readers. It is
noteworthy that making an argument for quantitative literary scholarship, Yarkho uses the
example of chemistry: “By making quantitative records and microanalysis fundamental to this
research, I merely suggest the same be done for literary scholarship as Lavoisier did for
chemistry one and a half centuries ago.”82 This alone shows that mathematics for Yarkho is a
method but not a model; his model are natural sciences. The very title The Methodology of Exact
Literary Scholarship implies not the exactitude of mathematics (too abstract on its own) but that
of biology. Yarkho writes that the book which inspired him was Einfürung in die exakte

thereof in 2.2.
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Qtd. in Yarkho, Metodologiia, v.
82
Ibid., 7.
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Erblichkeitslehre (An Introduction to Exact Heredity) by Wilhelm Johannsen, one of the
founding fathers of genetics.83 Yarkho declares biology the closest discipline to literary
scholarship, which is why he talks about the evolution of literature as a biologist talks about the
natural one. This does set him apart from all other representatives of RF.
Meanwhile, there are scholars who believe that biology was also at the heart of Opoyaz
concept of literary evolution. This is what Rad Borislavov claims in his very timely dissertation:
“Shklovskii was the first among the Russian formalists to speak of literary history in terms of
biological evolution and during the 1920s flirted with a biological view of genre in which sudden
and random formal changes in art were seen as akin to Darwinian chance variations and genetic
mutations.”84 The word “flirted” seems aptly chosen, and that perhaps is the very reason why the
Darwinian overtones of Shklovsky’s declarations should not be exaggerated. The style of the
Opoyaz Formalists—Shklovsky especially—is highly metaphorical, ironic, and open to sudden
associations. Borislavov decides to write about the meaning of mutation in Shklovsky based on
the following phrase, among others: “But literature, too, is almost accidental. The writer fixes a
mutation.”85 However, it is enough to look at the context of this very short sentence to see that
ars amatoria, for instance, could also lay a claim to the pedestal occupied by biology in
Borislavov’s account: “Perhaps, love does not exist. It is not a thing but a landscape that consists
of a number of objects, which are disjointed but seen together. / But literature, too, is almost
accidental. The writer fixes a mutation. / That is how we fix love.”86 Borislavov seems to have
heard in Opoyaz Formalism an overtone of the note which, in effect, is Yarkho’s (cf. 4.3).
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What is a metaphor for an Opoyazian, is a carefully chosen analogy for Yarkho; if he
mentions mutation, it will find its place in the edifice of his Metodologiia, which indeed has a
section on “successive evolution and mutation.”87 Moreover, not only does Yarkho say that
mutation is a means of evolution in literature—he also shows how mutation can be identified
empirically: one should take a series of prima facie similar stories, and if the number of
alterations in the story created later is more than fifty per cent, it is an instance of mutation, not
successive change.88 Needless to say, Yarkho also offers ways to measure this change. And
though his criteria may be disputed, his treatment of the problem allows one to turn from abstract
87

Yarkho, Metodologiia, 17.
Among other things, such formalism is easier to combine with the unwillingness of some
leading DH scholars to fall into the trap of rigid categories, which we no longer need and which
impose on us the old habits of thinking in the new situation of Big Data and fast computers
processing them. Thus, Lev Manovich and Jeremy Douglass (Lev Manovich and Jeremy
Douglass, “Visualizing Temporal Patterns in Visual Media,” Manovich.net, 2009, accessed
March 12, 2020, http://manovich.net/index.php/projects/article-2009) critique the abidance of the
old frames of thought when
88

[b]ooks and museums devoted to art, design, media, and other cultural areas continue to
arrange their subjects into small numbers of discrete categories - periods, artistic schools,
-isms, cultural movements. The chapters in a book or the rooms of a museums act as
material dividers between these categories,” so that “a continuously evolving cultural
‘organism’ is sliced and segmented into a set of artificial boxes. ([1])
Manovich and Douglass add that
since the emergence of modern institutions of cultural storage and cultural knowledge
production in the nineteen century (i.e., public museums and humanities disciplines
housed in universities) we have been forcing the continuity of culture into strictly discrete
categories in order to theorize, preserve and exhibit it. (ibid.)
Hence the rhetorical question: “If we are currently fascinated with the ideas of flow, evolution,
complexity, heterogeneity, and cultural hybridity, why our presentations of cultural data do not
reflect these ideas?” (ibid.) Also cf. Lev Manovich, “Can We Think Without Categories?”
Digital Culture & Society, vol. 4, no. 1 (2018).
This is not to say that Yarkho reasoned along these lines, but such was the counterflow
(vstrechnoe techenie) of his theory, as Veselovsky called it, i.e., its potential compatibility with
twenty-first century trends (Alexander Veselovsky, Izbrannoe. Istoricheskaia poetika (Moscow:
ROSSPEN, 2006; hereafter Veselovsky, Istoricheskaia), 541).
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metaphors to “talking specifics.”
Since Yarkho’s book is a methodology, his choice of the science of living things as a
model for literary scholarship is duly substantiated.89 As if echoing Moretti’s present-day
attempts to wed Darwinism and literary theory (Moretti has tried to apply Darwin’s divergence
principle to the study of genre—cf. 4.3), Yarkho says: “One of the books that ought to be written
in the near future [. . .] is, in my opinion, On the Origin of Literary Species.”90 “Were I to stay
alive,” adds Yarkho—his health undermined by then, among other things due to the three years
he spent in a Siberian penal settlement—“I would set to writing this work right away, as soon as I
have finished writing this methodology.”91
Nevertheless, he did make the first step towards writing such a book. There is so much in
Yarkho’s The Methodology taken from biology that one is even tempted to mistake him for a
biological literalist when confronted with a statement like this: “For convenience, it can be said
that the child [i.e., the literary work] has been ‘born’ (i.e., the process of genesis (geneticheskii
protsess) came to an end) when it has come out of the mother’s womb.”92 One is likely to
entertain further the illusion of Yarkho’s biological literalism because of the biological
terminology in Metodologiia, such as when we read about literary “heredity,” “the digestion of
nutriment,” viz., external sources) in literature, or “the crossbreeding” of sources.93 It is true that
literature for Yarkho is like a living organism, akin to those studied by biology. Moreover, since
89

Herein, the Opoyaz Formalists again stand in stark contrast to Yarkho. They want to remain
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“the human being is the product of nature,” as Yarkho puts it, “his work cannot be withdrawn
from the common flow of life,” which is why literary scholarship, “as a science of life,” “ought
to be conjoined with the biological disciplines.”94 Nevertheless, it does not make Yarkho a
biological literalist, as argued below.
In his attempt to marry literary scholarship and biology, Yarkho seeks for their common
denominator, the fundamentals they share. The latter, three in number, emanate “from the
common flow of life,” of which literature and other living organisms are manifestations:
“multiplicity, continuity, and changeability.”95 Yarkho, as he is wont to do, illustrates his words
with a diagram—yet another trait that brings him closer to “digital criticism,” to which
“diagrams [. . .] are central”96:

(Yarkho, Metodologiia, 23)

This diagram shows the limit beyond which our intellect can never go, unable to trace this
world’s countless phenomena to one definite origin.97 The single dot—the absolute—is
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unattainable; instead, we are given many rays, illustrating the indestructible and “rationally
unorganizable multiplicity” of life as we perceive it.98
However, we cannot compartmentalize this multiplicity either, due to the principle of
continuity, owing to which “our mind is powerless to discriminate between adjacent
phenomena.”99 Somewhat jokingly, Yarkho exemplifies this idea—the impossibility to marshal
multiplicity once and for all—by mentioning the whale: the whale is a mammal, of course, but
ordinary people have a good reason for calling it a fish “based on a great many of its exterior
attributes.”100 Continuity thus understood challenges us in our attempt to classify, which is the
modus operandi of DR (Yarkho tried to address this challenge—cf. the analysis of his paper on
Classicism and Romanticism above). Our definitions will never be definitive enough as “the
world will always reveal itself to us, again and again, from different angles”—which, Yarkho
concludes, results in infinity, both on the macro- and on the micro-level.101 This, in turn, brings
Yarkho to the third universal law of life: “perpetual changeability,” which is a “a type of
infinity,” “especially “changeability in time.”102
For all these reasons, Yarkho does not insist on the absolute authority of science, and this
probably distinguishes him from many nineteenth-century positivists. He concedes that
“scientific truth is the kind of proposition that cannot be rebutted [only] at present.”103 This is
already the contemporary understanding of science; such science may be less self-assured than
sweeping philosophical interpretations, but unlike them it is falsifiable (Karl Popper’s criterion
of science).
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It is truly remarkable that Yarkho tackled, as early as in the 1930s, those issues that some
Distant Readers are only preparing to address. Thus, William Benzon (a staunch proponent of
applying evolutionary theory to the kind of data Matthew Jockers obtained in his Macroanalysis)
argues that the next step should be the creation of “an explicit model in which the cultural
correlates to genes, phenotypes, and species,” “for those are the central (theoretical) actors in
biological evolution.”104 Meanwhile, Yarkho did write about the literary analogues (or rather
homologues, as he preferred to call them) of genotype and phenotype, at the time when
Johannsen’s discovery was relatively recent. Genotype in literature, according to Yarkho, is the
material uniquely actualized in a given story, and such a story is the “phenotype.” If we have two
stories with similar motifs, these motifs will be genotypes and the stories, phenotypes.105
The following example should illustrate it. Yarkho mentions Russian eighteenth-century
Skazanie o dreve zlatom (The Fable of the Golden Tree). The fable treats of the Byzantine “czar”
Levtasar, a corrupt epicurean, who, after numerous crimes, receives a prophecy: he sees hands
writing something on the wall, which scene Daniel the prophet interprets as the omen of
Levtasar’s imminent death. Yarkho agrees with other scholars, saying that Khronograf (The
Russian Chronograph, a medieval collection of chronicles with an account of Byzantine history
among them) inspired Skazanie o dreve zlatom. In Khronograf, there is an image of the emperor
Theophilos, whose son Michael, called the new Balthasar (hence the distortion “Levtasar”), is a
drunkard and a squanderer of the golden tree. Yarkho dwells on many other elements of
Levtasar’s story, but the facts mentioned now are enough to show that various narrative elements
(homologous to a genotype) were arranged into a unique story (homologous to a phenotype).
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The Fable of the Golden Tree is also one of the examples Yarkho adduces to illustrate
literary crossbreeding, whereby literature evolves. This is not the only means of literary change
from one work to another, though. Yarkho mentions others, which are not necessarily biological:
“the dissolution of tradition,” 106 “the agglutination of sources,”107 and “hyperbolism,”108 when
an imitator, for example, takes some features of the original author’s work and exploits them—
fan fiction is a good example. Finally, Yarkho mentions “pushing off”109 (ottalkivanie) a certain
tradition; this particular ratio of change came to the fore in Opoyaz Formalism.110 However,
crossbreeding is of special interest here, given our discussion of biology as a model for Yarkho.
As always, Yarkho gives examples from different levels of literature—not only from the
field of poetics (in his terminology, poetics has to do with images and motifs).111 He shows how
crossbreeding affects phonics; thus, he mentions crossbreeding in Mikhail Lermontov’s ballads
as a result of the poet’s attempt to adapt them to German versification. Yarkho also touches on
stylistics and speaks about the hybridization of Russian and foreign speech producing a peculiar
style.
Yet Yarkho does not follow biology blindly. When necessary, he points out differences
between the literary organism and biological ones. For example, a biological organism is born as
a whole, but the work of literature may be born in parts. Another example Yarkho adduces is that
of death. Though he speaks about “the process of dying” in relation to some literary trends, he

106

Yarkho, Metodologiia, 258.
Ibid., 265.
108
Ibid., 266.
109
Ibid.
110
Cf., e.g., “Literatura vne ‘siuzheta,’” in Shklovsky, OTP 1929.
111
When Yarkho calls poetics a separate area of literary scholarship, he means not the study of
verse (as the term is used in English), nor literary theory as such (as the Opoyaz Formalists
referred to poetics). For Yarkho, poetics in this case is “a science of the aesthetic employment of
images” (Yarkho, Metodologiia, 77).
107

36

also says that in literature death is “of a different order” than in biology, for “the literary work
and a particular form, theoretically speaking, live forever,” at least as long as there are “people
able to understand the language in which [the work] was written.”112 These remarks are not made
in passing. There is even a small section in Metodologiia devoted to differences between literary
scholarship and natural science, and this shows that Yarkho cared for literature’s specificity, akin
to his counterparts from RF and in distinction from nineteenth-century positivists.113 Drawing
parallels between literature and nature, Yarkho was mindful of the peril of reductionism. That is
why he referred not to analogies but to homologies in literature and nature, in the biological
sense, i.e., as something having the same origin (like fins and paws) but not being the same thing
(Darwin’s divergence comes to mind).
Because of Yarkho’s acknowledgment of the degree beyond which literature cannot be
reduced to nature, he is also very different from today’s adaptationist critics (the ones who made
crucial to their study of literature adaptation in the Darwinian sense of the term). In fact, they
probably would not like to be associated with Yarkho’s type of scholarship either. Joseph
Carroll, a spokesman of this scholarly trend, appears to be against any non-literal, nonDarwinian, application of the theory of evolution to literature.114 Each element of the literary
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work is to be interpreted from the standpoint of evolutionary anthropology. Suffice it to consider
the adaptationists’ attempt to explain the evolutionary function of the narrative. Carroll mentions
several such conjectures in a survey of adaptationist scholarship. According to adaptationists
Michelle Sugiyama and Steven Pinker, for example, the meaning of the narrative for adaption is
that it passes on certain models of behavior conducive to the survival of our species. Carroll does
not dispute this explanation, though he says that it fails to single out “any adaptive function that
is specific to art or literature proper.”115 Another adaptationist scholar, Geoffrey Miller, believes
that the narrative, along with other manifestations of mental work, pursues the goal of sexual
selection; unsurprisingly, Carroll criticizes this rather vulgar surmise as farfetched. Yet the
example shows the general direction of adaptationist scholarship: a vicarious study of nature at
the expense of literature.
Even if such adaptationist conjectures were true, they still would not prove that the
biological processes that engendered art also determine it. And while the scholarly opponents of
adaptationists accuse them of being “monocausal” in positing “literature [as] the product of
authors, whose identities are completely determined by biology,” Yarkho probably would not
even need to dispute it.116 Instead, he might refer to the distinction he made between the
evolution of the work and that which he called its “genesis,” i.e., its origin. Simply put, “the
work’s genesis goes on until the moment when the work has been written down or read
aloud to somebody, i.e., has potentially become liable to the other party’s alteration”; thereafter,
the work has entered the system of literary evolution.117 The following diagram from
Metodologiia illustrates Yarkho’s sophisticated understanding of the matter at hand; the diagram
115
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has to do with the relationship between the literary work and the factors exterior to it:

Illustrated here (Yarkho, Metodologiia, 250) is “the digestion of nutriment” (ibid., 249), after
which the literary work emerges.
The distinction between genesis and evolution is as fundamental in Opoyaz Formalism.
Like Yarkho, the Opoyazians even used the terms “genesis” and “evolution” in their studies.118
Like Yarkho, they realized the program of RF of “search[ing] for internal regularities in literary
works, such as form characteristics and their effects, and not for external laws that could clarify
the creation of the works.”119
The Formalists’ distinction of evolution from genesis also helps to preempt another naïve
objection, coming from the end of the spectrum opposite to where adaptationism lies. The
objection is that literature is artificially created, hence cannot be considered as autonomously
evolving. Distant Readers, Benzon, to be exact, counter this argument similarly to the
Formalists:
Cultural artifacts [. . .] are deliberately designed and created by human agents and
thus are not the result of a blind evolutionary process. That is true. But whether or
not any of these artifacts are retained in a group’s repertoire is a matter beyond the
will and design of individual creators. The process of cultural selection is
independent from that of artifact creation.120
E.g., cf. “Literaturnyi byt,” in Eikhenbaum, Moi vremennik.
Rens Bod, A New History of the Humanities: The Search for Principles and Patterns from
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120
William L. Benzon, “Reading Macroanalysis: Notes on the Evolution of Nineteenth Century
Anglo-American Literary Culture,” SSRN, September 3, 2014, accessed March 12, 2020,
118
119

39

The understanding present in this excerpt has been popularized by and large thanks to the
breakthrough of RF in literary scholarship. By fencing off literature, the Russian Formalists
adhered to what can be called alienation, in the most general, non-Marxian, sense: literature is a
system whose components function first and foremost according to its own rules, having been
alienated from those extra-literary systems which begot them (e.g., some historic event or a
biological urge causing someone to write something—a fact of literary genesis but not
evolution).

1.4. Literary Development: An Extension of Nature vs. the Self-Governing Logic of the
System
This last section of the chapter returns to the juxtaposition of Yarkho with the
Opoyazians, for it is here that RF forks, thereby presenting a choice to Distant Readers (each of
them individually, of course). How DR will carry on with its analysis of literary evolution, only
time will tell; perhaps, it will offer a third way to these two approaches, but not taking any will
likely lead DR to the most stereotypical kind of positivism: multiplying data but not our
understanding of what they speak, multiplying answers without questions.
At the beginning of this chapter, it has already been said why the problem of literary
change is key to distant reading in the broadest sense of the word, including both DR as a
contemporary theoretical movement and RF. It is with regard to this problem that a comparison
of Yarkho and the Opoyazians is especially important. Both speak about literary evolution in
terms of its dynamism, yet with different assumptions. Though Yarkho often employs the term

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2491205, 96, emphasis mine.
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simply as a synonym for changeability and development,121 he often means it biologically, such
as when he writes about the attempt to “delve deeper into the organic dynamism of literature.”122
Elsewhere, he says that “the notion of the organic dynamism of literature” necessitates “a
number of qualitative, quantitative, and ordinal concepts,” which are “very close to the current
understanding of the nature of the organic world.”123 We find another instance of the term
“dynamism” understood biologically when Yarkho singles out the three levels of literary
scholarship: phonics, stylistics, and poetics. He writes that “[t]hese three areas [. . .] also differ
dynamically (biologically)”); “images wane sooner than stylistic figures, and the latter, sooner
than phonic forms.”124 What he means by waning is the loss of “unusualness” by a literary form
and with it, “aestheticity” and the organic kind of “vitality” (not to be confused with vitalism).125
This last excerpt, in which unusualness is associated with aestheticity, is worth dwelling
on. At first glance, it is not far from the Opoyaz theory of art’s constant revival from the death of
automated perception thanks to defamiliarization.126 Speaking about it, the Opoyaz Formalists
use the term “dynamism” and its cognates all the time, also in their interpretation of literature as
a “dynamic speech construction” (dinamicheskaia rechevaia konstruktsiia).127 Yet the
Opoyazians do not talk about dynamism with reference to biology; neither do they dwell on the
biological possibilities of literary evolution as a metaphor—conversely, they discuss dynamism
as something inorganic, as it were. The following excerpt from Eikhenbaum’s book on
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Lermontov illustrates it:
The authentic Lermontov is the historical Lermontov. […] I do not in the slightest
mean Lermontov as an individual event in time […] Time and thereby the concept
of the past do not underlie historical knowledge. Time in history is a figment, a
convention playing an auxiliary role. We [the Formalists] study not movement in
time but movement as such—a dynamic process that there is no way to split up
and that never gets interrupted but, for this very reason, does not contain real time
and cannot be measured by time. Historical study opens up the events’ dynamic,
whose laws operate not only within the framework of an arbitrarily chosen epoch
but everywhere and always. In this respect, however paradoxical it sounds, history
is a science of the permanent, the immutable, the immovable though it has to do
with change, with movement. It can be a science only insofar as it manages to
transform real movement into a chart.128
Eikhenbaum’s opposition of dynamism to time is very unusual; Yarkho, for example, identifies
the two, as evidenced by his phrase “chronological (dynamic) analysis” of literature.129 Here
again, it is by resorting to Bergson that one can shed light on Eikhenbaum’s abstruse passage.
Bergson differentiated mechanical, i.e., calculable and divisible, time from time
understood as duration, by definition indivisible.130 It seems that in the passage on Lermontov
Eikhenbaum resorts to a Bergsonian proof by contradiction. For Bergson spoke about real time
as duration while it looks as though by real time Eikhenbaum means our everyday, mechanical,
notion thereof. Eikhenbaum’s stance can be understood better if we imagine time
chronologically—as a succession, a chain of countless individual (hence, divisible) facts. Yet
Eikhenbaum, just as the Opoyaz in general, is opposed to historicism with its linearity. As an
Opoyazian, he sees history as made of patterns (which rely on our recognition of facts as typical,
not individual), and those artists who belong to the same pattern are contemporaries as it were
(cf. 3.5 and 4.5). This is why Eikhenbaum writes in Moi vremennik about Stepan Shevyrev
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(1806-1864), Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910), Nikolay Shelgunov (1824-1891), Nikolay
Chernyshevsky (1828-1889), and none other than Viktor Shklovsky (1893-1984) as
contemporaries. The criterion which allows Eikhenbaum to consider them under the same
historical pattern is that they all, each at a certain period of his life, took the path of
deprofessionalization, of literary dilettantism—by making their writing a kind of a “hobby,”
which let them avoid the routine and conventions of the literature of their day and, consequently,
say a new word in it. “The line [of writers] is unexpected?” Eikhenbaum poses and immediately
answers. “Such are the laws of history and history of literature in particular.”131 It should be
added that Eikhenbaum compares these writers based on the similar stance they took at a certain
time, and since the same writer may change his or her ways, it is possible, according to
Eikhenbaum’s theory, to regroup these and other authors depending on the historical pattern at
issue.132
A question arises: if dynamism for Eikhenbaum and his counterparts does not mean
chronological movement (though Eikhenbaum obfuscates the matter by saying that dynamism is
movement as such), what, then, is dynamic in such patterns as the one mentioned above? The
answer is defamiliarization, namely, the novelty of these artists’ aesthetic status quo at the
background of other artists and their creations, no longer sensed as aesthetically dynamic.
One will object that the sense of novelty, as well as outdatedness, implies chronology, but
chronology tends to only one direction (that which is behind is old and that which is ahead is
new), whereas history, according to the Opoyaz Formalists, is not a string of beads but more like
131
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a checkered wool cloth. Each of its colors is like a pattern; the eye sees the (dis)appearance of
colors, but each color is always there by belonging to the same thread; one color does not come
after or before another—the colors are always there. Meanwhile, the checkered wool cloth’s
opposition of colors is what dynamizes and sets each of them in motion, atemporally so. The
following excerpt from Tynianov can clarify the matter. Tynianov describes how the work of art
is organized in keeping with a certain constructive principle:
The form of the literary work must be recognized as a dynamic
phenomenon.
Such dynamism manifests itself, first of all, in the notion of the
constructive principle. Not all factors of the word are equivalent; the dynamic
form is made not of their assembly or fusion (cf. the often-used notion of
“correspondence”), but by means of their interaction, hence the foregrounding of
one group of factors at the expense of the other. In so doing, the advanced factor
deforms the subordinate ones. 2) The sensation of form is always the sensation of
the passage (hence, change) in the interrelationship of the subjugating,
constructive, factor with the subjugated factors. It is not necessary at all to add a
temporal nuance to the notion of such passage, such “unfolding.” Passage,
dynamism, can be considered by itself, outside of time, as pure movement.133
The hierarchy of elements, the struggle between them within form, is what renders them
dynamic. Language, the material of literature, illustrates it. A structure in it can be “immovable”
like a pun or a metaphor, which one perceives as dynamic thanks to the semantic tension
between the two meanings of the same word in a pun (cf. 5.4) or the clash of the literal and
figurative meanings in a metaphor.134 What matters to the Opoyazians is the systemic
relationship of works in history, the systemic and not the chronological distance between the
elements; just as “the relationship of materials” in the literary work, that in literary history is “the
relationship of the zero dimension.”135 Tynianov’s concepts of “the archaeology of movement,”
arkheologiia dvizheniia (from “The Interlude”), and “dynamic archaeology,” dinamicheskaia
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arkheologiia (from The Problem of Verse Language); thus, geological levels represent history
not temporarily but rather spatially, “geometrically” even—as a chart. As a matter of fact, the
substitution of space for time is much more down to earth than temporalization; the latter can be
a distraction and an abstraction, time being “merely a speculative projection of real
transformations within a complexly organized heterogenous space.”136
All of this should have clarified Eikhenbaum’s description of history as a chart and the
Opoyaz vision of dynamism. This model, Kliger writes, is not “traditional, positivist, historicism
treating a phenomenon as some exterior object (Pushkin as he was ‘in real life’)”; neither is it
“hermeneutic historicism, incarnated in ‘the history of receptions’ (Pushkin as the Symbolists
needed him)”; the Opoyaz model of history is exactly “the ‘archeology of movement.’”137
The Opoyaz approach to history, the very idea of defamiliarization already emphasizes
the fact that literature exists by virtue of our perception, and it is the laws of the uniquely
mediated forms of this perception that the Opoyazians investigate. The medium has its own
systemic laws irreducible to nature just as a landscape painting is irreducible to the landscape. In
fact, the Opoyaz stance resembles Saussure’s definition of language as a synchronic system,
which definition—it is necessary to stress—was opposed to the Neogrammarians’ naturalistic
interpretation of language.138 The specific laws of language or literature, having been discovered,
Ilya Kliger, “Arkheologiia dvizheniia ili sistema system: O nesinkhronykh modeliakh istorii v
rabotakh formal’noi shkoly,” in S. N. Zenkin and E. P. Shumilova, eds., Russkaia
intellektual’naia revoliutsiia 1910–1930-kh godov (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie,
2016), 52. Hereafter Kliger, Arkheologiia.
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do not require the crutch of biology or any other discipline. The Opoyaz unwillingness to
approach literary evolution naturalistically can also be traced to Veselovsky, who, while trying to
create historical poetics, opposed the naturalism of Ludwig Jacobowski,139 who analyzed
literature from a Darwinian standpoint).
Unlike Yarkho, for whom biology is the foundation for understanding literary
development; unlike the Marxists, whose foundation are socioeconomic processes, the
Opoyazians rely on literary form as an ontologized logic, so to speak. The Opoyaz theory of
history qua systemic evolution, qua dynamic construction, is, in effect, an extrapolation derived
from the logic of the literary work as a construction, an objectification of this logic, nay, this
dialectic, to use the Hegelian word—the logic of literary organization reconsidered as objective
and self-governing.140 Unlike Hegel, however, the Opoyazians did not promote objective
idealism in literary scholarship (though some vestiges of it are discernible in Opoyaz theory—cf.
4.5). Unenthusiastic about Yarkho’s kind of empiricism, the Opoyazians did not start with
isolated perception either, hence their opposition to what they called psychologism in literary
studies (cf. 5.2). Instead, they started with the oshchutimost’ (sensibility, perceptibility) of the
thing, observing—both synchronically and diachronically—the logic of the interaction between
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the material components of the work or multiple works. In fact, the “thingness” of Opoyaz theory
anticipates such major doctrines as Marshall McLuhan’s media theory (cf. 6.6).
Enough has been said to display the difference between the two trends of RF with regard
to the key problem of literary development. The question to pose in conclusion is which of these
approaches in general and vis-à-vis DR in particular appears to us more promising today, if at all.
It seems as though Yarkho’s version of RF has more to do with DR, because of the proximity of
both their methodological assumptions and instruments. Placed in a larger context thanks to
Yarkho, RF should become more relevant to DR, whereas Opoyaz Formalism can finally be
acquitted of the false charges of positivism or interparadigmaticity.
The problem DR has had with Opoyaz Formalism thus far is its vision of literature being
self-contained. Thus, answering the question “why a form loses its ‘artistic usefulness’ and
disappears,”141 Moretti emphasizes the difference between himself and Shklovsky:
For Shklovsky, the reason is the purely inner dialectic of art, which begins
in creative estrangement, and ends in stale automatism. [. . .] This journey
“down the inevitable road from birth to death” can however also be
explained by focusing, not so much on the relationship between the
“young” and “old” versions of the same form, but rather on that between
the form and its historical context: a genre exhausts its potentialities—and
the time comes to give a competitor a chance—when its inner form is no
longer capable of representing the most significant aspects of
contemporary reality.142
It should be remembered that Moretti began as a Marxist; moreover, he does not have to fight the
battle of the Opoyaz Formalists, who vindicated literature as an autonomous system at the cost of
rejecting other approaches, including the socioeconomic or, as Marxists say, historical materialist
one. Moretti has no need to pay this price: literary theory has long been established, and the
fervent efforts to guard the borders of literature have been mostly displaced nowadays by an
141
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interdisciplinary ideal. It should, of course, be added that Moretti is talking about early Opoyaz
theory, for example, referring to Shklovsky’s Knight’s Move (Khod konia), which the author
himself called “not a very good book.”143 Besides, Moretti does not do justice to the alreadymentioned turn of the Opoyazians to the sociological aspect of literature. Moretti himself
admitted—during the Q & A session at the Russian Formalism and the Digital Humanities
conference at Stanford—that he was mainly familiar with early Opoyaz manifestoes, through
Tzvetan Todorov’s introduction at that. Be it as it may, given the tremendous contribution of
Opoyaz theory to contemporary literary scholarship and the fact that it addressed many of the
same problems as DR, while deliberately foregoing mathematization and “biologization”—
because of all this, Opoyaz legacy is, in a way, no less pertinent to DR than Yarkho’s, negatively
so. That is, Opoyaz theory can serve as a counterargument to DR, but, unlike critical theory or
hermeneutics, with a shared point of departure: attention to form as a clue to literary meaning
and development.
The Opoyaz approach to literature is indeed more intuitive of the inner changes within the
literary system, the shifts of that system sensed by writers and readers. Different from the
psychology of creativity,144 it is, again, closer to Saussure’s langue, which as a system is rooted
in individual speech acts (parole) but is superior to each of them individually. Furthermore, the
Opoyaz Formalists were among the first to account for the “observer effect” in literary
scholarship. In quantum physics, it is a theory according to which observing the situation
changes it (cf. the Schrödinger’s cat thought experiment). Thus, some Opoyaz texts imply that
scholars incarnate and construct the historical patterns they study, without, however,
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compromising their objectivity, as in the example with langue and parole: the bias of a scholar
has to do with some general shift in the system (cf. 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7).
If so, it is very important that we consider the “observer effect” in today’s actualization of
the nomothetic, pattern-centered, study of literature. The prominence of DR and the revival of
interest in RF, from a new angle, is in itself a question about what literature is to us today, what
we value in it, what we want to study in it, and whether we want to study it more on its own
terms or via other disciplines, and then which ones. RF struck up this conversation; hopefully,
DR and today’s heirs of RF will keep it going.
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CHAPTER TWO
OPOYAZ FORMALISM: THE MUSIC-PLAYING SOCRATES145
“[T]o look at science from the perspective of the artist, but to look at art
from the perspective of life.”146
—Friedrich Nietzsche
2.1. Servants of Two Masters: The Constructive Principle vs. Ostranenie
This, second, chapter of the dissertation is devoted to the dialectical contradiction that lies
at the heart of the doctrine and the institutional development of the Opoyaz. It has to do with the
ambiguous, intermedial, status of the Opoyazians as both the observers and the participants of
the literary life of their time. Such a statement may be taken for granted, like the existence of
gravity, yet, just as without considering gravity we will eventually misjudge the movement of
bodies on Earth, so we will also misjudge Opoyaz Formalism should we ignore its ambiguity.
Elaborated and theorized in this chapter, this contradiction becomes a major leitmotif of the
entire dissertation.
The Opoyaz Formalists were in the thick of the literary life of their time. They took part
in it not as distanced scholars but as critics proper. In today’s Anglophone world, the distinction
may seem somewhat artificial, but in the Russian tradition, literary criticism as a form of
journalism and literary scholarship had existed as two separate, albeit overlapping, fields until
the end of the USSR. In 1920s Soviet Russia especially, being a literary critic meant more than
simply publishing reviews; one could not stay impartial but had to have a stance on literary
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affairs.147 The Opoyazians were caught in the vortex of literature personally, having been on
close terms with the leading authors of the day—from the Russian Futurists to the
representatives of the Serapion Brothers literary movement. This meant not merely getting
together with such authors but working with them creatively, as in the case of the Serapion
Brother Vsevolod Ivanov, whose novel Yperite (Iprit) was co-authored by Shklovsky (cf. 3.2).
This last example shows that Shklovsky, as well as Tynianov and Eikhenbaum, were
even more involved in the literary everyday when they acted as writers themselves—a
circumstance that contradicts young Eikhenbaum’s remark about himself and his fellow critics
as those “different from the artist only in that [they] cannot write a novel.”148 Eikhenbaum’s
novel, A Route to Immortality (Marshrut v bessmertie), was published in 1933. Shklovsky and
Tynianov were more seminal. Shklovsky’s lifelong writerly career started with a 1914 book of
free verse, entitled Leaden Lot (Svintsovyi Zhrebii). His first work in prose, Revolution and the
Front (Revoliutsiia i front), saw the light of day in 1918 and later became part of the memoir A
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Sentimental Journey (Sentimental’noe puteshestvie). As for Tynianov, he turned into a
prominent writer of fiction beginning with the novel Kiukhlia (1925).
Yet it was not creative writing or literary journalism that brought the Opoyazians together
in the first place but rather one common goal: establishing a discipline, nay, a science of
literature. A 1919 newspaper article (also discussed in 1.2) declaring the creation of the Opoyaz
stated: “The Society for the Study of the Theory of Poetic Language [. . .] has made it its aim to
elaborate the problems of literary theory and a variety of linguistic disciplines as these are
essential for creating scientific poetics (nauchnaia poetika).”149 Poetics stood for literary
scholarship as such; the Opoyazians’ use of the word “poetics” had to do with a tradition of
Russian scholarship dating back to such influential theorists as Alexander Veselovsky and
Alexander Potebnya. If we turn to the adjective nauchnyi, scientific, it will prove still trickier. In
the Russian context, nauka (science, scholarship) covers not only natural and exact science but
also the humanities. This, one could argue, has encouraged generations of Russian literary
scholars to seek greater rigor in their studies, though it is also possible to assume that, because of
the term’s ubiquity, Russian humanists, unlike Anglophone ones, have not been as prone to
borrow their criteria for scientific rigor from mathematics or, say, biology (unlike Yarkho, as the
previous chapter demonstrates).
Literature as a science, scientific poetics, was thus on the banner of the Opoyazians. In
calling for it, they were prompted by discontent with current academic scholarship, along with
predominantly impressionistic criticism. As Victor Erlich writes, from the Opoyaz standpoint
“academic literary scholarship was guilty of [. . .] painstaking but sterile accumulations of
disjointed bits of knowledge without any discernible effort toward a meaningful integration and
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interpretation” while “‘creative’ criticism threw overboard scientific objectivity for the sake of
‘appreciation.’”150 The Opoyazians combatted these dominant trends by encroaching on the
territory of both literary scholars and critics.
In fact, it is often hard to distinguish between the Opoyazians’ scholarly and critical
works, especially in the case of Shklovsky, many of whose books were written at the crossroads
of scholarship, literary journalism, and belles-lettres: Zoo, or Letters Not About Love (Zoo, ili
pis’ma ne o liubvi; 1924), The Third Factory (Tret’ia fabrika; 1926), A Hunt for Optimism
(Poiski optimizma; 1931), and others. Alexander Chudakov justly says that “for Shklovsky the
problem of genre and scholarly (nauchnyi) language [. . .] was not of great concern” because of
his “invariably syncretic style.”151 Similar syncretism, mixing abstruse theory with artistic
reasoning and means of expression, can also be found in Tynianov (cf. the preface to The Death
of the Wazir Mukhtar (Smert’ Vazir-Mukhtara) or his article The Interlude (Promezhutok)) and
in Eikhenbaum (cf. the texts included in My Chronicle (Moi vremennik)).
Yet it would be a delusion to think that these two aspects of Opoyaz Formalism—the
scholarly one and the one related to criticism—coexisted in peace. This chapter shows that, in
reality, they waged a war against each other. The pages to come will uncover a hidden
contradiction between the Opoyazians’ intention to establish a science of literature and their
wholehearted engagement in literary affairs. The chapter’s main claim is that the contradiction
between these two trends determined Opoyaz Formalism’s dialectical evolution. For this
contradiction resulted in a series of theoretical and institutional crises, which prevented the
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Opoyazians from establishing a rigorous science of literature and yet advanced them to higher
levels at which the promise of fulfilling their ambition of scientific poetics was more and more
encouraging.
As it is demonstrated below, the trend responsible for the Opoyazians’ engagement in
literary life arose from their proximity to the Russian avant-garde, Russian Futurism in
particular. Opoyaz Formalism and Futurism both tackled the fundamental problem of poetic
language, i.e., language in its artistic manifestation. Shklovsky gave his first talk devoted to
poetic language, “The Place of Futurism in the History of Language,” in 1913 at the Stray Dog
Cabaret surrounded by Futurist poets. The author of The Formal Method in Literary
Scholarship (1928), Pavel Medvedev (or was it Mikhail Bakhtin?),152 recognized the role
Futurism played in the Formalist (primarily Opoyaz) movement:
[T]he environment which actually nourished formalism in its first period was contemporary
poetry, the changes which took place within it, and the theoretical battle of opinions which
accompanied these changes. These theoretical opinions, expressed in artistic programs,
declarations, and declarative articles, were not a part of scholarship [nauka], but of
literature itself, directly serving the artistic interests of the various struggling schools
and movements.153

Medvedev was right: (Opoyaz) Formalism and Futurism shared not ideas alone but also a style
of holding an argument, provocative and uncompromising. The Futurists assailed their
opponents, and so did the Opoyaz Formalists, whereas those who held similar yet less consistent
(or radical?) views on literature were condemned by the avant-garde scholars and poets as
eclectics. The Futurist vein also showed itself in the Opoyazians’ eccentricities, the most risqué
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of which belonged to Shklovsky. These are eloquently portrayed in Veniamin Kaverin’s novel
The Troublemaker, or Nights on Vasil’evskii Island (Skandalist ili vechera na Vasil’evskom
ostrove). The novel’s characters have only recently “changed the revolution” (i.e., the Russian
revolution of 1917) “for science,” but their belligerent and adventure-seeking temper remained
the same.154 One of the main characters, “a writer, a troublemaker, and a philologist [i.e., a
literary scholar]” Viktor Nekrylov, was modelled after Shklovsky.155
Unlike Medvedev (who criticized the Formalists—again, this primarily applied to the
Opoyazians—for intermingling scholarship with their literary life), Boris Engelgardt, the author
of The Formal Method in Literary History (1927), faulted the Opoyazians for the opposite sin:
applying scholarly methods, which should be impartial, to the events of contemporary literature.
Engelgardt believed that literary scholarship ought to approach a work of art as an “atemporal
quantity,” considering it sub specie aeternitatis.156 Meanwhile, literary criticism was to “adapt a
given work of art for the cultural mentality of the present,” which required that subjective
criticism be separated from scholarship.157
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discourse as a defining feature of Russian literary studies: ‘The battle between official
and journalistic criticism, or more precisely, between learned, professorial writings on
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characteristic of the history of Russian literary criticism’. [. . .]
Ivanov concluded that, historically, the conflict was resolved in favour of the journalists,
who took over as the true heroes of literary-critical practice in Russia, mainly due to their
ability to respond promptly to new social conditions and progressive literary movements.
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The Opoyazians disagreed. They often approached contemporary artists from the
standpoint of scholarship. Eikhenbaum’s book Anna Akhmatova: An Attempt at Analysis (Anna
Akhmatova. Opyt analiza; 1923), for example, was theoretically dense, and that, given the state
of criticism, served as a gesture. The same was true of Shklovsky writing in his Theory of Prose
(1925/1929) about Yevgeny Zamyatin, Andrei Bely, and other contemporaries. However, the
Opoyazians simultaneously retained their critical and journalistic commitments when they
engaged in literary scholarship, as an entry from Eikhenbaum’s diary illustrates: “Yesterday, an
interesting conference at the Institute of Art History took place. [. . .] We were arguing with
Zamyatin, who spoke in favor of ‘dispassionateness’ (besstrastie) in scholarship (nauka).
Tynianov and I were trying to prove that at the present time there is no chasm between
scholarship and criticism and that there can be none.”158 This understanding crystallized in
Tynianov’s phrase “theoretical temperament” (teoreticheckii temperament), positing that
journalistic temperament and scholarly theory are useless without each other.159 This
proposition became the guiding principle of Opoyaz Formalism, but Medvedev and Engelgardt,
though they discerned the tension between Opoyaz Formalism’s two trends, seem to have failed
to appreciate the dialectical nature of the contradiction.
Even today, two mutually exclusive opinions on Opoyaz Formalism prevail—that it
succeeded at establishing genuinely scholarly, if not scientific, criteria for the study of
literature and that it did not. Proponents of the first believe that the Opoyazians managed to
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find the real subject of literary scholarship: the structural aspects of the literary work and the
patterns whereby art develops. Adherents of the second opinion tend to regard the Opoyazians
almost as tricksters who stormed into literature with avant-garde irreverence, willing to
dominate literary scholarship rather than seek scholarly truth.160 The problem is that the
Opoyazians’ works will easily prove each of these opinions.
It was in an equally controversial situation that Shklovsky wrote: “You are trying to
choose what to believe…. / Do not. –It’s all true. / You’ve got both in Russia. / In Russia,
everything is so contradictory that we have become witty despite our will and desire.”161 A new
approach to Opoyaz Formalism, it would seem, should start by accepting these contradictory
opinions as equally legitimate since they both reflect the two conflicting trends of Opoyaz
Formalism itself. This chapter singles out three major theoretical collisions of the two trends,
the three dialectical contradictions of Opoyaz Formalism.
In examining these dialectical contradictions, one methodological pitfall had to be
avoided: inferring contradictions from the Opoyazians’ statements made at different times. This
is especially dangerous given the terrific speed at which Opoyaz Formalism evolved between
the late 1910s and early 1930s. The Opoyazians themselves were perfectly aware of this
evolution, as illustrated by Eikhenbaum’s “The Theory of the ‘Formal Method’” (Teoriia
“formal’nogo metoda”; 1925), whose every section marks a new step in the development of
(Opoyaz) Formalism.
For this reason, the first two dialectical contradictions do not go beyond 1924—the year
when the tension between Opoyaz Formalism’s two trends exacerbated, so that Roman
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Jakobson wrote about Opoyaz Formalism’s “crisis, especially since 1924.”162 The crisis
manifested itself in the Opoyazians’ growing debate with their opponents and among
themselves. To avoid causal explanations (for causation, cf. 5.4 and 6.6), alluringly simple but
theoretically dead-end, when inward oppositions are explained away by a reference to the
evolution of the authors’ views, this chapter will try to analyze the contradiction of the two
trends at the earlier stages of Opoyaz Formalism.
Furthermore, this contradiction is expressed here in the language of Opoyaz literary theory.
Thus, Opoyaz Formalism’s project of creating a science of literature is referred to as the
constructive trend (konstruktivnaia ustanovka).163 It reflects the Opoyazians’ attempt to uncover
constructive patterns of literature or, as the Opoyazians put it, how the work (of art) is made.
Meanwhile, the theoretical consequences of the Opoyazians’ participation in literary life could be

referred to as the defamiliarizing trend (ostranniaiushchaia ustanovka)—based on the principle
of ostranenie (defamiliarization, (b)e(n)strangement), formulated by Shklovsky under the
influence of Russian Futurism. The sole axiom accepted in this chapter is the Opoyazians’
undisputed eagerness to establish a science of literature, scientific poetics.

2.2. Dialectical Contradiction I. Opoyaz Theory vis-à-vis Positivism
It is tempting to define as positivist the Opoyaz Formalists’ attempt to establish a
literary science by analyzing the (verbal) patterns of literature—positivist in the sense of “any
system that confines itself to the data of experience and excludes a priori or metaphysical
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speculations.”164 Surely, Opoyaz Formalism was different from nineteenth century positivism
with its “attention to climate, environment, race, and the ‘moment,’” as Galin Tihanov
writes.165 Yet he agrees that (Opoyaz) Formalism was indeed “technical, precise, meticulous,
scientific and cold as positivism itself.”166
(Opoyaz) Formalism began by leaning towards empiricism, studying how material
elements form the literary work and how they function in it. Such elements are various artistic
devices or the motifs of which the plot is made, and—where verse is concerned—meter,
stanzaic organization, rhythm, etc. That is what Shklovsky meant by “art as device.”
It was now possible to focus only on those incontestable elements of the text that could be
sensed, hence construed. Scholars of the past, keen on philosophizing, wanted to know what the
author tried to convey; the (Opoyaz) Formalists believed that first and foremost the work
conveys itself, its unique organization, and they wanted to know how. The titles of Opoyaz texts
speak for themselves: Eikhenbaum’s “How Gogol’s Overcoat Is Made” (Kak sdelana “Shinel’”
Gogolia; 1918) and Shklovsky’s “How Don Quixote Is Made” (Kak sdelan “Don Kikhot”;
1920). In 1922, Shklovsky wrote enthusiastically, brandishing this practicality of his: “We now
know how life is made, and how Don Quixote is made, and how the automobile is made.”167
A noteworthy manifestation of the constructive trend are the algebraic symbols the
Opoyazians employed. In 1919, Shklovsky represented plot as an algebraic expression: “There
are folktales constructed on a peculiar narrative tautology of the type а + (а + а) + { [а + (а + а)]
+ a2,} etc.”168 In 1924, Eikhenbaum, too, laid out a “constructive scheme” of Lenin’s article:
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“(letter a is the epigraph, Roman numerals are the paragraphs): / a{[(I + II + III) +
(IVa + Va + VIa)] + (VII + VIII) + [(IX + X + XI) + (XII + XIII + XIV)] + XVa} / Or in a
simpler form (by stanzas, which I am designating with capital letters): a[(A + Ba) + C + (D + E)
[+] Fa].”169 Such an “algebraization” of something as outwardly spontaneous as speech made
systematic literary research possible. And even though the Opoyazians were not the first to
employ this method, since Andrei Bely had already done it in “Lyric Poetry and Experiment”
(1909), for example, unlike Bely, they shunned any impressionism and mysticism as detrimental
to the science of literature.170
However, the theory of defamiliarization withstood the positivist tendency of Opoyaz
Formalism. This theory emerged from Shklovsky’s Futurism-inspired critique of the “algebraic”
way of thinking—the one genuine art opposes. While the desire to study literature in its
specificity first led Shklovsky to methodological gestures that resembled literary positivism, in
this case it made him defend literature from the attempts to reduce its uniqueness to algebraic
uniformity.
Shklovsky started developing the theory of defamiliarization in his early works “The
Resurrection of the Word” (Voskreshenie slova; 1914) and “Art as Device” (Iskusstvo kak priem;
1917). Written as manifestos, declarative yet unelaborate by nature, they implied more than they
stated. Their argument went as follows. In everyday life, our perception is ruled by
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automatization, and when automatization catches sight of a thing, this thing is ensnared in a
category of some sort. This thing is no longer perceived as such but as one of a class; it morphs
into a faceless sign, an algebraic symbol: “With the algebraic method of thinking, things are
considered in terms of number and space; we do not see but recognize them, based on their
immediate traits. The thing passes us by prepackaged, as it were, and we [. . .] can see only its
surface.”171
Shklovsky is thereby against understanding the work as a series of symbols representing
something other than this work. That is why he opens “Art as Device” by attacking the theory of
literature qua images. The adherents of this theory, Shklovsky writes, “consider poetry a unique
kind of thinking (thinking with the aid of images) and see the task of images in organizing
heterogeneous objects and actions into groups, and explaining the unknown through the
known.”172 In other words, if every element of the work serves a particular idea, then every
element is auxiliary. Meanwhile, auxiliary elements are interchangeable as long as the overall
message remains the same. Nothing is left, then, of the work’s specificity, and it no longer
matters much what particular words and devices the author used in a poem, for why should these
countless nuances matter when they do not change the main idea, the general formula?
Shklovsky insists that literary science should not approach literature with such an “algebraic”
logic.
Moreover, he argues, images in genuine (verbal) art are not intended to ease perception—
they challenge it, which proves that art is not about ideas but about itself. “It would be interesting
to apply this law [of facilitating perception by means of images] to Tyutchev’s comparison of
summer lightning with the deaf-and-dumb demons, or Gogol’s comparison of the skies with the
171
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Lord’s chasuble,” Shklovsky writes.173 Literature, according to Shklovsky, hinders our
perception by uniquely transforming the object it represents as well as the linguistic medium of
representation. This difficulty allows us to sense (almost physically) the concreteness and
diversity of the world represented by the word (“to restore the sensation of life, to make the stone
stony, [. . .] art exists”)174; it also allows us to sense the uniqueness of words, devices, and the work
of art as “the sum of its stylistic devices.”175 This makes defamiliarization essentially anti-algebraic
and anti-positivist.

At first blush, the contradiction between Opoyaz Formalist positivism and the theory of
defamiliarization could be resolved rather elegantly. The logic goes as follows. The study of the
work’s plot and other non-exclusively verbal patterns resulted in Opoyaz positivism—an
example is Shklovsky’s work “The Relationship between Devices of Plot Construction and
General Devices of Style” (1919). Meanwhile, the idea of defamiliarization appeared when
Shklovsky was working on the problem of poetic language, beginning with “The Resurrection of
the Word.” It would seem the Opoyaz Formalists were doing two different things at once.
However, this solution is inapplicable since these two enterprises were not separate in Opoyaz
Formalism. The most widely cited passage from “Art as Device” illustrates it:
To restore the sensation of life, to make things felt, to make the stone stony, [. . .] art
exists. The purpose of art is to give the sensation (oshchushchenie) of the thing, as
something seen, not recognized. Art’s device is the device of the “defamiliarization” of
things and the device of laborious form, increasing the difficulty and the endurance of
perception, since the process of perception in art is self-valuable and has to be
prolonged; art is the means of experiencing the making of the thing, while that which is
made in art is unimportant. 176
The defamiliarizing and the constructive trends of Opoyaz Formalism are mixed here. Most of
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the passage follows the logic of defamiliarization, regarding art as comprised of unique (or
uniquely organized) elements uniquely representing the world in its uniqueness, which is why
the perceiver dwells on the objects represented and on the very form of their representation. The
last two sentences, however, already bespeak the constructive trend, so much preoccupied with
the problem of how the work of art is made that the represented thing becomes “unimportant.” If
the passage is at first concerned with the “stoniness” of the stone, by the end it does not seem to
care much about it. The latter tendency manifests itself in the following passage from
Shklovsky’s 1921 essay on Vasily Rozanov:
A literary work is pure form; it is not a thing, nor material, but a relationship of
materials (otnoshenie materialov). And, as any relationship, this one, too, is a
relationship of the zero dimension. That is why the scale, the arithmetic significance,
of the work’s numerator and denominator, is unimportant. Comic (shutlivyi), tragic,
universal, and indoor works of art—the juxtapositions of a world with a world or of
a cat with a stone—are all equal to each other.177
It is remarkable how much Shklovsky resorts here to mathematical metaphors. The phrase that
things “are all equal to each other” in literature, reads as the rejection of their uniqueness,
their singularity. The “stoniness” of the stone is no longer sensed. What else is it but the result
of automated perception, which “devours things, clothes, furniture, the wife, and the fear of
war.”178 Everything seems to be placed in “the zero dimension.”
This contradiction between the thing of full weight and the thing that is zeroed out could
be interpreted as follows. In “The Resurrection of the Word,” Shklovsky elaborates the originally
Humboldtian idea (borrowed by Potebnya) of the word’s inner form, saying that the French word
enfant (child), for example, literally means “not speaking.”179 This proves that, initially, the word
is perceptible, that it can be sensed, but that it wears out with time, just as the word enfant, no
177
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longer associated with muteness, merely designates a child. Shklovsky says that the word loses
the artistic perceptibility of its inner form when it turns auxiliary, which, in turn, “is a great relief
for thinking and can be the necessary condition for the existence of science.”180 It could be
argued, therefore, that in “The Resurrection of the Word” Shklovsky writes from the standpoint
of art; in the Rozanov essay, from the standpoint of science; and in “Art as Device,” from these
two standpoints simultaneously. The first standpoint can be identified with the artist, whose goal
is to restore the uniqueness of the word and of the thing it represents. The second standpoint can
be identified with the scientist, who thinks in constructions and patterns, and these, by definition,
imply a degree of uniformity. It is therefore legitimate to say that the artist orients himself
towards the defamiliarizing trend whereas the scientist follows the constructive one—while the
critic, one may add, is somewhere between the two.
However, solving the contradiction of the two trends by separating them is impossible—
not only because both had to do with the Opoyazians’ desire to study literature in its specificity.
This separation is also unfeasible because both trends hinge on the category of oshchushchenie,
which translates as sensation, or sense perception.
This category is central to Formalism (in fact, not only Opoyaz but also other movements
within RF). “The purpose of art is to give the sensation (oshchushchenie) of a thing,” Shklovsky
writes.181 It is noteworthy that this is lost in Benjamin Sher’s translation: “The purpose of art,
then, is to lead us to a knowledge of a thing.”182 The author of “Art as Device” would have never
accepted it: knowledge is too incorporeal; it is fraught with abstract thinking leading away from
the kind of palpability that we sense when our hitherto automated and perfunctory perception
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stumbles over the strangely impenetrable art. Sensation it is.183 In Theory of Prose, this term and
its derivatives appear multiple times when Shklovsky writes about “the sensation of a thing” in
the work of art, “the sensation of the plot,” “the sensation of semantic disproportion,” etc.184 It
is, therefore, possible to speak about Opoyaz “sensualism” understood as reliance on the
experience of “the sensually perceptible quality,” to use Medvedev’s definition (albeit applied to
European Formalism).185 Such empiricism could be seen as positivist, hence belonging to the
constructive trend. Yet the theory of defamiliarization appeals to sensation, too, and relativizes
this criterion thereby.
Thus, Shklovsky says that language in literature acquires poetic specificity (uniqueness)
thanks to defamiliarization, which (re)creates the sensation of words and things by rendering
them strange. Defamiliarization becomes the attribute of art, but defamiliarization itself is both
the cause and effect of a certain type of sensation. This can be seen from the following excerpt
(the term “prose” used in it should not mislead us if read as a vestige of Futurist jargon denoting
non-art created in the everyday, “prosaic,” language): “A work may be 1) created as prose and
perceived as poetry; 2) created as poetry and perceived as prose. This shows that the artistic
quality (khudozhestvennost’), the work’s belonging to poetry, is the result of our means of
perception.”186 The passage continues thus: “Meanwhile, we shall call those works artistic, in the
narrow sense, which have been created by certain devices,” and it seems as though the
constructive trend is taking over—until the relativity of defamiliarization breaks in and it turns
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out that the aim of such devices is “to make these works perceived as artistic, as much as
possible.”187 The question arises: what does it mean to be “perceived as artistic?” And whose
perception, whose sensation, will be the yardstick?
To avoid this relativity, the Opoyazians could have turned to reader/writer psychology, but
this would have been unacceptable as a step leading away from their decision to study literature in
terms of its linguistic and constructive specificity, without replacing such a study with an inquiry in
psychology or in any other field. At the beginning, the Opoyazians could not spell out the criteria

for the kind of sense perception that makes a thing literary, artistic. The fact that they continued
to rely on this category without defining it made it subjective and unfit for the absolute disposal
of the constructive trend.
Moreover, defamiliarization relativized the criterion of sense perception in one more
way— by making it contingent on time. There would have been nothing easier than to consider
certain devices as ever-defamiliarizing. Yet defamiliarization and the resurrection of the word
implied that, just as the inner form of the word is lost one day, so is the artistic perceptibility of
the work. At a certain point, any device fulfilling defamiliarization becomes automated, or, as
the Opoyazians also called it, canonized, i.e., recognized as legitimate but no longer laborious,
i.e., no longer artistically stimulating for our perception. This also made a strictly empirical,
constructive analysis impossible. From then on, the status of a constructive element in the work
had to be considered in terms of literary history qua the history of artistic perception—the
problem addressed in the third dialectical contradiction.
Finally, the theory of defamiliarization undermined the positivist potential of Opoyaz
Formalism by tempting the Opoyazians into applying the logic of defamiliarization not only to
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literature but also to literary scholarship. Thus, the Opoyaz declaration cited above says about
Alexander Veselovsky, who was a truly great philologist, that “[h]is ideas were not developed”
but “canonized” by subsequent scholars.188 One would think that the criterion for scholarly
ideas is truth, and that scholarly truth cannot get canonized like some artistic device (i.e., to be
in vogue and then fall out of it, consecrated as a museum piece—cf. 4.2). Yet this was the way
the Opoyazians reasoned. Furthermore, while working to establish the science of literature, they
were simultaneously writing about the danger of canonizing this new science of theirs.189 For
this reason, the Opoyazians were highly mistrustful of any followers who would join in their
ambitious scholarly enterprise—thus, in 1924, in the heyday of Opoyaz Formalism, when the
school had existed for barely ten years if not less, Eikhenbaum wrote about “an onslaught of
eclectics, canonizers, compromisers, and epigones.”190
The artistic acuteness with which the Opoyazians felt how rapidly yesterday’s
breakthroughs morph into tomorrow’s clichés made them renounce the positivist prospect the
constructive trend offered: to provide exhaustive definitions for their hypotheses and systematize
the devices and constructions of which literature consists. It is revealing, for example, how
Shklovsky begins his work whose proper title reads “The Structure of the Novel and the Short
Story”: “To begin with, I have to admit that I don’t have a definition of the short story, i.e., I
don’t know what qualities a motif should have, or how motifs come shape a plot.”191 That is why
Leon Trotsky’s evaluation of Opoyaz Formalism as “essentially descriptive and semi-statistic”
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(Structuralist or Yarkho’s works come to mind) does not stand up to criticism.192 As a matter of
fact, because of having applied the defamiliarizing trend to their own movement, the Opoyazians
became deliberately unsystematic.
Many contemporaries of the Opoyazians pointed out this inconsistency: trying to
establish a science of literature without putting their discoveries in order. Boris Pasternak wrote
about it in a letter to Medvedev, in relation to Medvedev’s book on Formalism: “If I were in [the
Formalists’] place, I would at once [. . .] begin developing a system of aesthetics; what has
always [. . .] made me stay away from [. . .] the Formalists was exactly this incomprehensibility
of their standing still on the verge of the most promising ascents.”193
This does not mean, however, that the Opoyazians abandoned their scholarly project. On
the contrary, they believed that the traditional methods of academic scholarship were too static to
capture the essence of literature. But it order to do it themselves, the Opoyazians first had to
identify the source of literary specificity to be able to study it. As Eikhenbaum said, “the
fundamental problem for the ‘Formalists’ is not the methods of literary scholarship, but literature
as an object of study.”194

2.3. Dialectical Contradiction II. Changing the Subject of Literary Theory
The contradiction between the Opoyaz Formalists’ urge to create a science of literature
and the relativity brought in by defamiliarization determined the way in which they tackled the

192

Leon Trotsky, Literature and Revolution, trans. Rose Strunsky (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1971), 163.
193
Qtd. in Gabriel Superfin, “B. L. Pasternak-kritik ‘formal’nogo metoda,’” in Yuri Lotman, ed.,
Trudy po znakovym sistemam V. 284. Pamiati Vladimira Iakovlevicha Proppa (Tartu: Uchenye
zapiski Tartuskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1971): 529.
194
Eikhenbaum, O literature, 375.
68

fundamental problem of the future literary science: its subject of inquiry. Eikhenbaum wrote,
retrospectively: “The core principle for the organization of the formal method was that of
specification and concretization. All efforts were directed to putting an end to the earlier status
of literature, when, to quote Veselovsky, literature was a res nullius.”195 Eikhenbaum referred
to a famous passage in Veselovsky:
Literary history resembles the territory that the international law defines as a res
nullius [an abandoned thing], where the art historian and the aesthetician go hunting,
along with the erudite and the scholar of social relations. Each of them carries out what
he can, according to his abilities and beliefs, with the same label on the good or prey,
which is far from being the same.196
This explains why literature’s specificity was so important for the Opoyaz Formalists—in fact,
Eikhenbaum even put the word “Formalism” and its derivatives in quotes and referred to
himself and his allies as “specifiers,” spetsifikatory.197 The x in the sought-for formula of
literature became the notion of literariness (Roman Jakobson’s term). And since literature is a
verbal art, the Opoyazians decided to look for literature’s literariness in language, hence the
titles of their earliest works: “On the Poetic Combination of Glossemes” (O poeticheskom
glossemosochetanii) and “On the Sounds of Verse Language” (O zvukakh stikhotvornogo
iazyka) by Lev Yakubinsky, “On Poetry and Trans-Sense Language” (O poezii i zaumnom
iazyke) by Shklovsky, “On Verbal Gestures of the Japanese Language” (O zvukovykh zhestakh
iaponskogo iazyka) by Yevgeny Polivanov, etc. It should be remembered that the Opoyazians
were also influenced by Russian Futurism’s manifestos about poetic language.
Numerous questions soon arose. What makes language literary, or else poetic, artistic? In
verse, there are at least some things to latch onto—meter, rhythm, etc.—but in prose they are
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largely useless. One can still look for them in Gogol or Andrei Bely’s poetic prose, but what
about Chekhov, for instance, whose stories are sometimes intentionally quasi-pedestrian in their
descriptions? And what about Rozanov’s works written in the form of a diary? What makes them
literary? Thinking in images? But this is unacceptable because it will deprive art of its specificity
(as argued above). Or shall we simply say that art is fictional? But this is equally precarious:
what are we to do then with artistically written “nonfiction?”
In 1924, Tynianov proposed a criterion to tell literature from that which it is not. He
named it the literary fact (literaturnyi fakt) and laid out a theory behind it in an eponymous
article. Tynianov defined literature as a “dynamic speech construction.”198 The word “dynamic”
was key here: every text is a speech construction, but, without being dynamic, it is not a fact of
literature. However, dynamism is a variable. Thus, Shklovsky wrote about Rozanov’s Solitaria
and Fallen Leaves as literary works—because this is how Rozanov’s contemporaries, including
Shklovsky, perceived them—even though the structure of these works was hardly
distinguishable from that of an ordinary diary. Aware of this problem, Tynianov repudiated “a
‘stiff’ ‘ontological’ definition of literature as a ‘substance.’”199 Put simply, this meant: that
which we call literature changes; something non-literary can become literature, and,
furthermore, something literary can cease to be that. That is what happened to letters written in
Russia in the early nineteenth century, for example. The person of the twenty-first century, if not
trained in literary history, will likely read them as simple, though nicely phrased, texts;
meanwhile, for Pushkin and his correspondents they were a fact of art.200 “Whereas a thorough
definition of literature is getting only harder,” Tynianov remarked, “every contemporary will
198
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point his finger at what the literary fact is.”201
In writing this, Tynianov was driven by historical relativity, which defamiliarization had
revealed. At the same time, he resorted to construction-centered “sensualism” once again when
discussing contemporaries’ perception of dynamism, having concluded that “literature is a
speech construction sensed as a construction proper (oshchushchaemaia imenno kak
konstruktsiia).”202 But the initially empiricist and seemingly positivist criterion of (sense)
perception—derived from the structural study of literature—was again employed by
defamiliarization. Shklovsky anticipated it when he wrote in “Art as Device” that “the artistic
quality [of a work] [. . .] is the result of our means of perception.”203 Commenting on this, Maria
Umnova (a perspicacious scholar of Formalism yet little known because of her untimely death)
observed that “the relativism of this new school of science, having affected its attempts to give a
stable definition of literature, resulted in [. . .] the ‘negative’ definition of this phenomenon.”204
The only way to return scientific rigor and palpability to the category of (sense) perception was
to develop a theory of literary history in order to determine the criteria underlying
contemporaries’ perception of art—and this without lapsing into psychology.

2.4. Dialectical Contradiction III. Letting History Decide
No matter how mercurial its object is, a science should have at least some invariables to rely
on. When the Opoyaz Formalists made literature contingent on the ever-changing perception of
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dynamism, the only immutable factor became change itself.205 The Opoyazians could have relied on
contemporaries’ “attestations,” but then a historical survey would have superseded literary science.

Neither could the Opoyazians have explained the development of literature by social history—it
went against their understanding of literature as a largely autonomous system with its immanent
laws (the specificity principle).206 To cite Bod again, “they searched for internal regularities in
literary works, such as form characteristics and their effects, and not for external laws that could
clarify the creation of the works.”207 The only possible solution that remained was to find the
algorithms of aesthetic change. That is what the Opoyazians undertook in their theory of literary
history, or historical poetics, as they called it. They started to develop it very actively beginning
with the mid-1920s, which is why this third dialectical contradiction refers to their works after
1924—the turning point in the history of (Opoyaz) Formalism as explained above.
The rudiments of Opoyaz historical poetics can already be found in Shklovsky’s 1921
essay on Rozanov. In a few paragraphs, Shklovsky outlined the key pattern of literary evolution.
According to Shklovsky, there is no single national tradition in literary history. Instead, there is a
struggle between different artistic movements, each of them fighting for its aesthetic canon.
When a movement wins, it dethrones the old canon and crowns its own. But the winner soon
becomes conceited and reckless, and the winner’s canon, though respectable—as a matter of fact,
because of being respectable, soon loses its alluring dynamism and gets automated, or else
canonized, when legions of epigones profane it with their imitations. This canon is soon
displaced, but one day it takes revenge and returns, though somewhat transformed already. By
Cf. Tynianov saying (PILK, 258) that “the principle” “of literary evolution” “is struggle and
change (smena).” Also cf. 4.7.
206
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studying the logic whereby canons alternate, Opoyaz literary science could try to take hold of the
ever-changing dynamism, deriving it from the dialectics of history, not individual tastes.
Tynianov made a breakthrough with his essays “The Literary Fact” (discussed above) and “On
Literary Evolution” (O literaturnoi evoliutsii; 1927). Eikhenbaum also contributed to solving the
problem in his book Lermontov: An Attempt at Historical-Literary Evaluation (Lermontov. Opyt

istoriko-literaturnoi otsenki; 1924) as well as in the articles written in the second half of the 1920s
and later included in his 1929 book My Chronicle. Tynianov and Eikhenbaum established a
number of patterns whereby literature evolves, for example, discussing the ways in which verse
and prose correlate in history. The constructive trend was beginning to dominate. Now, the
precision with which Tynianov and Eikhenbaum wrote about literary evolution was closer to the
ideal of the science of literature. Thus, Tynianov recognized the multiplicity of factors developing
within the system of literature each at a different speed: “The evolution of the constructive function
goes by rapidly; the evolution of the literary function, from one epoch to another; the evolution of
the functions of literary series as a whole in its relation to other series, for centuries.”208 The
Opoyazians were increasingly overcoming the relativity of the notion of the literary fact.
Thanks to the study of patterns, the category of perception became less subjective.
Tynianov’s words that “every contemporary will point his finger at what the literary fact is”
sounded less ambiguous.209 Now the Opoyazians could show that “literary contemporaneity is
not the sum of isolated and subjective aspirations, on which it is impossible to rely, but a system
of correlations characterized by objective unity.”210 In this dissertation, this will be further
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designated as the common perceptual denominator and/or sensus communis.211 The factor of
perception was no longer seen as arbitrary. This resembled Osip Brik’s polemical summary of
the Opoyazians certitude in the imminence of literary evolution: “Had Pushkin never lived,
Eugene Onegin would have still been written.”212 If so, it follows that Eugene Onegin would
have been perceived the same way even if Vissarion Belinsky and Pyotr Vyazemsky had never
lived. In other words, though it is true that perception emanates from individuals—just as parole
does in Saussurean linguistics—for every epoch there is a certain norm of perception by which
individuals abide—and this is already comparable to the Saussurean notion of langue (also cf.
1.4).
However, the way in which the Opoyazians applied historical poetics to the study of
the literature of the past revealed the degree to which this theory was rooted in their own
literary experience of participating in literary life. The following excerpt from Tynianov’s
211
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1926 essay “The Archaists and Pushkin” (Arkhaisty i Pushkin), included in The Archaists and
Innovators (Arkhaisty i novatory) collection, illustrates it:
The archaists [Russian writers of the first quarter of the nineteenth century with a
penchant for “archaic” literary and linguistic forms] with their struggle against
aestheticism and mannerism were born polemicists, so to speak, their polemic usually
taking scandalous forms.
Literary scandals accompany literary revolutions on a regular basis
(zakonomerno), and, in this sense, the big scandals of the archaists resonate with the
even bigger scandals of the Futurists.213
Thus, Tynianov extrapolated the realities of his own epoch to those of the nineteenth century.
The danger latent in this and similar passages written by Tynianov becomes even more
apparent in the following passage from Eikhenbaum’s 1927 article “Literature and the Literary
Everyday” (Literatura i literaturnyi byt):
Someone in jest called it [history] a “prophecy backwards.” This is not at all as
strange as it may seem. Yes, we prophesy backwards in order to understand the
present time—because we cannot prophesy ahead. We look for answers and analogies
in the past—establishing the “logic” (zakonomernost’) of phenomena.214
The fact that the Opoyazians spoke on behalf of literary science while influenced by their
literary ambience, and even exhibiting it as in Eikhenbaum’s case, incurred Medvedev’s
criticism: “[T]he first methodological orientations [. . .] cannot be created ad hoc, following
subjective ‘instinct.’ In the case of the formalists, for instance, the ‘instinct’ was simply their
futurist taste.”215
Yet the Opoyaz Formalists continued to speak on behalf of literary science. Moreover,
Eikhenbaum insisted that historical poetics is solely possible as “a science of double vision,”
when the only possible way to “discern the facts of the past” is “under the banner of today’s
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problems.”216 Influenced by the defamiliarizing trend, Eikhenbaum made that which was
showing through Shklovsky and Tynianov’s texts a principle when he declared historical
involvement—and that almost unavoidably implied partiality—a criterion of historical poetics,
hence literary science in general.
Such a stance caused much distrust. Indeed, given the apparent subjectivity of “double
vision,” which can be neither verified nor falsified (in Karl Popper’s sense), how could one rely
on the Opoyazians’ self-assured evaluations? This compromised what they said about historical
patterns and the judgments they passed, calling some literary phenomena historically dynamic
and promising while casting others aside. Could their prophecies backwards and forward all be
just a matter of chance? This was the question a reviewer of Eikhenbaum’s book on Lermontov
posed: “[Eikhenbaum] is not at all ready to admit the fortuitous (sluchainoe) as a given; it is
almost always necessary for him. Why, for instance, was it ‘due’ that emotional rhetoric sprout
on the ruins of the classical epoch of Russian verse? –This is enthralling but dangerous.”217
Even more surprisingly, the Opoyazians’ belief in the logic of literary evolution and
their subsequent refusal to consider it fortuitous coexisted with a fascination with literature’s
transience, i.e., unpredictability. That is why Eikhenbaum said that literary science “cannot
prophesy ahead.”218 And that is also why in 1924 Tynianov answered the question of “Where
will literature move?” by writing: “[Literature] is not a train that has to arrive at a certain
destination. [. . .] Russian literature has been given many commissions. But to give it
commissions is useless: it will be commissioned India and will discover America.”219
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Thus the defamiliarizing trend of Opoyaz Formalism, ensuing from the Opoyazians’
involvement in literary life, undercut the exactitude of their scholarly conclusions. Ironically,
however, the defamiliarizing trend, with its orientation towards the literary today, reflected the
Opoyazians’ attempt to attain to a far greater exactitude than scholarly schemes could give. The
Formalists could not make a choice between the search for the algorithms of literature and the
desire to champion literature’s mercurial, willful nature.
At the end of the 1920s, the Opoyaz Formalists for the last time undertook to overcome
the fortuity, relativity, and subjectivity caused by defamiliarization. The attempt was made in
Tynianov and Jakobson’s “Problems in the Study of Literature and Language” (Problemy
izucheniia literatury i iazyka; 1928)—the theses mapping out the future of literary and linguistic
scholarship.220 By that time, it had become obvious that the problem of fortuity in literature was
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This was a bifurcation point in the development not only of the Opoyaz but all of RF because
in 1929, after Tynianov and Jakobson had met in Prague and sketched the theses, hoping to
revive the Opoyaz under Shklovsky’s leadership, Shklovsky wrote to Yarkho. A search for those
who would join the new Opoyaz began, and Shklovsky invited Yarkho among others. Yarkho
refused; according to Shklovsky, he “ha[d] written a polite reply [. . .], in which he claim[ed],
however, that the correct method is statistical (statisticheskii),” which, Shklovsky hastened to
add, “shows he does not understand the meaning of the word method, as it were” (qtd. in
Tynianov, PILK, 533–534). There is an extant reply by Yarkho, but not the one that Shklovsky
criticizes here. The letter in which Yarkho laid out his theoretical stance disappeared with
Tynianov’s archive during the Siege of Leningrad. For more information, cf. Alexander
Galushkin, “‘I tak, stavshi na kostiakh, budem trubit’ sbor. . .’: k istorii nesostoiavshegosia
vozrozhdeniia Opoiaza v 1928 – 1930 gg.,” Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, vol. 44, no. 4 (2000).
To understand Shklovsky’s reproach to Yarkho for not realizing what method means, it is
important to consider the Opoyaz understanding of method, best articulated in Eikhenbaum,
Vokrug. In it, Eikhenbaum argued against those critics who believed that Marxism and (Opoyaz)
Formalism could be combined, the latter seen as an ancillary component. Eikhenbaum opposed
this by saying that it was impossible to combine Formalism and Marxism because these are
principles, not methods. Eikhenbaum claimed that the scholarly principle has to do with one’s
fundamental assumptions—for (Opoyaz) Formalism, it was the assumption that literature evolves
autonomously—unlike the Marxists’ assumption that everything, including literature, is
determined by the economic base. Statistics, say, can be used a method used for both or either of
these principles. It looks as though Shklovsky meant something similar to Eikhenbaum’s
principle when using the word “method.” Apparently, Shklovsky could not understand how
Yarkho’s quantitative approach could be seen as a fully-fledged principle. Whether Opoyaz
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partially owing to the influence of other systems, or series (riad) (to use Formalist terminology),
such as economics, political history, psychology, etc. Yet the Opoyazians were equally unwilling
to give up literature’s specificity. The contradiction could have been overcome by studying all
other systems in their specificity and by developing a set of methods for their comparative study,
given the principle whereby every system is in the first place determined by its immanent,
autonomous laws (cf. chapter 3). This could have been the first step towards a science of
sciences.221
Unfortunately, the Opoyazians did not get a chance to try to realize this project.
There were a number of reasons for it, including disagreement among the Opoyazians, but
one of the main ones was political. The previously flamboyant literary life in Russia was
being suffocated as the era of Stalinism approached. In 1930, Shklovsky recanted Formalism
in the article “A Monument to a Scientific Error” (Pamiatnik nauchnoi oshibke) (cf. chapter
3). And though the recantation was ostensible, as Richard Sheldon demonstrated, the
Formalist movement could no longer consolidate its efforts. It may be said that Shklovsky
burned the Formalists’ ships before others did (cf. the next chapter). Nevertheless, even if
Formalism had created the science of sciences, the three dialectical contradictions suggest
that the battle between the constructive and the defamiliarizing trends would have remained
unresolved, each time reappearing at the next level (cf. Table 1 and Figures 1-4 ).

Formalism and—for the lack of a better term—Yarkho’s Formalism could be productively
combined is a different question.
221
It is tempting to regard Structuralism as the fulfillment of this attempt. There are many
things in the theses that anticipate Structuralism. However, Structuralism should not be
identified with Formalism. There were disagreements between the two. These disagreements
had to do, among other things, with Shklovsky’s unwillingness to approach art from a
predominantly linguistic standpoint. Cf. Shklovsky’s critique of Jakobson’s linguistic approach
to literature in Viktor Shklovsky, Tetiva. O neskhodstve skhodnogo (Moscow: Sovetskii
pisatel’, 1970; hereafter Shklovsky, Tetiva), chapter “O stat’ie Romana Jakobsona ‘Poeziia
grammatiki i grammatika poezii’. Novye sledy.”
78

Table 1. The contradictory trends underlying the theoretical debates of RF and Opoyaz
evolution in particular.

1. The idiographic

2. The nomothetic

3. Autonomy of
literature; agency
lies with literature

1. The
idiographic

1x1. Literary
dynamism
(uniqueness and
unpredictability)—
defamiliarization

1x3. The artist’s
freedom from society
but the artist’s
dependence on literary
evolution

2. The
nomothetic

2x1. Literature’s
unique, immanent
evolution, when the
rules are periodically
reinvented

3. Autonomy of
literature;
agency lies with
literature

3x1. The artist’s
freedom from society
but the artist’s
dependence on
literary evolution

4. Vitalism;
active existence
(possibly
through
struggle);
agency lies with
the littérateur

4x1. Literary
dynamism
(unpredictability)—
defamiliarization as a
form of escaping the
literary system

1x2. Literature’s
unique, immanent
evolution, when
the rules are
periodically
reinvented
2x2. Strict
synchronic and
diachronic laws;
predictability; laws
of literature’s
correlation with
the other series
(systems) are also
strict and
predictable;
literature is
determined or
codetermined by
other series
(systems)
3x2. Strict
synchronic and
diachronic laws;
predictability, but
largely
independent from
the other series
(systems), due to
specificity, and
possibly opposed
to them
4x2. The artist’s
freedom as
realized necessity;
the artist must act
to make something
happen, but, by
being an artist, the
artist cannot but
act.
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4. Vitalism; active
existence (possibly
through struggle); agency
lies with the littérateur
1x4. Literary dynamism
(unpredictability)—
defamiliarization as a form
of escaping the literary
system

2x3. Strict synchronic
and diachronic laws;
predictability, but
largely independent
from the other series
(systems), due to
specificity, and
possibly opposed to
them

2x4. The artist’s freedom
as realized necessity; the
artist must act to make
something happen, but, by
being an artist, the artist
cannot but act.

3x3. Art’s freedom
from society

3x4. Literature’s own
consciousness, opposed to
that of the artist; sentient
system

4x3. Literature’s own
consciousness,
opposed to that of the
artist; sentient system

4x4. Literary dynamism
(unpredictability)—
defamiliarization as a form
of escaping the literary
system

Figure 1. The divergence and convergence of the idiographic and the nomothetic.
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Figure 2. The idiographic and the nomothetic can both be approached from the standpoint of
quality and/or quantity.

Figure 3. Combined and simplified figures 1 and 2. The x in the middle may also be interpreted
as a multiplication sign, multiplication understood both mathematically and biologically.
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Figure 4. Figures 1, 2, and 3 are represented here in the language of Opoyaz theory, considering
Tynianov’s definition of literature as the “dynamic speech construction”; speech here is the
material, in the sense of medium: both as a means of communication and the physical
environment, so that Shklovsky’s definition of the literary work as “the relationship of materials”
applies.

2.5. The Music-Playing Socrates
As a result, defamiliarization had played a twofold role in Opoyaz Formalism from the
very beginning—by pushing Opoyaz science forward, on the one hand, and by hampering its
scientific systematization, on the other. Firstly, defamiliarization encapsulated the idea of poetic
language, crucial to Opoyaz Formalism; secondly, defamiliarization stimulated the development
of Opoyaz science by confronting it with new problems emerging from the need to systematize
the relative factors brought in by defamiliarization. With the constructive trend only, Opoyaz
Formalism would have exhausted itself very quickly by focusing solely on the classification of
devices.
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Yet, because of having originated from the avant-garde aesthetic and modus vivendi,
defamiliarization made the Opoyaz Formalists eschew anything that would resemble
academism. The Opoyazians intervened in literary life without looking at it from the outside, as
many would think behooves a true scholar. Instead, the Opoyazians opposed their “theoretical
temperament” to the seemingly objective academism.
Apparently, the problem of establishing the scientificity of Opoyaz Formalism lies in the fact
that, in order to solve it, one may be tempted to provide “a ‘stiff’ ‘ontological’ definition” of
science.222 Yet science, especially the humanities, constantly evolves (though such evolution need

not be understood as orthogenetic, i.e., entailing progress—cf. the prolegomena to this
dissertation), as do the criteria for its evaluation. Thus, Giambattista Vico was a scientist though
from today’s standpoint his Scienza Nuova may not appear scientific. The opposite is also true:
what did not comply with the criteria of one epoch can do so with those of another. Jan
Levchenko put it in a precise and witty way by naming his monograph on Formalism The Other
Scholarship.
It seems reasonable, therefore, to speak of Opoyaz Formalism as the scientific fact of its
time—in the same fashion as Tynianov spoke of the literary fact. It does not mean in the
slightest that Formalism should be declared impeccably scientific. However, it is imperative that
the dynamic nature of Opoyaz Formalism be duly appreciated (cf. chapter 4).
One could say that Opoyaz Formalism outgrew literary scholarship; that it developed a
convoluted yet illuminating philosophy of science (for the philosophical underpinnings of
Opoyaz theory compared with DR, as articulated by Moretti, cf. chapters 4, 5, and 6). Perhaps
the Opoyazians could be ranked together with such twentieth century philosophers of science as

222

Tynianov, PILK, 258.
83

Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and others. If so, it is no wonder then that scholars of (Opoyaz)
Formalism—from Bakhtin and Medvedev to Aage A. Hansen-Löve—have been tempted to
write about it using its own terminology. This proves that Opoyaz Formalism can be not only the
object of inquiry but also its method.
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche tells a parable that fully captures the idea of this
chapter if applied to Opoyaz Formalism. Nietzsche writes that Socrates, who had always been a
proponent of science and an enemy of poetic fury, finally gave in to music, which he was unable
to rationalize and yet admired, thus turning into “the music-playing Socrates.”223 In this parable,
music symbolizes that elusive essence of art which makes even a great scholar admit, as
Shklovsky said, that one’s “craft is cleverer” than the one who deals with it.224
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CHAPTER THREE
OPOYAZ FORMALISM, DR, AND MASS LITERATURE 225
“The machine changes man more than anything else.”226
—Viktor Shklovsky
3.1. Opoyaz Formalism’s Turn to Literary Sociology

When it showed its full might in the twentieth century, mass culture posed a serious
threat to traditional aesthetics. Omnipresent and omnipotent, mass culture affected all spheres of
life, and in literature as everywhere, “a sudden revulsion of quantity into quality” took place
according to the Hegelian dialectic.227 The rapid growth of the cultural market altered modes of
producing, receiving, and judging art. Appeals to beauty and good taste now felt hopelessly
archaic, agreeable but useless—like decrepit craftsmen’s workshops in comparison with newlybuilt factories. The Russian poet Maximilian Voloshin, famous for his poetic insight, eloquently
expressed the idea in 1922:
Machine taught man
[. . .]
That genius is obsolete, that culture
Equals necessities increased in number,
That the ideal
Is surfeit and success,
That there exists a single global stomach,
And that, apart from it, there are no gods.228
The assembly line society privileged its new institutions over the old ones, and the patron of the
Parts of this chapter are a revised version of my article—cf. Basil Lvoff, “When Theory
Entered the Market: The Russian Formalists’ Non-Marxian Approach to Mass Culture,”
Ulbandus Review, A Culture of Institutions / Institutions of Culture, vol. 17 (2016); hereafter
Lvoff, When Theory.
226
Viktor Shklovsky, Zoo, ili pis’ma ne o liubvi, in Yuri Tynianov and Viktor Shklovsky, Proza
(Moscow: Slovo, 2001), 646. Hereafter Shklovsky, Zoo.
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Georg W. F. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel: Translated from the Encyclopaedia of the
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Maximilian Voloshin, Putiami Kaina: Tragediia material’noi kul’tury in Maximilian
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Lak 2000,” 2004), 32. Hereafter Voloshin.
225

85

arts changed: no longer a single connoisseur expecting art to edify and treat him to its subtleties
but the faceless masses of workers with their urgent necessity for respite from hard,
dehumanizing work. In this brave new world, the muses of old art were driven out by the culture
industry—as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno christened the new cultural order in their
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944).
Horkheimer and Adorno are justly ranked among the first scholars of mass culture,
having deduced the theorem: “The budgeted differences of value in the culture industry have
nothing to do with actual differences, with the meaning of the product itself.”229 Today, the
Frankfurt School’s Marxian approach to mass culture is considered classic. Much less known are
the writings of Opoyazians devoted to the same problem. These works challenge the
stereotypical view of RF as a Russian precursor of New Criticism—a gross oversimplification.
For the Formalists were more interested in analyzing the dialectical development of literary
modes of representation than in close readings of texts. More importantly, however, these
Formalist works offer an original, non-Marxian approach to the extremely topical problem of
mass culture.
Still faithful to literature’s literariness, the Opoyaz Formalists studied the laws whereby
literature and social life correlate, but their victories and defeats in this area, outside of Slavic
departments, are insufficiently known by scholars, including the Digital Humanists. Otherwise,
Moretti and his colleagues would have long been engaged in a theoretical dialogue with them.
The first reason why the Opoyazians’ literary sociology is understudied is the anti-sociological
bent of early Opoyaz Formalism, so fervently articulated that it had become almost inextricable
from it; the second is Viktor Shklovsky’s public denial of Formalist doctrine in favor of Marxism
229

Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical
Fragments (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 98. Hereafter Horkheimer and Adorno.
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in 1930.
In the mid-1910s, newborn Opoyaz Formalism, insisted on separating art from social life.
It argued that in everyday life, with its everyday language and thinking, both the word and the
world are reduced to operable, uniform concepts, in order that consumption and communication
of information can dominate. Conversely, in art, experience matters most. Concentrating on
expression, art rehabilitates the word and the world, and thus our perception of them by restoring
their original complexity and inexhaustibility. At the core of these views was the Opoyazians’
rejection of the form-content binary. Instead, they spoke of art as form and life as material.230
From their perspective, the form of an artwork, the way in which a particular work finds
expression, was its real and unique message. The ideas and events that the work expresses (its
material) were secondary in importance and auxiliary to form.231 Roughly speaking, early
Formalism saw the relationship of the work’s material to its form like that of the alphabet to a
word or a pebble to a mosaic: that is, material can be artistically present only when it is
expressed in form. Yet already in the mid-1920s, the Formalists modified their stance. Though
their understanding of form remained the same—as a hierarchy of principles whereby the work
structurally exists—they reappraised the role of material, conceding that it could play an active
part in the work’s formation.
An example of this change is Shklovsky’s 1928 book Material and Style in Leo Tolstoy’s
Novel “War and Peace” (Mater’ial i stil’ v romane L’va Tolstogo “Voina i mir”). Shklovsky
shows how Tolstoy, while writing his novel about the Russian war with Napoleon, delved deeply
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This does not exhaust the concept of material in Formalism. The term also means the medium
in which a certain art is realized; for literature, it is language. Cf. Bakhtin / Medvedev, 104–128.
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This statement was both novel and traditional, if one remembers Aristotle, for whom matter
existed by being realized through form. For a more recent application of Aristotelian theory of
causality to art, cf. 5.3.
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into historical documents—only to distort them. Concerning this, Shklovsky states that Tolstoy
wished to idealize his own social group, the Russian nobility, because the nobility was under
attack due to both Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War and rising opposition from the plebian
intelligentsia (raznochintsy) at the time when Tolstoy began writing the novel. However,
Tolstoy’s inclusion of documentary materials affected his style, leading to such sociologically
dense “psychological characteristics” and historico-philosophical digressions that the focus was
often shifted away from the twists and turns of Tolstoy’s plotlines. This violated the canonical
form of the novel at that time,232 and in turn, made Tolstoy’s work aesthetically, and in the eyes
of his contemporaries, ideologically radical, akin to the work of raznochinets writers, such as
Nikolay Chernyshevsky. In Victor Erlich’s succinct account of Shklovsky’s book, “Tolstoj’s
[aristocratic] class bias compelled him to distort or color historical truth,” but “this deformation
was in turn deformed and modified by the exigencies of the medium Tolstoj chose to employ.”233
Erlich believes that this book shows Shklovsky “caught between militant Formalism and
a somewhat ill-digested Marxism.”234 Ill-digested or not, Shklovsky’s approach was anything but
a combination of the two.235 His work was still fundamentally non-Marxian, because in the
Viktor Shklovsky, Mater’ial i stil’ v romane L’va Tolstogo “Voina i mir” (Moscow:
Federatsiia, 1928), 239. Hereafter Shklovsky, Mater’ial.
233
Erlich, RF, 122–123.
234
Ibid., 125.
235
The Formalists, who also referred to themselves as specifiers, considered eclecticism a mortal
sin. The most articulate expression of this idea can be found in Eikhenbaum, Vokrug, written as
part of his paper war with Marxist critics, including Leon Trotsky, who at some point suggested
that the Formal method could be an auxiliary to Marxist literary scholarship. Eikhenbaum wrote
that a synthesis would be detrimental to the Formalists and the Marxists alike as both schools
should be consistent in explaining the world based on their unique doctrines. Any compromise
between the two (the Formalists conceding that sometimes art is determined by social life and the
Marxists conceding that sometimes the base does not determine the superstructure) would only
weaken them. That is why the Formalists did not accept a rather insightful attempt of Pavel
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struggle between the base (Tolstoy’s class) and the superstructure (Tolstoy’s art), it was the
latter, in Shklovsky’s opinion, that prevailed. What changed, however, is that Shklovsky kept the
promise he made two years earlier in his book, Third Factory, where he advocated occasional
employment of Marxist principles, in this case the theory of class struggle: “We are not Marxists,
but if we need this utensil in our household, we will not eat with our bare hands out of spite.”236
Nevertheless, Shklovsky’s contemporaries did not take this maxim to heart, and the Marxist
critic Isaak Nusinov, for instance, wrote a review of Material and Style unambiguously titled
“Belated Discoveries; or, how V. Shklovsky Got Tired of Eating with Bare Formalist Hands and
Provided Himself with a Homemade Marxist Spoon.”237
It was hard at that time, and probably still is, to believe in the sincerity of Shklovsky’s
statements—because of his deliberately provocative declarations made in the early days of
Opoyaz Formalism. For example, his belief that what really matters is “art as device” whereas
“that which is made in art is unimportant.” 238 To understand Shklovsky’s position, which made
him overstate the freedom of art from any social influence, it is necessary to remember that in the
1910s, when literary scholarship was largely dominated by positivism and literary criticism by
the impressionists, “Formalist a-sociologism,” as Erlich justly remarks, “was a matter of
methodological expedience.”239 The Opoyazians felt that Russian scholars and critics had not
discussed literature professionally, on its own terms, since the end of the Golden Age of Russian
literature—when Pushkin and his contemporaries, eager to establish a great national literature,
were riveted to formal matters. With time, however, the achievements of that era had been
Shklovsky, Tret’ia, 88.
Isaak Nusinov, “Zapozdalye otkrytiia, ili kak V. Shklovskomu nadoelo est’ golymi
formalistskimi rukami i on obzavelsia samodel’noi marksistskoi lozhkoi,” Literatura i marksizm,
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largely forgotten, and, spurred on by severe censorship, ideological criticism flourished, and
even employed literature as the grounds for political debates.240 Thus, it is clear why the
Opoyazians initially fought against a sociological stance on literature, but as they moved
forward, they attempted to resolve the problem of literature vís-à-vís social life. The immediate
reason for the change was the new market reality the Opoyazians confronted at the turn of the
1920s, described below. However, as chapter two demonstrated, the Opoyazians did not rest in
the ivory tower of pure aesthetics. Combining scholarship with literary journalism and creative
writing, Shklovsky, Tynianov, and Eikhenbaum were compelled to check their hypotheses
against the literary lifeblood of the epoch pulsing through their veins. They saw literature as ever
mutable and did not want theory to lag behind it, which is why they accepted the challenge of the
emergent market more readily than did the Marxian critics or other rivals.
It was the Opoyazians’ readiness to confront change that made them endure a series of
theoretical crises, especially in the mid-1920s. However, this was not a marker of their demise
but a turning point of Opoyaz Formalism’s evolution, and from the mid-1920s onwards some of
its most compelling hypotheses were advanced. Yet instead of appreciating the Opoyazians’ turn
to sociological problems, as in Shklovsky’s monograph on Tolstoy, the majority of contemporary
critics saw it as cunning motivated by weakness.
Those who saw it this way felt that their suspicions were confirmed when Shklovsky
publicly recanted Formalism and acknowledged the superiority of Marxism in his 1930 article “A
Monument to a Scientific Error.” “My error,” Shklovsky wrote, “consisted in [. . .] trying to study
works of art as a closed system, regardless of its [this closed system’s] correlation with the whole

Cf. Jakobson, Formal’naia, lecture 1, in which Jakonson argues that formalism was
characteristic of the Russian outlook on art from the very outset, all the way to the 1830s, when
Belinsky and his allies changed the status quo.
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system of literature and with the basic culture-forming economic order (kul’turoobrazuiushchii
ekonomicheskii riad).”241 The contrast between these words and Shklovsky’s earlier works
(especially in Knight’s Move) could hardly have been starker.242
People distant from Opoyaz Formalism are tempted to see this change of stance as the
failure of Formalism. Yet those with close knowledge of Opoyaz Formalism justly observe that it
had no choice but to surrender, since the storm of Stalinism had already been gathering. This led
the critics of Opoyaz Formalism to the conclusion that Shklovsky, who was an unexcelled master
of irony, did not fully mean whatever he wrote about the sociology of literature.243
And yet, as Richard Sheldon has demonstrated,244 so great was Shklovsky’s irony that his
recantation was both a fake, “ostensible surrender” (the title of Sheldon’s article) and a point-blank
statement of Shklovsky’s beliefs, which remained Formalist. The name of Shklovsky’s article,
Sheldon observes, was itself ironic because it alluded to Jules Romains’s novel Donogoo Tonka,
whose plot might provide insights into Shklovsky’s thinking. The protagonist of Romains’s novel
is a renowned geographer whose career is in danger because his book contains a map with a
nonexistent South American city called Donogoo Tonka. To save the situation, he decides to travel
to the geographic location where the city should be and actually build a city named Donogoo
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Tonka. But, to his surprise, when he arrives, the task has already been done by his followers who
were eager to find the city they had seen on the map. A monument to the geographer’s scientific
error is erected in the city. Applied to Shklovsky, this could be read as follows: he erred but, when
rectifying the error (which consisted in providing a flawed foundation for his arguments), he
actually strengthened the foundation of his “heresy.” In the article, Shklovsky only said that he
would not like “to stand as a monument to his own error,” but he preferred not to say anything
about the irony of this image.245
Moreover, Shklovsky repeated in the 1930 article the theses of his Tolstoy book and other
sociology-oriented works of the Opoyaz period. And while he stated now that “in order to study
literary evolution [. . .] it is necessary to become familiar with the Marxist method in its entirety,”
in the subsequent two sentences he said, ostensibly humbled and covertly irreverent: “I am not
declaring myself a Marxist of course, because one does not join scholarly methods. / One masters
and creates them.”246 Finally, when repenting his attempts “to study works of art as a closed
system,”247 he did not say anything entirely new. One year before, in a letter to Tynianov, he had
already criticized early Opoyaz Formalism’s anti-sociological “position,” calling it “antediluvian”;
but instead of abandoning Formalism, in that letter, Shklovsky discussed its future development.248
Shklovsky wrote this letter when Tynianov was in Prague with Roman Jakobson.
Tynianov’s sojourn resulted in the nine theses he and Jakobson wrote (cf. 2.4). The theses tried
to move Opoyaz research in a new direction: to study the systems of literature, of language, and
of social and economic life no longer separately but by finding the laws governing their
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correlation. Though novel, this systematic approach had been anticipated as early as in
Tynianov’s Formalist classic—his 1924 article “On Literary Fact.” Tynianov and Jakobson’s
project could have been the next step in Formalism’s evolution. Due to political circumstances, it
did not happen, but the endeavor itself clearly shows one thing. Despite the Formalists’ natural
interest in Marxist scholarship, they did not depend on it as much as Shklovsky claimed. They
were working on an alternative, all-embracing theory, whose main difference was that, unlike
Marxism, it came from the assumption that all spheres of life are mainly governed by their own,
internal laws.
3.2. The Opoyaz Concept of Literaturnyi Byt
“At this moment, I need time and a reader. I want to write about unfreedom,
Smirdin’s salary books, magazines’ influence on literature, and [. . .] life.”
—Viktor Shklovsky249
One of the indicators of change in Opoyaz theory is the concept of byt. Though a cognate
of the English to be, it does not mean existence—unlike its lofty paronym bytie. The most
accurate translation of byt might be “everyday life”; it is sometimes translated as “mores.” As
mentioned above, Opoyaz Formalism set out by opposing art to everyday existence. Later, the
Opoyaz understanding of byt changed together with Opoyaz theory, which reassessed the literary
everyday as a sometimes-active factor in literary evolution.
The twenties in Russia witnessed the return of automatization, the return of byt. At some
point, it had seemed to be gone. For, even though it was the mechanization of life and human
perception that made possible the Great War and the Russian revolution, the war machine undid
the very everyday life from which it had emerged by sowing destruction. In an Opoyazian’s own
words, “the main difference between revolutionary life and habitual existence [was] that now
249
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everything [was] felt (oshchushchat’sia). Life became art.”250 However, when matters quieted
down, byt returned, catalyzed by the New Economic Policy, which was implemented at the time.
The Bolsheviks saw NEP as a necessary evil, as Lenin explained: “The New Economic Policy
means that the grain levy (prodrazverstka) is replaced with a tax and that, to a considerable
extent, capitalism is being restored. To what extent, we do not know”;251 “the private market has
overpowered us.”252
The return of the market affected art. A demand for mass literature appeared. Before the
revolution, when Russian literature of the Silver Age flourished, the market was easier to ignore.
But now the intelligentsia (let alone the aristocracy) had shrunk so much that it no longer
determined the literary situation. A great many serious writers lost their readers, and this had an
impact on the whole industry.
For some time, a degree of inertia remained in the Opoyazians’ statements, as in
Shklovsky’s preface to his Theory of Prose: “My task in the theory of literature is to study its
inner laws. To draw a parallel with a factory, I am interested not in the state of affairs on the
world cotton market, and not in the policy of its trusts, but only in the count of yarn and the ways
of weaving it.”253 However, the articles Shklovsky and his fellow Opoyazian wrote about the
crisis of literature suggested otherwise: the market became a great obstacle to Opoyaz
Formalism, and counting yarn could suffice no longer.
In 1924, Tynianov described the crisis of literature as follows:
Writers write joylessly, as if they were moving rocks. With even less joy, the publisher
rolls these stones to the publishing house, and it is with total aloofness that the reader
looks at them both. Everybody can see the writer, who writes; some see the publisher,
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who publishes, but it seems as though nobody sees the reader who would read. What
distinguishes today’s reader is precisely the fact that he does not read.254
And yet the reader did read, of which Tynianov was perfectly aware. It was just that Russian
writers and publishers felt uninvolved. The face of Russian literature was no longer Russian, or,
as Shklovsky said, it was hard to recognize because now “Jack London, O. Henry, and Pierre
Benoit [were] the most widely read Russian writers.”255 That is to say, foreign writers ousted
their Russian peers from the market. The market was inundated with adventure novels, so
numerous and, paradoxically, so similar in their plots’ eventfulness (which readers craved
regardless of “the meaning of the product itself”) that Shklovsky saw it as automatization
incarnate.256 Typical of this trend was the author of Tarzan novels Edgar Rice Burroughs.
Shklovsky must have felt the bitter irony of the situation, for in 1921 (before the boom of
mass literature) he had pinned his hopes on the Serapion Brothers—the literary movement he
promoted as its senior member.257 The Serapions did not have a doctrine, but their goal was to
create dynamic literature that would overcome the inertia of automatization. One of the strategies
for doing this was writing plot-driven literature, which they thought Russia had always lacked,
having to learn from Western writers. Despite the fact that the Serapions such as Lev Lunts or
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Veniamin Kaverin penned some plot-driven stories of high literary quality, this technique was
soon compromised—“cracked” by the market and put on the production line.
Other theorists, as sophisticated as the Opoyazians, could have stigmatized this new
literature as unworthy of attention. Yet the Opoyazians disagreed. Shklovsky wrote: “Tarzan
may be ignored, and this will be traditional but silly. It is necessary to study mass literature and
the causes of its success.”258 However, before the Opoyazians wrote their works devoted to the
problem of the market, an extraordinary event in the history of literary scholarship took place. It
can be argued that Shklovsky began to solve this problem not in theory but in practice. To
understand the market, he—by that time an established author but not popular with the masses—
undertook to write an adventure novel exactly like those about Tarzan. The 1925 novel, titled
Yperite, was coauthored by the Serapion Brother Vsevolod Ivanov, but, for brevity’s sake, it is
discussed here in relation to Shklovsky alone. However, before more is said, it is important to
stress: because Yperite was written at the zenith and as part of mass literature of the time of NEP,
it should be viewed as distinct from Shklovsky and the Serapions’ earlier plan of plot-driven
literature. The latter simply withstood automatization, whereas Ivanov and Shklovsky’s project
embraced automatization, hoping to be able to turn it around.
The plot of Yperite—so cinematographically eventful and defiantly inconsistent—would
require several pages to summarize.259 It flaunts the clichés of the day. The novel describes a
Viktor Shklovsky, “Tarzan,” Russkii sovremennik, no. 3 (1924): 253–254. Novels and films
about Tarzan were exceptionally popular with the mass audiences at that time.
259
The connection between the kind of mass literature discussed here and cinema, still a young
medium in the 1920s, is well known. It is noteworthy that, while Adorno and Horkheimer scold
movies as such in their Dialectic of Enlightenment, considering them as commodities rather than
artworks, the Opoyazians embrace cinema and are among its earliest theoreticians and critics—
cf. a brief list of primary sources at the end of this footnote. Cinema helped the Opoyazians
understand universal narrative techniques. Cf., e.g., Shklovsky’s comparison of listing “tasks”
and obstacles at the beginning of fairy tales, adventure and chivalric romances, as a “motivation
for the creation of the conditions that require clarification” with “that which in the poetics of
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chemical world war between the Western capitalists and the Soviets. These and other elements of
science fiction (à la H. G. Wells) abound in Yperite, reflecting the sensationalism of the Soviet
newspapers of the day. New York, for example, mechanically heats its own atmosphere while
the famed London fogs are drained into a smog sewer system, and the provincial-sounding
Russian city Ipatievsk (which does not exist in reality) has skyscrapers. The events described are
perfectly preposterous, including endless fights and chase scenes. The protagonist, named
Slovokhotov (which could be translated as Bigmouth), is a Russian fugitive sailor accompanied
by a trained bear. At some point, escaping a legion of enemies, the sailor and the bear get on an
ocean liner with bourgeois passengers and sink it, after which these two reach dry land,
whereupon they encounter a beautiful young girl whom Slovokhotov saves from a walrus. The
girl takes him for Tarzan and covers the naked Slovokhotov (who previously lost his clothes)
with a tiger pelt that she happened to have with her (apparently, a mocking reference to Tarzan’s
loincloth). Some time later, a painfully banal and also ironic “movie shot” follows: “A handsome
young man in a tiger pelt/cloth is at the wheel, driving with one hand and embracing the waist of

cinematograph is called ‘passage,’ i.e., the scene without its own significance, used for
preparation” (Shklovsky, OTP 1929, 46). Moreover, analyzing the specificity of cinema as
against that of literature put both on trial (cf. Tynianov’s “Kino – slovo – muzyka,” in Tynianov,
PILK). What matters, however, is that the Opoyazians’ early preoccupation with cinema testified
to the catholicity of their outlook, prepared for the challenge of art’s massification. It is
noteworthy that for Moretti cinema already served as a model to explain why certain authors, and
not their competitors, become selected by the market—cf. Moretti’s references to the economists
Arthur de Vany and W. David Walls’ “model for the film industry”—Moretti, DR, 69; also cf.
Moretti’s “Planet Hollywood” (in Moretti, DR), in which the migration of genres is studied.
Finally, the attention of Morettian and Opoyazian formalisms to cinema testifies to the kind of
universality that goes beyond language and other local, untranslatable, features.
For the Opoyazians’ works devoted to cinema, cf. Boris Eikhenbaum, ed., Poetika kino
(St. Petersburg: RIII, 2001); Shklovsky, Literatura i kinematograf; Viktor Shklovsky, Za 60 let.
Raboty o kino (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1985; hereafter Shklovsky, Za 60 let); Viktor Shklovsky, Za
40 let. Stat’i o kino (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1965); Viktor Shklovsky, “O zakonakh kino,” Russkii
sovremennik, no. 1 (1924); hereafter, Shklovsky, O zakonakh); Tynianov, PILK.
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his female companion with the other.”260 Later in the novel, the young girl takes Slovokhotov
and his bear to England, where the bear starts drinking because of homesickness.
The list could go on and on, but the point is that even to a reader modestly acquainted
with Shklovsky’s work, it is obvious that the book is a parody, and Shklovsky reminds the reader
of it constantly. He does this by baring the device, undermining the already evanescent
verisimilitude of the plot, as when he mentions the contemporary writer Boris Pilniak, whose
disconnected narrative style Shklovsky attacked in critical articles: “The secretary spoke like
Pilniak: the blizzard. The snow. Wolves. Mother Russia.”261
Yperite was not a success, but the failure was important because it allowed Shklovsky to
experience the resistance of the newly established literary “economy.”262 The market played an
260
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The problem of the standpoints from which success and failure may be defined, often in
diametrically opposed ways, is analyzed in the following chapter. Meanwhile, Evgeny
Peremyshlev (“Dvoinoi portret,” Opojaz.ru, October 7, 2005, accessed March 12, 2020,
http://www.opojaz.ru/shklovsky/double_portret.html) does not consider Yperite’s failure a
failure:
Alreadt later, Vs. Ivanov considered Yperite as an obvious failure, though he
conceded that the novel had taught him to “create the plot.” Now, looking back, one can
see: there turned out to be more achievements and gains than failures in that work—a
new method of the formation of literary and biographical material was tested; here, too,
there emerged a “double portrait” of Vs. Ivanov and Shklovsky, albeit only a sketch of it;
for the first time, showing through parody and travesty, stood a serious and scientific
phenomenon, later called “literary personality.”
B. M. Eikhenbaum’s article “The Literary Everyday” saw the light of day only in
1927; meanwhile, the authors of Yperite, each in his own way, had already been
constructing their own “personalities.” Vs. Ivanov came up with endless versions of his
autobiography and with “self-portraits”; Shklovsky was busy creating an image of the
author in his books and acted in unusual ways in public.
Meanwhile, Shklovsky admitted that, while Yperite was originally intended to be a hackwork, it
ended up not so bad at all—cf. Alexander Galushkin, “Razgovory s Viktorom Shklovskim,”
Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, vol. 131, no. 1 (2015).
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ironic trick on him again. First, it appropriated Shklovsky and the Serapions’ project of plotdriven literature, having immediately automatized it, while in this case, the market not only
absorbed Shklovsky’s move but also anticipated it, for Yperite was far from being the only
attempt to outwit the market. Mariia Malikova writes that the twenties witnessed the rise of
adventure novels authored by professional and sometimes refined Russian writers who had lost
their old readers and had to survive by emulating their Western colleagues and even by passing
off their own work as translations of Western originals.263 Like Shklovsky and Ivanov, many of
these writers, if not most of them, hinted at the real state of affairs, resorting to irony, hoping to
be heard and excused, but for the market it mattered little.264 Such undertones of meaning265
were indistinct to the masses—just as were the undertones of classical operas absorbed by the
never-abating radio broadcasts, to use Horkheimer and Adorno’s example.
A theoretical leap was needed to reckon with this new reality, and Eikhenbaum made it in
his theory of literature and the literary everyday, put forth in the eponymous article of 1927.
Though simple at first blush, this theory bespoke a complex philosophy of literature that had
always been latent in Opoyaz Formalism. Eikhenbaum wrote that while Pushkin’s iambic
tetrameter, for instance, had nothing to do with the “socioeconomic conditions of the [. . .]
epoch,” Pushkin’s engagement in journalism that helped to establish new literary genres was the
result of a socioeconomic shift—the commercialization and professionalization of the literary
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métier, made possible by the growth of capitalism in Russia.266
Eikhenbaum’s theory, claiming that sometimes the everyday affects literature, may have
seemed inconsistent with the Opoyazians’ earlier works, which is why some of his students did
not accept it at first.267 Eikhenbaum’s new theory was liable to the same accusation that he had
leveled at Sakulin—that of unprincipled eclecticism. And yet it was in keeping with Opoyaz
understanding of literature as a self-evolving system (cf. 6.5). It is important to stress that the
theory of the literary everyday did not argue for any direct influence of socioeconomic life on
literature. The ones affected were the author and the reader; their social behavior changed the
environment around literary evolution but not the evolution itself.268 To use another evolutionary
metaphor, the role of socioeconomic life in literature—in such epochs as the 1920s—could be
compared to that which a meteor supposedly played in the evolution of life on this planet, by
putting an end to the dinosaurs’ existence. The meteor’s impact on evolution was immense;
however, life adapted to the new environment according to its internal, evolutionary, laws, not
according to the laws of physics that had determined the meteor’s trajectory from outer space.
This very important analogy will henceforward be referred to in this dissertation as the meteor
factor.
It was also in 1927 that Tynianov’s article “On Literary Evolution,” addressed to
Eikhenbaum,269 advanced the like-minded idea of literature as not a monolith but a compound
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structure whose parts evolve unevenly (cf. 2.4):
The system (sistema) of the literary series (riad) is first and foremost the system of the
functions of the literary series, ever correlating with the other series. The composition of
the series changes, but the differentiation of human activities remains. Literary evolution,
just as that of the other culture series with which it correlates, concurs with them neither
in pace nor in character (due to the specificity of the material with which it operates).270
What this quotation shows is that the Opoyazians reconsidered, from the standpoint of form, not
just the object of their discipline but the very optics of it. They were able to see literature not
merely as the “content” of literary scholarship but primarily as an ever-shifting modus operandi
of poetic functions. Literary scholarship, then, was not about some texts that were by default
considered as literary but about the means whereby these texts become felt as literary (i.e., felt as
a literary fact, viz., a dynamic speech construction, according to Tynianov). Literature as a
compound of poetic functions was not the content but the form of the discipline devoted to it,271
spreading above and marshalling different kinds of material, sometimes that of the other systemforms. A case in point is the theory of factography (literatura fakta), developed by the
Opoyazians partly together, partly alongside the Lef theorists; this theory regarded documentary
and journalistic genres as a kind of literature—at that time, in the 1920s, given the disposition of
content between the system-forms of literature, economics, psychology, social history, etc. etc.
270
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and New York: BPS Books, 2015; hereafter Eric McLuhan, Sensus Communis), 11)

Tynianov speaks of differentiation; the system, i.e., form, should then itself be seen as a device
of difference, the latter understood as a principle of recategorization, from the standpoint of the
dynamic (or else, defamiliarized) speech construction.
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That is why Eikhenbaum’s analysis of Pushkin’s journalistic work and his students’ attention to
the amount of money a writer was paid (cf. the next section), was not renegade, albeit fraught
with misunderstanding and misapplication, resulting in a breach of the specificity of literary
scholarship.
Eikhenbaum’s literary everyday and Tynianov’s understanding of literary evolution as a
consequence of the series’, systems’, interaction, hence the reshuffling of content between
them—both were predicated on the idea of the “system of systems,” advanced by Tynianov and
Jakobson.272 There is a temptation to see the “system of systems” as an attempt to make amends
and stop underestimating the significance of the economic or psychological aspects of literature;
a temptation to see it as an attempt of the Opoyazians to overcome the narrowness of scholarship
to which they pledged allegiance; a temptation to interpret the search for the “system of systems”
as the Opoyazians’ belated giving up of their methodological stubbornness and a prologue to
Structuralism. Yet the “system of systems” could be seen conversely. Metaphorically speaking, it
could be seen as the Opoyazians’ coming to terms with the cycles of the sun and the rotation of
the Earth and other planets, in order to understand when the sun of literariness beams down on
one thing or another, rendering it literary, or when, as in the moment of crises, a planet blocks it
and causes an eclipse, i.e., a system breakdown, like the one analyzed in this chapter. Tihanov’s
272

Tynianov, PILK, 283. David Duff writes:
Such acute insights and daring lines of thought do not accord well with customary
perceptions of Tynianov as the rigid system-builder among the Russian formalists.
Though committed to systematic explanation and capable of feats of abstraction that
exceed those of most of his readers, he is anything but the arid theorist as which he is
sometimes portrayed. His vision of literature as a vast, evolving “system of systems” in
which every part is in dynamic tension with other parts is not a misguided attempt to
impose artificial unity on the chaotic diversity of creative experience, but an inspired
effort to uncover some of the hidden laws about how literature works. (David Duff,
“Maximal Tensions and Minimal Conditions: Tynianov as Genre Theorist,” New Literary
History, vol. 34, no. 3 (2003): 561)
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term “regimes of relevance”273 sums up this idea; to repeat the words already cited in chapter two:
“The evolution of the constructive function goes by rapidly; the evolution of the literary
function, from one epoch to another; the evolution of the functions of literary series as a whole in
its relation to other series, for centuries.”274
This also helps see a fundamental difference between the Opoyazians and Moretti.
Moretti’s fascination with “the great unread” is a fascination with encompassing all of literature:
“[F]or me, the aim is not so much a change in the canon—the discovery of precursors of the
canon or alternatives to it [. . .] as a change in how we look at all of literary history: canonical
and noncanonical: together.”275 The Opoyazians, frugal in the works they analyzed (as against
the omnivorous positivists), were primarily interested in all that was, is, or may become (and
then quite likely cease to be) literature.
One thing is certain: the study of “the system of systems” and the discovery of the literary
everyday made it possible to account for the socioeconomic factor in the literary evolution of
literature. Due to objective, pan-systemic, reasons analyzed at the outset of this chapter, there
was high demand (or a social mandate as the theorists of Lef would say)276 for theorizing the
interdependency of literature and its readership(s), the phenomenon of mass vs. “high” literature
being a special case of this problem. Satisfying this demand, “Academia,” the same press that
published the Formalists’ books, released Levin L. Schücking’s The Sociology of Literary Taste,
Cf. Galin Tihanov, “Why Did Modern Literary Theory Originate in Central and Eastern
Europe? (And Why Is It Now Dead?),” Common Knowledge, vol. 10, no. 1 (2004). Cf. Galin
Tihanov, The Birth and Death of Literary Theory: Regimes of Relevance in Russia and Beyond
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019).
274
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prefaced by Viktor Zhirmunsky. Zhirmunsky, who shared much with the Opoyazians but was
considerably less radical, introduced Schücking’s book as an alternative to the extremely
elaborate, if not plainly casuistic, literary sociology of the Opoyazians:
The questions posed in Schücking’s book overlap with the problem of “the literary
everyday,” currently being elaborated by B. M. Eikhenbaum. Yet Schücking’s scholarly
interests are broader by far, while his choice of subject matter is determined by a
rigorously thought-through and substantiated methodological system. From this
standpoint, the issues of the writers’ professional routine (“the literary everyday”) are
only an element of the social everyday, which, according to Schücking, determines the
evolution of the artistic taste in sociologically differentiated groups of readers.277
Schücking was a model German professor278—a voice of common sense, which surely does not
guarantee rectitude. Common sense does not necessarily have more sense—it is simply more
common, whereas Opoyaz scholarship started beyond common sense, beyond the consensual (cf.
chapter 6). For this reason, Schücking has to become one of the characters of this and the next
chapter: he is the litmus paper that reveals the different qualities of those Formalists to whom
this manuscript is devoted.
It is noteworthy that a balanced argument for the influence of social tastes on literary
development came not from the Soviet Marxists but from a foreigner, Schücking, through a
moderate Formalist, Zhirmunsky. Moreover, the (in)famous Literary Encyclopedia279 criticized
Schücking in Alexander Tseitlin’s entry about the “Pre-Marxian Methods of Literary
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Qtd. in Levin Schücking, Sotsiologiia literaturnogo vkusa. S prilozheniem statei Shekspir kak
narodnyi dramaturg, Sem’ia kak faktor evoliutsii vkusov, trans. B. Ia. Geiman and N. Ia.
Berkovsky (Leningrad: Academia, 1928), 11.
278
The Opoyazians, albeit indebted to people like Oskar Walzel and Eduard Sievers, did not
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Tynianov, PILK, 515).
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Scholarship” as a representative of the “peculiar sociologism” of “bourgeois German literary
scholarship.”280 Evgeny Dobrenko writes about the reception of Schücking in the late 1920s:
The German professor’s discourses on the Renaissance or the era of Biedermayer, and on
the audience’s reception of Shakespeare’s or Dante’s works, seemed immeasurably
remote from the “tasks of the day” or from “the present situation.” Comparing the paths
of inquiry in Europe and in Revolution-era Russia, one understands that two completely
different things were perceived in one and the same “object”: one side saw in the reader
an object to be studied, and the other, an object to be influenced (“remade,” “reforged,”
or “shaped”). And in this, precisely, lay the fundamental reason why, despite the presence
of generative ideas, despite the enormous interest in the reader and the scope of the
studies of him in the 1920s, a theory of reading could nonetheless not be formulated into
a theory as such: under the conditions of the grandiose social experiment, there was no
time for the “second firing” of the theory. It was only needed as a practical
methodology.281
Schücking’s common sense with its “bourgeois” observations about the correlation of
social life and literary tastes was insufficiently radical both for the Opoyazians and the Soviet
Marxist critics. Interestingly, Yarkho, though meticulous in analyzing every conceivable level of
literature as it evolves, did not concern himself with the problem of the market. First of all,
Yarkho was more concerned with older and more reputable literature than Tarzan. Secondly, he
could worry about the audience less than the Opoyazians and especially the Marxists thanks to
his method of inferring the evolution of literature from its statistics, discussed in chapter one.
Lastly, Yarkho was loath to think of literature in terms of some social demand for it (again, it
should be remembered that natural, not social sciences, were his model for literary scholarship).
That also is the reason why Yarkho, despite his major significance for the topic of this
dissertation, features little in the present discussion. Judging by his published work, he did not
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tackle the problem of the market, discussed in this and the following chapters, even though his
method did provide the statistical instruments that could be used to this end, with the Opoyaz
theory or without it—a fascinating topic for a study beyond the purview of this manuscript.
Yarkho’s unwillingness to analyze the tastes of the audience in order to understand
literary evolution was rather traditionalist. “It is natural for a writer to follow the tastes and
habits he acquired in his cultural milieu, but we have no grounds to believe that each time, he
looks up to the opinion of his milieu. On the contrary, he participates, through his new
proportions and combinations (svoimi novymi proportsiiami i kombinatsiiami) [i.e., as a
“species” contributing certain properties to literary life], in forming the tastes of that milieu,”
Yarkho writes.282 In his opinion, Schücking proceeds from the theory of the social mandate;
meanwhile, Yarkho objects to the logic behind this term:
As a matter of fact, “social mandate” is only a metaphor and a most unfortunate one at
that. Were those who brought it into use at least a little bit interested in economics, about
which they harangue so much, they would see that in 999 cases out of 1000, the author
works not “to order” but “to supply”—a fundamental difference. “Order” implies that the
ordering customer knows the sample of the work, whereas the collective has no idea of
what the author will offer it.283
Moreover, Yarkho says that the most deserving literary works are seldom made to order:
“Literary works made to order, are very rare and mainly belong to the lowest levels of literary
creativity, to the stenciled twaddle of newspapers, but no one ordered either Eugene Onegin or
The Dead Souls, for ‘ordering’ something of the sort would require having genius almost equal
to that of Pushkin and Gogol.”284 As can be seen, for Yarkho there is a hierarchy of literature,
just as there is for Schücking (who favors such established geniuses as Shakespeare and Goethe
and rejects the esoteric decadents of his time), just as for the Soviet Marxists (their yardstick
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being more ideological, class-struggle oriented, rather than aesthetic), and just as for the
Frankfurt critics, of course.285 The only real difference are the Opoyazians, whose vision of
literature, as the rest of the dissertation will show, was considerably more dynamic.
The proposition of Osip Brik that “had Pushkin never lived, Eugene Onegin would have
still been written” has already been discussed in section 2.4, and its contradiction to Yarkho’s
statement that takes the greatness of Onegin for granted is obvious.286 This, however, does not
mean that the Opoyazians were deterministic about literary evolution (cf. chapter 2) and
relativistic about its participants, themselves included. Anticipating the next chapter’s discussion
of literary success and the axiological stance of the Opoyazians vis-à-vis Moretti and Schücking,
it is necessary to dwell here on the following key passage from Tynianov’s essay “On Literary
Evolution.” Tynianov writes that it is inadmissible to “evaluate a dynamic fact from a static point
of view,” illustrating this statement with a typically belligerent metaphor: “[It] is the same as to
evaluate the characteristics of a cannon-ball beyond the problem of flight. A ‘cannon-ball’ can
look very well without being capable of flying, i.e., without being a cannon-ball, and it can be
‘awkward’ and ‘ugly’ but capable of flying, i.e., being a cannon-ball.”287 In other words, the
ingenuity of Eugene Onegin, which Tynianov for one, being one of Pushkin’s greatest scholars,
never disputed—this ingenuity had to do with the dynamism of Onegin and the rest of Pushkin’s
oeuvre—time-sensitive dynamism, not eternal perfection. The Opoyazians, the fathers of the
ever-slipping ostranenie, make an argument for devising a new formula, working out a new
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equation each time, this being the only constant. The only problem, i.e., for bookish rationality,
is that the Opoyazians rely on their feeling of the epoch, which is not convincing enough for such
adherents of common sense as Schücking (no matter the overcoming, in Opoyazian theory, of the
bias of an individual in the common perceptual denominator, or the sensus communis, of the
epoch at issue—cf. 2.4).
Schücking is different from both the Opoyazians and Yarkho, this university, this literary
movement of one, in that he is a moderate. Schücking writes that “a not unimportant part is
played in the creation of a work of art by the existing taste,” but he immediately adds that “[t]his
does not mean, of course, that art is a commodity deliberately produced to suit the public
taste.”288 Schücking also has a response to Yarkho’s rather Romantic intercession for the genius
author as against the public. Yes, the audience cannot expect a Eugene Onegin (for the time
being, let it be an axiom), but what Schücking writes about the publishing houses should also
apply to all other social institutions, including the author (in this case, Pushkin), his literary
canon and its milieu, etc. Just as “[p]ast successes have brought [. . .] firms into the confidence of
the public, which in taking new works from them feels a certain guarantee of their literary
merit,” so did the success of Pushkin before Eugene Onegin.289 “The success of these works is
not, of course, thereby assured,” Schücking adds, “but the appearance of a work in the lists of
one of these publishers at least carries the suggestion that an aesthetic authority has pronounced
in its favour, so that it is sure to arouse favourable expectation.”290 This is not so far from what
Yarkho maintains, saying that the collective “is more like a civilian walking down a shopping
street who suddenly sees in the window a new collection of products; if he likes them, he buys
288
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them; if not—he keeps walking. He cannot be said to have made an order.”291 Indeed, he cannot,
and yet one is likely to return to the shop whose production is more agreeable to his taste.
The Opoyazians, of course, could not be in favor of “favourable expectation” and
aesthetic agreeableness could not be agreeable to them; thus, Shklovsky writes in passing about
“the people of ‘good taste’—by the way, the worst there is among the artists,” or readers for that
matter.292 Note that “good taste” is in quotation marks; real good taste, to return to Tynianov’s
metaphor, would be the ability to tell which cannon-ball can fly well; but let us not equivocate
this matter further as long as the difference is clear.
As far as taste is concerned, Schücking (more about it below) does recognize the taste of
both the public and the moderate, commonsensical group of connoisseurs, academics among
them; vis-à-vis the artists, who often get carried away, the taste of the audience is an equal. By
contrast, Yarkho is interested to see the change—not exactly in taste but it can be interpreted this
way—from one literary movement to another, as from Classicism to Romanticism (cf. chapter
1); to explain it, he will resort to the laws whereby systems evolve in the image and likeness of
nature. Now, Moretti relies on the readers en masse, the market being his prototype for literary
evolution at large, as follows from “The Slaughterhouse of Literature”—the famous essay
devoted to Sherlock Holmes novels (more about it below). Moretti is perhaps the least elitist of
the authors discussed here (which is not to be immediately applauded but simply taken note of);
he writes: “Readers, not professors, make canons.”293 The Opoyazians would not have a problem
with this statement if only by professors Moretti did not mean the elect few capable of
appreciating that which laymen cannot; for example, the poetry of Velimir Khlebnikov. The
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following passage from Moretti is telling, his apparent unwillingness to deal with poetry in
particular:
John Guillory’s focus on poetry in Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon
Formation (Chicago 1993) strikes me as very odd; it makes of his book a Janus-like
creature, always right in its specific analyses but wrong in its general claims. Yes, the
academic canon was indeed the one he describes, but the (more significant) social canon
was different and completely unrelated to it. Similarly, the rise to prominence of
metaphysical poetry was indeed a significant change within the academy, but outside the
academy it was no change at all, because lyric poetry had already virtually lost its social
function.294
Of course, we could also call academia or any other institute of patronage of the arts, a kind of
market, but it borders on equivocation. The next section, just as the next chapter, should show
that the Opoyazians were interested in the market, yet not for the market itself, and that they
were ready to respect the voice of the majority, yet not for the majority’s sake, but because of a
certain curve in the evolution of the literary fact.

3.3. The Opoyazians Enter the Market
This and the next sections of chapter three describe the Opoyazians’ study of the market
as a type of literary everyday. Parallels are drawn in this and the next two sections between the
Opoyaz theory and that of Moretti, whereas their differences are mainly discussed in chapter
four.
That this analysis was trailblazing is recognized by one of the leading scholars of that
period, Dobrenko. “Undoubtedly, the members of OPOIaZ [. . .] came closer than anyone else to
understanding the book market as a literary issue,”295 he writes and, as examples, names
Shklovsky’s 1926 Third Factory, Tynianov’s 1927 essay “On Literary Evolution,” and
Ibid., 68. Cf. this with the Opoyaz stance: “The dialectic of literature consists in the constant
change of the correlation between verse and prose genres” (Grits, Trenin, Nikitin, 147).
295
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Eikhenbaum’s 1927 “Literature and the Literary Everyday” and “Literature and Writer”
(Literatura i pisatel’)—the latter is discussed in the next chapter. In addition to this, Dobrenko
duly mentions two more books, both published in 1929; they are at the heart of this and the
following sections: Shklovsky’s Matvei Komarov: Resident of Moscow (Matvei Komarov:
Zhitel’ goroda Moskvy) and the book Literature and Commerce: The Bookshop of A. F. Smirdin
(Slovesnost’ i kommertsiia: Knizhnaia lavka A. F. Smirdina), written by Opoyazians’ students
Teodor Grits, Vladimir Trenin, and Mikhail Nikitin, and edited by Shklovsky and Eikhenbaum.
The book on Komarov, too, had its assistants, their particular contributions summed up in the
preface (Nikitin, Trenin, and Grits again, as well as Nikolai Khardzhiev, Pavel Kaletsky, and
Antonina Bokhonova), which bespeaks collegiality—a distinctive feature of data-driven studies,
as with Yarkho and Distant Readers (cf. chapter 1).
After Material and Style in Leo Tolstoy’s Novel “War and Peace,” Shklovsky’s book on
Komarov was the next step in the same direction of literary sociology. 296 Komarov was an
eighteenth century writer of pulp fiction—or, to be precise, lubochnaia literatura, which featured
adventure stories, much like today about love or rogues and criminals, accompanied by lubki,
simple and colorful illustrations, similar to today’s cartoons, which the semiliterate could enjoy.
Such were Komarov’s two great bestsellers, both analyzed by Shklovsky: The Tale of the
Adventures of the English Milord George and The Story of the Russian Criminal Vanka Cain and
the French Criminal Cartouche. (The original titles of these works, abridged here, were much
longer according to the eighteenth-century tradition.)
In the case of Opoyaz Formalism, “literary sociology” seems to be a better definition than
“sociology of literature”: poetics and the formal principle remained prevalent to the Opoyazians.
In a way, Dobrenko says the same thing: “In putting a ‘theoretical understanding of the methods’
for studying mass literature at the center, the OPOIaZ adherents did not have time to create a
sociology of literature of their own which would have addressed the contemporary situation”
(Dobrenko, 167).
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By making Komarov the hero of his new book, Shklovsky tried to kill many birds with
one stone. Among other things, Shklovsky hoped to propitiate the Marxian gods. He maintained
that Komarov, whose role in the evolution of Russian literature he tried to rehabilitate, used to be
a serf. Not only was it ideologically useful—it was of crucial import, according to Shklovsky.
Comparing Komarov’s Vanka Cain with its anonymous prototype, Shklovsky emphasized
Komarov’s moralistic (nravoopistale’nyi) additions and redactions, related to Komarov’s social
status. Shklovsky wrote: “Komarov [. . .] starts the tradition of the accusatory novel297 as it were.
[. . .] interestingly enough, the character of Komarov’s text is anticlerical”—which is not
surprising for one familiar with the history of the Russian peasant, Orthodox Christians yet often
feeling exploited by the priests, po'py.298
To appreciate the decisiveness of Shklovsky’s step towards literary sociology, it is
enough to compare the Komarov book with Shklovsky’s earlier works—“The Mystery Novella”
from his Theory of Prose, for example. Back then, Shklovsky wrote that the sociological
circumstances did not matter much, so that it made little difference whether Holmes be a private
detective or a state employee if the scene of action were in the Soviet Union.299 In the Komarov
book, Shklovsky, conversely, did pay attention to the author’s partisanship, his partiinost’ (to
christen it with Lenin’s key notion from “Party Organization and Party Literature”). Komarov’s
partisanship mattered as integral to his literary everyday and literary orientation, ustanovka.300
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“The opinion widely spread among scholars, that Komarov marred the naïve original story of the
people, is incorrect because Matvei Komarov had a specific target orientation (opredelennaia
tselevaia ustanovka).”301 The result of this orientation was the creation of new forms for the
Russian novel; just as in the 1928 book on Tolstoy, this was an instance of Shklovsky’s getting
his formalist “cash back” on sociology: “My study of Matvei Komarov is first and foremost a
study of the history of the creation of the forms of the Russian novel.”302 The moralization by
Komarov—a (former?) serf—of the story of the infamous criminal Vanka Cain, led to
psychologization. This happened because, unlike the anonymous prototype in which “Vanka
Cain is cut out of wood” as it were, Komarov’s book made the humorous catchphrases
(pribautka) of the anonymous prototype a speech characteristic of the heroes.303 Komarov also
“motivates the fragments rife with humorous catch phrases by dialogues and monologues,”
according to Shklovsky, and motivation is the soul of any psychologism (cf. 5.2).304 Moreover,
the fact that Komarov interspersed the story of Vanka Cain with moralistic footnotes
distinguished the voice of the author from that of the character, so that “in contrast to the
‘subjectivity’ that hinged on the monologic form of the anonymous prototype, Komarov’s
manner [was] ‘objective,’ novel-like.”305
Shklovsky is interested in Komarov’s social background as a context for the pribautki
and other devices; the context clarifies the orientation of these devices, i.e., the must-feel factor:
the readers’ expected reaction to or sensation of these devices,306 i.e., the time coordinates, from
301
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the standpoint of sensus communis, of the given moment in literary evolution. Orientation
(ustanovka), though present in the Formalist works from the very beginning, was separately put
forth as a very important category in Tynianov’s 1927 essay “Ode as an Oratorical Genre,”
explaining the literary peculiarities of eighteenth-century odes as against the milieu of the
imperial court. Therefore, orientation can be regarded as a “beam” affecting the coloring of the
work while the literary everyday can then be envisaged as a particular “refraction” of that beam
of orientation, the work being oriented towards other works and the literary everydays in their
background. Having begun with the effects of Komarov’s orientation, conditioned by his alleged
status of a serf in a wealthy household (inferred from Komarov’s advertisements placed in his
book), Shklovsky makes a step towards the reader, the reader no longer as a personification of a
textual function but now as a member of society—one small step for someone else but one giant
leap for an Opoyazian. Thus, Shklovsky writes about amorous relationships’ being repeatedly
thwarted in The English Milord that “perhaps this stylistic device was perceived by the peasant
reader against the background of the writings of the lives of saints, where such motifs can often
be found.”307
This bespeaks an important shift in Shklovsky’s understanding of form that allowed him
to turn to literary sociology without ceasing to be a specifier, spetsifikator (cf. 2.3). The logic of
the two trends of Opoyaz Formalism (the construction-centered and the ostranenie-driven
may infer the “must-feel” criterion from this fragment: “[B]oth in the field of poetry as well as
prose, pulp fiction (lubochnaia literatura) must present itself to our senses (dolzhna
oshchushchat’sia nami) as being displaced from our consciousness yet powerful and delegating
its literary accomplishments to canonized literature” (Shklovsky, Komarov, 15–16). This “mustfeel” criterion is time-sensitive, which is why Shklovsky writes about Komarov’s The Tale of the
Adventures of the English Milord George that “the awkwardness” of motivation (cf. 5.2) in it, as
a result of Komarov’s decorous redactions, “is explained by the state of novelistic technique at
that time and apparently was not felt (oshchushchat’sia) by the contemporary reader” (ibid.,
121).
307
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trends—cf. chapter 2) led him to writing: “In the literary history of The English Milord George
the primary form (pervonachal’naia forma) of the literary work ought to be distinguished from
the complementary form (dopolnitel’naia forma) it received having been perceived by its new
peasant reader.”308 The primary form is closer to the constructive trend, the complementary
form, to that of ostranenie, but the two are hardly separable: the first is like the falling tree, the
second is like witnessing it fall, and does it really when not witnessed, and can we really tell our
witnessing it from its falling?
The discussion of primary and complementary—shall it be called, secondary?—brings to
mind John Locke’s classic distinction in An Essay concerning Human Understanding, between
the primary and secondary qualities of objects. The primary qualities have to do with body or
matter, and in the case of the literary work would simply mean a certain text, made of letters—
though, more complex than that, made also of some manifest and immutable features, namely,
constructions, such as the ones analyzed by Shklovsky in Theory of Prose (e.g., narrative
parallelism). Secondary qualities of an object are not the object themselves yet they affect our
senses through the primary qualities of that object. Locke’s example is fire: its warmth is not its
primary quality; warmth is subjective to us humans, and it is of importance only when we are
close to the fire; however, when interacting with fire, whether it is hot or cold to us is a matter of
how we orient ourselves towards it and how close or remote from it our literary everyday is.
That is, the primary and complementary are actually one to us the readers, even though
the work, the thing, is actualized and realized differently in our perception depending on the
balance of the primary and complementary. Shklovsky’s writing about the complementary form
here is redundant, not much different from the process that he described in “The Resurrection of

308

Ibid., emphasis mine.
115

the Word,” when one resorts to a pleonastic epithet (e.g., burning fire) to resurrect-defamiliarize
the original meaning-sensation of the word.
Defamiliarization already implied that, but Shklovsky of the Komarov period made it
explicit enough to act on it. This shift allowed him as a specifier to discuss not only the innerliterary conjuncture immanent to the system of literature, but also the market: not only “the count
of yarn and the ways of weaving it” but also “the state of affairs on the world cotton market”
including “the policy of its trusts.”309
That is what Shklovsky’s and Eikhenbaum’s students, under their guidance, did in the
book about the famous book publisher Alexander Smirdin, full of data about the writers’
paychecks, the circulation of books, etc.—the facts that migrated from the realm of literary
genesis to that of literary evolution, given the literary everyday of the “commodity period of
[Russian] literature (tovarnyi period v literature).”310 This approach necessitated a rather
frequent use of tables, and this tabulation of data resonates, however slightly, especially given
the same context of the literary market, with Moretti’s thinking about literature through graphs,
maps, and trees.311
The Marxist rivals ridiculed this, especially the study of paychecks, as a desperate
undertaking, not far from vulgar sociologism, but, as Aage A. Hansen-Löve justly writes, the
Opoyazians were indeed “the first to analyze the ‘literary market’ as an economic and
communicative phenomenon,” discussing “the communicative aspect of the economic order and
the economic aspect of the communicative order.”312 Dobrenko points out the Opoyazians’ use
309
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of Marxist terms:
The authors were primarily interested in the “functioning of literature.” Not only the
writer and reader, but also the publisher and bookseller, are central figures in this
approach, and the field of their interaction is the market, commerce. The authors defined
the 1830s era in Marxist politico-economic categories as an era of general
professionalization of the writer’s labor, an era beginning a period for itself which can be
conditionally called the “commodity” period of Russian literature.313
The categories were indeed Marxist, or at least annexed by that time by Marxist
hegemony and unimaginable without it. At any rate, just like their Marxist rivals, the Opoyazians
did take a step in the direction of the politics of the reader and the market, though without the
Marxist presumption of ignoring the form of other systems in favor of the economic one. The
step was bold for the ones trying not to let their formalist guard down, perhaps partly desperate,
the clouds that burst with “A Monument to a Scientific Error” already gathering; what matters is
that the step had been taken, towards both the author and the reader.
As far as the author is concerned, Shklovsky’s 1927 The Technique of the Writer’s Craft
is exemplary. This was not exactly a textbook314 but rather one of the “popular creative work

The 1927 debate became possible mainly due to the internal evolution of the Formalists,
particularly of Eikhenbaum and Tomashevskii, and their recognition that the study of
other, extra-literary series (riady) is unavoidable and essential. However, the Marxists
apparently took this not as a serious sign of natural scholarly evolution but as an
admittance of weakness or even past guilt. Characteristically, when Eikhenbaum set out
at some length [. . .] his programme for the study of the sociology of literary production
and stressed, among other elements of research on the 'literary everyday' (literaturnyi
byt), the necessity of studying the history of honoraria, Gorbachev quipped that it was in
all likelihood precisely the honoraria that made the Formalists abandon their antisociological purism [. . .] instead of admitting publicly the need to temper the crudity of
sociologism. (Tihanov, Marxism and Formalism, 76)
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handbooks” of the 1920s, as Levchenko writes.315 Levchenko observes that the very title of the
book “emphasiz[ed] techniques-related aspects of creative work, alien to ‘the pangs of the
word.’”316
Evidently, Shklovsky knew his subject well. “The book turned out to be in demand,”
Levchenko continues; “friends were enthusiastic about it: Eikhenbaum wrote that it was
‘wonderful’ and pointed out its ‘Tolstoyan spirit,’” Tolstoy, like Pushkin, being one of the
Opoyazians’ favorite examples of a writer so gifted as to have changed numerous times in his
lifetime, from one literary everyday to another.317 Tynianov, too, commented on the high
demand for Shklovsky’s book, though, according to Levchenko’s interpretation of Tynianov’s
other comment, Tynianov, “with his developed psychological intuition, not to mention inside
knowledge of the situation, d[id] not fail to register a shift in [Shklovsky’s] age and worldview,
marked by what seemed like a purely practical publication.”318 Yet again this is a question of the
inner evolution of the Opoyaz, and, as put above, what is of primary import here is that the step
in this direction had been taken.
A handbook telling how to be a better writer implied the kind of know-how that could be
applied to the reader: understanding the must-feel factor (introduced above) meant the possibility
of manipulating it. Before more is said, however, it is important to add: manipulation does not
automatically imply that the manipulator has agency (for more about agency, cf. 6.1). To an
Opoyazian, agency still lies with the form of literary works, this form actualizing the
configurations programmed in it in various ways in the process of literary evolution. This could
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be illustrated with an analogy from War in Peace, whose philosophy of chance and law in
history is key to understanding the Opoyaz doctrine. On the one hand, Tolstoy writes that the
outcome of a battle depends on the will, the morale, of people, and not on such abstractions as
strategy. On the other hand, only the wills of all the people taken together can bring about
change, while the laws behind the synergy of these wills remain inaccessible to people. In other
words, that can be changed, which is within the range of possibility, and politics is exactly the
art, the range, of the possible, i.e., something preset beyond the agency of the participants.319 One
may affect the literary process to some degree through manipulating the literary everyday, but in
order to join the game, one should have the cards, and for the Opoyazians, as for Tolstoy, history
is the dealer (cf. 2.4).
Let us, however, return to the issue of “the formal as political.”320 That the readers can be
manipulated not just by means of the in-text devices but also politically, through an orchestration
of the literary everydays, follows from a fragment Grits and his coauthors cite, from the
miscellany section in The Moscow Observer. “Nowadays,” the fragment reads, “it is solely
N. N., who, having done away with Karamzin, is trying to catch the literary youth and force it to
whimper at the sight of butterflies or to weep over a song of a yellow siskin, but just take a
gander at what we will be turned into in ten years: perhaps, we will roar then instead of
whimpering.”321 (Citing this must have reminded Grits and his coauthors of the contrast between
“whimpering” Symbolism and “roaring” Futurism.) So orientation can be manipulated: that is
why Shklovsky was so interested in factography (mentioned in the previous section), for
319
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example, in Pushkin’s journalism—as an extension and reorientation of Pushkin’s literary
activity, a magazine being a new context in which the status of even previously known genres
alters.322 This follows the logic described by Marshall McLuhan in Understanding Media: The
Extensions of Man (cf. chapter 6): in the process of humankind’s development, an older medium
becomes absorbed by a newer one (e.g., newspaper—radio—television—the Internet), so that the
effect of the older medium on us, its meaning to us, is already different from what it used to be.
Just as a poem by itself reads different in a collection of poems, classic movies and shows affect
us differently when watched on a platform like Netflix. (Shklovsky would doubtless study such
platforms.) The ability to manipulate platforms and literary everydays thereby gives access to the
complementary form singled out by Shklovsky.
At this point, it is necessary to digress momentarily once again, to distinguish the
Opoyazians’ literary sociology with its kind of manipulation from the kind of manipulation
favored by the sociologists of literature proper. The type of manipulation discussed just now can
be compared to steering a ship: using the wind and other weather conditions to your advantage;
however, it is not about changing the weather (cf. 4.6)—as, for example, was the case with the
totalitarian Union of Soviet Writers, whose foundation in 1934 marked a veritable end of literary
“biodiversity” in the USSR for decades to come. As before, the middle—Schücking’s
approach—should ease our understanding of the Opoyaz and official Soviet Marxist extremes.
Schücking is definitely a “moderate,” but he is closer to statism and the idea of engineering, not
manipulating, the literary process. Thus, towards the end of his book, he pins his hopes on school
instruction and family, as “guardian[s] of tradition”; he further makes a plea for academic

Cf. V. B. [Viktor Shklovsky], “Sovremennik” (hereafter Shklovsky, Sovremennik), “Tirazhi
nashikh zhurnalov,” “O Bulgarine,” Novyi Lef, no. 5 (1927). To read about the Opoyazians’
theory of journalism, one of the first in the world, cf. Lvoff, LKF, section 3.2.
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criticism (how different from both the Opoyazians and Moretti!) and points out, approvingly,
that a greater role is played by such “[o]rganizations exerting influence” as “literary societies,
lending libraries, and the like.”323 This by itself may sound harmless, but Schücking writes
below:
The objection often raised that an association can create a programme but not art will not
impress any who have some knowledge of the history of literature. Think of the birth of
neo-classicism in Shakespeare’s day! It is not by any means unprecedented for a
programme to be drawn up and the soil prepared by its demands, and for the seed of a
new art then to fall upon it. The essential thing is that the programme shall not be drawn
up from a wholly backward-looking point of view—a danger that exists in certain literary
reform associations.324
The example of neo-classicism, responsible for the kind of normative, prescriptive, poetics
against which various formalists, from Veselovsky to the Opoyazians fought, is telling and
brings to mind Andrei Sinyavsky’s famous association of Socialist Realism with Classicism. By
contrast with this, it is possible to call the Opoyazians’ literary politics laissez-faire: “The market
has given the writer voice.”325 (It is, of course, important to emphasize that the sociopolitical
stance of the Opoyazians, different for each of them, was left.) As Adam Smith believed in the
invisible hand of the market, the Opoyazians believed in the invisible hand of literary
evolution.326
Conversely, a sociologist of literature will always try to bring into the open the hands of
the dealers influencing the market. A good example is Janice Radway’s Reading the Romance.
Shklovsky the author of Matvei Komarov or his students would not disagree with the following
statement made by Radway: “Book buying [. . .] cannot be reduced to a simple interaction
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between a book and a reader. It is an event that is affected and at least partially controlled by the
material nature of book publishing as a socially organized technology of production and
distribution.”327 Yet they would probably have doubts about this statement, which is also the plan
of Radway’s book: “If it can be shown that romance sales have been increased by particular
practices newly adopted within the publishing industry, then we must entertain the alternate
possibility that the apparent need of the female audience for this type of fiction may have been
generated or at least augmented artificially.”328 This is not to say that the Opoyazians do not
want to see the attempts to generate and augment fiction artificially. But they believe that,
whenever such attempts succeed and a work or a whole canon matches the blood type of the
literary today and the literary everyday, that happens by virtue of the agency of literature, not of
literary agents. Yet literary agents had better ride the wave of agency, whatever it is, even the
writer’s unfreedom, which the writer has to embrace as well, creatively so—as Shklovsky
attempts to in the famous passage “On Art’s Freedom” from Third Factory. A widely known
parable comes to mind: a religious man is drowning; suddenly, a rowboat comes by, but the man
refuses to jump in because he is waiting for God to save him; the second and then the third
rowboats appear, but the man refuses all the same until he drowns; the man is now in the world
beyond and asks God why he was not saved, to which God replies that he extended a helping
hand three times to the man. Now, the role of God in this is a question of causality and faith,
while the practical lesson is, sink or swim.
This string of metaphors compels one more, so important for understanding the
Opoyazians’ politics vis-à-vis their literary sociology. Shklovsky wrote of himself: “People say
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that one need not be a fish to become an ichthyologist. / As for me, I am a fish: a writer who
analyzes literature as art”.329 Being a fish and ichthyologist at once implies what some may see
as a conflict of interests (cf. 4.6), and others as essential involvedness, as putting one’s stock in
theory, giving it gravitas since it now gravitates to a particular literary situation (cf. 2.4 with
regard to Eikhenbaum’s notion of double vision). The acutest critics of Opoyaz Formalism, such
as Boris Engelgardt, understood it, which does not mean they had to agree with it:
The methods of a poetics that is being constructed according to the demands of
rigorous scientificity (nauchnost’), can by no means be suitable in the realm of literary
journalism (khudozhestvennaia kritika), and a representative of literary scholarship
(nauka o literature) has to draw a solid line between his tasks and the tasks of a critical
interpretation.
But that was exactly the case with the Formal School. To many of its proponents,
an active participation in literary contemporaneity has always been a priority, and, while
devising the methods of impartial (ob’ektivnyi) and abstract scholarship of the so-called
formal elements of poetry, they, partly unconsciously, transferred them to the realm of
journalism (kritika).330
The contradiction described by Engelgardt, discussed from the standpoint of the two
trends of Opoyaz Formalism in the second chapter, is not at issue now; what is at issue is the
contamination (as Derrida would call it) of theory and practice in Opoyaz Formalism. It is thus
necessary to interpret commercially Grits and his coauthors’ statement that it “would be most
interesting (liubopytno) to track the evolution of the consumer of the lubok pictures and
handwritten collections [of popular literature] to the novels of Matvei Komarov.”331 It was
indeed in their interest to understand this, considering the stocks they held and given the striking
parallels between the Russian eighteenth century and the second half of the 1920s.332
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The Opoyazians, especially Shklovsky, Eikhenbaum, and their students, sought the twoway legitimization of the market in the 1920s (as worthy of theoretical attention and creative
participation) through its comparison with the literary commerce of the later eighteenth and
earlier nineteenth century. There were two very important assets at issue, to be explained below:
1) the legitimacy of universal, “imported,” action-based literature (its parity with local,
“domestic,” language-centered produce); 2) vindicating montage as a legitimate, dynamic kind
of authorship. These two issues are discussed in the last two sections of this chapter.

3.4. The Eighteenth Century as the Ship of Contemporaneity
First, more has to be said about the Opoyazians’ interest in Matvei Komarov, an author
and a peculiar one at that (as is explained below), and Alexander Smirdin, a publisher and bookseller, these two representativeness of lubok literature and the nascent literary market in Russia.
The choice of Komarov, Smirdin, and some others as the key figures of Russian literature was
leveled at the great man theory—the kind of historicism (cf. 1.4 for the Opoyaz vs. historicism)
that Tolstoy had attacked in War and Peace. It was “a blind rejection of ‘the history of
generals,’” i.e., the esteemed writers culled from unalike canons and evened out within the myth
of a single tradition, that “caused [. . .] an interest towards the study of mass literature,” as

eighteenth century and the one in which they found themselves can be criticized as rather
untenable from the standpoint of Marxism, since in the twentieth century the new quantity of
mass culture arguably led to its new quality. This is the argument Lukács makes when citing
Marx’s words about the status of commodity exchange in capitalist societies being different from
the societies in which serfdom prevails (as in Russia of the period described by Shklovsky):
“Where the commodity is universal it manifests itself differently from the commodity as a
particular, isolated, non-dominant phenomenon” (Georg Lukács, History and Class
Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1999), 85). For a comparison of Shklovsky and Lukács, cf. Galin Tihanov, “Viktor
Shklovskii and Georg Lukacs in the 1930s,” Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 78, no. 1
(2002).
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Tynianov wrote.333 Indeed, Komarov did not belong in the canon of Russian literature from the
establishment’s perspective, so to speak. Shklovsky juxtaposed Komarov with eighteenthcentury aristocrat Antiokh Kantemir, whose satires, published after Kantemir’s death, were not a
fact of the literary evolution of his epoch, though, according to Shklovsky, they were later
inscribed in the canon of Russian literature.334 For that reason, analyzing Komarov, Smirdin, and
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literary market, was an endeavor to redress the injustice of
“replacing the history of [Russian] literature” with “the study of the influence of the court and
the government on literature,” as Shklovsky’s students wrote, echoing their mentor.335 Grits and
his coauthors also remarked, with typically Opoyaz defiance: “The fear of writing something
worse than Bova Korolevich [a folklore hero, already prominent in sixteenth century lubki]
dispirited many writers. The majority of them indeed wrote worse.”336 Unlike the aristocratic
writers, Komarov, and other craftsmen like him, depended entirely on public taste, royalties and
circulation being its indicators. In other words, exploring Komarov’s professionalism and the
market of his time was a pure case for Shklovsky because nothing random, such as the
arbitrariness of individual taste, could be mistaken here for the workings of the system of
literature.
Yet by no means did Shklovsky merely want to celebrate popular literature and its market
by belittling the literature of the “establishment”; this would have been “‘the history of
generals’” turned inside out. Averse to academic scholarship (as practiced by pedantic German
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professors and their followers in Russia), with its capricious and outdated “tables of ranks,”
Shklovsky shone the lantern of the literary fact in such a way that it highlighted literarily
dynamic works, not the “high” or the “low” ones.
Shklovsky writes that “high” literature partly canonized lubok: “The very themes of early
Pushkin, Pushkin of the epoch of Ruslan and Lyudmila, are a canonization of lubok themes.”337
In fact, “high” and lubok literature were brought together by competition, Shklovsky observes:
“The readers of lubok literature were very widespread, and in the higher stratum [of society] read
high literature. There was an ongoing struggle for the market between lubok and non-lubok
literature, and that is why Belinsky is constantly writing reviews on lubok literature.”338
Furthermore, according to Shklovsky, Komarov ushered in the age of professional
authorship in Russian literature, the professionalization of literature affecting the authors writing
for a more educated public than Komarov already in the 1830s, Pushkin among them. The
literary situation in 1830s Russia, when the professionalization of literary work engaged the
authors and the readers of the higher classes, making them participate in the market of literature,
was precisely the subject matter of Grits and his colleagues’ book about Smirdin. Shklovsky also
Shklovsky, Komarov, 12. In 2.4., the Opoyazians’ peculiar understanding of the canon has
already been described. When a work is canonized, it is successful, but this also means that now
it has to be succeeded, by some other artistic practice that is more dynamic; to get into the canon
is to reach the peak, to become emeritus, so to speak, but as a result also retired. In such a way,
canonicity does not automatically mean power according to Shklovsky and his allies. In fact,
pulp fiction was stronger before it got canonized as it felt distinct and not an item of “public
property.” This logic can be inferred from the following passage:
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important one in terms of the quantity of its literary inventiveness was the group of
Novikov, Chulkov, Popov, Levshin, and the neighboring group of people such as Matvei
Komarov, Filippov, Zakharov, and others. (Shklovsky, Komarov, 291)
338
Shklovsky, Komarov, 82.
126

mentions Smirdin in the Komarov book, saying that “the very significance of the emergence of
Smirdin [. . .] was in the reassignment (perekhod) of capitals and commercial skills of the lubok
authors, now to be exploited by another literary group.”339
It is noteworthy that Grits and his coauthors did not write negatively about Smirdin, who
published Russia’s first mass magazine, The Library for Reading, or about such infamous
littérateurs as Faddei Bulgarin or Nikolai Grech.340 The authors of Literature and Commerce
maintain that the role Smirdin, Bulgarin, and Grech played in the commercialization of Russian
literature was a progressive one, helping Russian literature to evolve. Thus, thanks to
commercialization, journalism flourished, and Pushkin, for one, took advantage of it in his
literary journal The Contemporary, having started to move towards original documentary
prose.341
Shklovsky sees Komarov both as an underdog of literary evolution and, to permit a pun,
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the pack leader, moving towards the new literary fact. Thus, Komarov interests Shklovsky as
someone so significant that Belinsky wanted to write about him and that Tolstoy “studied
Komarov in the ‘90s, calling Matvei the most famous Russian writer.”342 Komarov was indeed
highly popular with commoners, including petty bourgeoisie and merchants, who read Komarov
and writers like him more than anyone else, opting for them in the literary market. That
Shklovsky derived Komarov’s significance from his popularity, thereby reconsidering the nature
of literary success (cf. chapter 4), has much in common with Moretti’s democratic reassessment
of the Western canon (cf. 3.2). Whether this was literature for the petty bourgeoisie or for the
aristocrats was not in itself important to the Opoyazians. This was a case of the meteor factor,
conditioning the environment but not governing its laws of development, so that the bourgeoisie
and the aristocrats became more homogenous than one would think, coexisting in one
biocenosis. Akin to the literary situation of the 1920s, that of about the 1830s was a clash of
aesthetic canons, not primitively understood “protagonists” and “antagonists” of literary
evolution. The following excerpts, taken from magazine columns, as we would say nowadays,
originally published by Shklovsky in issue 5 of Novyi Lef for 1927, are telling: “Overall,
Bulgarin did not hound Pushkin. He only gave him guidelines (rukovodiashchie zamechaniia)”;
the latter phrase, though, is partly ironic, as the Russian phrasing brings to mind party
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guidelines)343; “We know about his [Bulgarin’s] confrontation with Pushkin, the confrontation
with the aristocracy, for the sake of the mass reader”; “The Library for Reading was a success,
which, naturally, cannot be held against it.”344 Moreover, not only was there a legitimate
confrontation of the “high” and nascent mass literature, as we would call them, but also a
crossbreeding thereof, as Yarkho might say; Shklovsky wrote:
In the history of Russian literature, the vast [. . .] pre-lubok literature, so to speak,
created the prerequisites enabling the existence of the novel of life and manners (bytovoi
roman), and that is where the line that later took over in nineteenth century stems from.
This victory and, most importantly, the canonization of the forms of the low
genre, was caused by the rise of the third estate in Russia. At the same time—and this
apparently happened sometime in the [18]20s, the third estate got differentiated; a part of
it became the bourgeoisie, and having created for itself the book-publishing and bookselling apparatus, ushered in the mature period of Russian literature.345
Shklovsky names Gogol as a representative of the “bourgeois line” of Russian literature that
“gets stronger and promotes its own classics” after “a certain degree of victory of the bourgeoisie
in the epoch of Nicholas I.”346
This complicates the history of Russian literature as described in textbooks, especially of
the Soviet period with its emphasis on the democratic and revolutionary trends (delightfully
mocked by Naum Korzhavin’s “In Memory of Herzen: A Ballad of Historic SleepDeprivation”). According to such history, Gogol, the founding father of the Natural School, as
Belinsky called it, was then succeeded by Nekrasov and others. Meanwhile. Shklovsky writes
that the popularity of Komarov vexed even such a “people’s” writer as Nekrasov,347 and that the
new editions of Komarov’s books ceased only with the Bolsheviks in 1918.
Moreover, Shklovsky wrote that The Tale of the Adventures of the English Milord
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George was “an example of a literary work that stayed on the market for 136 years,”348 and that,
if not for the confiscation of its last edition in 1918 (a vivid instance of the meteor factor), “we
do not know for how long it would have lived without outside interference.”349 This shows that
the longevity of Komarov’s work is of great import to Shklovsky—true longevity, not that of a
museum piece but that of the literary fact. Longevity brings us to Fernand Braudel’s concept of
the longue durée, further discussed in the next chapter.
The longue durée, which is a key category of DR,350 helps to explain the Opoyazians’
emphasis on the Western origin of the forms used by Komarov and the popular authors published
by Smirdin. Thus, Grits and his coauthors write: “It is worth noting that many fairy tales, popular
with the mass reader, are mainly borrowings from German, French, and Italian fairy tales.”351
Lubok, too, has ancient origins in the Western tradition. Shklovsky writes: “The lubok
pictures were not directly created by the ordinary people but reached to the ordinary people from
the sphere of low literature, well connected with the West at that, comprising the material of
chivalric romances directly referenced by Chulkov as well as echoing Herodotus, not to mention
other, much later literary reminiscences, perhaps from Sterne.”352
Shklovsky shows how Western forms were getting assimilated in Russian literature first
through lubki, then through the works of Komarov and other professional authors writing for the
mass public, and later, through the work of those authors who are nowadays considered
348
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undisputed classics: Pushkin and especially Gogol. Lev Lunts’s famous appeal made in 1922 and
taken up by his Serapion Brothers—“To the West!”—would have been as timely a century
earlier. “From time immemorial, a certain type of art has existed in the West, from our Russian
standpoint not serious if not plain pernicious. It is the so-called adventure literature,” he wrote.353
This brings us back to the beginning of this chapter with its description of Soviet Russia
being inundated with Western mass literature. The cinematographicity of the latter has already
been pointed out—no wonder Shklovsky mentions Tarzan literature in his article “On the Laws
of Cinema.”354 This serves as a perfect segue to Moretti’s essay “Planet Hollywood” (2001),
which once again reveals how much in common there is between RF and DR.
Like Opoyaz literary sociology, Moretti’s essay, with its analysis of “film genres…. and
national markets,” focuses on the interrelationship between “morphology” and “geography,”
though Moretti’s task is rather different from the Opoyaz one: “Instead of using morphology to
understand geography, the other way around.”355 The Opoyazians are not so interested in
geography per se. Still, Moretti is not engaged in area studies. His interest in geography is
sparked by his concern for culture, which is why he labels his subject matter “cultural
geography,” meaning that “each region of the world functions like a cultural ecosystem: it tends
to select one genre—and to reject another,”356 which, in turn, manifests “the Darwinian side of
cultural geography: forms that fight for space.”357
So the question is about the compatibility of morphology with geography. After
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comparing action films, popular worldwide, with comedies, which “do not travel well”358 as they
have to do with “the national spirit,” not so easily translatable,359 Moretti observes that “[t]he
abrogation of language in action films is a powerful factor” in the international success of a film.
It must be stressed that, writing about comedy, he is considering the “talkies”—and concludes
that “stories travel well because they are largely independent of language.”360 In this, Moretti
develops the constructive trend of Opoyaz Formalism. Unlike the defamiliarizing trend (heralded
in “The Resurrection of the Word” with its emphasis on language and “Art as Device” with its
examples coming mainly from the Russian tradition), the constructive trend revealed itself in
“The Relationship between Devices of Plot Construction and General Devices of Style,” mainly
concerned with the “nuts and bolts” of the narrative and largely based on examples from
Weltliteratur, with which Shklovsky dealt as a monolingual, Russian being the only language he
knew. It is also necessary to add to the opposition of language and construction, national and
international literature, that between history (as primary forms contingent on complementary
forms within the same work) and “timeless” constructions. History unfolds dialectically, i.e., by
the logic of ostranenie, within the system of national literature. This opposition is eloquently
articulated by Tynianov in his unfinished monograph about Tyutchev and Heine, written in the
early 1920s: “The genesis of a literary phenomenon lies in the random sphere of transitions from
language to language, from literature to literature, whereas the sphere of tradition is governed by
laws (zakonomernyi) and is enclosed within the circle of national literature.”361 At the same time,
at the risk of complicating the matter, it should be added that the longue durée need not be
inseparably associated with genesis; it can also withstand genesis, when genesis is historicist.
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That is the case of Veselovsky, to whom Shklovsky, however much he argued with him, is
indebted in “The Relationship between Devices of Plot Construction and General Devices of
Style.” Thus, Ilya Kliger and Boris Maslov write about Veselovsky’s magnum opus: “In
particular, it is incumbent on Historical Poetics, as we envision it, to challenge and supplement
contemporary ‘historicism’ with conceptions of cultural persistence and the historical longue
durée.362 To sum up, Shklovsky, the most Promethean of all the formalists, Russian and not, is
like Figaro, qua e là, su e giù, on the cusp of every contradiction; and in the case of mass
literature (whose temporal peculiarity is discussed in the next chapter), Shklovsky leans towards
the longue durée.
But let us return to Moretti. After arriving at an “empirical confirmation” (it has to be
remembered that in DR every assertion must be corroborated, not simply illustrated), he writes
that “plot and style becom[e] manifestly de-coupled as a result of their movement (or not) in
space.”363 Moretti’s statement that “stories travel well—better than other genres, anyway”364
echoes Shklovsky’s famous passage from Knight’s Move:
If the everyday and the relations of production influenced art, wouldn’t the plots
be fixed to the place where they correspond to these relations? For plots are homeless.
If the everyday were expressed in short stories (novelly), European scholarship
would not puzzle over where—in Egypt, India, or Persia—and when the short stories of
The 1001 Nights were created.365
The mention of The 1001 Nights also reminds us that not the West as such is at issue but rather
the longue durée of adventurous tales, contingent not on language but plot construction.
At this point, to understand more deeply the stakes of the Opoyazians’ and Moretti’s
study of the longue durée of adventurous plots vis-à-vis the actually or potentially international
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market, it is necessary to consider Marshall McLuhan’s concept of cool and hot media (for a
comparison of Shklovsky and McLuhan, cf. chapter six). Here is how McLuhan defines them:
There is a basic principle that distinguishes a hot medium like radio from a cool one like
the telephone, or a hot medium like the movie from a cool one like TV. A hot medium is
one that extends one single sense in ‘high definition.’ High definition is the state of being
well filled with data. A photograph is, visually, ‘high definition.’ A cartoon is ‘low
definition,’ simply because very little visual information is provided. [. . .] On the other
hand, hot media do not leave so much to be filled in or completed by the audience. Hot
media are, therefore, low in participation, and cool media are high in participation or
completion by the audience.366
The fact McLuhan calls TV a cool medium should not confuse us given McLuhan’s deliberate
pun on “cool” in the colloquial sense, as something fashionable and attractive—as against, it may
be added, something so hot that one is often loath to touch it, afraid of burning himself.
Now, lubok is a typical example of a cool medium. Suffice it to compare two passages. The first
one is a definition of lubok in Grits and his coauthors’ book, cited from the entry “About the
Pictures of the Common Folk” in The Papers of the Imperial Moscow University’s Society of the
Admirers of Russian Literature:
[T]he lubok pictures [. . .] replace for the commoner picture galleries and literature,
because in them, verbal descriptions are coupled with the pictures of events, true or
fictitious, and of topics, allegorical or genuine, that, pictured in the imagination via colors
and words, leave a strong and long-lasting imprint, taking hold of one’s mind.367
This sounds very much like comic books, and this intuition is borne out by the second passage,
from McLuhan:
It is relevant to consider that the old prints and woodcuts, like the modern comic strip and
comic book, provide very little data about any particular moment in time, or aspect in
space, of an object. The viewer, or reader, is compelled to participate in completing and
interpreting the few hints provided by the bounding lines. Not unlike the character of the
woodcut and the cartoon is the TV image, with its very low degree of data about objects,
and the resulting high degree of participation by the viewer in order to complete what is
366
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only hinted at in the mosaic mesh of dots.368
It should not be surprising, then, that one of the early Russian comic books, graphic novel
Pinkerton’s Agency, was written by Lydia Ginzburg, one of the brightest second-generation
Opoyazians.369 Seen from this point of view, lubok proves that the longue durée in culture is
realized in cool media, national literatures with their nuances and inner power struggle being
overheated as against Weltliteratur, which is aloof and “cool” about it.
Here, it is important to remember that the oppositions discussed above should not be
reduced to the binary of good or bad, the progressive or the regressive. As Shklovsky writes in
the Komarov book, “the evaluative viewpoint often prevents literary historians from seeing real
facts.”370 Everything depends on context, on what is dynamic at a given point in literary
evolution. Thus, the universality of adventure stories discussed in this chapter may be liberating.
However, it may also be a powerful agent of automatization, i.e., sameness, as with the Tarzan
novels in the twentieth century or with the novels of Ann Radcliffe, that pioneer of Gothic
fiction, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus, Grits and his coauthors write that in
nineteenth-century Russia “[t]he surname Radcliffe embodied the whole genre of ‘horror’
novels, and novels attributed to her but not belonging to her, signed ‘Radcliffe,’ appeared time
and again.”371 The latter example was most relevant to the 1920s with their pseudotranslated
novels, signed with foreign names but written by Soviet authors.372 However, even sameness,
bemoaned by Horkheimer and Adorno as the bane of the market, is not necessarily a pernicious
368
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phenomenon, especially from the standpoint of the constructive trend; thus, Shklovsky says with
regard to the Sherlock Holmes stories that their devices are “monotonous (odnoobraznyi)” but
that “it has to be said, after all, that self-repetition in literature is a much more common
phenomenon than usually thought.”373
Shklovsky with his allies and, almost a century later, Moretti with his, demonstrated
thereby the ease with which the longue durée of adventurous motifs and plots—first analyzed by
positivists, like Aarne, and then by proto-structuralists, like Propp—travels from one culture to
another. However, the transition from one culture to another is not that easy; a foreign text does
not immediately, i.e., without mediation, become the second nature of another national context;
again, Tynianov’s remark, cited above, comes to mind—about national literature as a sphere of
evolution, as against the external communication between national literatures as a sphere of
genesis.
It takes time for a fact to migrate from the realm of genesis to that of evolution.
Alexander Veselovsky (whose significance for RF has been discussed in the previous chapters)
declared a very important principle for understanding the problem of the national vs. the foreign:
he regarded influence in the original sense of inflow, maintaining that no influence occurs
without a counterflow in the recipient culture.374 (It is a separate issue, of course, whether this
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counterflow be interpreted in terms of the literary evolution of a culture moving towards a
confluence, or in terms of social necessity.)
In grafting, for example, the peculiarities of each plant ought to be considered, and
grafting is not always a success at first. Thus, Moretti writes about the proliferation of AngloFrench novels in the nineteenth century and American films in the twentieth: “In the case of less
powerful literatures, then—which means: almost all literatures, inside and outside Europe—the
import of foreign novels doesn’t just mean that people read a lot of foreign books; it also means
that local writers become uncertain of how to write their own novels.”375 This describes the crisis
of the 1920s that Russian literature found itself in.376 (The key question “how to be a writer?”
posed in the ‘20s by Eikhenbaum is discussed in the upcoming chapter.)377 “Market forces,”
Moretti continues, “shape consumption and production too: they exert a pressure on the very
form of the novel, giving rise to a genuine morphology of underdevelopment.”378
The “morphology of underdevelopment” is a phenomenon both Moretti and Shklovsky
are interested in. They describe two approaches to underdevelopment. The first is turning your
oddity vis-à-vis the influencing culture into a strength: a new constructive principle. The
mismatch379 between the domestic and imported proves to be one of the productive
375
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consequences of foreign invasion that creates “one of those ‘impossible programmes’” that
“works,” as Moretti puts it.380 This, for example, was the case with War and Peace, in which “the
novel was destroying its forms,” according to Shklovsky—to wit: “It was only later that the mind
of the reader put up with the monstrosity of the construction of War and Peace and even
aestheticized this initially mistaken composition.381 In other words, an artistic device, and artistic
contrivance, resulted here from the fixation of a shift, a random mutation.”382 Moretti echoes
this: “Machado de Assis takes the ‘compositional defects’ of Brazilian novels, and turns them
into an incredibly original narrative style. Elsewhere, the clash with the symbolic power of
Western Europe produces major paradigm shifts, like the Russian novels of ideas, or Latin
American magical realism (or the slightly different case of the Kafka-Joyce generation).”383
The second way out of the “morphology of underdevelopment” is assimilation. Even a
brief analysis of series and game shows for TV, first produced in the West and then exported to
other regions, shows that the transition requires a certain degree of “domestication” for the
influence to be carried out. This creates a most productive kind of hurdle about which Moretti
writes in “Conjectures on World Literature” (2000): “A few years ago, introducing Kojin
Karatani’s Origins of Modern Japanese Literature, Frederic Jameson noticed that in the take-off
of the modern Japanese novel, ‘the raw material of Japanese social experience and the abstract
formal patterns of Western novel construction cannot always be welded together seamlessly.’”384
Moretti continues: “I [. . .] began to treat Jameson’s insight [. . .] as if it were a law of literary
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evolution: in cultures that belong to the periphery of the literary system (which means: almost all
cultures, inside and outside Europe), the modern novel first arises not as an autonomous
development but as a compromise between a western formal influence (usually French or
English) and local materials.”385 An example of such a compromise is Faddei Bulgarin’s 1829
Ivan Vyzhigin, an unprecedented bestseller, about which Grits and his coauthors write: “The
success of Ivan Vyzhigin was not coincidental. Ivan Vyzhigin was one of the first Russian novels
in which the plot construction of the West European, primarily Spanish, picaresque novel went
with the material taken from Russian everyday life.”386 “Ivan Vyzhigin,” the authors conclude,
“was felt (oshchushchat’sia) by its contemporaries as the first ‘Russian’ novel”—mark the
passive voice, bestowing agency on literary evolution, not the members of society.387
Meanwhile, Moretti also says that “the formal compromise is usually prepared by a
massive wave of west European translation”—the case of both the eighteenth century and the
literary situation of the 1920s.388 Translation is, of course, not merely a linguistic but as much a
cultural process. Shklovsky describes the translation of Western sources in the eighteenth
century for the needs of the common people.389 He mentions Mikhail Chulkov390 who wrote fairy
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tales mistaken for folklore, concluding that “lubok pictures were not directly (neposredstvenno)
created by the people but came to the people from low literature, on top of that well-connected to
the West, also comprising the material of chivalric romances, to which Chulkov referred, as well
as echoing Herodotus, along with other, considerably more recent literary reminiscences, maybe
even Sterne.”391 Shklovsky writes that “the processing of the material that later caught on with
the people as the so-called folklore went along two paths”—Chulkov’s group (“by means of a
parodic renewal, primarily having to do with folk tale material”) and the “streamlining
(ratsionalizatorskii)” path of writers like Komarov, with its “approximation to contemporary
language” and “simplification.”392

3.5. Opoyaz Literary History as Montage
Shklovsky’s Marxist rivals must have felt that there was something wrong in the business
of singling out obscure or admittedly undeserving eighteenth century caterers of pulp fiction and
celebrating them as the harbingers of literature’s future, including its subsequent
democratization. Shklovsky’s rivals probably felt that his real protagonist was not Count Tolstoy
or (alleged) serf Komarov, but literary evolution itself.
The heaviest blow came not from the Marxists but from Zhirmunsky’s pupil and one of
the most authoritative specialists in the eighteenth century: Grigory Gukovsky, “who, unlike [the
Opoyazians’] ideological adversaries [. . .] was ready to speak the same language”—or so it
seemed.393 In a scathingly critical and brilliant article “Shklovsky as a Literary Historian,”
Gukovsky started with Grits and his coauthors’ book, quickly dismissing it, and for the rest of his
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lengthy diatribe picked to pieces the Komarov monograph. Gukovsky highlighted the two books’
inaccuracies, owing to their authors’ rashness and ignorance about the originals as well as about
the secondary source must-reads on the eighteenth century, leading to the authors’ “rediscovery
of America.”394 The following quotation from Gukovsky’s review shows that the title
“Shklovsky as a Literary Historian” was ironic:
I might be ready to put up with Shklovsky’s insufficient familiarity with scholarly
bibliography concerning the Russian eighteenth century if he had at least studied well the
material itself, i.e., the entirety of eighteenth century prose and poems (unfortunately, he
did not do it either). Yet I cannot recognize one’s right to afford theorizing about the
interrelationship of folklore and bookish art, without studying the material of both of
these arts or having a notion of the main tendencies of scholarly thought in this field. For
it is the same as to write a book on political economy unaware of the existence of
Marxism, or to write a book about the evolution of species without knowing anything
about Darwin.395
Andrei Zorin comments on the conflict between Gukovsky and Shklovsky from a psychological
standpoint:
Of course, such a brilliant connoisseur of the eighteenth century as Gukovsky could not
help being vexed by numerous factual inaccuracies, arbitrary assumptions, and hasty
conclusions [. . .] and, above all else, the spirit of scholarly dilettantism [. . .] And yet
[. . .] the matter of fact was that the authors of both publications [the Komarov and the
Smirdin books], and primarily Shklovsky himself, had begun to evolve in the same
direction as Gukovsky. [. . .] In Gukovsky’s view, Shklovsky’s impetuous and superficial
reorientation discredited Gukovsky’s own profound turn to Marxist literary scholarship at
that time.396
To be fair, it is necessary to concede that Shklovsky never did become a true Marxist. Thus,
already in the Thaw years, while still quoting Marxist authors in Bowstring (Tetiva), Shklovsky
turned less to Marx and more to Engels, as well as to Lenin, using both of them as a bridge to
Hegel, and eventually Heraclitus with his dialectics. Meanwhile, as the discoverer of ostranenie,
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Shklovsky was interested in dialectics from the very beginning, already in “The Resurrection of
the Word.”397
Yet Shklovsky’s putative Marxism does not make him less of a historian. When,
evidently agreeing with Gukovsky’s diagnosis, Levchenko says that “the history of literature had
never been a forte of Shklovsky, who had been fighting against it since his school years,”
Levchenko is speaking about the history of literature rather than literary history.398 (The
difference between the sociology of literature and literary sociology has been discussed above.)
Levchenko uses the word “history” in its conventional, historicist, sense, but it has already been
mentioned that to the Opoyazians, history was a system, i.e., form, i.e., a certain organization,
hence deformation (deformatsiia),399 from the standpoint of the common perceptual
denominator, of the otherwise unorganized and uncircumscribed facts of the past (genesis).
Gukovsky blamed the Opoyazians for skimming off facts and making them go sour,
compromised by theoretical partiality. The Opoyazians—irrespective of their interest in these
facts, facts new not as such (as Gukovsky maintains) but new to them, under the aegis of literary
theory—were loath to go back to the time when the positivists were mainly preoccupied with
archiving data rather than theorizing.
It is no wonder then that “Matvei Komarov serves to enable absolutely contradictory
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assertions” by Gukovsky and Shklovsky.400 The language the two scholars are speaking only
seems to be the same; each word, including such basic ones as “history,” is in fact a victim of
equivocation. Shklovsky and Gukovsky are speaking from the standpoint of different systems,
when the same key, depending on tonality, may be considered either sharp or flat. Even when
speaking about Komarov, they have two different phenomena in mind. The first phenomenon,
the one in which Shklovsky places his cash value (cf. the preface), is the evolutionary Komarov,
Komarov as the portal, bringing together the literary fact of the 1920s and of the last quarter of
the eighteenth century in Russian literature. Thus, armed with “double vision” (cf. 2.4),
Shklovsky points out Komarov’s interest in plot-driven literature in The English Milord George
as well as his interest in documentary literature in the book about Vanka Cain, which,
conversely, is “documentary, fabula-based,401 but not plot-driven,”402 thereby solving the eternal
problem as relevant in the twentieth century as in the eighteenth: “There was a debate about the
possibility of prose based on Russian, not yet aestheticized, material. [. . .] Komarov proves our
material is suitable.”403 The word “proves” is in the present tense justly so, because when
Shklovsky wrote it, he meant his own epoch no less than that of the eighteenth century. When,
based on the multiple editions of Komarov’s work, Shklovsky mentions Komarov’s
“uninterrupted literary biography [. . .] from 1771 to 1917,” this is not a figure of speech.404
By contrast, Gukovsky sees Komarov as a compiler of pulp fiction, not even an author
proper:
N. I. Nikolaev and M. V. Khramtsova, “Marginal’nyi mir i geroi v russkoi literature XVIII
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Several years ago, when the “teachings” of the vulgar sociologists had not yet been
refuted, the was a fad in literary scholarship of bringing to the forefront and nearly
extoling the talentless and vulgar handicrafts of the literary peddlers of the eighteenth
century, the “puny” hacks of the lackey “party” (napravlenie), poisoning the
consciousness of the democratic reader with trash literature, not only devoid of ideology
but also adjusting to the landowners’ plans “for the people.” Among such handicrafts are
the publications of Komarov, who was not a writer at all, but only an “adapter”
(prisposobitel’) of other people’s books for the lowbrow reader. [. . .] Bringing Komarov
and others to the forefront was motivated by the fact they were not noblemen but from the
democratic milieu (liudi demokraticheskie). However, is it necessary to prove that our
socialist culture accepts the legacy of such “noblemen” as Radishchev or Pushkin, and
rejects the “legacy” of the Komarovs. Almost the same is true for some other lubok
publications, produced “for the people,” without reflecting the worldview of the people
whatsoever.405
Contemporary scholar Mikhail Osokin, too, considers the title of “author” unmerited in the case
of Komarov, whose “role as an editor was more modest yet than customarily thought” because
“the interpolations that put the narrative together and imparted the sought-for ‘literariness’ to the
texts, was borrowed by him from the popular novels of Fedor Emin”—an author mentioned by
Shklovsky as well without Osokin’s implications.406
Led by the example of factography, Shklovsky does consider editing as authorship. He
says that “the perspective on authorship back then,” i.e., in the eighteenth century, was
different.407 As he also writes in his preface to the book about Smirdin, “the concepts ‘writer,’
‘author,’ and ‘composer’ (sochinitel’) need to be defined more precisely.”408 Several pages after
this, Grits and his coauthors themselves say that “there appeared a necessity to differentiate and
clarify the overly broad concept of the writer, including the professional writer. The volume of
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this concept equally comprises poets, fiction writers (belletristy), journalists, and translators,
whereas different categories of the writerly profession play very unalike roles in directing
literary evolution.”409 Nowadays, this understanding of authorship is easier to accept, when
Svetlana Alexievich received the Nobel Prize for Literature for her books, which are a montage
of interviews.
Montage, in general, is a very important concept for RF and the avant-garde in general.
Shklovsky’s 1930 account “How I Write” bears witness to this fact. First he says: “In my case, a
fragment unfolds into a work of its own, and that which is of greatest import, like in cinema,
stands between the fragments.”410 Shklovsky the researcher tackles his material like a filmmaker
using a storyboard: Shklovsky says that a typist copies the fragments he annotated while reading.
After this, Shklovsky continues, “the fragments hang on the wall for a while. I group them,
hanging them together; then transitions, written very briefly, join them. Then I write on sheets of
paper a rather detailed synopsis of chapters and put the connected fragments into files.”411
Yet it is any montage, not just Shklovsky’s, that Gukovsky rejects. “It seems to me,” he
writes, “that montage as such, because of the essence of its genre, not only allows
methodological unscrupulousness (besprintsipnost’) but almost demands it. The material,
adduced by editors, is amorphous as such; it does not fit within any scholarly conception,
regardless of all [. . .] manipulations of it.”412 Gukovsky also mentions 1929 Literary Circles and
Salons,413 written and compiled by Mark Aronson and Solomon Reiser under the guidance of
their teacher, Eikhenbaum, and says that, albeit a “conscientious book,” it is a useless one since
409
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“an informed reader already knows these memoirs [the ones published in the book], while an
uninformed one will not understand anything, lost amid snippets and fragments.”414 “Fragments”
is the key word. To someone as Gukovsky, interested in literature as a totality of texts, fragments
are a misrepresentation of the nature of things: distorting decontextualization. To the
Opoyazians, with their interest in literariness, not to say self-interest as the agents of literariness,
the fragment is a focal point, a privileged moment of the literary fact. An image form Tolkien’s
The Hobbit comes to mind: it was impossible to get inside the Lonely Mountain—it was all
rock—unless the sun shone on the keyhole in the rock, creating a passage. Such is the Midas-like
nature of the literary fact: whatever it touches is no longer random or unworthy, but valuable.
Thus, the literary fact of 1920s factography415 led to the birth of the author: the author as
the compiler and the editor, l’auteur comme monteur. Moreover, what is first a mistake (the lack
of certain skills, as with Moretti’s “morphology of underdevelopment”), may later become a
regularity of literature, hence no longer mistaken, because “an invention as such, the invention of
a literary style in particular, is often born of a fixation of a random mutation, a random
change.”416 This of courses raises a broad philosophical question, not to be tackled here: if we
agree that Khlebnikov was a poetic genius, what about the mockingly nonsensical poems of
Captain Lebyadkin from Dostoyevsky’s Demons, in which much of the Russian Futurism is
anticipated? But to return to Matvei Komarov—Gukovsky also criticized him for damaging the
anonymous original of the story of Vanka Cain, by downplaying the rhyming catchphrases,
pribautki, and replacing them with moralistic platitudes pandering to the petty bourgeoisie.
Conversely, from Shklovsky’s standpoint, these changes paved a way to the psychologization of
414

Gukovsky, Shklovsky kak istorik, 197.
In Russian, the similarity of these two terms is even more confusing: literaturnyi fakt and
literatura fakta, respectively.
416
Shklovsky, Gamburgskii 1990, 422.
415

146

the novel with the language of pribautki, no longer associated with the style of the author thanks
to Komarov’s redactions (cf. 3.3.), so that the function of the pribautki changed to “a means for
characterizing the hero.”417 Furthermore, Shklovsky is deliberately partial, when, opposed to the
ornamental language of the imitators of Andrei Bely, namely, Boris Pilniak (the butt of
Shklovsky’s unflattering review),418 he also objects to the anonymous original, “written in
pribautka prose” with “an orientation to ornamental language.”419
Had Shklovsky claimed that something was true simply out of his day-to-day preferences
as a littérateur, his stance would be much simpler. Yet he and his fellow Opoyazians insisted on
following the literary fact rather than artificially constructing it; that is what made them
formalists in the true sense of the word, after all (cf. 6.4). In this case, it is possible to turn
Shklovsky’s criticism addressed to Eikhenbaum in 1928 against Shklovsky himself: “The
method [. . .] you’ve chosen, with all your talent and the knack for finding the right words,
results in mistakes, eloquent and incorrigible. It is necessary either to be writing a novel or to
make the stitches visible (ostavliat’ sledy instrumenta).”420 The inner relationships among the
Opoyazians go beyond the purview of this dissertation, so, instead of discussing whether
Shklovsky was right about Eikhenbaum, the following should be said: though Gukovsky is
correct in saying that the Komarov book is very declaratory, Shklovsky did leave “the stitches
visible.” For he was open about reappraising the constructive principle of Komarov’s books from
the standpoint of the literary facts of later epochs. However, one thing remains undefined: how
can we tell the literary fact from its semblance? This problem has already been discussed, but not
resolved, in 2.4. In registering the literary fact, Shklovsky and his fellow Opoyazians rely on
417
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their feeling, oshchushchenie, of the epoch, of shifts from one epoch to another, of history. The
following words, from Shklovsky’s “How I Write,” are telling: “The meaning of the work turns
out to be unintended, and here, on the ruins of your future work, you get this feeling of the unity
of the material, that possibility of a new composition that [. . .] is called inspiration.”421 An even
better word is “intuition.”
Gukovsky’s critique made Shklovsky doubt his intuition, his very ability to sense the
literary fact, hence contemporaneity. In a fragment titled “A Conversation with My Conscience,”
he wrote: “My conscience is blushing. So where are the articles about contemporary literature?
Did you do the right thing by writing now about Matvei Komarov and Tolstoy, and what do you
plan on doing next?”422 But, after a little exchange with his conscience, Shklovsky tries to dispel
his doubts: “As for Matvei Komarov and history, that is the means of studying
contemporaneity—I will write about contemporary literature; I’m not afraid of it”423
It follows that the clarity with which Gukovsky argued for a more traditional,
commonsensical, view on Komarov and his books interfered with Shklovsky’s vision of
literature; Shklovsky was afraid he was running the risk of falling for an optical illusion, but
Shklovsky also felt, or perhaps wanted to feel, as before, that he was on to something. Akin to
magnetoreception in birds, with their ability to find their way during migrations without
cogitating, the feeling of the literary fact was essential for knowing when to migrate from one
literary fact to another, following ostranenie-driven theory.
Challenged by the market, the Opoyazians made a very risky bet in their literary
sociology books, but more pressing than the question “did they win?” is the question “what to
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consider as victory?”
CHAPTER FOUR
SUCCESS AS THE TOUCHSTONE OF LITERARY DEVELOPMENT424
“One should not think that art is single-storied.” 425
—Viktor Shklovsky
4.1. The Successions of Success

A clear, or at least visceral, idea of literary development is impossible without that of
success. No winners or losers announced, paradigm shifts will not be determined either. History
is not written without its victors. Viktor Shklovsky and Franco Moretti—as well as those who
followed them—duly recognized success as a clue to the mystery of how and why literature
changes.426
Yet, rather than see success as an answer to the question of literary history, both Moretti
and Shklovsky—the latter especially—understood that the equation had two unknowns, success
being the second. High modernist literature, read by the chosen few, vs. adventure stories, read
indiscriminately by all and sundry—this brought about the question: which was to be proclaimed
successful and according to what standards? Moreover, the opposition of mass to “high”
literature, as chapter three illustrates, was yet another question, not an answer. One approach was
to proclaim successful the fittest who survives; the other, to say that the last shall be first (i.e.,
those authors who did not give in to automatization and preserved individuality at the cost of
This chapter deals with Moretti’s better known texts. Meanwhile, DR has evolved
significantly since then, its understanding of canonicity and success having become more
complex—cf. J. D. Porter, “Popularity/Prestige,” Stanford Literary Lab Pamphlet 17, September
2018, accessed March 12, 2020, https://litlab.stanford.edu/LiteraryLabPamphlet17.pdf.
425
Viktor Shklovsky, O teorii prozy (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel’, 1983), 88. Hereafter Shklovsky
OTP 1983.
426
Or to be precise, how it changed: predicting change (the issue discussed in this chapter) is
already the next theoretical step, since an understanding of the past does not guarantee that of the
future.
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losing a mass readership)—but even a cursory inquiry will immediately expose the devil in the
detail.
Thus, it may be said that the work read the most is the winner, but why then did Conan
Doyle’s detectives survive, while Lew Wallace’s Ben-Hur or Faddei Bulgarin’s Ivan Vyzhigin,
once vastly popular, fell out of vogue? It may be said instead that the most innovative, albeit
scarcely read, work is a success, but there is always a risk of confining ourselves to the
arbitrariness of academic critics, prone to mistake highfalutin or ideologically-fitting works for
truly seminal ones—Moretti’s objection. (Sometimes, it may be not critics but a totalitarian
government or powerful groups in modern capitalist societies pushing off politically approved
works of art on the public.) Finally, that work could be declared successful which has influenced
the greatest number of others, but this is already fraught with substituting a “‘history of
generals’”427 for what Wölfflin famously called an “art history without names,” which, however
debatable, was a great leap for scholarship. Like the Opoyazians, Moretti insisted that certain
features, such as devices and sets thereof, are successful, rather than individual authors. Besides,
those who have engaged in creative writing will confirm that the source of their inspiration is
often not as weighty or respectable as presumed; a strong case could be made for weaker, even
poor, works inspiring one to do better, whereas a masterpiece is likely to hypnotize and
immobilize the author to be influenced. Meanwhile, some works, such as adventure narratives,
are—like Rossini in Stephen Fry’s description—“so popular it’s easy to overlook how good” and
influential they are.428
All of the abovementioned problems could be reduced to this: which work can be
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considered a “game changer” in literary development? However reluctant, one eager to answer
this question must attribute a value to certain tendencies, works, and forms as against others. The
one tasked with this, is by definition a critic, and so it turns out that present at the slaughterhouse
of literature are not only the works and their authors but also their critics, who do have their
stakes in the literary enterprise, even when unwitting or not as demonstratively involved as the
Opoyazians were.
With this in mind, this chapter elaborates on the comparison between Opoyaz and
Morettian formalisms. The comparison entails the following problems: (1) establishing the
nature of cultural success, seen differently from the standpoint of mass culture and “high”
culture; (2) using success as an indicator of cultural development; (3) determining the role of the
literary scholar as the one who either constitutes or “pollutes” the object of study; (4) clarifying
the qualities of the object, as well as the very object, analyzed by the literary scholar, viz.,
juxtaposing the idiographic trend in authorial literature with the predominantly nomothetic trend
in verbal folklore and mass culture; (5) consequently, choosing whether to side with those who
study literature as a string of norms or exceptions, success determined accordingly.

4.2. Nothing Succeeds Like Success
Successful is that which a vast number of people consume for a sufficiently long period
of time—Moretti’s stance on success, albeit not simplistic, is crystal clear. The Opoyazians’ is
anything but; the dialectical contradiction at the core of their theory (cf. chapter 2) explains why,
yet it should not beg the question, which, brought to a head, demands: who is more successful,
“Tarzan” or Khlebnikov?
Shklovsky posed this question in the famous anecdote he told about the so-called
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Hamburg score, when professional wrestlers, the yearlong participants of fixed matches, meet
once a year at an inn in Hamburg, behind closed doors, and fight to find out the best among
them—an image that bears resemblance to Moretti’s slaughterhouse metaphor. Shklovsky wrote,
to his contemporaries’ chagrin: “A Hamburg score is vital for literature. / By the Hamburg
score—Serafimovich and Veresaev do not exist. / They can’t even reach town. / In Hamburg—
Bulgakov is at the mat. / Babel is a lightweight. / Gorky raises doubts (he’s often out of
shape). / Khlebnikov is a champion.”429
This seems decisive and clear, but even here, much is to be clarified.430 Thus, writer
Viktor Konetsky interpreted Shklovsky’s words as follows: “2. Bulgakov is already at the mat
because he has been admitted to the highest competition (already in 1924!). / 3. Khlebnikov has
already left the mat because he has already won.”431 While Shklovsky’s evaluation of Bulgakov,
who resented it, does not seem to raise serious questions432 (Shklovsky had never placed
Bulgakov in the center of the wrestling ring), the status of Khlebnikov, though privileged, is
uncertain.
A case in point is the disagreement between Shklovsky and Tynianov about Khlebnikov,
after Tynianov’s preface to a collection of Khlebnikov’s works. In the preface, Tynianov decided
not to attribute Khlebnikov to any school, even to the Russian Futurists:
Speaking of Khlebnikov, it is admissible not to speak of Symbolism and Futurism,
and it is not necessary to speak of zaum’ either.433 For until now, those who did so, spoke
not about Khlebnikov but about “and Khlebnikov.” [. . .]
429
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It proves false. [. . .] both Futurism and zaum’ are […] sort of a surname shared by
different relatives and even namesakes. [. . .]
In 1928, Russian poetry and literature want to see Khlebnikov. Why? Because
there suddenly emerged an “and” of a much greater scale: “contemporary poetry and
Khlebnikov” and another “and” is brewing: “contemporary literature and Khlebnikov.”434
What a contrast to Shklovsky’s preface to his students’ book about Smirdin: “Just as a fluid idea
tries to solidify in a word, so too literary evolution is drawn to surnames and conventional signs,
thereby creating legends.”435
Singling out Khlebnikov by disassociating him from the Futurists was a manifestation of
the defamiliarizing, counter-systemic, trend of Opoyaz Formalism, and Shklovsky’s objection to
Tynianov’s preface, the reaction of the constructive, systemic, trend. “The separation of
Khlebnikov from Futurism is a theoretically reactionary work,” Shklovsky wrote. “For
Khlebnikov it is a minus since it is a stenciled work; that is exactly how classics are created”—or
canonized, i.e., fecklessly admired, “trademarked,” shelved, and eventually archived for good436;
as Mark Twain quipped, a classic is “[a] book which people praise and don’t read.”437
In the meantime, Shklovsky tended to single out Khlebnikov himself (as in the excerpt
about the Hamburg score), not to mention Shklovsky’s post-Formalist memoirs. Tynianov, too,
was hesitant; he wrote in a private letter to Shklovsky: “Maybe I’m not right in our debate about
Khlebnikov. I felt sorry for some provincial [i.e., not yet established and defamiliarizing] current
in initial Futurism [. . .] I thought it was only Khlebnikov and opposed him to the entire school
because I wasn’t finding it in Mayakovsky. It’s likely that I’m mistaken.”438
If the defamiliarizing trend, driven by the exegi monumentum kind of instinct, is eager to
434
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single out an author, the constructive trend, conversely, tries to scatter the author, so to speak, the
word “scatter” having two important meanings here: (1) as a translation of rassredotochit’, used
by Shklovsky to speak about the author not as a private person but rather as a crossroads of
tendencies439; (2) “scatter” as in “scatterplot”—an important type of diagram that DH scholars,
among others, use to study patterns (e.g. the scatterplot of Shakespeare’s plays in Stanford
Literary Lab’s Pamphlet 1).
Scattered or not, however, Khlebnikov is still “a champion” for the Opoyazians—but in
what sense? Due to Opoyaz dialectics and resistance to “static definitions,”440 even a reader well
acquainted with Opoyaz texts will get muddled. Would that it had been possible to ask
Shklovsky and Tynianov: is Khlebnikov a winner because he is at the center of the canon (the
Futurist canon, that of zaum’—you name it)? If so, does it mean that he is canonized as a winner,
i.e., someone who has already won, hence no longer remains the reigning champion? Or does his
standing alone, without a school of his own (as Tynianov claimed)—does it mean that, for all his
talent, for all his significance for his contemporaries, he is a loser of literary evolution:441 not
Shklovsky wrote: “The aim of the book is to scatter (rassredotochit’) Smirdin” (qtd. in Grits,
Trenin, Nikitin, 5). Сf. 1.4. Also cf.: “A writer’s monograph is impossible. [. . .] Unlike the
writer, art enjoys three kinds of freedom: 1) the freedom of the indigestion (neusvoenie) of his
personality; 2) the freedom of culling from his personality; 3) the freedom of culling from any
other material. [. . .] It is necessary to write not about Tolstoy but about War and Peace”
(Shklovsky, Tret’ia, 100). N.B.: Shklovsky uses the indigestion metaphor, and so does Yarkho,
when he discusses “the digestion of nutriment” in literature (cf. 1.3); this is yet another example
of how Shklovsky overlaps, often unwittingly, with his contemporaries including Yarkho, who,
by contrast, is most deliberate in his choice of metaphors. To read more about Yarkho’s choice
of metaphors, cf. Marina Akimova, “Gumanitarnye nauki i biologiia: B. I. Yarkho i
terminologiia russkogo prestrukturalizma,” in Vyacheslav Ivanov, Marina Akimova, E. V.
Permyakov, T. V. Tsivian, eds., Antropologiia kul’tury. Vyp. 3. K 75-letiiu Vyacheslava
Vsevolodovicha Ivanova (Moscow: Novoe izdatel’stvo, 2005); hereafter Akimova,
Gumanitarnye.
440
Tynianov, PILK, 255.
441
Thus, in his review of Moretti’s work, Oleg Sobchuk reminds us of the three principles of
“Darwinianly” understood cultural evolution, the third principle relevant in the case of
Khlebnikov:
439

154

canonizable—yet, precisely because of it, a winner of literary evolution, the one who continues
to stand in the center of the ring? To sum up, is Khlebnikov a winner because he is a winner, or
is he a winner because he is a loser (as an underdog)? (Tynianov and Shklovsky did not even
entertain the thought of his being a “loser-loser.”)
Revisiting Shklovsky’s theory of defamiliarization and canon-formation will complicate
the matter further. We know that, according to Shklovsky, a genuinely novel work, author, or
school ought to be imbued with defamiliarization. (That is why such a work, author, or school
will be felt by its contemporaries, felt as laborious, yet again, dialectically so, when Pushkin—as
Shklovsky maintains in “Art as Device”—Pushkin with his “simpler” verse, was more laborious,
i.e., unusual, for his contemporaries as against the heavier, but by Pushkin’s time, habitual verse
of Derzhavin.) Thus, armed with the sword of defamiliarization, the author enters the tournament
as a pretender to canonization, but, should he prevail, he is destined to die by his own sword:
familiarized because of being attractively-defamiliarizing, he is canonized—canonized like a
saint, in the form of a relic (until his resurrection and reincarnation by grace of literary
evolution). To put it in Darwinian, or rather Spencerian, terms, defamiliarization is the cause of

To call changes in time evolution, three important principles ought to be observed. First,
there should be variation (variativnost’) in the developing structure; second, the species
should compete for limited resources (food, sexual partners, etc.); third, those species that
win this competition should be able to pass on their features to descendants.
(Oleg Sobchuk, “Nomoteticheskoe literaturovedenie: punktirnyi nabrosok,” Novoe
literaturnoe obozrenie, vol. 132, no. 2 (2015); PDF version with different pagination
retrieved from
https://www.academia.edu/14401586/%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%82
%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B
5_%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%83%D1%
80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5_%D
0%BF%D1%83%D0%BD%D0%BA%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%BD%D1%8B%
D0%B9_%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B
A: 5.)
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the author’s survival: survival as staying alive as well as survival as surpassing life and
remaining a vestige (perezhitok, as Veselovsky called it).442
Now, not only is “survival” an auto-antonym (also known as “contronym” or a “Janus
word”—an apt illustration of the Janus nature of Opoyaz doctrine); so, also, are the English
“success” and the Russian uspekh (both implying accomplishment and completion; primacy and
secondariness; ascendency and Ascension—as used in Christianity, which, in turn, evokes an
association with Assumption, Uspenie in Russian). Likewise, the survival of the fittest as a form
of adaptation—at first blush, clear as an axiom—gets poisoned with ambiguity. If adaptation is
standing in the limelight of the literary fact, adaptation is life; if adaptation is habituation,
adaptation is death—but adaptation is actually both. Accordingly, the fittest is both the strongest
and the weakest. As a result, each term makes sense but, taken together, the statements do not
add up. That is exactly what an antinomy is, and antinomy, as Holquist and Kliger compellingly
argue,443 is engrained in the nature of language, hence also verbal art (cf. Table 1 and Figures 1-4
in chapter 2).444
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As it makes its way into the twentieth century, the universal-historical paradigm,
especially in its Marxist instantiation, undergoes an important modification with the
emergence of the discourse of uneven development or “nonsynchronicity” (cf. 4.5). This
tendency is detectable already in Veselovsky, whose notion of the persistence or survival
of verbal artistic forms complicates the more straightforwardly linear narrative of
evolution from primitive community to complex civilization.
[. . .]
Employing Edward Tylor’s concept of the “survival” of rudiments of earlier social
forms in later and even properly “modern” societies, Veselovsky argued that
manifestations of verbal creativity do not disappear with the stage of social development
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So, rather than try to resolve the antinomy (which is impossible by definition), let us track
it through a series of theoretical problems (all of them related to success).

4.3. The Evolution of Success: Convergent or Divergent?
The very choice to view development as a relay race (tradition) or a swerve
(contradiction) is antinomical. So is the choice to view evolution as either convergent or
divergent. Indeed, biology does not brook such logical, abstract, relativism—antinomy—and
insists on either one principle or another as the dominant one. Thus, Darwinism considers
divergence as the primary mechanism of evolution even though it acknowledges convergence in
nature, albeit only to a degree. In culture, however, much depends on how the matter is looked
upon (cf. the prolegomena to this dissertation); that, of course, is disputed, but so far, since the
ancient treatises on poetics, that has been the case.445
Moretti’s devotion to the Darwinian model of evolution is understandable: divergence
accounts for all those branches, all those works or methods, that turned out to be an evolutionary
dead-end: for example, the “non-Doylian” mystery novels that died because of having been
unable to adapt to the expectations of the public (whether already existent or partially moldable).
And it is the unread, i.e., the extinct, that fascinates Moretti, no less than that which has survived,
because that which has been selected requires the context of that which has been evolutionarily
Aristotle’s notion of ενέργεια, rendered by Joe Sachs as “being-at-work” (Joe Sachs, ed.,
Aristotle’s Physics: A Guided Study (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press,
2004), 21). This also brings to mind Shklovsky’s juxtaposition of “that which is made”
(sdelannoe) in art, with “the making” (delan’e) (Shklovsky, OTP 1929, 13)—also cf. 6.2.
445
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evolution through leaps, already in Aristotle’s Poetics, which again betrays the humanities’
implicit disbelief in qualitative progress—cf. S. L. Kozlov, “Literaturnaia evoliutsiia i
literaturnaia revoliutsiia: K istorii idei,” in Marietta Chudakova, ed., Tynianovskii sbornik.
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157

cast aside, in order to be understood. Of course, as Moretti’s theory develops, confronting new
facts, it also has to account for the instances of convergence, typical for culture (more is written
about it below), but he remains faithful to divergence.
As for RF and its stance on the nature of evolution, there is a divergence (pun intended)
of views about it. In chapter one, Yarkho’s approach to literature and nature as homologous has
already been contrasted with the Opoyaz view of literature as essentially autonomous,
characterized by its own laws and patterns. In 1.3 in particular, an objection was raised to Rad
Borislavov’s desire to make Shklovsky a Darwinian, or a “fellow traveler” of Darwinism;
Shklovsky, it was maintained, is anything but stingy with his metaphors; those from nature and
natural sciences are indeed present in his texts, and Shklovsky may well have read up on the
subject, as Borislavov claims. However, this motif had never become a leitmotif for Shklovsky,
neither in the 1920s nor in his later works. The burden of proof lies with those arguing otherwise.
Cynically put, even if Shklovsky seriously entertained the prospect of “Darwinizing” his theory
(despite his eagerness to claim back the res nullius of literature instead of letting some other
discipline colonize it)—even if he entertained this prospect, so what? If nothing has come out of
it, not even a separate article, not even a series of Shklovsky’s famously straightforward and
vehement paragraphs, why read more into his encounter with Darwinian ideas, especially given
Shklovsky’s highly skeptical attitude towards interpretation—precisely because interpretation
tends to read itself into the object interpreted rather than understand how that object functions?
Borislavov engages in the kind of close reading that is perhaps too close for an author like
Shklovsky, who, despite his multilayered irony, was not fond of hermeneutics (unlike the
Symbolists, whom he ridiculed for that) and never truly loyal to anything but his own style (not
changing it even when recreating dialogues between himself and his interlocutors)—the style
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from which his method emerged. It looks as though Borislavov reads too much into Shklovsky’s
response to Trotsky’s critique, namely: “An active interrelationship—when form influences
content, sometimes transforming it dramatically—is known well to us in all spheres of public as
well as biological life. This is by no means a reason for repudiating Darwinism and Marxism,
and for establishing a ‘Formal school’ in biology and sociology.”446 “In the document preserved
in Shklovskii’s personal file at RGALI,” Borislavov comments, “a handwritten comment
‘incomprehensible’ (neponiatno) can be seen underneath the phrase ‘formalist school in
biology.’”447 “It is unlikely,” he continues, “that Shklovskii was confused about the tenor of
Trotskii’s not very subtle rhetoric regarding the future of the formalist school. He must have
been intrigued about or baffled by, unless he had been following Soviet discussions in biology,
Trotskii’s phrase ‘formal school in biology.’”448 “By conflating Marxism and Darwinism and
opposing them as sound materialist theories to frivolous formal pursuits,” Borislavov concludes,
“Trotskii may have inadvertently provided the initial impetus for Shklovskii’s ubiquitous
references to genetics after his return from exile, by suggesting an analogy between formalism in
biology and formalism in literature.”449 The arguments against the sufficiency of such
corroborations (regardless of the learnedness of the author and some valuable details his work
contributed) have just been explained above. Meanwhile, Borislavov’s mention of Mendelism is
more telling than the author may have assumed. “In the early 1920s,” he writes, “it had become
common [. . .] to refer to Darwinism, augmented by recent developments in genetics, as ‘formal’
in addition to ‘Weismannist,’ ‘Morganist,’ and ‘Mendelian,’ after the early pioneers of genetics
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research.”450
Mendelism helps to see the difference among the Russian Formalists. For it was not
Opoyaz Formalism but a different branch of RF that concerned itself with Mendelism and
biologically understood mutations for that matter: Yarkho’s. Yarkho mentions Mendel already at
the beginning of The Methodology: “I shall make no secret of it: in the inmost recesses of my
soul, I am dreaming of Mendel’s lot: in ten-twenty years, I shall be excavated, discovered,
etc.”451 This alone, of course, would not prove much, if not for Yarkho’s use of Mendelism as a
method.
He uses it in The Methodology, in the section “The Concept of the Feature” (Poniatie
priznaka) in which he discusses the basics of (literary) analysis. Yarkho writes that analysis takes
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conclusion that all these peculiarities of living organisms could not be explained by
natural selection, seen at that time as a purely conservative factor, i.e., preserving the
norm (by eliminating all deviations from it), and by no means a creative one. This left
wide room for the revival of Lamarckian ideas of programmed evolution steered by the
efforts of the organism itself. [. . .] Genetics, which emerged in 1900, could have come to
the rescue, but, ironically, the first generation of geneticists took a rather anti-Darwinian
stance in their understanding of evolution, because, according to their views, mutations
were the very source of new formations and, consequently, the moving force of evolution,
while [natural] selection was merely a “sieve,” sifting and separating harmful changes
from accidentally conducive ones.
This was overcome in what is now called the modern synthesis—primarily that of Darwin’s and
Mendel’s ideas.
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two features, “qualities of the same object,” and compares them until it uncovers a difference.452
“That is when analyzing may (but should not) stop,” he says.453 Yarkho adduces two literary
examples and a biological one. The simpler example is from Corneille’s Examen de “La
Suivante,” in which, Yarkho writes, the great tragedian “singled out three ways of connecting
scenes: 1) bruit (the voice of the entering personage is heard); 2) vue (he is seen from a distance);
3) présence et discours (the previous ones remain on stage and talk to him).”454 To this, Yarkho
adds: “Later, however (Discours sur le poème dramatique), Corneille thought it necessary to
divide the last feature into two, as observation had made it evident that in drama there can also
be a ‘presence’ without ‘discourse’ (for instance, a hiding personage).”455
This may be seen as a pea-sized example, but, after all, Mendel’s momentous discovery
was owing to his observation of peas, namely, their colors, illustrating the laws of inheritance,
which accounted for the change of traits in the generations of descendants. Yarkho’s example of
Mendelism is very similar. “If [. . .] in the Mendelizing of plants it is observed that white flowers
alternate with yellow-violet ones, then ‘white’ and ‘yellow-violet’ are equipotent traits,” Yarkho
writes.456 “If, however,” he continues, “in further crossbreeding both yellow and violet flowers
appear (the yellow-violet ones turned out to be heterozygous457 and split), then ‘yellow-violet’
already constitutes two traits”—as with Corneille’s “présence et discours” criterion, Yarkho
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claims.458
Finally, Yarkho gives an example from his own work on Speech Distribution in Five-Act
Tragedy (cf. 1.2), which compared Classicist tragedies (of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries) with Romantic ones. At first, such a feature as the number of parties speaking (one,
two, three, etc.) was sufficient to tell statistically Classicist tragedies from Romantic ones.
“However, in dividing the first epoch [Classicism] into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
the number of monologues in the latter turned out to be near-Romantic,” Yarkho says, so that “it
became necessary to analyze the ‘monologue’ feature and split it into smaller features: 1) one
personage delivering a speech (a) he is alone—on stage, b) he addresses the silent audience; 2)
the personage in the middle of a conversation has time only to give a cue for someone who enters
or exits (when the personages change quickly).”459 “These, of course, are perfectly
heterogeneous phenomena,” Yarkho concludes, “feature (1) being typical for the Classicists of
the eighteenth century and feature (2), for the Romantics and Shakespeare.”460
Yarkho’s discussion of such features, or traits, his great attention to even the smallest
details—trivial to others but most essential to him, as building blocks in his statistical research of
literary life—all this shows that a concern with nomenclature lies at the heart of Yarkho’s
endeavor to marry biology with poetics. Indeed, Yarkho “suggested replacing the entirety of
traditional literary nomenclature of types by the appropriate biological one, i.e., telling between
[literary] species, genus, order, family, etc.”461 As for Opoyaz taxonomy, it is nonexistent,
because to them that would have been exactly the kind of static, near-positivist, classification
that they avoided (cf. chapter 2).
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Taxonomy or not, what is noteworthy is that for three pages already nothing has been said
about divergence vs. convergence, which is telling: so far, even with Yarkho, this opposition has
not been necessary; it did not play the same role of both a necessary stumbling block and a
theoretical cornerstone as for Moretti. And yet, once again, there was a branch of RF for which
this opposition was of great import—the one represented by Roman Jakobson. Though
Jakobson’s take on literary evolution and the relationship between literature and nature requires a
separate study, the following summary will suffice here.
Jakobson’s turn to biology may seem surprising as he was, of course, the one to insist that
we study literature in its literariness and culture and language in their specificity. On the cusp of
the 1920s, an explicit reference to any other discipline was undesired—let alone, biology,
manipulated by the totalitarian regimes, as Jakobson reminisced in a 1968 French television
program, “Vivre et Parler.” Yet it was in that very program, decades later, that Jakobson
embraced biology, discussing biological and linguistic correlations in the company of an
anthropologist, Lévi-Strauss; a molecular biologist, François Jacob; and a geneticist, Philippe
L’Héritier.462
By then, DNA had already been discovered, and geneticists, as François Jacob wrote,
“were astonished to find that heredity corresponds to a message written along the chromosomes
using not ideograms, but a chemical alphabet,” so that “expressions borrowed from linguistics
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have been widely used in molecular genetics.”463 Jakobson, in particular, elaborated on this in his
works, including “Essais de linguistique générale. 2. Rapports Internes et Externes du Langage,”
in which he correlates nucleotides with phonemes and codons with words. (As contemporary
scholars show, these correlations also concern the semantic aspect, including such “phenomena
that can be found in the genetic code [as] synonymy, polysemy, ambiguity.”)464
In light of what has been written in chapter one about analogy vs. homology (yet another
opposition in addition to divergence and convergence), a question immediately arises: was this
correlation seen as analogous or homologous? François Jacob writes that “Jakobson has always
favored [. . .] the idea that a strict relation is imposed between the two systems by a sort of
filiation,” whereas Jacob himself “h[e]ld to [. . .] the idea that analogous functions impose
analogous constraints,” hence the correlation between language and DNA/RNA.465
In the already mentioned 1968 program, Jakobson reveals that already in the 1920s, he
had been influenced by biological ideas, particularly those of Lev Berg, namely, his 1922 book
Nomogenesis; or, Evolution Determined by Law. To what degree Berg’s theory holds today for
biologists is a question for a different dissertation. What matters now is the very choice of Berg
by the foremost Formalist and then Structuralist. The choice is telling. Berg opposed his theory
both to that of Darwin and Lamarck. (Again, how incompatible Berg and his opponents’ theories
were and how fair his representation thereof was, is a separate question.) Darwinism, for Berg, is
too accidental, while Berg’s nomogenesis is a type of orthogenesis (teleological evolution); thus,
François Jacob, “The Linguistic Model in Biology,” in Daniel Armstrong and C. H. van
Schooneveld, eds., Roman Jakobson: Echoes of His Scholarship (Lisse: The Peter de Ridder
Press, 1977), 186. Hereafter Jacob.
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Berg prioritizes the principle of convergence (~analogous similarity) over divergence
(~homologous similarity); regularity of mutations over chance variations; and evolution as a
realization of a program over evolution as a formation of new features. Unlike Lamarck’s
orthogenesis, however, Berg’s nomogenesis unfolds not from a single organism but
nomothetically, as a law for all and sundry.
Jakobson is true to these principles as early as in his Remarques sur L’Évolution
Phonologique Russe, published in 1929, in which he gave a systemic explanation for sound
changes in the evolution of Common Slavic, showing how the synchronic phonological rules of
Common Slavic triggered its evolution (diachrony) into modern Slavic languages, with the same
rules remaining in these languages (restating themselves on the level of synchrony). Even an
accidental change, such as a borrowing from a foreign tongue, will proceed and take root, if
applicable according to these rules. A brilliant example can be found in Peter Steiner’s paper
devoted to RF and DH, in which he tells how the speech sound [f] migrated from Greek to old
Russian only because of matching a niche in the hierarchy of the latter, i.e., only because
meeting the structural expectations of the recipient tongue.466 To put it in Jakobson’s own words,
“the differentiation between related and nonrelated organisms loses its decisive character.
Convergent development, involving immense masses of individuals in a vast territory, is to be
considered as a dominant law.”467 This is also the logic that is imprinted in the idea of a language

Cf.: “The Russian phonological system contained five pairs of hard consonants
related through the opposition of voiced/voiceless: [b]/[p], [g]/[k], [d]/[t], [z]/[s], and
[zh]/[sh]. But the lonely [v] stood out like a proverbial sore thumb. The Greek [f] easily fit
into an empty slot correlating with a voiceless [v] while no such vacancy was available for
either [θ] or [ð]” (Peter Steiner, “Digital Humanities and Russian Formalism: Darwinism and
Anti-Darwinism in Literary History,” Vestnik SPbGU. Filosofiia i konfliktologiia, vol. 33, no. 2
(2017): 219).
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union (Sprachbund, or iazykovoi soiuz), put forward by Nikolai Trubetzkoy. To be fair, it should
also be added that Rad Borislavov does discuss this ramification of Formalist thought, but the
indisputable difference between the (proto-)Structuralist and Opoyaz branches of RF does not
prove that, where the former sided with convergence, the latter necessarily sided with its
opposite, or reasoned along the lines of the same binary opposition for that matter.
Furthermore, the same assertion as in chapter one has to be reiterated: biology was truly
essential, nay, indispensable, to Yarkho and to Yarkho alone among the Russian Formalists. We
may indeed envisage a tree growing from a seed when we read about the evolution of Common
Slavic as triggered, according to Jakobson, by the loss of yers as short high vowels (in modern
Russian these yers are etymologically represented by the soft and hard signs). We may but we
ought not to. This is a very specific example, which can but, again, need not be described by
falling back on biology. In the spirit of early Formalist theory—materialist and haptic—we
would do well to remember that the word “evolution,” which is much older than the biological
teachings that used it, literally means “unfolding.” This brings us back to Shklovsky, whose
works, including Theory of Prose, rely on the term unfolding (razvertyvanie) as much as on that
of “device” (priem). In Shklovsky, unfolding is formulaic, like a program to be installed:
“Razvernem formulu” (“let us unfold a formula”), he writes.468 Later, in the 1983 version of his
Theory of Prose, Shklovsky makes a biological pun on literature (or a literary pun on biology—
hard to tell when it is a pun): “The time came, and the trees opened (razvernut’) their buds; then
they painlessly turned yellow—they will shed and remain surrounded by leaves and the lines of
poems” (Prishla pora – i derev’ia razvernuli svoi pochki; potom bezbol’no pozhelteli – opadut i
ostanutsia v stroiu list’ev ili strok poem).469 This, again, testifies to the intensity of Shklovsky’s
468
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metaphorics, hence the unreliability of demetaphorizing his texts.
So, without trying to make Shklovsky a Darwinian, let us see what aspects of literary
evolution, as described by him and his fellow Opoyazians, resemble divergent or convergent
evolution.
Given the Opoyazians’ emphasis on contradictions in literary development,470 it seems
appropriate to begin with parody, which they considered crucial in literary evolution, so much so
that Shklovsky in his writings about Sterne, and Tynianov in his writings on parody (cf. 5.3 and
5.4) discussed a parodic aspect to literary evolution as such. Parody, of course, can be seen as a
swerve from a certain tradition, a divergence from it. But it can also be seen as convergent, as
mimicry (akin to an animal that pastiches the camouflage of another, trying to pass as poisonous,
for example), thus adapting to the ever-changing environment of the literary fact—a case in point
is Tynianov’s interpretation of parody as not necessarily humorous but rather unique in its
original sense, as an act of re-singing, perepesn’ (cf. 5.4).471
Next, we see clear signs of divergence in the Opoyazians’ treatment of such key figures
of Russian literature as Pushkin and Tolstoy. Both were ideal writers to the Opoyazians for their
ability to swerve from their own selves, ever changing. One example are Tynianov’s words about
Pushkin, cited in chapter one: “The historical Pushkin is different from the Pushkin of the
Symbolists, but the Pushkin of the Symbolists cannot be compared with the evolutionary
significance of Pushkin in Russian literature.”472 Another example is Eikhenbaum’s essay “The
Literary Career of L. Tolstoy” from My Chronicle—Eikhenbaum claimed that “Tolstoy had
Cf. Igor Smirnov, “Formalizm i nigilizm,” Zvezda, no. 2 (2014), for a discussion of the more
radical Formalists approaching language and literature from the standpoint of contradiction
(logically understood) as against the moderate Formalists, such as Zhirmunsky, who approached
literature and language from the standpoint of a contrary relation (again, in the logical sense).
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survived several epochs, several ‘contemporaneities,’” so that there were many Tolstoys, writers
and people, as it were, each iteration diverging from the previous one.473 For—repetita iuvant—
the literary phenomenon is rendered literary by the literary fact, meaning that the same object can
exist as different phenomena in different contexts, not to mention the evolution of an author.
On the other hand, convergent, even orthogenic, trends can be found in Opoyaz texts, as
with the Opoyazians’ constant comparisons not just of other contemporaries but also themselves,
with the writers of the past, particularly between their own Opoyaz and the famous Arzamas: the
literary society of Zhukovsky, Pushkin, and others. These self-comparisons, as Efim Kurganov
shows in his article, were only partly playful:
The comparison of the Opoyaz with the Arzamas was not made accidentally.
It was rooted in the general attitude of the entire trio of Tynianov
Shklovsky—Eikhenbaum.
By defining the role of Viktor Shklovsky in the Opoyaz, Boris Eikhenbaum
actually [. . .] spoke about the mission of this society, [. . .] once again revealing its
vocation through the Arzamas: “There was a time when Shklovsky threatened the old
generation of Russian intelligentsia with the Opoyaz —exactly like one hundred
years ago, when the future Russian ‘classics’ threatened the academicians and the
Shishkovians with their Arzamas.”474
According to Kurganov, these two literary societies fulfilled the same function, being a
platform for quick-witted critics who, half-seriously, half-jestingly, attacked the academic
scholarship of their day. Kurganov shows that “the ambience of the Opoyaz was literally
permeated with [the spirit of] Pushkin’s time” and that every Formalist was assigned his role in
this masquerade:
Among the Opoyaz members, there was a distinct feeling of an overlap of Tynianov
and Shklovsky with Pushkin and Vyazemsky—an overlap in personalities but above
all else in terms of their cultural orientation. For the Opoyaz, Shklovsky was
473
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Vyazemsky in the sense of being a kind of a troublemaker, a sophisticated artist of
literary carnage, a ringleader, a forward.475
This, to rephrase Darwin, is a convergence of character. It looks as though the literary fact
became “sentient” thanks to the Opoyazians’ reflexivity. Schillinger’s description of the
movement from instinct to consciousness as art matures, does apply as well. Commenting on
“[t]he forms of action by which living organisms adapt themselves to the goal of survival in the
existing medium,” he writes: “This efficiency comes about through ‘instinct’ among the lower
species, but through the conscious utilization of previous experiences leading to deliberate
efficiency among the higher animals.”476 Schillinger even sets the task of creating “the
technology of art production,” when, with a proper understanding of how art works, we can leave
it to computers (in Schillinger’s case, an act of sheer orthogenesis).477 He writes:
Becoming more and more conscious in the course of his evolution, man begins to create
directly from principles; with developments in the technique of handling material art
media (special components) and the rhythm and composition as a whole (general
components: time, space), man is enabled to choose the desired product and allow the
machine to do the rest; this is the rational and functional period of art creation.478
However, the rationality mentioned by Schillinger is opposite to art’s razum (intellect, reason,
logic), about which Shklovsky wrote: “Art develops by the logic (razum) of its technique.”479
The answer can be found in Schillinger, who immediately adds: “Thus, the evolution of art falls
into a closed system.”480 By contrast, the Opoyazians see art as fundamentally open, the
defamiliarization-driven logic of its development preventing it from closing on itself, so that
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divergence prevails.
It is also possible to reduce the opposition of closed and open systems, convergence and
divergence, to the same old opposition between the constructive and the defamiliarizing trends,
inherent not only in Opoyaz theory but also in the human mind. For the latter realizes itself
through expression while simultaneously estranging that which is expressed by outsourcing it to
the reality of signs, with which the human mind must reckon eventually.481 This said, it would be
a crude overgeneralization to boil down the opposition of the two trends, particularly in the case
of convergence vs. divergence, to that of the nomothetic and the idiographic, because divergence
and convergence can both be read as systemic or not: divergence or convergence can be seen
both as the law of the system or as the overcoming of the system by the idiographic. (In fact, it is
possible to regard the idiographic and the nomothetic as manifestations of divergence and
convergence, perhaps not even respectively but alternately.)
To a large degree, divergence and convergence may be treated as an expression of the law
of the unity and struggle of opposites. Thus, Moretti takes into account the observation of
Stephen Jay Gould (viz., that unlike natural evolution, “[c]ultural change [. . .] receives a
powerful boost from amalgamation and anastomosis482 of different traditions”)483 and the
observation of George Basalla, who, in turn, relies on Alfred Kroeber’s “tree of culture” with a
greater number of coalescences than the tree of life. Basalla writes: “Different biological species
usually do not interbreed, and on the rare occasions when they do their offspring are infertile.
Artifactual types, on the other hand, are routinely combined to produce new and fruitful
481
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entities.”484 (Figure 5, given at the end of this section, illustrates the matter.)
And yet, these concessions notwithstanding, Moretti still finds divergence to be of greater
heuristic potential for the study of evolution, since, as written above, it was the problem of “the
great unread” that created the demand for DR and Quantitative Formalism, and since it is
divergence (“random attempts at innovation” that “show no foreknowledge [. . .] of what may be
good for literary survival”) that explains the extinction of at least the 99 percent of all texts ever
written (which 99 percent “the market [. . .] pushes [. . .] into all sorts of crazy blind alleys”).485
This means that “divergence becomes indeed, as Darwin had seen inseparable from
extinction,”486 which then, unlike convergence, is not a positive but a negative source of literary
value: as death is inseparable from life and makes the latter a limited resource (hence ever in
demand), so is extinction inseparable from the value of the canon, so that we need the 99 percent
of “the great unread” to appreciate the remaining 1 percent better.
To compare Yarkho’s take on the death of literary works (in a nutshell, they are alive as
long they are read, so this seems comparable with Moretti), see chapter one, section 3.
Meanwhile, let us examine several Opoyaz excerpts discussing extinction.
The following excerpt from Shklovsky shows that an Opoyazian may mean extinction
metaphorically, not literally like Moretti: “We lacked the skill to write about the present. Art, no
longer mating with life, was degenerating and becoming extinct because of constant marriages
with close relatives—the old poetic images.”487
Ibid. It is noteworthy that Basalla’s example (“The internal combustion engine branch [of the
evolutionary tree] was joined with that of the bicycle and horse-drawn carriage to create the
automobile branch, which in turn merged with the dray wagon to produce the motor truck” (qtd.
ibid.) overlaps with Marshall McLuhan’s account of how media evolve, McLuhan’s formalism
being of great import to this dissertation (cf. chapter 6).
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The next passage, also from Shklovsky, is a lengthy one and requires a more detailed
explanation:
Anna Karenina is a good novel, but try to put it in the conditions of the present day.
Vronsky is in love with Anna. Karenin is the husband, two of them being equals at that.
The revolution takes places. First, Karenin is taken to the Tavrichesky Palace, then he
finds some translator’s job and finally emigrates; Vronsky is in the Volunteer Army,
coming from the Crimea. Anna lives as an émigré and walks the streets of Berlin or Paris
in a sealskin coat. Even her landlady is not interested to know whom she lives with. The
conflict that created the plot is gone. It has gone extinct.488
The transformation described here has to do with the meteor factor (cf. 3.2), i.e., a dramatic but
extraneous change affecting the system (in our case that of literature) in terms of limiting the
material at its disposal. Yet this is not a literary extinction, for Tolstoy’s novel lives, whereas a
historical novelist can use the same plot again; thus, the extinction, in Opoyaz terminology, is a
fact of genesis, not evolution; moreover, neither is it the kind of extinction Moretti wrote about.
Meanwhile, the following excerpt, this time Eikhenbaum’s, demonstrates that extinction
is reversible to an Opoyazian:
The alternation of problems and semantic signs leads to the regrouping of traditional
material and the introduction of new facts that kept falling out of the previous systems
due to its natural limitations. The inclusion of a new series of facts (under the banner of
one interrelationship or another) is their discovery, as it were, for the existence outside of
the system (“fortuity”) is tantamount to nonentity from the scholarly standpoint.489
In other words, certain facts become extinct when they leave the system, but later on they can be
discovered and resurrected. By contrast, it looks as though for Moretti, for the very sake of his
argument, extinction must be irreversible; a statistical error may well explain a sudden
resurrection (different from a regular resurrection because the thing resurrected had never been
in demand), but the 99 percent of works unread (by humans, not computers) will remain extinct.
In the atemporal but dynamic universe of the Opoyazians (cf. 1.4), the boundaries, again, are
488
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never defined: a text that was not part of literature but had existed for a long while, suddenly
becomes the literary fact; other texts, once popular (in the sense of genesis) but not really read
(because of being automatized), do not exist, literarily speaking, so that literary extinction is out
of the question.
For Moretti, Conan Doyle’s competitors are defeated for good. With the Opoyazians,
everything is more complex—or perhaps less systematized, in the spirit of defamiliarization.
Some literary phenomenon may gain victory but a short-lived one, owing not to literary qualities
but, say, ideology; on the contrary, something may have not won now but may in the future, the
next epoch with its literary fact being more benevolent; until then, such a phenomenon will bide
its time as the “junior line,” mladshaia liniia, so that what seemed to be a non-victory turns out
to have been a deferment.490
Thus, the problem of defining extinction in literature compels the definition of defeat. For
Moretti, extinction and defeat are synonymous, but not for the Opoyazians. Rather, it is not
extinction (which for Moretti happens within the field of literature) but epigonism (which for the
Opoyazians is automatically ousted from the system of the literary fact, even if this epigonism
enjoyed momentary popularity) that is seen as ultimate elimination. The term “epigonism” is
much more common in Russian than in English. Unlike imitation, which may be creative as with
parody, epigonism is about being overall unoriginal; epigonism is an uncreative repetition, a nail
in the coffin of a canon that was once alive.491
It is very important not to identify epigonism with canonization. The latter notion has
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already posed some problems regarding the status of Khlebnikov, whereas Khlebnikov has
nothing to do with the former. Canonization deals with the junior line reaching adulthood, so to
speak; thus, Shklovsky writes about Alexander Blok: “He wasn’t an epigone because he was a
canonizer,” since Blok transformed “the simplest types of lyricism,” such as sentimental love
songs (romansy) into a tendency of literary evolution to be reckoned with.492 Canonization may
mean transformation, but epigonism is a degenerate clone, always.
Figure 5. Convergence as the reflection of divergence: a) history and evolution as chronology
and genesis turned upside down; b) divergence

If we interpret development systemically
(so that diachrony will merge with
synchrony); if we interpret development
atemporally as against linear,
chronological, time (cf. 1.4); cf.
Engelgardt’s comment (Engelgardt, 115)
on the “atemporal quantity” of the
Opoyazians’ object of study); finally, if we
interpret development as “a ‘prophecy
backwards’” (Eikhenbaum, Moi vremennik,
87), in the sense of the evolutionary goal
found a posteriori,i then, it means that the
wheel of history can be turned back; that
divergence can be turned upside down and
seen as convergence: the random
divergence of genesis and chronology
replaced by the regular (zakonomernyi) and
nomothetic current of evolution, which
“transforms real movement into a chart”
(Eikhenbaum). Yet this is not the only
interpretation. If we consider development
from the standpoint of the defamiliarizing
trend, divergence can be seen as life, while
convergence, as a dead-end of eclecticism.

as vital defamiliarization; convergence as
eclectic extinction, akin to the Big Bounce
theory, in which the universe “closes” in on
itself, potentially to reemerge (divergently)
from the point of singularity; also cf. 1.2 for
Yarkho’s view on the law of waves in literary
evolution. (All these are, of course, analogies.)

François Jacob’s interpretation of
Jakobson’s approach to evolution—
cf. Roman Jakobson, Iazyk i
bessoznatel’noe (Moscow:
“Gnozis,” 1996), 219.
i
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4.4. Different Subjects of Literary Scholarship for Opoyazianism and “Morettianism”
The comparison of Moretti’s and the Opoyazians’ views reveals: the problem of the
subject of literary scholarship (cf. 2.3) is the point of divergence in the evolution of formalism
and distant reading—both with lowercase letters: not as particular schools of theory but as
traditions of interpreting the word and the world. This explains some other differences between
“Morettianism” and “Opoyazianism.”
Moretti analyzes the literary struggle not as a whole but from the standpoint of a certain
feature (device or devices), or at least a certain class, such as mystery novels or novels in
general. For Moretti, there is a focus: how could he speak about bifurcation without it? For the
Opoyazians, the samples seem to be more than random—arbitrary, as it may seem, when prose
as a whole is juxtaposed with verse as a whole, and not in a theoretically abstract way but in
terms of literary evolution (e.g. Tynianov’s “The Interlude”), or when fiction is contrasted with
literarily reconsidered nonfiction (Opoyaz literary factography—cf. 3.2). Moretti’s “The
Slaughterhouse of Literature,” exemplary of divergent literary evolution, is tic-tac-toe clear:
clues—no clues, clues necessary for the plot—clues merely accessory to the plot. In the
Opoyazians’ case, the tic-tac-toe grid has no limits, for the ways of the literary fact are
inscrutable.
Nevertheless, it should be added that, according to Moretti himself, “a process of
selection determined by a single character [. . .],” namely, the presence and functionality of
clues, “is almost certainly atypical,” since the “‘condensation’ of the structure in a single element
[. . .] is highly unusual,” “a multiplicity of biological traits” being the norm.493 Yet the
multiplicities, the clusters, analyzed by Moretti and his colleagues are specific enough to be
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detected and computed, i.e., mapped (another very important approach of Moretti’s—from
topography to tropography). Meanwhile, the literary specificity in the Opoyaz sense—when, only
God (of literature) knows why “there suddenly emerged an ‘and’ of a much greater scale:
‘contemporary poetry and Khlebnikov’”494—this specificity is fundamentally less objective. For
it is rooted in the contemporaries’ desire to “speak with their time, their desire to understand and
speak its voice,”495 rooted in the contemporaries’ faith in their intuition (cf. 4.5):
“Contemporaries’ ‘underestimations’ always raise doubts. Their ‘blindness’ is perfectly
conscious. [. . .] We consciously underestimate Khodasevich because we want to see our verse—
we are entitled to it.”496
To reiterate, something becomes the center of attention, shifting from the realm of
genesis and chronology to the realm of evolution and history, once a certain aspect has caught on
with the public, having done so as a common perceptual denominator, i.e., in terms of its
dynamic, defamiliarizing, sensation—as such rendered aesthetic (the original αἰσθητικός
(aisthētikós) meaning “of sense perception”). Once the public, or a public, has placed value in
such an aspect, so that it has been singled out by this public’s sensus communis,497 the
Opoyazians, as contemporaries, write about it. Therefore, the Hamburg score applies only to the
result, but not to the rules: the rules, i.e., the criteria of dynamism, are constantly changing. In
Moretti’s case, the rules, albeit at first shrouded in mystery, are clearer: people (not necessarily
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contemporaries, i.e., the representatives of a certain epoch, but people much like us) are fond of
solving riddles, especially the ones they have a chance to co-investigate (thanks to operation intext clues). Hence, people opted for Conan Doyle’s stories about Sherlock Holmes.498
Neither model has a distinct advantage: Moretti’s is easier to apply, but this does not
mean it is more accurate; the Opoyaz accounts better for the competition of sensus communes
(plural), the competition of different agendas, with largely unpredictable, albeit explicable, shifts
between them. Let us dwell on the Opoyaz model, namely, the Opoyazians’ appeals to
contemporaneity, in the next section.

4.5. Success as the Incarnation of Contemporaneity
The Opoyaz talk about contemporaneity and contemporaries raises the problem of
generations, which, in turn, largely stems from the Romantic idea of Zeitgeist. Albeit the
Opoyazians hoped to have “dispensed with the geist of the Germans,”499 their treatment of
history as the literary fact, falls into the same tradition, if only as an instance of influence a
contrario.500
Previously, in chapter two, an attempt has been made to show how an otherwise
subjective and impressionistic diagnosing of the literary fact can be approached more
objectively—when, regarded from the standpoint of the common perceptual
denominator / sensus communis of an epoch, “literary contemporaneity is not the sum of isolated
and subjective aspirations, on which it is impossible to rely, but a system of correlations
498
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characterized by objective unity.”501 To clarify, let us turn to a comparison—as does Ilya Kliger,
who draws parallels between the Opoyaz understanding of history and that of Benjamin and
Althusser. For our purposes, let us dwell on Althusser.
Kliger writes about Althusser’s “structural model of causality that replaced the
mechanistic and expressive models, previously dominant in philosophy”502:
The structural model of causality, according to Althusser, makes it possible to give up
metaphysical dualism, which posits some latent principles animating the visible process
of history. The social whole is considered not as a projection of preexistent instances
(“the spirit of the time” or the “economic base”), but a complexly differentiated structure
of relatively autonomous domains (of culture, science, politics, economics, legislature,
etc.).503
“That is to say,” Kliger concludes, “we are dealing with the social whole as an immanent system
of systems, the specific form whereof is determined by the structural dominant, i.e., that domain
of social existence which, at a given moment, is put in the forefront at the expense of the other
ones, and which hierarchizes, ‘articulates,’ social space.”504 Finally, Kliger postulates
asynchrony as the conditio sine qua non of structural causality:
It is obvious that a coherent application of the concept of structural causality requires that
we abandon the linear-progressive constructions of historical dynamics. The model of
society as a complex system is asynchronous; it presupposes the coexistence and
intertwining of various temporalities and a constant singling out of the so-called
“vestiges” (perezhitki), i.e., the elements of the system that temporarily remain immutable
during the changes at the level of neighboring structures.505
The problem of “the coexistence and intertwining of various temporalities,” manifest in the
uneasy relationship between different generations, is indeed one of the central ones for the
theorists and artists of the first decades of the last century. Boris Dubin writes about it:
“Generation,” in the semi-scientific and journalistic parlance, as used by the
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intelligentsia, becomes the benchmark (measure) for a simple and universally understood
social juxtaposition (comparison). It is used to refer, on the one hand, to a generation of
people of the same age, some of whom stand out and others lag behind; and on the other,
[it is used to refer] to sudden changes between the older and younger contemporaries
(“long and not long ago,” “before and now”). J. Ortega y Gasset designates people of the
same age by the term “generation,” and contemporaries, as “epoch.”506
Other texts of that period to consider are Wilhelm Pinder’s The Problem of Generation in
European Art History and especially Ernst Bloch’s Heritage of Our Times, in which the problem
of non-simultaneity, or nonsynchronism (Ungleichzeitigkeit), is addressed. As for the
Opoyazians, Dubin adds, they, “Viktor Shklovsky in particular, suggested the distinction
between the ‘synchronists’ (sinkhronisty), who ‘found’ themselves or were ‘thrown into’ the
same time, and ‘contemporaries’ (sovremenniki), who consider the period of time allotted to
them, ‘their own.’”507
Simultaneity (cf. Introduction, II) meant to be literarily alive to the Opoyazians—
simultaneity with allies and enemies alike, as long as the same structures were lit for them by the
literary fact, no matter whether they celebrated or attacked them. Accordingly, the Opoyazians’
greatest fear was losing touch with their own epoch, while authors like Pushkin or Tolstoy,
capable of changing along with the literary fact, were their source of hope.
While all this sounds not so different from the account of Opoyaz Formalism in chapters
one and two, the difference is that the Opoyazians in the later 1920s, primarily Eikhenbaum and
Shklovsky, made an “anthropological turn.”508 As chapter three illustrated, they looked at such
Boris Dubin, “Pokolenie: sotsial’nye granitsy poniatiia,” Monitoring obshchestvennogo
mneniia: ekonomicheskie i sotsial’nye peremeny, no. 2 (2002): 12.
507
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Sound literary criticism rejects any direct or immediate conclusions about the biography
of a poet when these are based merely on the evidence of his works, but it does not at all
follow from this that there is no connection whatsoever between the artist's biography and
his art. Such an “antibiographical” position would be the equivalent, in reverse, of the
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changes no longer from the standpoint of forms alone (how something is written, how an old
form is revived through new material and vice versa). Now, they also applied the same criteria at
the next level, that of the abovementioned “system of systems”: trying to understand how the
environments for the existence of literature (i.e., the literary everydays) coexist.
As the contemporaries of their time, the Opoyazians did not plan this as their next
project—they had to embrace it when they felt that the changing literary today began to
challenge their theory as a modus vivendi. At this point, the author had to do more than propitiate
“the God of literature” and secure a place in the sun by wresting it from the other canons. Now,
the author had to understand which god to worship; in the first case, it sufficed to ask “how to
write”; now the question was “how to be a writer.”509
This may be illustrated with another religious metaphor. At first, the question was how to
be righteous, but then, with the advent of Christianity, religious people confronted the problem
of nonsynchrony: what did it mean to be righteous and how was one supposed to be righteous,
given the difference between the Old and the New Testaments? Let us put the religious content
aside and concentrate on the logic of the following passage from Augustine’s Confessions:
Nor did I know that true and inward righteousness, which judgeth not according to
custom, but out of the most rightful Law of God Almighty, by which the fashions of
several places and times were so disposed, as was fittest both for those times and places;
itself in the mean time being the same always and everywhere; not another thing in
another place, nor otherwise upon another occasion. According to which righteousness
Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and Moses were righteous, yea, and all those other
commended by the mouth of God: but they were judged unrighteous by unskilful people
simplistic biographical approach. Have we forgotten Majakovskij’s admiration for the
“genuine heroism and martyrdom” of Xlebnikov, his teacher? “His life,” wrote
Majakovskij, “matched his brilliant verbal constructs. That life: is an example for poets
and a reproach to poetizers.” And it was Majakovskij who wrote that even a poet’s style
of dress, even his intimate conversations with his wife, should be determined by the
whole of his poetic production. He understood very well the close connection between
poetry and life. (Roman Jakobson, Language in Literature (Cambridge: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), 291)
509
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judging out of human judgment, and measuring all mankind in general by the model of
their own customs: just as if in armour, a man being ignorant what piece were appointed
for what part, should clap a greave upon his head, and draw a headpiece upon his leg, and
them murmur because they would not fit him.510
An example with armor (a greave on the head, a headpiece on the leg) is telling and has to do
with function taken to the second power: not function alone but also the function of functions.
Thus, the challenge is not only to have an appropriate greave or headpiece but also to know when
to put them on—or, it may be added, when not to, should the conditions change, as happened so
many times with those warriors who drowned because of having been heavily armed. Likewise,
there are epochs when, to be a writer, one ought not to write,511 in order to remain a dynamic
author and not a vestige of the past. Thus, Eikhenbaum writes that Tolstoy, “having experienced
a series of literary failures after a number of successful starts, stepped aside from [the then
leading journal] The Contemporary and even literature, having hatched an outflanking maneuver
(strategicheskii obkhod).”512 The latter consisted in turning to “popular schooling—an
undertaking of as vital importance in the early ‘60s, as the Crimean campaign was for the mid50s.”513 In Eikhenbaum’s opinion, “Tolstoy’s historical behavior is unique exactly because he,

St. Augustine, St. Augustine’s Confessions, trans. William Watts, vol. I (London: William
Heinemann, 1912), 124. Hereafter Augustine.
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(1924), Tynianov observes that “writing about poems nowadays is almost as difficult as writing
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unlike Fet or Turgenev, is in constant pursuit of contemporaneity and falls back only to attack
from a new angle. In the ‘50s, it was necessary to write feature stories about war, in the early
‘60s, to tackle the problem of popular schooling.”514 Under the banner of the literary fact,
“pedagogy was an intricate ruse (takticheskii khod) that let Tolstoy ‘trick’ contemporaneity and,
having won back the attention of the public, which he had lost in the ‘50s, return to literature.”515
But let us return to St. Augustine, to track further the axiological underpinnings of
nonsynchrony. After the metaphor with appropriate armor for appropriate bodily parts, he writes:
Of the same humour be those who are fretted to hear something to have been lawful for
righteous men in the former age, which is not so for righteous men now-a-days. And
because God commanded them one thing then, and these another thing now for certain
temporal respects; and yet those of both ages were servants to the same righteousness:
whereas they may observe in one man, and in one day, and in one house, different things
to be fit for different members, and one thing to be lawful now, which an hour hence is
not so; and something to be permitted or commanded in one corner, which is forbidden
and punished in another. Is Justice thereupon various or mutable? No; but the times
rather, which justice governs, are not like one another; for they are times.516
That is the same set of problems and the same question the Opoyazians raised; all we need do is
substitute being a contemporary of one’s epoch for righteousness; the ideal of dynamism for that
of Justice; the literary fact for “the times”; and literariness for God. The latter comparison,
metaphysics put aside, is useful in terms of its tradition-based familiarity, just as the following
fragment, which illustrates the immutability of the principle (literariness) as against its everchanging iterations (not literature, but “iterature,” so to speak: the literary fact):
Is it not that thou hast no need to be contained by something, thou who containest all
things; seeing that what thou fillest, by containing them thou fillest. For those vessels
which are full of thee, add no stability to thee; for were they broken, thou art not shed out:
and when thou art shed upon us, thou art not spilt, but thou raisest up us: but thou who
fillest all, with thy whole self dost thou fill them all.517
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Just as Augustine yearns after God, lest he, Augustine, should turn into an empty vessel, so does
Eikhenbaum—yearning after history, eager not to let go of that which is truly dynamic in his
epoch.
Meanwhile, appearances are deceitful. There are false prophets, and there are also false
kinds of success; and those gods who were once true but whose epoch is gone, are also false (at
least, for the time being). The most elaborate Opoyaz parable of the author’s striving for success
in the world of nonsynchrony is Eikhenbaum’s novel A Route to Immortality (1933). The novel
has a main character, Nikolai Petrovich Makarov, a real historical figure, but it would be an
exaggeration to call him a protagonist, for the same reasons we would not bestow this title on the
central character of a picaresque novel. Commenting on Eikhenbaum’s book, Elena Fratto
remarks: “In this novel, history is in fact a co-protagonist”—or, it could be added, perhaps the
only real one.518 Makarov is impressionable, sensitive to the beautiful, and cherishes the dream
of extraordinary accomplishments of an extraordinary life. As one reads about his life, it
becomes clear that Makarov is ever behind. That is not because he is untalented—in some ways,
quite the reverse, as with his guitar playing, at which he excels and even proves to be a technical
innovator. Yet nobody in Makarov’s time needs Paganini-like guitar virtuosity any longer;
Makarov’s masterly trills are no more in demand than kennings are in contemporary art.
Changing métiers and circumstances like a picaresque character, albeit pretending to be a
Romantic hero and trying to earn a biography, Makarov plays cat-and-mouse with life, the latter
always several steps ahead of him. When Makarov succeeds, his success is either short-lived and
seeming or no longer in demand, so not a success after all. Makarov is a synchronist, and even
though he clashes with his contemporaries, he shares no event with them. Makarov is significant
Elena Fratto, “Com’è fatto” il Maršrut v bessmertie di Boris Ejchenbaum,” Europa
Orientalis, vol. 29 (2010): 160. Hereafter Fratto.
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neither to be loved nor to be hated; he is simply uninteresting.
One thing remains to make Makarov’s failure complete: to grant him what he wished for,
but without the blessing of the literary fact—to cite T. S. Eliot, grant him “[s]hape without form,
shade without colour, / [p]aralysed force, gesture without motion.”519 Thus, it looks as though
Makarov has finally gained immortality in the form of an extremely popular French-Russian
dictionary that he wrote. It is in high demand; Makarov overhears the buyers: “‘Give me a
French-Russian Makarov,’ or ‘Give me a Russian-French Makarov,’ or ‘Give me an
international Makarov,’” thinking to himself. “What else to desire? That is what true glory is!
That is what true immortality is!”520 Yet this is sham glory, sham immortality, sham success, for
he is not esteemed as Makarov the guitarist, Makarov the poet (his other aspiration), etc.—
instead, he is merely a dictionary, like a Longman or le Robert: “People in bookshops kept
asking: ‘Give me a Russian-French Makarov’ or ‘Give me a French-Russian Makarov,’ without
showing any interest whatsoever in who that international Makarov was, whether he was alive,
married or a bachelor, a blond or a brunet, and so forth.”521 In contemporary Russian, there is a
meme for it: Makarov is a man and a ship (chelovek i parokhod), meaning someone with a
narrow specialty known only in his or her field—a man and a ship, both thrown overboard, from
contemporaneity.
When Makarov is officially recognized by the powers that be—the Academy (with its
“immortals”), the Imperial government, and, finally, the secret police—the final building block is
put in Makarov’s mausoleum (that of dictionary-like immortality, barren of zhiznetvorchestvo:
both the art of how to create and how to be an artist). Eikhenbaum’s verdict is inconsolable:
T. S. Eliot, “The Hollow Men,” All Poetry, accessed March 12, 2020,
https://allpoetry.com/the-hollow-men.
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Nikolai Petrovich believed that all his strokes of luck ensued from fate’s (sud’ba)
special patronage. [. . .]
Yet in reality, [. . .]
fate was no longer concerned with Makarov and his immortality. [. . .]
Until then, [fate] had been the ruler of the world—at least, it seemed so. Flippant,
dissolute, fond of caprices and fortuities, it played with people and their lives. [. . .]
And suddenly, everything changed.
Fate found a rival—an austere, powerful, and relentless force with a formidable
logic: history. [. . .]
It [history] led vast masses of people—the ones in whom fate had never taken
interest. These people recognized no fate, no authority, no God. [. . .] [History] walked in
small but firm steps. They resonated all over the Earth.522
Makarov is, in fact, one of those “Europeans” who, as Osip Mandelstam wrote in 1922, were
“pulled out of their biographies as billiard balls from their pockets.”523 To elaborate on the
metaphor of billiards, it may be said that Makarov spent his life playing billiards with fate, trying
to pocket a ball (find the relevant everyday), when suddenly a new era, that of the masses, set in,
meaning that the system of cultural evolution had reached a higher, more universal, level. It
turned out that the rules of the whole game had changed, so that when Makarov started winning,
he had actually been losing for a while, like a person who thought he was playing Russian
pyramid whereas it was an eight-ball game, in which the misguided player failed to tell between
striped and solid balls. Thus Makarov fell victim to the irony of the system’s permutations.
Of course, Eikhenbaum’s novel is itself an attempt “to listen to the flow of history,”524
“the choice of subject for Marshrut,” evidently, being “instrumental in the treatment of
literaturnyi byt and, above all, in the analysis of the present literary culture, devoid of any
intention of giving Makarov the glory that history has rightly denied him.”525
In My Chronicle, Eikhenbaum applies the question “how to be a writer” to himself.
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Hence the autobiographical section at the beginning of My Chronicle, in which Eikhenbaum tells
about his childhood and adolescence, tracking how he ended up as he did—how, not why:
history is suprahuman and “cannot answer any of the ‘whys’” of mere mortals, “but only the
question ‘what [something] means.’”526 Thus, Eikhenbaum tracks how he could have become a
musician (a parallel with Makarov) and did not become one; how he could have become a poet
(having obtained Gumilev’s blessing) and did not; how he could have chosen one career and not
another, etc. etc. Each time, Eikhenbaum’s plans are foiled by chance.
Yet, paradoxically, but paradoxically only at first blush (for more on Opoyaz paradoxes,
cf. 6.1), he finds consolation in imagining chance as a pattern of history, albeit inaccessible to
mere mortals like himself or Makarov (cf. the passage about history in My Chronicle, given at
the end of 5.4).527 That is to say, chance is sufferable only as non-chance, apophatically so. In a
diary entry of 1948, Eikhenbaum is perfectly clear about it: “Did Dostoyevsky have faith in
history? No, and there’s the rub”; “Either it and everything else does not exist, / the accidentally
(sluchaino) formed Earth will die by accident, / or—there is nothing but history.”528
To summarize, if chance is the unruly rule of all things, then everything is meaningless,
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God is dead does not mean that the divinity ceases to provide a clarification of existence,
but rather that the absolute guarantee of the identity of the responsible self disappears
from the horizon of Nietzsche’s consciousness, which in turn becomes indistinguishable
from that disappearance. … All that is left (to consciousness) is to declare that its very
identity is a chance case arbitrarily maintained as necessary, even if this means taking
itself for that universal wheel of chance, even if this means embracing if possible the
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verb “to be”, which is never applied to being itself but to the fortuitous. (qtd. in Gilles
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bereft of value: one’s life, aspirations, and ultimate death, biographical or generational (e.g. the
generational death of the people of the 1820s who lived in the 1830s, described by Tynianov in
The Death of the Wazir Mukhtar). If, however, history as a system governs us, it both explains
and ennobles our “lofty malady” (to cite the title of Pasternak’s poem to which Eikhenbaum
alludes in My Chronicle). Tynianov’s characteristic of literature is equally applicable to history,
with its “violent struggle for new vision, accompanied by fruitless strokes of luck, necessary and
deliberate ‘mistakes,’ principled insurrections, negotiations, battles, and deaths,” the latter being
“often real, not metaphorical—these of people and generations.”529
It could also be said that chance is the figure (the visible part changing before our eyes)
and history, the ground—never seen in its entirety, yet revealing itself through patterns—patterns
that withstand chaos and also dialectically ennoble that which shows itself to us attired as chance
(to read more about the figure and ground, cf. 6.6). Thus, Eikhenbaum wrote: “We do not know
any reasons—oh, would that we knew a tiny one! The whole world would be transformed. But
all we know and see are merely parallels: this there and that here. And so we compare. We know,
we feel that everything is one, that there is nothing small, accidental, standalone, but that
everything is big and planned (zakonomernyi).”530 Invisibility, on which history is thus
predicated, may seem to contradict the above-cited fragment in which Kliger compares
Althusser’s and the Opoyazians’ systemic nonsynchrony, opposing it to “metaphysical dualism.”
Yet, first of all, structural nonsynchrony need not annul “some latent principles animating the
visible process of history”—it only buries them deeper. Secondly, this contradiction can be seen
as the oscillation of Opoyaz Formalism, towards its defamiliarizing trend.
Consequently, such an approach to history may simultaneously seem liberating and
529
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deterministic, empowering and discouraging—in each case, the latter, because one willing to
know “how to be a writer?” is likely, upon confronting the impenetrability of history, to answer
the question with a question: “what’s the point?” An answer to that is that the writer would not
have to suffer from uncertainty if he did not have an urge to write. Therefore, there is something
in him already at the beginning—like a longing for music, a passionate wish to be a musician—
that compels him “to listen to the flow of history,” suggesting subject matter and style.531 Yet the
urge alone does not guarantee success: there are tone-deaf music lovers; often, they do not hear
what they cannot hear, and it is much harder to tell whether you are listening to the music of
history or just yourself.
Catching the music of history means finding the form favored by the epoch. Consider the
following excerpt in which Eikhenbaum writes about Blok’s poem Retribution: “No wonder the
poem itself is based on a comparison between historic and family events: the clan’s life is ‘the
retribution of history, milieu, and epoch.’ Blok interprets the transition from songful anapest to
Pushkin’s iambic verse with regard to the epoch.”532 Immediately, Eikhenbaum adds: “This is a
dangerous motivation [for more on motivation, cf. 5.3], but to Blok, languishing under the
burden of [. . .] Symbolism, it appeared to be the savior.”533 Eikhenbaum is thus careful not to
predicate literary evolution on social history in this proviso of his, but otherwise he is in accord
with Blok.
Eikhenbaum’s faith in history as a system of patterns is self-based, rooted in his sensation
of the epoch whose contemporary he is; it is the same drive that we find in Blok:
The flow of intuitions (predchuvstvie), resounding above some of us between the two
revolutions, [. . .] petered out, subsided, went somewhere underground. I think I was not
the only one who experienced the feeling of illness and pining during the years 1906531
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1916. Now, when all of Europe’s air has been altered by the Russian revolution, which
started with a “bloodless idyll” of February days and has been growing incessantly and
imminently, it seems sometimes, as though those recent years, so ancient and distant,
have never happened; yet the flow that had gone underground and has been silent deep in
the darkness—here it is, resounding again, and in its sound is the new music.534
“The task, the duty of the artist,” Blok concludes, “is to recognize that which is planned; to listen
to that music, with which the ‘air torn by wind’ resounds.”535
It turns out that a contemporary, an artist or scholar,536 carries inside an undefined and
haunting feeling that is both a question and an answer, something that borders on both certainty
and doubt. This dichotomy brings us back to faith and invites another passage from St.
Augustine. Just as Eikhenbaum asked some fifteen hundred years later “how to be a writer” (i.e.,
how to behave in order to choose the right literary everyday for catching the searchlight of the
literary fact), so Augustine asked: “[H]ow shall I call upon my God [. . .]?”537 As explained just
now, the question was the answer: “[B]ecause whatsoever is, could not subsist without it, must it
follow thereupon, that whatsoever hath being, is endued with a capacity of thee? Since therefore
I also am, how do I entreat thee to come into me, who could not be, unless thou wert first in me?
[. . .] I should therefore not be, O God, yea I should have no being at all, unless I had my being in
Alexander Blok, Sobranie sochinenii v vos’mi tomakh. Tom shestoi. Proza 1918-1921
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thee.”538
In a similar fashion, the faithful one does not want his act of faith to be compromised by
the finiteness of certitude, or else the faith will be in vain and grace, gone:
Perhaps, we are not allowed to see the causes so that we would each do his task,
apparently needed by someone. But we are allowed to see and recognize the effects—for
that is what every science of history preoccupies itself with. When we look back, we see
that in every little document, Truth is hiding, that in every tiny living thing, there was a
truth of its own, and that it existed not by itself, but in an organized (zakonomernyi)
whole. And so we say “not without reason” (nedarom)…. But the moment we begin to
tackle our life, the present day, our knowledge crumbles, for it is not Truth that we have
found but only the tracks of its formidable tread on dry ground. The historian turns into
the most naïve layman: “So, you are a historian—tell us….” While the historian, abashed,
shrugs his shoulders and keeps silence.539
Toned down, this nonetheless verges on the messianic,540 conjuring up Walter Benjamin’s
famous image of the angel of history, whose “face is turned toward the past,” but who, instead of
“a chain of events” (this resembles Eikhenbaum’s opposition of chaotic chronology to orderly
history—cf. 1.4), “sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage.”541
For the angel, history lies in ruins, but, though the angel of history is looking at the past not as a
whole but as a “wreckage,” there is a storm coming from Paradise that “irresistibly propels him
into the future to which his back is turned.”542 Thus, the wreckage, the effects of the “formidable
tread,” is the promise, an indirect proof, as well as the dialectic animation of order, history, so
that the following passage can read as both pessimistic and optimistic:
Each generation is allotted a strip of time. It plays, then studies, takes exams, spends
nights arguing and carousing, then falls in love, gets married, works hard, creates…. And
so, suddenly (and always with uncanny unexpectedness!), there comes a moment on this
path when that generation sees that is has been passing exams, falling in love, and
creating—“not without reason….” That it is accountable for everything, that everything
has been part of a plan (zakonomerno). And this is the point of maturity and terror. It sees
538
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that there is nowhere else to go, nowhere to hide from the unseen and unknowable causes,
no one to blame, and nothing to rectify.543
This passage may both read as an illustration of the Hegelian idea of freedom qua
realized necessity, as well as the reevaluation of historical necessity as temporary freedom544—
freedom as a confluence of series, rather than the dictate of one principle; freedom as an
opportune moment for the contemporaries to realize or squander—as potential energy to be
wasted or turned into kinetic one. Fratto, too, recognizes the palindromic ambiguity of freedom
as necessity, and believes that Eikhenbaum is more deterministic than, for example, Tynianov:
History, according to him [Eikhenbaum], is a force that cannot be hindered, so
trying to change its direction is not only unwise but also completely useless. From the
works of Tynianov, on the other hand, there emerges the will to render justice and bring
fame to those great personages whom history has not rewarded and who have been
unjustly forgotten. His novels do not reveal the will to reconcile with history, but rather
the aim of correcting it and the attempt to add something where it has proved ungenerous.
[. . .]
Furthermore, writing about Makarov does not have the aim to make known the
life and works of an insignificant writer.545
There is a grain of truth in Fratto’s observation as far as the fragments from Eikhenbaum cited
above are concerned, even though Tynianov’s stance seems oversimplified, for he does share the
systemic view of history and can be ruthless to certain personages thereof, whereas Eikhenbaum
may also endow certain individuals in history with agency, as in Tolstoy’s case. Once again, the
very fact of an intra-Opoyazian contradiction is of more import than the solution. The tension,
forming the uniqueness of Opoyazian Formalism, is what matters. Moreover, as has already been
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argued numerous times, when scholars encounter such contradictions among the Opoyazians,
they tend to oppose the latter to each other, and they are entitled to do so, as long as the
opposition is not explained away by some fundamental differences among the Opoyazians as
individuals, but taken for what it is worth: the dialectical contradiction of the Opoyaz.
It is this oscillation—whether we err on the side of freedom or on that of necessity—it is
this interlude, promezhutok, the unseen, that reveals itself as the precondition of history—history
as a system, but such a system that, being overdetermined, is stitched from shifts, switches,
reconfigurations. Thus, although eventually, all speculation put aside, the turtle will lose to
Achilles, who must outrun it, in Zeno’s world, which, like cinema, divided time into frames, the
turtle enjoys the freedom of outrunning Achilles—not chronologically, but at every given
moment. Likewise, Oedipus, unfree in the long run, was the author of his fate at every given
stage; he did not end up as a happy man, yet he entered history.
Eikhenbaum and Shklovsky shared this logic of oscillatory history as much as Tynianov.
Thus, Lydia Ginzburg quoted Eikhenbaum saying that he “wanted to protect his temporary
blindness,”546 while Shklovsky contended that “the attempts to systematize the[] violations”547 of
rhythm (i.e., to inscribe the anti-systemic in the system) would never succeed, and extrapolated
this principle to the evolution of literature and art as such: trackable yet unpredictable—much
like Derrida’s trace.548
This blindness, this lacuna—whether a loophole or a little leeway—is the contemporary’s
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chance to maneuver, and, there being no map of the ever-changing ocean of literature, one has to
sail and circumnavigate the reefs by relying on intuition.549 Langue may well be immutable and
that which is historically necessary, may well be irrevocable. However, parole may
serendipitously overlap with langue (as in the case of the Russian word letchik (pilot), which, as
the legend has it, had been invented by Khlebnikov before it entered the common language).
Tapping into the sensus communis of one’s epoch and realizing its potential, is at stake. Again,
this is simultaneously deterministic and not; overdeterministic rather, as has already been said—
one’s behavior (if not will), intuitive (if not conscious), being a key factor—a most active
constructive principle and a manifestation of the person-system, which is formally interacting
with the other systems (the system of literariness among them). As Fratto observes, “the ‘literary
behavior’ of the writers of the past is considered decisive for their success, as much as the choice
of a poetic image or a motif of the plot.”550 Ergo, it is possible to rephrase the question of how to
be a writer thus: “What is the winning strategy to remain at the center of the system.”551

4.6. Success and Literary Behavior
The way to bring such oscillatory history down to earth and give a practical answer to
Eikhenbaum’s question “how to be a writer?” would be fragmentation, or the niche strategy, to
use the market term. This is what Bradley Gorski does in his most timely dissertation entitled
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Authors of Success: Cultural Capitalism and Literary Evolution in Contemporary Russia.
Inspired by Eikhenbaum’s question and armed with his idea of literaturnyi byt (however, without
opposing it to the Marxist perspective but incorporating within it), Gorski analyzes the
disintegration of Russian literature in the wake of that of the Soviet Union. “As post-Soviet
authors engaged with the constantly shifting institutional and economic frameworks that
constituted the possibilities of being a writer,” Gorski maintains, “the possibilities of writing
itself also shifted. Each of the authors discussed in this dissertation tested the limits and pushed
the boundaries defining the field of possible solutions to each of these questions, and as they did
so, they opened up new ways both of writing and of being writers.”552 According to Gorski,
“[t]he literary process was driven, in large part, by authors who found innovative solutions to
immediate problems along their pathways to success,”553 namely, Boris Akunin as an author of
“Mass Literature for the Elite”; Olga Slavnikova through literary prizes, gaining “Recognition
Beyond the Market”; Aleksei Ivanov by launching a massive cultural project that literature is
only a part of (Gorski calls it “a ‘Corporative’ Model of Literary Success”); and Vera Polozkova
with her “Digitized Authorial Self-Creation.”554
What this implies is not only reacting to the meteor factor (cf. 3.2) but also tampering
with it, i.e., creating new contexts, not (only or necessarily) new forms. As Gorski claims,
“[w]ithout specifically intending to, the writers discussed [. . .] built the foundation as well as the
very forms—the base and the superstructure—of the [new] system [of Russian literature].”555
Creating new outlets is what the market does, and this resembles the nascence of the
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literary market in Russia—as described by Grits, Trenin, and Nikitin (under the patronage of the
first generation of the Opoyazians). For instance, one could look for parallels between Akunin’s
“Mass Literature for the Elite” and the authors published by Smirdin, who “‘canonize[d]’ the
book trade, ma[de] it a ‘high genre’” in the nineteenth century.556
Yet the implicit drive behind the Opoyaz study of these events is different—it is not about
studying the superstructure through the base; it is about tracking how the facts of genesis took on
a new life as the literary fact, hence the authors’ orientation to the literary everyday. Without
flattening the constructive hierarchy of the junior and senior canons fighting for a place under the
sun, this drive aims for a convergence of the forms at issue—convergence in the given epoch,
ruled by a certain literary fact. This implicit drive is laid bare in the following excerpt, when
Grits and his coauthors write about Smirdin’s “progressive role” and the fact that he “worked for
history”:
The commercial approach to literature, transferred to the yet untouched market of
high literature, played a most progressive role.
The second, no less important, cause of Smirdin’s success was the fact that he
worked for history, as a crossing point of historical forces.
The early 1830s was the period of the booming growth and development of book
trade. Smirdin rose [byl podkhvachen i vznesen] to the crest of the wave.557
It is hard not to agree with Gorski’s premise: “[T]he drive for success is pervasive, but
the very meaning of ‘success’ can be defined differently by different authors.”558 And yet the
Opoyazians seem to believe that beyond the multiplicity of meanings, there is an all-binding
reality of it: success not in the genetic sense but success as merging—not with the mainstream of
mass or elite literature but with the most dynamic, promising, tendencies of literary evolution.
Given both the knowledge about the criteria of success as well as the je-ne-sais-quoi
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aspect of it (otherwise, infallible prognostication would exist by now), it is possible to illustrate
the matter with a rather mercantile image—that of a fruit machine:
Figure 6. The “Fruit Machine” of Literary Success

Rules:
1 much stronger than 2—more typical for “high” literature
2 much stronger than 1—more typical for mass literature
1, 2, and 3 equally strong—universal, national eminence
3 much stronger than 2 and/or 1—a fact of social, not literary, history
There is a dialectical contradiction between 1 and 2
The greater 2 is, the higher the chance of 3 being long-lasting
The greater 1 is, the higher the probability of a longtime commitment of an elite form of 3
1 can exist on its own; 2 can never exist without 3
1 and 2 hinge on defamiliarization, first as something riddle-like and inimitable, then as coveted
and admiringly recreated

It is this single understanding of history, in spite of its changeability and even in defiance of it
(cf. 2.4), the desire not simply to win a small prize but to hit the jackpot, that reintroduces the
problem of success, almost already “niched away” so conveniently. As has been written before,
the conditions of the mathematical problem change each time, but there is faith that the solution
to it must exist; that there is a right angle for the sail to catch the wind of the epoch. Many
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authors will perish in the high seas without reaching the land, but the land will be there, and
history, as a process, will continue—such seems to be the implication of Opoyaz texts.
If so, this invites the objection that the Opoyazians did not manage to dispense with value
judgments:
Facile phrases about the good making its way in the end may comfort many an
unrecognized man of talent, but they fall wide of the truth. They recall the saying that
where the need is greatest God’s help is nearest a useful source, perhaps, of
encouragement in desperate situations, but of very doubtful logical validity in spite of all
the touching instances recorded in lesson-books. Such faith will help the creative artist,
but the literary or sociological observer who holds unreservedly to it is lacking in the
critical faculty. To the belief that the good wins through, the critic can only offer the
sceptical reply that that which wins through will thereafter be regarded as good.559
Reading this excerpt from Schücking, Zhirmunsky, quite likely, may have thought of the
Opoyazians. If he did, he had a sound reason for it, should we interpret “the good making its
way” as the Opoyazians’ faith in the contemporary as dynamic and in the dynamic, as desirable,
and should we remember how much hope they pinned on intuition, refusing to isolate themselves
from the writers whom they studied.
The urge to intuit the order of the day brought the Opoyazians together with
contemporary writers, and engaged them in the “economy” of literary evolution, with their own
cash value at stake, rendering their theory not objective but involved, as one of the players (cf.
the discussion of the observer effect in 1.4).
Hansen-Löve describes it as “the existentialization of the principle of ostranenie in
Shklovsky, his transfer of the sensualistic-vitalist presuppositions of artistic impressionism [. . .]
on the ‘daily’ (bytovoi) stance of the theorist and artist.”560 “The [Opoyaz] Formalists,” says
Hansen-Löve, “had always recognized the ambivalent, changeable, and ephemeral nature of the
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dominants in the synchronous ‘struggle of genres.’”561 As a result, he continues, “Formalist
criticism had to—often very quickly at that—change its stance the moment their favorite
tendency (supported by them critically, practically, and theoretically) became the norm and
manifested its ‘unproductiveness.’”562
This invites more objections. If we think about the Opoyaz stance, as described by
Hansen-Löve, as a conflict of interest, then the most peculiar problem of self-fulfilling
prophecies in economics would apply. That is an issue debated in Teppo Felin and Nicolai J.
Foss’s article, for instance. The authors cast doubt on “the ‘performativity’ of theories” (and the
Opoyaz theory is most performative, of course). They believe that “theories tend to influence
reality to the extent to which they approximate underlying objective reality, this, for example,
requiring a correct specification of human nature.”563 Insofar as this means the resistance of the
environment to those trying to affect it, it is hard to disagree. Felin and Foss aspire to show that
“there are important boundary conditions to theories falsely fulfilling themselves.”564 They call
into question the argument that “theories and associated language and assumptions in effect
shape, construct, and determine reality in a self-fulfilling fashion rather than merely describing
or explaining reality,” “the ‘strong form’ of the argument” being “that even false theories and
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associated false specifications of reality in effect evoke bad behaviors, in a self-fulfilling fashion,
‘which make the originally false conception come true.’”565 What is said of falsehood raises the
question of manipulation, already discussed in 3.3.
Felin and Foss, further, disagree with those who maintain that “[e]conomics [. . .] only
‘explains’ reality and behavior post hoc, that is, after the assumptions become widely adopted
and subsequently reflected in the behavior of individuals.”566 This, in turn, resembles
Eikhenbaum’s idea of history as “a ‘prophecy backwards’” (cf. 2.4).567 Yet Felin and Foss agree
with social psychologist Lee Jussim (the author of a well-known book Social Perception and
Social Reality: Why Accuracy Dominates Bias and Self-Fulfilling Prophecy) in that “a key
problem in citing or evoking the self-fulfilling nature of theories and language is the lack of
boundaries in making these arguments, that is, scholars have not been clear about the ‘conditions
that limit prophecy fulfillment’ [Jussim’s words].”568
Returning to the Opoyazians, it has to be reiterated that in its essence, the literary fact is
never really traceable and that the idea of set boundaries that limit literary development goes
against the premise of the Opoyaz doctrine. Finally, Felin and Foss suggest that we “consider the
question of why some assumptions of economic theories have not fulfilled themselves, while
others have,” and “[t]he answer,” according to them, “is that objective reality intervenes: the
boundary of objective reality means that not just any false theoretical claims, assumptions, or
prophecies can be made.”569 The last statement is hard to disagree with, and though the
conventionally understood objective reality is mistrusted by the Opoyazians, they do not yield to
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sheer subjectivity either, having started their journey (let us remember) with an attack on
impressionistic criticism. Opoyaz texts, as should be clear by now, are rife with mentions of
history, contemporaneity, the epoch, etc. (i.e., with mentions of reality) interfering with the plans
of the lesser mortals, hence the problem of freedom and necessity (cf. 4.5). Moreover, instead of
some self-deceiving Pythic frenzy, it is constant doubts that we find in the Opoyazians as they
try to penetrate history—as has been illustrated in 3.5, with Shklovsky’s and Gukovsky’s
polemic about Komarov.
Raised—by the defamiliarizing trend—to the highest levels of theoretical abstraction
(where the equipment used by pre-quantum physics does not register much, while that is the only
equipment there is at our disposal), the Opoyazians were more vulnerable than when they started
and would have been more secure had they hewn to the constructive trend. Meanwhile, the
Opoyazians’ involvement in literary “economy,” along with their unflagging insistence on
certain literary phenomena as necessary for the given epoch (cf. 2.4), explains why already their
contemporaries accused them of “making the weather” while forecasting it.
Naum Berkovsky, Zhirmunsky’s student, wrote: “There was a time when the Formalists
predicted literary weather. It is good, while forecasting, to have weather at one’s disposal—not
every observatory succeeds in it. Kaverin was exactly this kind of weather at the Formalists’
disposal. The theoreticians said that tomorrow there would be the adventure novel, and the next
day Kaverin produced the adventure novel—the ends met infallibly” (cf. 3.2).570 At the same
time, Berkovsky acknowledges himself: “With the years, Kaverin split off. Now, he has written
The Troublemaker [cf. 2.1], not bad at all, and here he, as it were, is already making the weather
forecast by a different observatory: forecast by Lef.”571 (Various visions of the future of Soviet
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literature, as articulated by the Opoyaz and Lef theorists, and as realized by Kaverin, are at issue.)
This shows that “making the weather” is not the same as fixing matches but is like betting in a
match, the wrestler, fighting by the Hamburg score, having every right to bet on himself.
That is the kind of theoretical muddle Moretti wanted to avoid. If we go back to Figure 6,
it looks as though he bet on 3 (the major social acceptance of the work or genre) and 2 (the
resulting reproduction of such work or genre), without complicating the idea of success by taking
1 (the criterion of dynamism), but quite the reverse. Unlike the Opoyazians, who were in the
midst of literary life (cf. chapter 2) and, because of it, identified history with actuality (when
eighteenth-century Komarov is a contemporary of the late 1920s—cf. 3.5)—unlike the
Opoyazians, Moretti takes history for…. history. As Geoffrey Winthrop-Young astutely remarks,
“[a]t bottom, Moretti is neither a literary theorist nor a literary historian. He is an historian who
happens to deal with literary texts.”572 This should not simplify Moretti’s endeavor, but his
theoretical obstacles are by and large different from the ones the Opoyazians inflicted on
themselves.
One of such obstacles, bringing us to the last section of this chapter, has to do with
writing authorial, individualized, Romantic, literary history all along, despite all declarations
claiming otherwise. Ted Underwood describes this Romantic trait eloquently:
By subordinating universal standards to the idea of historical change, Romantic
historicism hollowed out older ideas of fame. “No human monument,” Johann Gottfried
von Herder observed, “can endure intact and eternal, for it was formed in the stream of
generations only by the hands of a certain time for that time.” This is more than an
empirical observation that reputations fade and monuments crumble; the point is rather
that no monument or ideal can hope to be as fundamental, as absolute, as change itself.
But in sealing the fate of Ozymandias, historicism also opened up new forms of
immortality. One could wager the future not on immutability, but on flux. If writers and
thinkers were agents through which history worked its changes, they could imagine
Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, “How The Mule Got Its Tale: Moretti’s Darwinian Bricolage,”
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themselves as unacknowledged legislators of the world.573
4.7. Success as Norm vs. Success as Exception
There are indeed Romantic leitmotifs in Opoyaz Formalism, which has been pointed out
repeatedly by the scholars of RF.574 However, there is no need to limit the comparison to
Romanticism; Dmitry Likhachev’s description of so-called second styles applies. According to
Likhachev, primary styles, like the Renaissance, for instance, are simpler, more consistent, and
ideologically defined. The secondary style is the sophistication of the primary one and is devoid
of simplicity and ideological definiteness. If the Renaissance is a primary style, the Baroque is a
secondary one. Hansen-Löve, too, associates RF with this trend when he writes about its
mannerist heritage: “Along with the ‘classical canon’ and canonized classical literature, there
has always existed a side line, violating [. . .] clarity, harmony, and symmetry,” and the so-called
common sense, it could be added.575 “This,” Hansen-Löve continues, “already manifested itself
in the ancient mannerist movements, such as Barbarism, Asianism, etc. in Alexandrine
mannerism, then in Roman literature of the Silver Age period, in the late Middle Ages, and, first
and foremost, during the epoch of the ‘self-conscious’ Mannerism” of the Early Modern
period.576
Likhachev’s and Hansen-Löve’s characterizations of second styles and mannerist
aesthetics, respectively, have much in common. Thus, Likhachev writes that the second styles
develop “with lesser creative potencies of the social status quo, which is why, when they

Ted Underwood, “Stories of Parallel Lives and the Status Anxieties of Contemporary
Historicism,” Representations, vol. 85, no. 1 (2004): 5.
574
E.g. cf. Levchenko, Drugaia nauka, “6. Snova romantizm.”
575
Hansen-Löve, 23.
576
Ibid.
573

202

emerge, there are more elements of self-development, self-complication, and certain
‘independence’ from ideology”; as a result, “the secondary style withdraws into the ‘learned’
milieu, becomes a style for the few, and, as a result of ornamentation, develops forms tenuously
connected to content.”577 Yet, while Likhachev’s classification has a grain of truth, without
being perfect (which one is?), his evaluations, concerning “content,” as well as other forms of
rectitude, do raise doubts, given Likhachev’s eventual emphasis on realism as the final
destination of artistic development.
Still, the accusation, capable of undermining the qualification of Opoyaz Formalism to
participate in the race, especially in the digital era, is clear. It is possible to reduce the accusation
to this: blowing the role of art in art out of proportion, because of the Romantic infatuation with
the person of the artist. Such is Schücking’s argument. He considers any “formalism” the result
of an unprecedentedly high status the artists received in the nineteenth century, especially in its
second half. Now that they enjoyed complete freedom from the public, they could slight any
common ideas about art and proclaim only the specifically-artistic:
Their interest in art led them to occupy themselves with the elements of art on which its
appeal depends. Its effect, they considered, on an educated taste cannot lie in things
outside art, such as a morally uplifting or a stimulating subject. From this view came the
cult of things that in the view of earlier generations were only the media of art form,
rhythm, tone, allusion, and so on.578
Schücking opposes to this a sociology of literary tastes, maintaining:
We need an inquiry into the views of particular social groups and professions, and
especially of those persons, such as teachers or ministers of religion, who had in the
course of their ordinary duties to take up a definite position in regard to cultural
questions. We need an examination of the sales of books, of the number of editions of the
old literature and of the new literature advancing. We should sift the propaganda
matter.579
Dmitry Likhachev, Razvitie russkoi literatury X – XVII vekov (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 1998),
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Fair enough, yet the entire previous chapter was devoted precisely to the Opoyazians’ embrace
of literary sociology—on their terms, naturally, but still, which renders this, rudimentary, level of
parallels between sinful “Romanticism” and Opoyaz Formalism, rather weak. This can be seen
when Schücking attacks “this cult of the media of art [. . .] called l’art pour l’art—art for art’s
sake,” which, according to him, “divorced art from all influence over life except the purely
aesthetic, and so confined it within a sacred grove whose priests were the artists.”580 Yet, as has
just been said, the Opoyazians’ understanding of art did not prevent them from considering the
sociological aspect thereof. This understanding also made them prefer Tolstoy, who authored the
famous “What Is Art?” treatise, which is the direct opposite of l’art pour l’art, to Turgenev,
whose “tone of a salon socialite, somewhat ostentatious and turning the saddest thoughts and
confessions into the gracefully-artistic play of style and life itself,” did not appeal to Eikhenbaum
or his counterparts.581
It may even be assumed that Schücking got bogged down in the Romantic mindset more
than did the Opoyazians—a contrario, when, bemoaning the “[c]leavage in the public and setback for the literary element in social life,”582 he blames “the dogma that [. . .] the public is
simply not in a position to comprehend the true artist when he appears.”583 This shows that
Schücking tends to think of art in terms of its comprehensibility or incomprehensibility (most
simplistic), whereas the Opoyazians’ criterion is oshchushchenie, sensation (cf. 2.2).
Still, one could largely agree with Schücking’s diagnosis: “[L]iterature has long ceased to
be the main subject of conversation, still less the common ground of social life.”584 Moreover,
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while it would be simplistic to the point of misunderstanding the Opoyazians to impute l’art
pour l’art philosophy to them, they realized that many authors about whom they wrote were
successful not with ordinary readers but with other writers. Thus, Shklovsky says of Khlebnikov
that “he is a writer for writers.”585 That—and not such a naïve criterion as incomprehensibility—
is the reason why Moretti writes, quite defiantly and quite legitimately, about those whom
ordinary readers read, not university professors (cf. 3.2). But then a writer for writers may play a
most significant role in literary evolution, even if only a small number of people borrow his or
her books at the library. The context of Shklovsky’s words about Khlebnikov is this:
The following poets came from V. Khlebnikov: Mayakovsky, Aseev, Pasternak,
Nikolai Tikhonov and, of course, Petrovsky.
The most integral, the most traditional poets, such as Esenin, also changed
because of Khlebnikov’s influence.
He is a writer for writers. He is the Lomonosov of today’s Russian literature. He is
the quivering of a thing: today’s poetry is his sound.
The reader may not know him.
The reader may never hear him.586
One may ask: if this is not success, what is? The same could be said about the other giants of
Modernism: James Joyce or T. S. Eliot. Moreover, to anyone familiar with advertisements,
which have long made the absurd habitual, it should be obvious how many of the discoveries of
the avant-garde became advertising,587 so aptly defined by Marshall McLuhan, and summarized
by his interlocutor, as “the folk art of the twentieth century.”588 Pop art is yet another example.
Finally, what in the first decades of the twentieth century used to be the peak of contemporary
theory of literature and art, is rather comprehensible today, as popularizing books like Kit
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White’s 101 Things to Learn in Art School show.589 As has been demonstrated numerous times,
the distinction between “high” and mass literature, albeit unavoidable, is largely misleading; the
Opoyazians understood it, telling dynamic—others could say “progressive”—mass literature
from the automatized one. As Eikhenbaum wrote, “it is important to tell the mass literature that
prepares the formation of new genres, from that which emerges in the process of their
disintegration and serves as the material for studying historical inertia.”590
Accordingly, Shklovsky is trying to find originality in Conan Doyle’s work, as well as an
excuse for his repetitions. “I am not criticizing Conan Doyle but have to point out the
repetitiveness not only of his narrative schemes but also of the elements filling them (elementy
zapolneniia),” Shklovsky says.591 Yet he has to emphasize that Conan Doyle’s advantage is his
craft: the quality of his narrative combinatorics, despite the fact that “the diversity of types in
Conan Doyle is not great at all,” which, Shklovsky adds, “judging by the world success of the
writer, [. . .] seems to be unnecessary,” as long as “the devices of Conan Doyle’s stories,” albeit
“simpler than the devices of the English mystery novel,” “are more concentrated.”592 What
matters is that we see some hesitation in Shklovsky (having to do, no doubt, with the tension
between the two trends of Opoyaz Formalism). Meanwhile, one has to ponder whether Conan
Doyle’s success as Moretti describes it, is important to Moretti more as a manifestation of Conan
Doyle’s uniqueness or evolutionary adaptation; or perhaps, whether uniqueness for Moretti is
adaptation, rather than ill-defined originality.
Consequently, it could be said that, while the Frankfurt School critics wrote about the
works of genuine art, such as Mozart’s, becoming commodified and thereby “de-artified,” the
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Opoyazians “re-artified” mass culture, or resurrected it, to use Shklovsky’s metaphor (for
example, as chapter three has shown, by opposing its lively plots to the narratively weak
literature of the establishment; by stressing how dynamic mass literature gets).
Yet this, again, betrays the “Romantic” trend in Opoyaz Formalism: namely, their
opposition to automatization, to clichés, to repetition. Umberto Eco wrote about this conflict:
Much art has been and is repetitive. The concept of absolute originality is a contemporary
one, born with Romanticism; classical art was in vast measure serial, and the “modern”
avant-garde (at the beginning of this century) challenged the Romantic idea of “creation
from nothingness,” with its techniques of collage, mustachios on the Mona Lisa, art about
art, and so on.593
Both traits are present in Opoyaz Formalism, its principle of montage (cf. 3.5) meaning both
repetition (approached from the standpoint of the constructive trend: ready-made material is
used) and originality (something new is created from somebody else’s clichés). Eco anticipates
this counterargument: “Before, mass mediologists tried to save the dignity of repetition by
recognizing in it the possibility of a traditional dialectic between scheme and innovation (but it
was still the innovation that accounted for the value, the way of rescuing the product from
degradation and promoting it to a value).”594
Umberto Eco, “Innovation and Repetition: Between Modern and Post-Modern Aesthetics,”
Daedalus, vol. 114, no. 4. The Moving Image (1985): 178. Hereafter Eco. Cf. in this context a
recent attempt to generate all possible combinations of melodies and put them into the public
domain—Damien Riehl, “Copyrighting All the Melodies to Avoid Accidental Infringement,”
Youtube, January 30, 2020, accessed March 12, 2020,
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In Eco’s opinion, this emphasis on originality is being overcome in today’s world: “Now,
the emphasis must be placed on the inseparable knot of scheme variation, where the variation is
no longer more appreciable than the scheme. The term neobaroque must not deceive: we are
witnessing the birth of a new aesthetic sensibility much more archaic, and truly post-postmodern.”595 Apparently, it is to those of the now old, Romantic, formation that Schillinger’s
following statement will be shocking, not to those of the archaic/post-post-modern sensibility:
There is no reason why music or painting or poetry cannot be designed and executed just
as engines or bridges are. Today’s technical progress offers ample evidence of the
achievement possible through the method of engineering, i.e., through the method of
expedient economy and efficiency. And if this method has transformed the most daring
dreams of yesterday into the actualities of today, it can be equally successful in the field
of art.596
Examples of such engineered art are plenty, including such a vivid, or rather audible, trend as
contemporary music, which has gotten increasingly repetitive over the decades.597
The popular dystopian show Black Mirror provides a parable of the shift of
sensibilities—for that is the problem at issue. In Series 5, Episode 3, Rachel, Jack, and Ashley
Too, we are told the story of a singer. She is controlled by her manager and has to write and
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perform sickly-sweet, life-asserting, songs. The singer herself feels differently and does not want
to be “positive,” but that is what the fans expect from her and that is what the manager pushes.
When the singer decides to break her contract, the manager drugs the singer into a medically
induced coma, telling the fans the coma was due to an accident. With the singer in coma, it is
still possible to organize her brain waves for potential songs, later patterned after her previous
ones; and though the songs extracted from her mind are aggressive and dark, it is possible to
make them upbeat by using technology (such as switching the melody from the minor to the
major key; also cf. appendix B to chapter 5). At the end of the episode, when the singer is
rescued and can now sing whatever she wants, she opts for a genre diametrically opposed to the
glamor pop style of her career and starts to sing alternative songs at clubs—obscene and dark
songs full of rebellion. However, the art of the singer when she is set free, appears to be as
generic as at the beginning, just differently. If there is any freedom at all, it is in fact not in the
dark songs vs. the positive ones, but in the switch, which brings us back to the ideal of oscillation
discussed in the previous sections.
Meanwhile, the switch, or the shift (sdvig) as the Opoyazians liked to call it, is becoming
less and less valuable and sensible in the world of electric and digital simultaneity (simultaneity
in the different, non-Bakhtinian, sense—cf. the prolegomena), i.e., in the world no longer
experiencing the movement to and fro. That is what Eric McLuhan claims to be the case:
Beginning in the nineteenth century, we introduced new forms of communication:
electric technologies such as the telegraph and the telephone and, soon after them, radio.
Unlike earlier hardware technologies, these new forms operate at speeds approaching that
of light, virtually instantaneous. [. . .]
At electric speeds, there is no movement of information or idea from place to
place or from person to person; there is no human scale. If you will, the “message” does
not move from here or there; it is the sender that is sent, minus his physical body. In
effect. The audience (“receiver”) performs a complimentary maneuver and is suddenly
everywhere at the same time. [. . .] The physical body no longer constitutes a limiting
factor. On the telephone or on the air or online, the disincarnated user is simultaneously
209

here and there at the same time. The user can be in two places at the same time, or two
dozen places, or two million: there is no difference [cf. 1.1 about difference, change]. For
some generations now we have been calling this condition “the mass audience.” For the
mass audience, there is no movement to or from, just simultaneity of being. This is a new
experience of being, this separation from the body and its constraints.598
Such simultaneity is different from the literary today, the contemporaneity, the literary now, so
to speak, which the Opoyazians talk about so much. Akin to the market, which largely annuls
irony (cf. 3.2; regarding irony, also cf. 5.3 and 6.5), such simultaneity also annuls the switch, the
shift, i.e. defamiliarization: not in the narrow sense of a riddle-like device but as a dialectical
principle of literary development, as the struggle between the idiographic and the nomothetic, or,
as previously cited Eco put it, “a traditional dialectic between scheme and innovation.”599
Meanwhile, the Opoyazians do care about innovation, the new. Thus, Shklovsky values
not only the narrative devices of mystery novels but also the cases when “high” literature, which
hinges on the irony of ostranenie, forgoes them. According to Shklovsky, “the desire to conceal
technique” found “in some nineteenth century artists,”600 is exemplified in late Tolstoy’s
deceptively simple writing, demonstratively devoid of intrigue. “Temporal rearrangement [of the
parts in the narrative] [. . .] may be used to create ‘mystery,’ but rearrangement need not be
considered the source of mystery,” Shklovsky writes.601 “Tolstoy’s late works are often
constructed with the nonuse of this device,” he says, and adduces the “The Death of Ivan Ilyich,”
in which, already at the beginning, Tolstoy lays his cards on the table, surprising the readers by
refusing to surprise them: “The temporal rearrangement is given in such a way that, removed
from it, is an emphasis on the interest towards the denouement.”602 In this light, Eikhenbaum’s
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suggestion comes to mind: using oproshchenie (the name of Tolstoy’s and later Gandhi’s
philosophy of simple living) instead of ostranenie.603 This episode is telling: albeit rightly
rejected by Shklovsky (ostranenie is more universal), oproshchenie emphasizes the irony of the
kind of literature that will even present itself as boring to remain interesting and more than that:
dynamic, i.e., an innovation rather than a scheme.
This, again, marks a very important difference between Shklovsky and Moretti, for
Moretti calls to “a reversal of hierarchy between the exception and the series, where the latter
becomes—as it is—the true protagonist of cultural life.”604 He elaborates:
A history of literature as a history of norms, then: a less innocent, much ‘flatter’
configuration than the one we are used to; repetitive, slow—boring, even. But this is
exactly what most of life is like, and instead of redeeming literature from its prosaic
features we should learn to recognize them and understand what they mean.”605
The mention of “prosaic features” also exemplifies the contrast with the Opoyazians, for whom
literature was about poetic speech, not the prosaic, or practical, one (cf. 5.2). The Opoyazians are
indeed interested in the exceptional, because the literary fact is each time an exception, a
deviation from the norm; that for them is the difference between art’s genesis and artistic
evolution.
Series, opposed by Moretti to everything exceptional, is a particularly apropos example,
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illustrating the difference between him and Shklovsky. Thus, it is easier to understand why
Moretti would be interested in a kind of literary produce such as the Tarzan novels. But it is
harder to understand why, as chapter three showed, Shklovsky considered Tarzan novels,
adventure novels at large, original enough to be the literary fact of the day—despite their
shameless repetitiveness, which professional writers ridiculed, including Shklovsky and Ivanov,
with their parody of adventure novels, about Tarzan in particular (cf. 3.2).
The answer has to do with the issue of boundaries. The Opoyazians and the other Russian
Formalists were preoccupied with it and sought for the minimal unit of literature (in that, they
had been preceded by Saussure with his notion of the sign as the minimal segment of text).606
Such minimal unit could be the poetic line (as with Tynianov’s notion of the compactness of
verse series, tesnota stikhovogo riada) or even phonemes in Jakobson’s case (cf. 4.3). But the
minimal factor could also be bigger.
Thus, as Vladimir Novikov, who could be seen as a third-generation Opoyazian, writes in
the section titled “The Minimal Unites of Prose and Verse,” “the molecule of poetry is one line.
The molecule of prose—no, not one phrase, but a linkage of two phrases.”607 That is why the
originality of a prose work cannot be determined on the level of a phrase. As Shklovsky writes,
“The life of the word is not lonely, the word lives through repetitions.”608 “The most important
fortune of the word,” he repeats, “is that it lives in a phrase, and lives through repetitions.”609
Shklovsky expands on it: “What do Tolstoy or Dostoyevsky repeat in the unrhymed lines of
prose, made of simple words, which seem so simply connected? / Circumstances are tested here.
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Prose refunds the cause of the event. It reconstructs history.”610 This shows that Shklovsky
considers repetition not as form but as material, as the minimal unit of the next order
(phoneme—word—line—two phrases, etc.).
Likewise, the Opoyazians realized that with a periodical, it was the unity of the entire
construction (that of a newspaper or a journal) that affected the status of the texts it comprised
(fictional or not).611 Hence Shklovsky’s critique of Gorky’s novel The Life of Klim Samgin, not
only for the novel itself but also for its mode of existence: “Samgin isn’t fit for anything. This is
incidental (voobshche) fiction (belletristika), published incidentally. Which is an impossible
thing, like an incidentally constructed building.”612 The inertia of Gorky’s work is manifest in his
uncreative take on the series, his inability to feel the constructive potential of series, hence his
usage of series as chunks of frozen material:
The interest in the plot, in the hero’s fate has plummeted, so that Aleksey
Maksimovich Gorky is publishing his novel Klim Samgin in two magazines
simultaneously, and at that, with the beginning in one and the ending in another.
Only dead, frozen, and chopped meat is transported this way.613
Accordingly, something previously unoriginal may be rendered that through montage (cf.
3.5)—akin to two stock phrases that suddenly become original when put together by a prose
writer. The periodical, as an example of super-montage (cf. Lvoff, Peterburg), does exactly the
same thing. This logic allows considering the Tarzan novels as a super-unity, such as the unity of
a canon; from this standpoint, the Tarzan novels are a cultural phenomenon in which the
narrative and stylistic clichés are secondary compared to the dynamism of plot-driven
storytelling. Thus, we bypass the contradiction between 1) the “oddities” of the Tarzan novels
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and 2) the novelty of adventure stories, whose great speed (that of a moving picture) “exempts”
the other elements, narrative and stylistic, of “quality requirements.” Although a risky
comparison, it is like those grammatical mistakes that prigs find in the language of Tolstoy or
Dostoyevsky: not only do these stylistic oddities not spoil the novels—they even add to their
uniqueness (as with Dostoyevsky’s dialogism as described by Bakhtin).
Indeed, for Shklovsky as for Moretti, the issue of repetition is connected with that of
success, yet, unlike Moretti, Shklovsky is concerned with the kind of success that is not just the
one that makes the Tarzan novels popular with their audience—it is the kind of success that
makes them worthy of being “baptized” as the literary fact of their day. The following confession
that Shklovsky made at the end of his life, sheds light on the underpinnings of Opoyaz
philosophy, the latter having been inaudible during the Soviet “Roaring Twenties”: “The Opoyaz
[. . .] is the first Russian theory to have embraced or still embracing the world. Among us, it is
simply understood through ‘defamiliarization,’ but it still not understood as the art to repeat
without repeating (iskusstvo povtoriat’, ne povtoriaias’).”614
Moreover, despite the great degree of truth contained in what has been said about our
time’s departure from the Romantic vision of art, we may see how mass culture, once largely
ahistorical akin to folklore, develops into a new system of references, hence history, with the
inevitable search for change (as a means of survival), which leads to the same patterns of irony
as in the previous, now-forgotten, tradition, including “oproshchenie.” These patterns consist in
placing a loaded rifle on the wall, exactly not to let it go off. Thus, the tandem of historization
and sophistication, driven by the irony of ostranenie, manifests itself in the complex and highly
self-aware construction of today’s shows, such as on Netflix, Hulu, HBO, and other platforms
Viktor Shklovsky, “Pis’ma vnuku,” Voprosy literatury, no. 4 (2002): 285. Hereafter
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(e.g., Breaking Bad or Twin Peaks, as well as such cartoon shows as Futurama or Family Guy),
with cliff hangers and other sensational devices mercilessly ridiculed.615
It is no coincidence that folklore was mentioned in the previous paragraph because it is
folklore, with its collective normalcy, that is usually juxtaposed with capricious, authorial,
literature. Yet Shklovsky still approaches folklore from the standpoint of the defamiliarizing
trend, the standpoint of oscillatory history. “The mistake of the scholars of folklore,” Shklovsky
writes, “is their enduring value judgments (otsenochnost’) in their characteristics and their desire
to see in the people, genuine popular things, and their idea of the immobility of folklore.”616 Let
us also remember that Shklovsky mentions “high” literature turning into folklore (cf. 3.4), and
we will get oscillatory history again, at the next level, between literature and folklore.
Writing about one of the earliest theoreticians of folklore among the Russian Formalists,
Pyotr Bogatyrev, Hansen-Löve describes the same logic. “Bogatyrev’s synchronous analysis of
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ceramic ornament is traditionally passed down from one generation to another. The same
old heroic epics (bylina), legends (predanie), stories (skazanie), proverbs are piously
handed down from mouth to mouth. In the following periods, the evolution of styles
crystallizes. Reserved forms of young cultures gradually turn expansive and
overburdened, since for a successful impact on sated perception, new and stronger media
(sredstvo) are needed again and again. Classicism evolves into the baroque and, having
concluded its evolution, after a respite, when art, as it were, has come to naught, new and
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the ritual with regard to its artistic and extra-artistic functions is tightly connected with the early
Formalist opposition of the aesthetic/extra-aesthetic, intransitive/transitive, etc.,” he writes.617
“The same object (or action),” Hansen-Löve comments, “can function in one context as aesthetic
and in the other, as religious, magical, satirical, etc., just as one and the same system may have
different motivations” (to read more about motivation, cf. 5.2).618 As can be seen, this is the
same old dichotomy of evolution and genesis.
It is also telling that Vladimir Propp, as a direct precursor of Structuralism, avoids this
dichotomy, opting for what has been termed in this dissertation the constructive trend. HansenLöve writes that in his Morphology of the Folktale (Morfologiia skazki), Propp avoids
“correlating” his own interpretation of “the important aspects of the Formalist theory of plot”
“with perceptive ‘background’ and [. . .] extra-aesthetic motivation,” which means that Propp is
“bracketing off the Formalist principle of defamiliarization (at least, as far as analyzing the
folktale is concerned).”619 Hansen-Löve argues that “unlike Shklovsky, who stresses the
‘randomness’ and ‘the deformation of the sequence of motifs [. . .], Propp posits the regularity
and limited means for the variations of the sequence of events.”620 These statements, doubtless,
require a detailed discussion, but what matters for this section is the obvious conflict between the
constructive and the defamiliarizing trends, between the nomothetic and the idiographic. Thus,
Hansen-Löve continues, “Propp is interested in the ‘uniformity’ of the structural features of one
single genre,” whereas “the attention of the [Opoyaz] Formalists was originally devoted to the
‘multiformity’ of genres and the systems of devices in general.”621
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At this point, it is time we applied everything said about folklore to mass literature, for
these two systems do have great commonalities, as contemporary Ukrainian scholar Elena
Romanenko argues in the article “Folklore and Mass Literature as Semiospheres.” She says that
these semiospheres do “have many features in common,” regardless of the difference in their
“inner structure” that, for each of them, “functions by different laws.”622
Romanenko cites the words of a well-known folklorist Eleazar Meletensky, namely, that
“after folklore, it was mass literature and the poetics of solely traditional genres that became the
most permeating object for semiotics.”623 Romanenko writes about “the proximity of the
narrative structures of the novels of mass literature and of folktales” with their “use of repeated
motifs: at the level of the plot, images, and archetypes.”624 (Let it be remembered, as has just
been demonstrated, that Shklovsky had discovered it first.) Romanenko, too, singles out
repetition as the precondition of both folklore and mass literature. She writes that “the peculiarity
of folklore poetics and stylistics is repetitiveness” and that “it is on the same principles that mass
literature is based” with its “principle of the utmost sameness (tozhdestvennost’), and
trustworthiness (dostovernost’) of the portrayed with life and the most widespread cultural codes
and stereotypes.”625
Romanenko concedes that mass literature, “as a relatively young semiosphere,”
incomparably younger than folklore, “is not so inert” and “has a greater variability of texts” (as
has already been pointed out), yet, “addressed to mass (that is to say, collective) audience,” mass

Elena Romanenko, “Fol’klor i massovaia literatura kak semiosfery,” in V mire nauki i
iskusstva: voprosy filologii, iskusstvovedeniia i kul’turologii: materialy XXV mezhdunarodnoi
zaochnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii. (08 iiulia 2013 g.). (Novosibirsk: Izd. “SibAK,”
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literature is still, like folklore, “based on the principles of structural-semantic rigidity of the
system.”626
In conclusion, one more factor, the one of utmost importance, has to be mentioned:
writing. For literature, including mass literature, is the written word. The Opoyaz idea of “the art
to repeat without repetition”627 and the ability to treat mass literature and folklore as the literary
fact—all this hinges on the fact that literature is the written word, on the fact that it is fixed.
(This was also of great import to Derrida, but this parallel goes beyond the purview of this
dissertation.) What this means is that there is authorship in literature628—authorship in the sense
of the ability to fix a deviation from the scheme, thereby withstanding it, innovating in spite of it.
It was still in the twenties when the Formalists realized how important this aspect of
literature was and how much it distinguished literature from folklore. Thus, Bogatyrev and
Jakobson discriminated between folklore and literature, comparing them, respectively, with the
Saussurean notions of langue (i.e., system) and parole (i.e., the individual’s use of the
system).629 Like langue, folklore does not have an author. It could be added, at the risk of
inflicting vehement criticism, that it is for the same reason (lack of authorship as defined above)
that folklore has no history in the sense in which literature does—only genesis. As Bogatyrev
and Jakobson argue, folklore is the kind of verbal art that has been sifted by a collective and
whatever artistic struggle there was between different artists who were willing to express certain
things in a work, there is practically no trace left of it. This makes folklore more predictable than
literature, conventional, and almost formulaic. By contrast, literature, even when anonymous, is
626
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the result of individual endeavors, and a littérateur need not reckon with the conventions of this
art to the same extent as the creators of folklore. Moreover, a littérateur will make use of his
power to express himself in his work so as to convey unique meaning. The fact that literature
allows him to fix in writing whatever he has on his mind compels him to assert his individuality
(even for a split second of oscillating between the two norms, the past and the future one), often
at the cost of violating the existing conventions of this art, thereby causing the displacement of
the system of literature. Every such disruption creates difference, making development (from a
to b, from c to d, etc.), hence history, possible. That is why though the systemic approach may
well disregard the individual factor in the production and existence of literature, it cannot avoid it
altogether. For the medium of literature (writing) registers and thus instigates change, which
makes literature a system extended across history—an ever-changing system. This cannot but
influence one’s approach to any aspect of form in literature, for the status of the same structures
in it—from single devices to an entire work—varies depending on their function in a certain
literary epoch.
Yet the sixty-four-dollar question, with which this chapter concludes, is whether this
holds true given the altered status of writing in today’s digital world. There was a day when
“[p]rint [. . .] challenged the corporate patterns of medieval organization as much as electricity
now challenges our fragmented individualism,”630 Marshall McLuhan (the protagonist of the
sixth chapter of this dissertation) writes. He describes how “[w]ith typography the process of
separation (or explosion) of functions went on swiftly at all levels and in all spheres,”631
McLuhan’s example being King Lear. McLuhan cites Lear’s plan for his kingdom (“Only we
shall retain / The name, and all th’addition to a King; / The sway, revenue, execution of the rest, /
630
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Beloved sons, be yours: which to confirm, / This coronet part between you),632 commenting:
“This act of fragmentation and delegation blasts Lear, his kingdom, and his family.”633 With the
advent of this new system of communication, McLuhan writes, the status of the book changes:
“The book is a private confessional form that provides a ‘point of view’”; “The book form is not
a communal mosaic or corporate image but a private voice.”634 Yet “[f]ragmented, literate, and
visual individualism,” McLuhan maintains, “is not possible in an electrically patterned and
imploded society.”635 “The next logical step,” McLuhan writes, “would seem to be, not to
translate, but to by-pass languages in favor of a general cosmic consciousness which might be
very like the collective unconscious dreamt of by Bergson.”636
Of course, this is not to say that writing is disappearing, but its function has already
changed, just as the function of the spoken word and the function of memory metamorphosed
with written philosophy taking over.637 “Distant reading,” as a practice, paired with algorithmdriven “distant writing” of the texts largely intended for circulation online, is an example of this
trend described by Marshall McLuhan.
Yet, as the system of the spoken word did not disappear with the advent of a different
one, the system of authorial literature will not disappear either; instead, it will be driven to the
periphery, akin to displaced canons, as described by Shklovsky (the same dialectic of systems is
described in the very last section of chapter six). The juxtaposition of the two versions of distant
reading—the Opoyaz one with the DH version of Moretti—shows that the clash between the two
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trends of Opoyaz Formalism echoed some major, civilizational, shifts of its time, primarily the
shift from the Gutenberg galaxy, as McLuhan named it,638 to the one in which we live today.
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Cf. Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (Toronto:
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PART II. SPECIAL-PURPOSE
CHAPTER FIVE
SENSE AND HUMOR IN RUSSIAN FORMALISM639
“The art of being wise is the art of knowing what to overlook.” 640
—William James
5.1. The Lifeblood of Literature
Humor and things related were no laughing matter to the Opoyaz Formalists, but when it
came to art, Viktor Shklovsky, Boris Eikhenbaum, and Yuri Tynianov dared laugh where others
did not. Taken together, their articles, letters, and memoirs reveal that one of their favorite words
was veselyi (gay, merry). Dozens of apt quotations with veselyi and its cognates can be found in
Shklovsky, but this one is probably definitive: “Like ferment (gnezdo brozheniia), gaiety is at the
bottom of art.”641 No less resolute is another one, this time from Tynianov: “Literary culture is
merry and light [. . .] it is not tradition or decorum but the knowledge and skill of making things
both necessary642 and merry.”643 Whatever the Opoyaz Formalists implied by “merry,” they
evidently took it in earnest.
Among their texts, it is possible to single out those that focus on humor more than others:
Eikhenbaum’s “How Gogol’s Overcoat Is Made” (1919) and “Reflections on Art: Art and

This chapter is partly based on a revised version of my article—Basil Lvoff, “Sense and
Humor in Russian Formalism. Part I,” International Studies in Humour, vol. 6, no. 1 (2017).
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Emotion” (Razmyshleniia ob iskusstve. Iskusstvo i emotsiia; 1924) with its discussion of
laughter; Tynianov’s “Dostoyevsky and Gogol. Towards a Theory of Parody” (Dostoyevsky i
Gogol. K teorii parodii; 1921) and “On Parody” (O parodii; written in 1929); and Shklovsky’s
“Towards a Theory of the Comic” (K teorii komicheskago; 1922), as well as the chapters from
his Theory of Prose, on Cervantes’s Don Quixote and on the parody novel (Laurence Sterne’s).
However, each of these is likely to dissatisfy someone looking for a unified Opoyaz theory of the
comic, for there is none. Moreover, to the dismay of a more orthodox theorist of humor,
Tynianov’s work on parody or Shklovsky’s 1922 essay seem to suggest that the comic element is
not essential to the forms traditionally considered as comic (more on this in 5.4). And yet one not
primarily interested in humor will, upon reading the Opoyazians, chance on their frequent
celebrations of the phenomena related to it: gaiety, laughter, absurdity, (ironic) play, etc. To
them, the merry, the jocular (the Opoyazians made no sharp distinctions between these) was the
lifeblood of literature, as the following analysis should demonstrate. From this, only one
conclusion can be drawn: like the biblical God, humor is everywhere and nowhere in the texts of
the Opoyaz Formalists.
That—it could be argued—more than almost anything else sets them apart from a great
many theorists of humor: Aristotle, Hobbes, Bergson, Pirandello, Freud, or Bakhtin, to name
only some. These authors analyzed humor only with regard to specific texts, genres, or
situations, while for the Opoyazians humor was all-pervading. Freud or Bakhtin sought some
respectable truth underlying humor: Freud wanted to lift the veil on the affinity between the
technique of wit and dreams; Bakhtin spoke about the carnivalesque as a departure of the
freedom-seeking human spirit from the official culture, whose serious meaning, however, he did
not doubt (cf. 5.4). Conversely, the Opoyazians appear to have done the opposite, to the point of
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laughing off any seriousness—consider, for example, Shklovsky’s defiant statement about
Shakespeare’s famous play: “That King Lear is a tragedy is the least significant thing about it, in
my opinion.”644 Why the Opoyaz Formalists reasoned this way, whether they meant what they
said, what values and goals, explicit and not, they were driven by and towards, and what their
particular contribution to the theory of humor was—these are the issues tackled in this chapter.
The abovementioned ubiquity of humor determines the structure of this chapter. There is
no attempt in it simply to summarize the Opoyaz views on humor, as it could be done with
Bergson’s theory or Freud’s. To isolate the issue of humor from that of literature’s literariness
would be severely limiting. It would not be much different from interpreting the remarks of a
character out of the context of the entire novel. It will be shown soon that humor became relevant
to the Opoyazians as an ally in their struggle against what they called “psychologism,” in a
struggle for finding the formal meaning of literature, which prompted them, sometimes in earnest
and sometimes in jest, to make light of what other critics considered the real, serious, “content”
of a literary work.
For these reasons, the next two sections show how the theme of the comic bobbed up,
again and again, in the Opoyaz Formalists’ discussion of literature’s specificity and its autonomy
from other disciplines. This should inform the discussion of the Opoyaz special theory of humor,
analyzed in 5.4.

5.2. Opoyaz Anti-psychologism and the Benefit of the Joke
The Opoyaz Formalists wrote witty, feuilleton-like, essays about literature645 and were
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fond of merry and loud debates about it, at times culminating in rambunctious escapades in the
spirit of their allies among the Russian Futurists.646 Such was the gaiety of their subversive,
carnivalesque zeitgeist.647 Shklovsky and his friends acted with revolutionary fervor years before
the revolution of 1917; the revolution began for them with the Russian Futurists’ experiments in
language.648
Like the Futurists, so eager to break with tradition in art, the Opoyazians tried to break
with preceding scholarship.649 The reason why both movements fought against tradition was, to
cite Tynianov, their “new vision” of culture.650 The Futurists believed they had discerned our
speech in its primordial freshness and attempted to resurrect it by reinventing the language of
their day. The Opoyazians shared the Futurists’ intuition; as far as theory was concerned, the
Opoyazians were determined to penetrate the unique essence of verbal art, hence their aspiration
to create a science of literature from scratch. In Russia and in the world, the feeling of novelty as
such hovered in the air and informed all areas of intellectual life. Roman Jakobson reminisced
about that time:
There clearly emerged a united front of science, art, literature, and life, full of
unknown values of the future. It seemed as if a science based on new principles was
being created, a self-sufficient science, opening up endless perspectives and
introducing into general use new concepts, which at the time did not seem to fit into
Kol’tsova, Iu. Oksmana, N. Pogodina, G. Ryklina, Viktora Serzha, B. Tomashevskogo, Vl.
Shklovskogo (Leningrad: Academia, 1927).
646
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the usual framework of common sense.651
The feeling of European culture’s learned senility, so widespread at the turn of the century, had
suddenly ebbed away, and the Opoyaz Formalists rejoiced along with other innovators in the “the
saturnalia of a mind that ha[d] patiently resisted a terrible, long pressure—patiently, severely,
coldly, without yielding, but also without hope—and [was] now all of a sudden attacked by hope,
by hope for health, by the intoxication of recovery,” as the author of The Gay Science put it.652
As though echoing Nietzsche, Eikhenbaum exclaimed in 1918, “What a merry feeling of
liberation!”—when writing about contemporary Futurist poetry and the new kind of literary
scholarship inspired by it.653 The Opoyaz Formalists’ texts from the 1910s and the early 1920s
are permeated with this “merry feeling of liberation”—a liberation from the snares of a legion of
serious disciplines that tried to impose their tenets on merry, freedom-loving, and capricious
literature (the way the Opoyaz saw it). Social scientists, for example, or critics simply interested
in ideology wanted to discuss social problems contained in literature; historians, problems of
history; psychologists, those of psychology, while devoted readers, including those among
scholars and critics alike, were eager to look into writers’ private lives reflected in literary works.
Literature’s value was reduced to that of a mirror; because of this, literature had enjoyed nothing
fundamentally of its own.654 Such an approach—RF argued—made light of the specificity of
literature, of the unique way in which something is expressed in it, as well as of literature’s own
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historical development, from one artistic canon to another, according to its own, inner,
regularities, stemming from its inimitable organization. There was hardly a better weapon for
overcoming positivist tedium655 and impressionistic sensitivities than emancipatory humor—
especially efficient as an antidote to the all-powerful psychological approach.
At first blush, the psychological approach to literature (the inner life of (the author’s) soul
understood as the “meaning” of the work and of literature as such) stirred up unflagging
opposition among the Opoyaz Formalists. And yet, as it will be argued afterwards, it was a
certain tradition, the one they called “psychologism,” that they withstood, while simultaneously
paying attention to literature vis-à-vis the creative and the perceptive mind.
From the outset, the Opoyazians needed to make their readers realize: feelings and
thoughts (often viewed as “content”) are no longer themselves when recreated in the literary
work, no matter how “simple” or “artless.” The same could be applied to real life objects in a
picture. Such objects are artificial proper (Magritte’s ceci n’est pas une pipe comes to mind) and
abide by perspective laws—which may, of course, vary and be violated but are always present,
be it academic art or primitivism. In other words, to cite Shklovsky’s metaphor also inspired by
painting: “As it is incorrect to graze cows on painted grass, it is incorrect to measure a work of
art sociologically or psychologically.”656
A similar line of reasoning brought the Opoyaz Formalists to the following question:
655
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what is it that makes literature, literature; in other words, what is its specificity, its “literariness”
(Roman Jakobson’s term)? For the Opoyazians, unlike some other Russian Formalists, it was not
language alone but what they (and the Futurists) called poetic language, i.e., language uniquely
organized and creatively actualized. That is what the Opoyazians meant when they wrote about
the construction of the literary work, hence Tynianov’s later definition of literature as “the
dynamic speech construction.”657 The Opoyazians’ task was precisely to cut to the essence of
literature as a construction—or, to use Shklovsky’s pet metaphor, to lay bare (obnazhit’) the
device of literature.658
This is what Shklovsky felt or at least claimed to feel about his own books, containing his
innermost feelings and ideas. A vivid example is his famous Zoo, or Letters Not about Love.
This book, which is three in one (an epistolary novel, a memoir, and a treatise on art), is based on
a real story of Shklovsky’s unrequited love for Elsa Triolet.659 Yet, according to the author, the
essence of the book is not psychological as regards letting us in on his mental life; the essence is
literary, just as the essence of a picture with trees are not the trees—it is the artifice with which
the painter managed to limn these trees (otherwise, we probably would not notice them, as an
artist can, with our habitual and desensitized perception). In the preface to his book, Shklovsky
contends that his love story, the life of his psyche, served merely as mortar for the building
blocks of his variegated material (his numerous observations about literature, its theory, the
657
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Russian emigration, politics, the construction of automobiles, etc.). To put it in Shklovsky’s
terms, the love story served as a motivation (one could also say “justification”)660 for the letters
comprising the novel.661
This need not mean that Shklovsky felt nothing for Triolet, but the role of his feelings in
the structure of the work was already different from their mode of existence in everyday life.662
However intense, such feelings were as old as the world, unlike Shklovsky’s book, which was
anything but hackneyed—thanks to its strange construction, in which previously incompatible
types of material were brought together. The same could be said about two pieces of music
inspired by a composer’s thoughts about death: one written in a mediocre way and forgotten,
another composed by Mozart or Schnittke. All this brings to mind Shklovsky’s favorite quotation
from Vasily Rozanov: “‘People fancy that the soul is substance. But why can’t it be music? And
so they keep looking for its ‘properties’ (the properties of an object). But why can’t it have only
pitch (stroi)? . . .’”663 Below, we will see, more than once, this move of dismissing “content” for
Cf. Tynianov: “Motivation in art is the justification of some factor from the standpoint of
others, its accord with the others (V. Shklovsky, B. Eikhenbaum)” (Tynianov, Problema, 14).
661
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the sake of “form,” which, in turn, is reconsidered as content-laden.664
In their search for literature’s specificity, the Opoyazians were led by the belief that “the
constructive principle,” in the words of Tynianov, “is recognized not in maximum but in
minimum conditions responsible for it.”665 For this reason, they turned to those works that
seemed to be free from the brunt of “content,” and it was already there that the humor-related
underpinnings of Opoyaz theory made themselves known, before the Opoyaz theory of humor
had appeared.
The Opoyazians put forth—as an example of pure, motivation-free, construction—the socalled zaum’ (rendered into English as trans-sense or transrational language), i.e., nonce and
nonsensical words, such as Futurist poet Aleksei Kruchenykh’s “Dyr bul shchyl”—the kind that
an average person, unburdened with sophisticated theories, will likely ridicule. In his article,
Shklovsky himself mentions the association of zaum’, this bared construction, with the comic: he
cites Dickens’s words from David Copperfield, about Micawber, who revels in hearing
“ludicrous and unnecessary” words, just as so many other people.666 Shklovsky does not explain
the nature of this laughter in the article on zaum’, though he remarks in his later text on the
theory of the comic that “a new form is almost always perceived as comic”—we will revisit this
Cf. Shklovsky: “[C]ontent is the transformation of form into content” (Viktor Shklovsky,
Poiski optimizma (Moscow: Federatsiia, 1931), 63). Hereafter Shklovsky, Poiski.
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Tynianov, Problema, 17.
666
Qtd. in Viktor Shklovsky, “O poezii i zaumnom iazyke,” in Poetika. Sborniki po teorii
poeticheskogo iazyka (Petrograd: 18-ia Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia, 1919), 16; hereafter
Shklovsky, O poezii. This is not the original quotation from Dickens, but a translation of the one
Shklovsky uses in the Russian text. Shklovsky’s quotation is somewhat inexact. Cf. Janecek and
Mayer’s translation of Shklovsky’s article—Viktor Shklovsky, “On Poetry and Trans-Sense
Language,” trans. Gerald Janecek and Peter Mayer, October, vol. 34 (1985): 8, fn. 20; hereafter
Shklovsky, On Poetry. Dickens’s original passage begins thus: “Again, Mr. Micawber had a
relish in this formal piling up of words, which, however ludicrously displayed in his case, was, I
must say, not at all peculiar to him. I have observed it, in the course of my life, in numbers of
men” (qtd. in Shklovsky, On Poetry, 8). After this, the passage gets somewhat moralizing, which
seems to be lost in Shklovsky’s rendition.
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thought below.667 Again, there is no detailed explanation why: Shklovsky does not want to delve
into pure psychology, or philosophy for that matter, lest he should abandon the discussion of
literature.
Meanwhile, the theory which would fit this case perfectly is that of Bergson, with his
concept of laughter as a form of social critique of a certain rigidity—and to common sense zaum’
is exactly rigid, hence condemnable. For it is not the speech of a sentient being but a form of
gibberish spat out by a lunatic or a broken automaton. Needless to say, for the Opoyazians such
an estimate of zaum’ is just a philistine impression of someone complaining about a picture that
has abstract, unintelligible lines in it instead of trees. The utilitarian vulgarian wants to know
what “Dyr bul shchyl” means, and, upon hearing that it is meaningless (from the utilitarian
perspective, that is), he decides it is pointless.
But the Opoyaz Formalists have a different point of view. They know that a work of art
may exist with an explanation (or motivation) for what is happening, as well as without one. As a
matter of fact, the bulk of Opoyaz writing is not devoted to such unalloyed and marginal cases as
zaum’. The Opoyazians, for example, wrote about the same Russian authors as their Marxist and
other rivals: Pushkin, Tolstoy, Leskov. Yet the Opoyazians’ primary focus was not on the
psychological or social aspect but on the interplay within the system of these authors’ single
works, their oeuvre, and the ever-evolving literature as a whole—a vivid example is the
Opoyazians’ analysis of Cervantes and Gogol, summarized in the next section. As for the works

Viktor Shklovsky, “K teorii komicheskago,” Epopeia, no. 3 (1922): 66. Hereafter Shklovsky,
K teorii. There is a telling passage in Zoo in which Shklovsky describes an unusual vaudeville in
a Czech theater. “At the end of the performance,” Shklovsky writes, “a comic actor does all the
numbers, parodying and exposing them. For instance, he shows magical tricks standing with his
back to the audience, which can see where the missing card went” (Shklovsky, Zoo, 684). Why
form is likely to be taken humorously when laid bare is discussed in the next sections of this
chapter.
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with “content” and “meaning,” i.e., with a motivation, the Opoyazians considered them the
hardest, but also the most interesting, to construe. Tynianov wrote: “What is outwardly most
facile and simple—the realm of motivated art—turns out to be most difficult and untoward
material.”668 Writing about the “constructive factors” of the work, he further observed that their
“specifica” is “smooth[ed] over, as it were” by “inner motivation,” which “makes art ‘facile,’
acceptable.”669 Accordingly, the Opoyazians reappraised motivation as one of the work’s
devices—a device for putting together the work’s variegated elements so that this work could
unfold.670 The latter kind of motivation, however important, was again seen as a device—not as
the ultimate message of the work. From the literary perspective, a psychological motivation
inherent in the work would be important not for the fact it is psychological but for its motivating
constructive function. If the previous sentence seems redundant so that one wants to reread it,
that is because the line drawn by the Opoyazians is so fine—which makes the distinction even
more important. In Tynianov’s words,
it is most difficult to study the functions of a factor in “facile” art. A study of these
functions is concerned not with the quantitatively typical but with the qualitatively
distinctive; as for the elements shared with other areas of intellectual activity, these
are the peculiar plus of art. That is why it is motivation (= the shading in of the
plus) that distinguishes motivated works of art, as their original negative
characteristic (V. Shklovsky).671
This terse passage, so characteristic of Tynianov, could be simplified by the following
comparison. Imagine two fractions with the same denominator; the denominator is doubtless
important: without it, none of these fractions would be themselves; yet if we want to understand
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Tynianov, Problema, 14.
Ibid.
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For more detail, cf. Letter 22 from Shklovsky’s Zoo, in which motivation in the formation of
psychological novel is discussed. Shklovsky was not alone in feeling as though psychology were
not the gist of the novel as such but a convention, by that time largely worn out—cf.
Mandelstam.
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Tynianov, Problema, 14–15.
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that which makes each fraction unique, we have to focus on the numerator. Similarly, it can be
said of Tynianov’s excerpt that psychological material (shared by literary works, private diaries,
people’s thoughts and actions, etc.) is the denominator (“the quantitatively typical”). However,
when psychological material is accounted for from the literary standpoint, this material is no
longer the denominator (i.e., that which also belongs to other, nonliterary, systems), but the
numerator (i.e., “the qualitatively distinctive,” the uniquely literary). For this reason,
psychological motivation should not be taken at face value—it is a device, a ruse, a catch, and
art’s ultimate one at that.672 For all these reasons, the Opoyazians saw zaum’ as the simplest case
study of literature qua construction; zaum’ only proved—to repeat Tynianov’s words—that “the
constructive principle is recognized not in maximum but in minimum conditions responsible for
it.”673
In this regard, zaum’, free from psychological motivation, is not senseless and pointless:
it testifies to the laws of literature and its medium, language.674 Moreover, having first stated that

When the Formalists insisted—as Jakobson put it—that “the science of literature [. . .] ought
to recognize ‘device’ (priem) as its only ‘hero,’” it went without saying that the device was also
the protagonist of literature as such (Roman Jakobson, Raboty po poetike (Moscow: Progress,
1987), 275; hereafter Jakobson, Raboty). To bare the device meant to show that it is the device
that constitutes the essence of the work and propels the entire system of literature in its
evolution.
673
Tynianov, Problema, 18.
674
It, of course, has long been established by scholars that so-called nonsense is not without
rhyme or reason. In his article devoted to Lewis Carroll’s nonsense, Michael Holquist (“What is
a Boojum? Nonsense and Modernism,” Yale French Studies, no. 96 (1999): 104) writes:
672

[N]onsense, in the writing of Lewis Carroll [. . .] does not mean gibberish; it is not
chaos, but the opposite of chaos. It is a closed field of language in which the
meaning of any single unity is dependent on its relationship to the system of the
other constituents. Nonsense is “a collection of words of events which in their
arrangement do not fit into some recognized system” [a quotation from Elizabeth
Sewell’s The Field of Nonsense], but which constitute a new system of their own.
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zaum’ “often has no particular meaning (znachenie) and acts outside or apart from any particular
meaning, directly upon the emotions of people around,” Shklovsky goes on to explains the
artistic meaning of commonsensically meaningless words, which leads to one and only
conclusion.675 Just as the Opoyazians differentiated between practical, or everyday (bytovoi),
language and the so-called poetic language (subordinate to artistic laws), they also distinguished
an everyday meaning from an artistic one, hence Shklovsky’s phrase about “the meaning of
‘worthless’ (nichtozhnyi) speech,” such as zaum’.676
This solves the problem of meaning (temporarily) but begets another one. No sooner did
we part with psychology than we ran into it at the next corner, namely, when Shklovsky replaced
the notion of meaning as that which “makes sense” with the notion of the construction’s
emotional meaning (or shall we say significance?).677 On one hand, Shklovsky’s essay on zaum’
rejects the kind of psychological motivation that reduces the heroes’ or the author’s actions and
words to a rational and translatable summa summarum of specific ideas and practical goals. On
the other, Shklovsky’s essay hinges on emotion (which is usually considered a psychic fact), so
much that it employs the word or its cognates more than a dozen times. It looks as though
Shklovsky had felt that some justification of the “gibberish” about which he wrote was in order,
after all.

Different types of zaum’ are singled out, some of them more motivated than others—cf. Vladimir
Feshchenko, Laboratoriia logosa: Iazykovoi experiment v avangardnom tvorchestve (Moscow:
Iazyki slavianskikh kul’tur, 2009).
675
Shklovsky, O poezii, 14.
676
Ibid., 16. Cf. Janecek and Mayer’s translation: “the meaning of ‘meaningless’ speech”
(Shklovsky, On Poetry, 7). The word nichtozhnyi in Shklovsky is a quotation from Mikhail
Lermontov’s poem cited in his article.
677
What matters here is the fact that emotion is considered a psychological phenomenon.
Another problem that goes beyond the scope of this chapter is the interpretation of that which
constitutes meaning. Yet the question of meaning vs. significance vs. information, etc. is of
primary importance. One thing is for certain: meaning may mean different things. Cf. 5.3.
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One could, of course, say that Shklovsky’s essay on zaum’ is an exception, that it is an
early text, and then cite Shklovsky’s later statement that “art, essentially, is beyond emotion
(vneemotsional’nyi).”678 However, emotion proves to be a very important category for the
Opoyazians in general, not for Shklovsky alone. Thus, it was in the same collection of Opoyaz
articles that Shklovsky’s counterpart Lev Yakubinsky wrote, in the article titled “On the Sounds
of Verse Language”: “In verse language—thanks to the attention being focused on sounds—an
emotional attitude towards them reveals itself, which is a fact of great importance for defining
the interrelationship of sound and meaning as the aspects of speech in verse language.”679 In this
article, Yakubinsky refers to William James, who wrote the book titled Psychology, while
Shklovsky’s essay draws on none other than a founding father of scientific psychology, Wilhelm
Wundt, namely, on his theory of Lautbilder (phonetic images). It may seem that, by resorting to
phonetic images, Shklovsky tries to motivate the transrational in “motivationless art”
(nemotivirovannoe iskusstvo), as he calls it elsewhere.680 Moreover, this is not the only mention
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Shklovsky, OTP 1929, 192. Shklovsky makes this claim in his essay on Sterne (we will turn
to it later as the humor-related theme of parody is at its heart). Shklovsky asserts it when arguing
that Sterne’s sentimentalism was not about sentiments; essentially, it was a certain principle of
description. Emily Finer sums up this argument in Turning into Sterne: Viktor Shklovskii and
Literary Reception (Oxford: Legenda, 2010, 90):
If art has no content [i.e., the thoughts and feelings we read into or infer
from a work are not essential to it], there is no point in [. . .] searching for
Sentimentalism [in Sterne’s Tristram Shandy] [. . .]
Shklovskii’s attack on Sentimentalism maintains that description from a
‘sentimentalist point of view’ is no different to description from the point of view
of a horse [Leo Tolstoy’s “Kholstomer” is implied; Shklovsky analyzed it in “Art as
Device.”]. According to Shklovskii, a shift in point of view can activate processes
of ostranenie, but a Sentimentalist narrative – if it exists – is no more or less
successful in provoking a new observation of reality than any other narrative from
any other point of view.
679
Lev Yakubinsky, “O zvukakh stikhotvornogo iazyka,” in Poetika. Sborniki po teorii
poeticheskogo iazyka (Petrograd: 18-ia Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia, 1919), 44.
680
Shklovsky, Zoo, 607.
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of Wundt by an Opoyazian. Tynianov’s 1924 Problem of Verse Language refers to Wundt
multiple times, though often to contradict him. Recurring references to contemporary
psychologists made by the Opoyazians, the topicality of emotion for them—all this testifies to
the fact that, for all their provisos, they were having a dialogue with psychology. Let us briefly
dwell on this contradiction, after which we will see how humor came to the Opoyazians’ rescue.
Among those to have pointed out this inconsistency—the dependency of the Opoyazians
on psychological categories—was Lev Vygotsky (Hansen-Löve considers him a Formalist,
irrespective of his differences from the Opoyazians). In his The Psychology of Art, a section
devoted to a critique of the Opoyazians bears the same title as Shklovsky’s famous “Art as
Device.” Vygotsky does justice to the Opoyazians, but he disapproves of their attacks on
psychology, one of his strongest arguments being that the Opoyazians cannot do without
psychology in their own theory:
The [Opoyaz] Formalists themselves proceed from the assumption that they have
put an end to the cheap and popular psychological doctrine of art and are, therefore,
inclined to regard their principle as an essentially anti-psychological one. One of
the methodological foundations of this principle is the rejection of any
psychologism in developing the theory of art. They try to study artistic
(khudozhestvennyi) form as something perfectly objective and independent from the
thoughts and feelings present in it, as well as any other psychological material.681
Yet they break their own rule, Vygotsky says—for instance, by resorting to the category of
perception (Shklovsky’s “Art as Device” is a perfect case in point).
Vygotsky is right: insofar as the Opoyazians focused on the reaction produced by a work
of art (consider such Opoyaz terms as ostranenie, automatization, and dynamism), their theory
was, at least in part, psychological (hence, its appeal to today’s literary scholars with a penchant
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Vygotsky, 70, emphasis mine.
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for cognitive science).682 And yet, as Ilona Svetlikova argues in her perspicacious book The
Origins of Russian Formalism: The Tradition of Psychologism and the Formal School, the
Opoyaz opposed psychologism, not psychology.683
Nowadays, Svetlikova observes, it is hard to see the difference between psychology and
psychologism, not to mention the fact that the latter term has become pejorative, cut off from its
historical context. Meanwhile, she says, psychologism was a particular “historical force that
determined exceptionally much in the intellectual life of the nineteenth and twentieth century.”684
“Originally,” Svetlikova writes, “the word ‘psychologism’ denoted an adherence to the view
whereby all the facts of consciousness and its work are to be described exclusively within the
framework of psychology, relying on its methods and apparatus.”685 Based on this definition, it
could be said that the difference between psychology and psychologism is that between a
circumscribed discipline and its principle extrapolated to other disciplines.686 Psychologism goes
beyond the inner life of the psyche and busies itself with the mind’s (objectified) products,
Cf. David Romand and Sergueï Tchougounnikov, “Le formalisme russe: Une seduction
cognitiviste,” Cahiers du monde russe, vol. 51, no. 4 (2010). Cf. Annie van den Oever, ed.,
Ostrannenie: On “Strangeness” and the Moving Image. The History, Reception, and Relevance
of a Concept (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), “Part III. Cognitive and
Evolutionary-Cognitive Approaches to Ostranenie: Perception, Cognitive Gaps and Cognitive
Schemes.” Cf. Alexandra Berlina, “Let Us Return Ostranenie to Its Functional Role: On Some
Lesser-Known Writings of Viktor Shklovsky,” Common Knowledge, vol. 24, no. 1 (2018).
683
Interestingly, humor in Formalist theory does not attract Svetlikova’s attention. Vygotsky did
not write about it either when analyzing Opoyaz works; neither did he dwell on humor with
regard to Sigmund Freud’s Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious, discussed in another chapter
of The Psychology of Art.
684
Svetlikova, 19.
685
Ibid., 17.
686
Likewise, Eikhenbaum refused to consider Formalism a method and insisted on its being a
scholarly principle (Eikhenbaum also accentuated the root of the word principle, saying that
there cannot be more than one); accordingly, the Opoyazians (or specifiers (spetsifikatory), as
Eikhenbaum preferred to call his allies and himself) may have, and did, change their methods,
without, however, abandoning their allegiance to the principle of the dominance of form in art
(let it be remembered that the understanding of form in Opoyaz Formalism was a complex one
and entailed the category of material)—cf. Eikhenbaum, Vokrug.
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including art. Psychologism is rooted in the belief that aesthetic problems can be solved through
psychology, namely, by dint of empirical (physiological) and mathematical experiments (as in
Gustav Theodor Fechner’s experimental aesthetics).687 In the realm of the comic, a vivid
example of psychologism is Lillien J. Martin’s 1905 study “Experimental Prospecting in the
Field of the Comic.” Meanwhile, it will be shown later that not only is the Opoyaz take on humor
devoid of any such psychologism; no matter how much the Opoyaz trio of Shklovsky, Tynianov,
and Eikhenbaum was influenced by the psychology of the time, it avoided psychologism even
when dealing with such traditionally psychological notions as perception or emotion.688
The Opoyazians treated perception in art as something impersonal rather than a fact of the
individual’s inner, psychic, life. The most vivid examples, perhaps, are Tynianov’s “The Literary
Fact” and “On Literary Evolution,” in which one reads that literature develops by certain formal
patterns that immanently presuppose certain modes of perception. This could be compared to the
development of language, which already contains certain perceptual possibilities unfolding
687

Rad Borislavov writes:
Physiological psychology examined the difference between voluntary and
involuntary actions and how these in turn affected the mind’s cognitive abilities, the
ability to focus for a given period of time, and thus to control one’s attention. [. . .]
Physiological psychology not only became an important reference point for
Victorian cultural life, it was also the immediate precursor to experimental
psychology. (Borislavov, 40)

Cf. Sirotkina’s studies regarding the physiological and psychological experiments and
underpinnings of the arts in Russia during the first decades of the twentieth century: Irina
Sirotkina, “Futurist v fiziologii: k 120-letiiu Nikolaia Aleksandrovicha Bernshteina,” Kul’turnoistoricheskaia psikhologiia, vol. 12, no. 4 (2016); Irina Sirotkina, “Nicolas Bernstein : un
physiologiste, figure de proue de la psychologie russe ?” Bulletin de psychologie, vol. 52, no. 4
(1999); Irina Sirotkina, Shestoe chuvstvo avangarda: tanets, dvizhenie, kinesteziia v zhizni
poetov i khudozhnikov (St. Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Evropeiskogo universiteta v SanktPeterburge, 2016).
688
An objection to Fechner’s experimental aesthetics, based on its alleged inability to account
for the uniqueness of aesthetic experience proper, can be found in Bely’s “Lyric Poetry and
Experiment”—cf. Lvoff, Andrei Bely i Boris Eikhenbaum.
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according to its inner rules, i.e., its morphological, structural, and evolutionary characteristics.
Svetlikova compares such anti-psychologism of the Opoyazians to that of Edmund
Husserl, as in his Logical Investigations (1900-1901). This study, which is at the origin of
Husserl’s phenomenology, has an anti-psychologist agenda. In Svetlikova’s account, “the
content of a proposition” for Husserl “and the attendant psychic processes are the phenomena of
different series,” which is why it is incorrect to think that “we explain the nature of a preposition
by describing its psychic genesis,” for “logical connection is an ideal form, irreducible to one
psychic act or another.”689
We see the same logic in Eikhenbaum’s The Young Tolstoy (Molodoi Tolstoy; 1922):
“The life of the soul (dushevnaia zhizn’) is subsumed [. . .] under some general notions of the
forms in which it manifests itself; it submits to a certain design, which often has to do with
traditional forms, and thus inevitably assumes a conventional aspect not coincident with its
actual, nonverbal (vneslovesnyi), immediate content.”690 Therefore, it may be concluded that
there is no contradiction between Shklovsky’s reduction of psychology to motivation, on the one
hand, and his discussion of emotion, on the other, since emotion in literature, not as “the life of
the soul” but as a form in which this life “manifests itself,” is a business of literary theory, not
psychology. Jakobson, who was very close with the Opoyazians in the 1910s and 1920s, wrote
689

Svetlikova, 33–34. It is important to remind the reader that the Opoyazians did not delve into
philosophy but, conversely, shunned it, as has already been pointed out. There is a danger that
Opoyaz Formalism in Svetlikova’s description may sound too academic for a deliberately not-soacademic movement. Ilya Kalinin (“Istoriia literatury kak Familienroman (russkii formalizm
mezhdu Edipom i Gamletom),” Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, vol. 80, no. 4 (2006): 75) points it
out: “The drawback of [Svetlikova’s] important and useful work is that [. . .] as a result of
Russian Formalism’s many theoretical breakthroughs being reduced to nineteenth-century
European academic psychology, it [RF] ended up almost completely deprived of its
revolutionizing potential.”
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Boris Eikhenbaum, Molodoi Tolstoi (Petrograd: Izadatel’stvo Z. I. Grzhebina, 1922), 11;
hereafter Eikhenbaum, Molodoi. Also cf. Boris Eikhenbaum, “O Chekhove,” Severnye zapiski,
no. 7 (1914).
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on the matter with utmost clarity in his famous 1921 essay “The Newest Russian Poetry”
(Noveishaia russkaia poeziia):
In emotive and poetic language, language representations (phonetic as well
semantic ones) draw greater attention to themselves; the link between the acoustical
aspect and that of meaning (znachenie) is greater, more intimate, and more
revolutionary as a result, because the habitual associations by contiguity sink into
the background. [. . .]
But this exhausts the affinity between the emotive and the poetic language.
While in the first one, it is affect (affekt) that dictates its laws to the verbal mass
[. . .], poetry, which is nothing but an utterance oriented towards expression
(vyskazyvanie s ustanovkoi na vyrazhenie), is governed [. . .] by immanent laws; the
communicative function, inherent in practical as well as emotive language, is
minimal here.691
In such a way, the Opoyaz doctrine does not exclude the author’s feelings and individual
aspirations, but it brackets them off692—or, to cite one of the most perspicacious scholars of RF,
“Formalist anti-psychologism in the realm of creative aesthetics (i.e., the elimination of the
author as a biographical, existential, personality) should not be confused with a rather
psychological tendency of the Formalist aesthetics of perception. [. . .] Formalist antipsychologism is primarily against the exclusion of ‘constructiveness’ from the factors of the
psychology of creativity.”693
Jakobson, Raboty, 274–275. Cf. Jakobson’s example: “When Mayakovsky says: / ‘I will open
to you with words simple as mooing / Our new souls, buzzing as lanterns’ arcs’ (tragedy
Vladimir Mayakovsky), then the poetic fact are the ‘words simple as mooing,’ while the soul is a
secondary, attendant, and made-up fact” (ibid., 275).
692
The very act of bracketing off may be reminiscent of phenomenological epoché—cf.
Yampolskaya’s article (Anna Yampolsakaya, “Fenomenologicheskaia reduktsiia kak priem,”
Voprosy filosofii, no. 2 (2017)) analyzing Marc Richir’s phenomenology by resorting to
Formalist terms. However, Hansen-Löve justly remarks that the Opoyaz Formalists were not
influenced by Husserl’s teaching unlike the Moscow Formalists, especially Gustav Shpet, who
oriented himself towards the German philosopher and even corresponded with him.
Nevertheless, Hansen-Löve adds, Boris Engelgardt’s analysis of Opoyaz Formalism
demonstrates the Opoyazians’ own kind of reduction, comparable with Husserl’s. This reduction
manifests itself in “the elimination of the [. . .] notion of the aesthetic message as [. . .] an
‘expression’ of some ‘design’ or ‘task,’ determined by the extra-aesthetic [. . .] social,
biographical, or ideological position” (Hansen-Löve, 174).
693
Hansen-Löve, 178.
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Accordingly, the Opoyazians bracketed off the serious, if not tragic, “content” of the
literary work, as the following critical summary of Shklovsky’s writings on Cervantes and
Eikhenbaum’s essay on Gogol should demonstrate. Furthermore, the Opoyazians highlighted
humor as that which brings out the construction of the work. Concluding this section, which has
been chiefly devoted to Opoyaz Formalism vis-à-vis psychology and the question of emotion in
particular, it is essential to mention another Opoyaz text on that matter, Eikhenbaum’s article
“Meditations on Art: Art and Emotion,” which devotes special attention to the comic. At first, we
find in it the same argument as in The Young Tolstoy: there are emotions of the soul (i.e., our
inner psychic life) and of the spirit (i.e., objectified, cultural, forms of emotions), but what is of
special interest for us is that the only emotion that, according to Eikhenbaum, is purely spiritual,
is laughter. Carol Any’s summary of this article is lucid and succinct: “An instance of a purely
spiritual (dukhovnyi) emotion, in Eikhenbaum’s opinion, is laughter. We understand humor no
matter our state of the soul (dushevnoe sostoianie). Comedy, the lowest form of drama, is the
quintessence of art for Eikhenbaum. Comedy’s capability to affect us without evoking personal
emotions is a sign of the highest form of art.”694 The idea is clear: when we cry at a play, we tend
to prioritize our crying, unable to see well through the tears. Meanwhile, laughter does not
interfere with our attention to the play’s formal specificity. When watching a comedy, we are
ever on the lookout for the funny, such as various twists and catches (both could be covered with
the Russian word priem, device) in the dialogue or in the plot; in this condition, we do not
necessarily expect to be moved but are ready to derive pleasure from the work’s play of wit.
In seeing things this way, the Opoyazians were not alone but—as the previous
comparison with Husserl shows—in the vanguard of European thought. It was in 1925, the next
Carol Any, “Teoriia iskusstva i emotsii v formalisticheskoi rabote Borisa Eikhenbauma,”
Revue des études slaves, vol. 57, no. 1 (1985): 138.
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year after the publication of Eikhenbaum’s article, that José Ortega y Gasset’s famous “The
Dehumanization of Art” saw the light of day. The following passage written by the Spanish
philosopher articulates the same idea; let it be cited at length to compensate for the Opoyazians
essayistic brevity, which, however brilliant, has often prevented many a critic from
understanding them:
A man likes a play when he has become interested in the human destinies
presented to him, when the love and hatred, the joys and sorrows of the personages
so move his heart that he participates in it all as though it were happening in real
life. And he calls a work “good” if it succeeds in creating the illusion necessary to
make the imaginary personages appear like living persons. [. . .]
It thus appears that to the majority of people aesthetic pleasure means a state
of mind which is essentially undistinguishable from their ordinary behavior. [. . .]
By art they understand a means through which they are brought in contact with
interesting human affairs. Artistic forms proper—figments, fantasy—are tolerated
only if they do not interfere with the perception of human forms and fates. [. . .]
[P]reoccupation with the human content of the work is in principle
incompatible with aesthetic enjoyment proper.
We have here a very simple optical problem. [...] Take a garden seen
through a window. Looking at the garden we adjust our eyes in such a way that the
ray of vision travels through the pane without delay and rests on the shrubs and
flowers. Since we are focusing on the garden and our ray of vision is directed
toward it, we do not see the window but look clear through it. The purer the glass
the less we see it. [. . .]
Similarly a work of art vanishes from sight for a beholder who seeks in it
nothing but the moving fate of John and Mary or Tristan and Isolde and adjusts his
vision to this.695
What Eikhenbaum and Ortega wrote resonates, in turn, with Bergson’s book on laughter,
first published in 1900: “[T]he absence of feeling [. . .] usually accompanies laughter. It seems as
though the comic could not produce its disturbing effect unless it fell, so to say, on the surface of
a soul that is thoroughly calm and unruffled. Indifference is its natural environment, for laughter
has no greater foe than emotion.”696 The difference, however, is that Bergson did not extrapolate
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José Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art and Other Essays on Art, Culture, and
Literature, trans. Helene Weyl (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 8–10. Hereafter
Ortega y Gasset.
696
Henri Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, trans. Cloudesley Brereton
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this principle to those works in which tears and laughter are mixed (as in drama), not to mention
pure tragedies; meanwhile, the next section shows that that is precisely what the Opoyazians did.

5.3. The Means of Meaning: Humor vs. Teleology
Thus far, we have seen that the Opoyazians vindicated the bare essence of literature with
high convincingness, as far as zaum’ was concerned. Emotive but uncommitted to anything more
“serious” than literariness itself, zaum’ allowed the Opoyazians, who relied on such perceptionrelated categories as ostranenie and automatization, to circumvent the pitfall of psychologism
(the difference between psychologism and the psychological has already been explained). Zaum’
helped the Opoyazians to draw a distinct line between the extra-textual and the specifically
textual. It also displayed their propensity for humor, which, unlike distracting earnestness,
proved compatible with literariness. Had Shklovsky and his allies limited themselves to zaum’
and the like phenomena, they would have largely eschewed the challenges described below, even
though their theory would have hardly been such a slap in the face697 of common sense, or as
much of a breakthrough. Yet the “imperialism”698 of Opoyaz theory, its great stubbornness and

and Fred Rothwell (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914), 4. Despite the Opoyaz
Formalists’ sympathy for Bergson’s work (cf. Curtis, Bergson), his approach to the comic
through the prism of laughter is rather psychological from the Opoyaz standpoint and is evidently
different from the approach expounded here. Shklovsky mentions Bergson’s theory of the comic
in the article “On the Laws of Cinema” (cf. Shklovsky, O zakonakh), but he does not delve into
it; he only says that this theory explains well Charlie Chaplin’s kind of comedy. Shklovsky also
singles out the role of automatization in the comic according to both Chaplin and Bergson, but,
as will be seen below, automatization, though important for Shklovsky’s overall dialectic of art,
does not figure much in his theory of humor proper.
697
Cf. the famous manifesto of the Russian Futurists, “A Slap in the Face of Public Taste”
(David Burlyuk, Alexander (sic!) Kruchenykh, Vladimir Mayakovsky, Viktor (sic!) Khlebnikov,
“Poshchechina obshchestvennomu vkusu,” in Russkii futurizm: Stikhi. Stat’i. Vospominaniia,
eds. V. N. Terekhina and A.P. Zimenkov (St. Petersburg: OOO “Poligraf,” 2009).
698
By the “‘imperialism’ of the constructive principle” of literature, Tynianov meant literature’s
incessant conquest of those forms that were not originally literary, i.e., were not initially taken as
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self-imposed blindness to alternative approaches,699 which let it become a most influential
twentieth-century doctrine, consisted in extrapolating the same principles as found in zaum’ to
motivated works of art, i.e., the ones that appear to have a message separable from the medium.
In the Opoyazians’ analysis of motivated works, the binary of the comic and its opposite
became—more vividly than before—the firing line of the debate between the literary and the
personal (in the extra-literary sense).
Two illustrative examples are Eikhenbaum’s essay on Gogol’s “The Overcoat” and
Shklovsky’s writings on Cervantes’s Don Quixote. Both of these classics are famous for their
humor, and yet there had existed a tradition, equally valid today, to motivate and ennoble this
humor, making it meaningful and significant, by insisting on a serious, tragic, message behind it.
Meanwhile, faithful to the doctrine expounded in the previous sections, the Opoyazians believed
that the message of the work is its medium; that the “what” is in the “how”; that the tenor is in
the vehicle. (This entailed the material, with units of meaning in it, but it was the
interrelationship of the units that was important, not the units by themselves.) Hence, the
respective titles of Eikhenbaum’s and Shklovsky’s essays: “How Gogol’s Overcoat Is Made”
art—e.g., the diary (Tynianov, PILK, 267). It may be said that the same expansion, only with
regard to literary theory, is distinctive of Opoyaz Formalism.
699
Cf. Lydia Ginzburg:
As all innovative movements, [Opoyaz] Formalism resided in partiality
(predvziatost’) and intolerance. [. . .] Zhirmunsky [he shared much with the
Opoyazians but was a moderate] remarked once, while talking to me about
Tynianov’s new views: “I have pointed out from the very beginning that a historical
study of literature is impossible without accounting for the interrelationship of the
series [other systems, such as the social one].” But at that moment, such a statement
could weaken the initial singling out of literary science as a specific one. Boris
Mikhailovich [Eikhenbaum] has been defending the proverbial theory of
[literature’s] immanent development only recently—however, not because of
having been unable to understand the arguments advanced against it, but because of
his desire to preserve his blindness while it guarded the search for the specific in
literature. (Ginzburg, Zapisnye, 37)
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and “How Don Quixote Is Made.”
Eikhenbaum’s essay “How Gogol’s Overcoat Is Made” carries out a painstaking
phonetic, verbal, syntactic—in one word, stylistic, analysis of the story. Drawing on the drafts of
Gogol’s work as well as on the contemporaries’ accounts of his manifestly theatrical manner of
reading his work in public, Eikhenbaum shows: Gogol’s design of the story was born from
verbal and syntactic play, which, in turn, climaxed in the phantasmagoric story of Akaky
Akakievich. Eikhenbaum maintains that the constructive principle of Gogol’s story is skaz, i.e., a
special way of telling the story in the “voice” that is not neutral but, on the contrary, so peculiar
that it constitutes another character in that story. Eikhenbaum’s aim is to show how Gogol’s
special way of telling the story by merrily alternating masks, tragic and not, lays bare the
fundamental playfulness of art as such.
At this point, the earnest and compassionate reader of Russian literature usually exclaims:
but what about the lesson of the story, the fact that Akaky Akakievich (as the consensus has it) is
the proverbial little man of Russian literature, ever humiliated and insulted (to use the title of
Dostoyevsky’s novel)? Eikhenbaum does not dodge these questions. On the contrary, he focuses
on the so-called “humane place” of the story, when the poor protagonist beseeches the world to
leave him alone and stop offending him. Yet, rather than consider this the ultimate message of
“The Overcoat,” Eikhenbaum regards it as only one of the colors in the kaleidoscope of skaz;
eventually, he diminishes the importance of the tragic element (which, according to him,
shielded the sentimental readers from the artistic essence of the work, which essence, to repeat,
had allegedly sprung from Gogol’s inner drive to wordplay): “In ‘The Overcoat,’ there is also a
different, sentimental-melodramatic, type of declamation that creeps into the overall punning
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style; this is the famous ‘humane’ (gumannyi) place,700 which had grown so popular with
Russian literary criticism that, rather than a side artistic device, had become the ‘idea’ of the
entire story.”701
By celebrating “the overall punning style” of the story, Eikhenbaum prioritizes the
humorous side of skaz. It could be argued, of course, that he overplayed its importance, but it can
also be said that he simply equated the tragic with the comic. What matters is that, without
necessarily rejecting the tragic, skaz abolishes its monopoly on meaning.
Unsurprisingly, Eikhenbaum’s contemporaries disagreed, but before we turn to them, let
us consider Shklovsky’s paper on Don Quixote, since it voices and develops some very
important assumptions of Eikhenbaum’s essay. Shklovsky wants to bring the construction of
Cervantes’s novel to light—something those preoccupied with the “meaning”702 of the work
failed to do, having forgotten in their ideological and psychological discussions of Don Quixote
about the literary specificity of. . . .Don Quixote. Shklovsky does not try to interpret the text in
the sense of guessing the meaning that underlies it. Instead, he takes Cervantes’s novel apart—
like a car, as he himself provocatively wrote, urged by the desire to see “how life is made, and
how Don Quixote is made, and how the automobile is made.”703
Shklovsky concentrates on those components that comprise the construction of
Cervantes’s novel, namely, the speeches of the main characters and the interpolated stories,
showing the ways in which these are brought together through various devices subject to the
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This humane place has to do with the theme of the little man, humiliated and insulted, which
theme, dominant in Russian literature, is traditionally traced back to “The Overcoat.”
701
Boris Eikhenbaum, “Kak sdelana ‘Shinel’’ Gogolia,” in Poetika. Sborniki po teorii
poeticheskogo iazyka (Petrograd: 18-ia Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia, 1919), 158.
702
It has been already shown that the Opoyazians did not disregard meaning—they reevaluated it
from the standpoint of literariness.
703
Shklovsky, Gamburgskii 1990, 146.
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dominant “threading device (priem nanizyvaniia).”704 But, just as the tailor (the writer) conceals
the seam from the unwitting eyes of the one whom he dresses, Cervantes motivates this
threading—for example, by the device of “framing” (obramlenie), such as when the reader of
Don Quixote is presented with “The Tale of Ill-Advised Curiosity,” which, having nothing to do
with the storyline, is introduced as a manuscript read by one of the novel’s characters.705 The
types of motivated threading, which Shklovsky analyzes, are many.
Threading, according to Shklovsky, is what allows Cervantes’s novel to exist; however, it
is not something auxiliary; the artistry of the novel does not exist for the Knight of the Woeful
Countenance—it is the other way round. The point of the novel is, simply, to be. Such is the
daring conclusion that Shklovsky’s essay compels. At first, it sounds insultingly reductive and
primitive; common sense suggests that Cervantes, a reputedly great writer, must have had
something to say, that he must have had some meaningful intention when writing the novel,
which is far from trifling zaum’ or Dada. But then one comes across two major answers to this
objection in Shklovsky’s texts (the essay at issue and also some others). The first answer has to
do with the negative, parodic, task of Cervantes’s novel; the second answer, which I infer from
Shklovsky’s writing, has to do with the Opoyaz take on the purpose of art. Both of these answers,
as will be seen in a moment, challenge the myth of the single witting author reining in his text,
unwaveringly heading towards some clear-cut destination.
Don Quixote’s original task of a parody was of cardinal importance to Shklovsky, who, as
an Opoyazian, considered parody the very incarnation of the driving principle of literary
development, for in the literary universe, seen through Opoyaz eyes, one heads not towards, as
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Shklovsky, OTP 1929, 87.
Ibid., 111.
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much as away from something.706 This is a negative, if not apophatic, dialectics.707 Thus,
Tynianov argued that Dostoyevsky discovered his own style by having combatted Gogol’s—
through parody. In a way, Shklovsky went even farther than this in his study of Sterne’s Tristram
Shandy (included in Theory of Prose under the title “The Parody Novel”). Shklovsky emphasized
Sterne’s playful turning upside down of multifarious conventions and clichés of previous novels,
yet, rather than consider Tristram Shandy an exception to the rule, Shklovsky proclaimed it to be
“the most typical novel of world literature.”708 Typical in the same sense in which zaum’ is
typical—not because of being the most widespread aesthetic principle (which it is not), but
because of being the rule’s purest, most unadulterated, confirmation—for this irreverent
upending of all is typical of ostranenie, whose energy is at the heart of art’s evolution.
Parody, “the humorous form” as such,709 according to Shklovsky, is “the least
canonized710 one and at the same time the most active in dealing with the sensation of semantic
disparities (semanticheskoe neravenstvo),”711 which is why it “prepares new forms for ‘serious’
art.”712 In such a way, the humor that Shklovsky writes about with regard to parody appears to be
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Shklovsky puts forth this view in a chapter on literature without a plot, from his Theory of
Prose, writing about the perpetual struggle between various canons (artistic principles). The
logic of this struggle is the same as with the sons’ not willing to be like their fathers, whom they
oppose.
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Cf. Bakhtin / Medvedev, chapter “The Apophatic Method in Literary History.”
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Shklovsky, OTP 1929, 204.
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Shklovsky discusses parody as a humorous form. It must be stressed—provisionally so—that
Tynianov did not consider parody a necessarily comic phenomenon—the last section of this
chapter explains why.
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Apparently, humor is the least canonized form because—at the time of Shklovsky—it was
still largely considered unequal to the tragic and thus denied as much canonizing attention.
711
He repeats this thought in “Towards a Theory of the Comic”: “a new form is almost always
perceived as comic”; “the comic genre in art is usually in the vanguard” (Shklovsky, K teorii,
66).
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Shklovsky, Gamburgskii 1990, 234. That is the reason why, as Hansen-Löve observes, “the
acts of ostranenie (as well as the effects of ostranenie) are simultaneously comical acts and
effects” (Hansen-Löve, 192).
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not its cause but the consequence. Humorous is our reaction to the bracing irregularity of the text
in which conventions (of art and its perception, or orientation) are violated, while new ones are
introduced, often by force, without having been polished yet by motivation and habit.
Led by these views, Shklovsky diminishes the significance of Don Quixote for the sake
of Don Quixote, as has already been said. That Cervantes’s knight is a woeful one is definitely
not the message of the novel, despite what the Romantics and, later, Dostoyevsky believed
(Shklovsky’s examples), or, say, Miguel de Unamuno in the twentieth century.713 Conversely,
Shklovsky emphasizes Cervantes’s unsympathetic attitude to Don Quixote and the idiocy of the
latter (in the first volume).714 And yet the fact that Cervantes let Don Quixote deliver wise
speeches (in Shklovsky’s opinion, this was initially done because Cervantes simply wanted to
see them in the book, just as he simply wanted to include in it “The Tale of Ill-Advised
Curiosity”)—this favored the transformation of the “brainless knight” into the Knight of the
Woeful Countenance, of which tendency Cervantes became aware with time, especially in the
second volume.715 “The novels’ second parts,” Shklovsky remarks, “or their continuations rather,
713

Unamuno wrote a book titled The Life of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. Simon Leys
summarizes Unamuno’s vision as follows:
His main argument, which he sustained, tongue in cheek, over more than four
hundred pages, is that Don Quixote should be urgently rescued from the clumsy
hands of Cervantes. Don Quixote is our guide, he is inspired, he is sublime, he is
true. As for Cervantes, he is a mere shadow: deprived of Don Quixote’s support, he
hardly exists; when reduced to his own meager moral and intellectual resources, he
proved unable to produce any significant work. How could he ever have
appreciated the genius of his own hero? He looked at Don Quixote from the point
of view of the world—he took the side of the enemy. Thus, the task which
Unamuno assigned to himself was to set the record straight—to vindicate at last the
validity of Don Quixote’s vision against the false wisdom of the clever wits, the
vulgarity of the bullies, the narrow minds of the jesters—and against the dim
understanding of Cervantes. (Simon Leys, The Hall of Uselessness: Collected
Essays (New York: New York Review of Books, 2013), 25.)
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Cf. Vladimir Nabokov, Lectures on Don Quixote (San Diego: A Harvest/HBJ Book, 1983).
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Shklovsky, OTP 1929, 94.
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change their structure very often. The main story (novella) cuts short, as it were, and the action
begins to develop according to a different principle already.”716 Nevertheless, this development
can by no means change the formative cause of the novel, the reason why this novel is itself. At
this point, Don Quixote is opposed not only to Don Quixote the hero but also to Cervantes, the
author (and also the reader, for Cervantes is exactly that when he interprets his own text).
Shklovsky does not deny the fact that he is more interested in the work than in its
author,717 and the work plays by its own rules eventually, even the most sophisticated author not
being fully aware of the astounding complexity of these rules, rooted deep down in art’s
evolution. What the author thinks—at the beginning of writing the work or in the process of it
(but definitely not later)—this may tell on the work; it just as easily may not, but even if it did,
this is certainly not decisive, in Shklovsky’s opinion. The following fragment from his essay on
Andrei Bely is revealing:
The philosophical worldview of the writer is his working hypothesis. [. . .]
When an external ideology, unsupported by the technical preconditions of
the craft, invades the realm of writing, the work of art does not come out. [. . .]
The attempts to create an artistic parallel to some extra-artistic worldview
hardly succeed. The work of art bends or straightens the line according to its own
laws.
Sometimes, the author cannot even say what he has created.718
Elsewhere, Shklovsky expressed the same idea: “I know my craft (remeslo) is cleverer than I.”719
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Ibid., 114.
Cf. Jakobson’s rejection of “biographism” and his simultaneous acceptance of biography as
the continuation of the author’s creative activity (Roman Jakobson, “O pokolenii, rastrativshem
svoikh poetov,” in Roman Jakobson, Selected Writings. Vol. V: On Verse, Its Masters and
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By the same token, his conclusion about Cervantes seems to be that Cervantes’s craft outsmarted
Cervantes.720 Whereas the individual’s inner psychic life, still inarticulate, is his own, the
moment it has been expressed, it has been alienated from him—from then on, it already belongs
to a certain system: the system of language, for example, or the system of literature in our case.
Thus, Shklovsky concedes that the ruefully sublime aspect of the protagonist, later championed
as such by the Romantics, who had thereby motivated the hidalgo’s every eccentricity—such
was the unforeseen result of what had initially been Cervantes’s parody of chivalric romances;
the protagonist’s lofty speeches countered the parodying task and made possible the Romantic
motivation of the knight errant. Nevertheless, this heroic, tragic, aspect that Don Quixote
gradually assumed was an addition to the novel’s gamut, but not the clue to its meaning, which
meaning resides in the novel’s construction. At first a mirthful madman and then a lofty lunatic,
toward the end of the novel the protagonist finds his sanity and dies as “a meek Christian,” yet
that is not the literary message: these are merely the “mask[s]” he alternates, Shklovsky writes.721
The meaning is not in one mask or another but in the very fact they alternate—this is yet another
example of the priority of the “how” over the “what” in Opoyaz theory. Eikhenbaum made the
same argument about “The Overcoat.”
Of course, to an admirer who ascribes godlike omniscience to his favorite author, the very
idea that most of the time the author does not control what he is doing, even when he thinks that
he does—this idea is blasphemous. And yet those among us who have written creatively know

Cf. Shklovsky: “An invention in general, and the invention of a literary style in particular, is
often born from the fixation of a random mutation, a random modification” (Shklovsky,
Gamburgskii 1990, 422).
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how true this often is—which knowledge is not always conducive to creativity.722 Still, writers
hope that there is some greater meaning looming behind their creativity, but the Opoyaz answer
seems to dash these hopes, while the Opoyazians’ treatment of Don Quixote and “The Overcoat”
raises disconcerting questions, including the following ones. Does all of this mean that there is
no purpose behind a work, as long as we do not reckon with the author, or that a purpose, if there
is one, is attendant, hence unimportant? Doesn’t it matter in which order the masks of which
Eikhenbaum and Shklovsky wrote replaced each other, and doesn’t this order reflect the author’s
design? Even if the author, supposedly, did not know what he was doing at first, doesn’t his later
realization of the tendency latent in his work shed light on the whole undertaking?723 Finally, if
the answer to all of these questions is negative, what are we left with? Nothing but the merry yet

That is what Alexander Blok said to Shklovsky, allegedly: “Blok told me that I was the first
person from whom he’d heard serious talk about poetry, but that the things I was saying, though
right, are harmful knowledge for the poet” (Shklovsky, Gamburgskii 1990, 454).
723
This problem, raised by the Opoyazians, namely, that of the author’s realizing the tendency
latent in his art and trying to act upon it, was further elaborated by Andrei Bely in his 1934 book
Gogol’s Craft. (It has previously been pointed out that early Andrei Bely influenced the
Opoyazians, but in the case of this book he took much from them himself—suffice it to compare
his statements with those made in Eikhenbaum’s study of Gogol.)
Here, it is the approach of Andrei Bely that may prove synthetic—not necessarily at the
cost of being eclectic, though one can find eclecticism in Andrei Bely’s book that, for example,
tries to juggle his subtle and idealistic aesthetic views with the Soviet notion of the social
mandate—but synthetic in terms of bringing together the thesis of the Opoyazians and the
antithesis of their teleology-centered opponents (discussed at the end of this section). Andrei
Bely writes how Gogol’s style emerged from the melody he heard; how it all started for Gogol
with single sounds—and here Andrei Bely resembles Eikhenbaum to a degree. What used to be a
simple sound grows into an image and an image, into a plot of the story. At some point, Andrei
Bely adds, a certain tendency reveals itself in the author’s work. But Andrei Bely warns against
the danger of “overthink[ing]” (pereosoznavat’) this tendency (Andrei Bely, Masterstvo Gogolia
(Moscow and Leningrad: OGIZ, 1934), 26). He likens the author to the wire; the electricity that
runs through it has to do with the collective (this somewhat resonates with what the Opoyazians
wrote about the epoch shared by its contemporaries and Bakhtin, about the event (sobytie) of the
work between the author and the reader). Yet, Andrei Bely admonishes, should the overly
deliberate author put his finger on this wire, the electricity, the radio signal will not reach its
destination. Thus, for all his differences with the (Opoyaz) Formalists, Andrei Bely also
acknowledges the autonomy of one’s creative work.
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pointless play of art? A hedonistic pastime, bound to tickle our perception?724 This would hardly
have been the answer for Shklovsky, who believed in the value of ostranenie, which he opposed
to automatization, “devour[ing] things, clothes, furniture, the wife, and the fear of war.”725
Obviously, he believed there was much more to art than simply pleasure. In fact, his ostranenie
and Tynianov’s “new vision,” both of which restore the value of the world—that was the answer.
The opponents of the Opoyazians did not necessarily disagree with the last statement;
thus, one of the most implacable and brilliant among them, Mikhail Bakhtin, used the term
ostranenie in his own work.726 Yet these opponents did not think that literature, multi-faceted as
it is, could be reduced to literariness, whereas the Opoyazians believed that by baring the device
they did not impoverish but rehabilitated literature. To analyze this fundamental rift between the
Opoyaz worldview and the worldviews of their opponents, let us turn to Gogol’s oeuvre, which
serves as a litmus paper, since Gogol was particularly popular with competing twentieth-century
Russian scholars. 727 He was thanks to his status of a classic; his style, so palpable and
variegated; and most importantly, the abundance of the lyrical and the sarcastic, the comic and
the tragic, the absurd and the tendentious, the meaningful and the meaninglessness in him, not to
mention the rare flamboyancy and universality of his gift.
Eikhenbaum’s take on Gogol has already been discussed, but to recapitulate: the
humorous and the dramatic are equivalent in the story of Akaky Akakievich; the logic of “The

The accusation of hedonism was leveled at the Opoyazians by Bakhtin in “The Problem of
Content, Material, and Form in Verbal Art”—cf. Mikhail Bakhtin, Art and Answerability: Early
Philosophical Essays, trans. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1990). Hereafter Bakhtin, Art and Answerability.
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Cf. Mikhail Bakhtin, “Epic and Novel,” in Bakhtin, The Dialogic.
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Cf. Robert A. Maguire, ed., Gogol from the Twentieth Century: Eleven Essays (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976). Cf. Zoya Vinogradova, “Gogol’ v literaturnom protsesse
1920-kh godov” (PhD diss., Saint Petersburg State University, 2004).
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Overcoat” is that of stylistic play effected through skaz. Those who disagreed with Eikhenbaum
did not deny the importance of skaz but did not want to regard this medium as the message of the
story either.
One of such critics was Alexander Slonimsky, the author of a short and insightful 1923
book The Technique of the Comic in Gogol. The title of the book (which was published by the
same house as many Opoyaz texts) and the fact that its author was a brother of Mikhail
Slonimsky, a member of the Serapion Brothers literary movement, in whose work Shklovsky
actively participated—all this only emphasizes the fundamental discrepancy in how Alexander
Slonimsky and the Opoyaz Formalists saw Gogol’s oeuvre. Slonimsky acknowledges this
discrepancy himself, already in the preface: “My method is not ‘formal,’ as it may seem at first
glance, but ‘aesthetic,’ rather. I analyze ‘technique’ insofar as it possesses ‘teleological’
value.”728
The word “teleological” is key here: Slonimsky is interested not in literature’s cleverness
(like Shklovsky) but in that of Gogol proper. Accordingly, Slonimsky rejects Eikhenbaum’s view
on Gogol’s humor as a realization of literature’s self-valuable play. Slonimsky relies on late
Gogol’s confession about his dissatisfaction with the “unadulterated” and “aimless” comicalness
of his early work.729 Slonimsky adduces The Inspector General as an example of Gogol’s
purposeful humor of the later period. In this work, Slonimsky writes, “Gogol sharply opposes his
humor—‘lofty and rapturous laughter’—to the pure, ‘merry,’ comicalness that he calls ‘the
grimacing of a slapstick joker’ (krivlian’e balagannogo skomorokha).”730 In discussing “The
Overcoat,” Slonimsky does justice to Eikhenbaum but turns to very different theorists, namely,
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aestheticians, Theodor Lipps, with his Komik und Humor, and Johannes Volkelt, with his System
der Ästhetik, who consider humor a manifestation of the sublime through the comic. What
Slonimsky writes next, citing Gogol occasionally, is very close to Romantic irony with its
legitimization of the high through the low.731 Slonimsky’s conclusion is that, while comicalness
in Gogol is the driving force of the plot, it is the purposeful movement upwards that the work is
written for, with its “headlong, ascending, lofty (pateticheskii) line of the grotesque.”732
Teleology—by way of an argumentum a contrario—is also implicitly present in Lev
Pumpyansky’s interpretation of Gogol’s humor. Written about the same time as Slonimsky’s
book (1922-1923), Pumpyansky’s essay was only published in the year 2000. In Caryl
Emerson’s summary, Pumpyansky’s main idea is that, with the comic in Gogol,
“[p]urposelessness suddenly descends upon the weary laborer, the superstitious believer, the
tragic mourner, and brings a moment of relief and freedom”; his “[c]onsciousness is at last
permitted to stand outside the lofty purpose and assess it.”733 By escaping the onus of teleology,
such purposelessness only acknowledges it.
As Emerson points out, Pumpyansky anticipated in such a way the idea of the
carnivalesque, advanced some time later by Bakhtin, his friend and colleague. Bakhtin’s essay on
Gogol (1940, 1970) was written in light of his book on Rabelais and long after the disappearance
of the Opoyaz movement. He writes about freedom from the fetters of ideology as the aim of
As a vivid example of it, cf. Charles Baudelaire, “Of the Essence of Laughter, and generally
of the Comic in the Plastic Arts,” Selected Writings on Art and Artists, trans. P. E. Charvet
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Baudelaire uses Charles Maturin’s Gothic
novel Melmoth the Wanderer as a model to discuss the comic. Baudelaire argues that one laughs
not only due to the feeling of being superior but also due to feeling infinitesimal as against the
Absolute.
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and Galin Tihanov (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2011), 85.
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Gogol’s humor, which stems from the laughter of popular culture, whose language and images
withstand the narrowness, abstraction, and stifling solipsism of official discourse. The inspiration
with which Bakhtin writes in his article about seeing the world as never solved and ever open to
the future reverberates with the logic of ostranenie;734 nevertheless, when we read about humor
in the Opoyaz Formalists, they do not resort to liberating ostranenie as much as to the rigid and
bared construction.735 As has been argued above and will be shown below, they needed humor to
articulate the construction-, and not the ostranenie-related, aspect of their theory.
It was precisely the Opoyazians’ understanding of construction that was the major flaw in
their theory according to Bakhtin’s “The Problem of Content, Material, and Form in Verbal Art”
(1924). Bakhtin protested against “the fact that [in Formalism] the uncritically understood goaldirected composition of a work is declared to be the artistic value itself, the aesthetic object
itself,” so that “cognitive judgment and inferior technical evaluation [. . .] are substituted for
artistic activity (and for contemplation).”736 The meaning is not in the work by itself, Bakhtin
says; that which the work is oriented towards, together with the work, is what constitutes its

Cf. Caryl Emerson, “Shklovsky’s ostranenie, Bakhtin’s vnenakhodimost’ (How Distance
Serves an Aesthetics of Arousal Differently from an Aesthetics of Pain),” Poetics Today, vol. 26,
no. 4 (2005).
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It should be pointed out that later, post-Opoyaz, Shklovsky never let go of Don Quixote,
whose significance, it seems, grew for him year by year. Ostranenie plays a far greater role in it
than in Shklovsky’s early and better known treatment of the novel. Shklovsky’s 1966 Stories
about Prose (Viktor Shklovsky, Povesti o proze. Razmyshleniia i razbory (Moscow:
Khudozhestvennaia literature, 1966)) and 1983 Theory of Prose, while retaining some of his
initial observations about the structure of Cervantes’s novel, address the connection between the
epistemological revolution of Cervantes’s time and the new type of the novel created by the great
Spaniard. Moreover, Shklovsky pays more attention than before to the fact that there are two
equally important minds in the novel—not just that of Quixote but also that of Sancho Panza.
Shklovsky writes much about Sancho’s popular, vernacular, background as significant for
Cervantes’s reform of the novel. In this, Shklovsky echoes Bakhtin. Finally, in 1983 Theory of
Prose Shklovsky attacks the Structuralists, Roman Jakobson included, for a purely rhetorical
analysis of Quixote—precisely the reproach Bakhtin leveled at the Formalists.
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meaning; taking a work by itself is “material aesthetics”; the work’s architectonics need be
considered.737 “Humor, heroization, type, character,” writes Bakhtin, “are purely architectonic
forms,” albeit “realized [. . .] through specific compositional devices.”738 The flaw of the
(Opoyaz) Formalists, according to Bakhtin—and here Shklovsky’s metaphor could be turned
against Shklovsky—is that they talk about the construction of the automobile without
considering for what purposes this automobile has been built and who is driving it, and where.739
This brings us to the main, irremovable disagreement between the Opoyaz Formalists and their
teleology-centered opponents.
The disagreement is of a philosophical nature, having to do with the problem of causality.
When the Opoyaz theorists insist on the self-sufficiency of the literary construction and those
from the other camp speak about teleology, the argument is between the formal and the final
cause. The distinction goes back to Aristotle, who singled out four causes of all existing things.
The intricacies and the history of the problem of causality put aside, these causes are as follows:
(1) the material cause, i.e., matter from which something is born; (2) the formal cause, i.e., the
design, the blueprint, of the thing, its structure, the way in which given matter is shaped; (3) the
efficient or moving cause, i.e., the agent of the thing coming into being (e.g., the author of the
novel); and lastly, (4) the purpose of the thing, or its final cause (what end the novel is written
for—to amuse or to terrify, to satirize or to glorify, etc.).
How the final, teleological, cause relates to literature should be self-evident. How the
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formal cause can do without the final is not as clear, but the short answer is that form absorbs
finality. For clarity’s sake, let an eloquent example be adduced from a nineteenth-century
Russian philosopher, writer, and critic Konstantin Leontiev, valued by the Formalists. Leontiev
wrote:
Form in general is the expression of the idea contained in matter. [. . .] Thus,
matter given us, is glass and its form, a tumbler—a cylindrical vessel empty inside;
where the glass ends, where it no longer is, the surrounding air begins, or so does
the liquid inside the vessel; matter cannot go beyond the glass—it does not dare if it
wants to remain faithful to the chief idea of its hollow vessel, if it does not want to
cease to be a tumbler.
Form is the despotism of the inner idea and prevents matter from scattering
about.740
The essence of the glass is its form, and the same is true of a single work and the entire
system of literature. As for the agent, his role is the least significant. As long as novels exist, they
are written and read; as long as houses exist, they are built and moved into; for what end novels
and houses exist is determined by what they (formally) are; people, though necessary for the
novels and houses’ existence, do not set the rules of this existence (the very nature of these
things dictates them), and so people are left nothing but to comply. The dialectic laws that
proceed from the form of the literary work determine the evolution of literature, even though the
writer is often unaware of them just as the glassblower and the carpenter may be ignorant of the
deeper scientific underpinnings of their craft; empirical knowledge is usually enough for them.
It may be opined that, in a way, the Opoyazians recognized not teleology in literature but
rather the teleology of literature, i.e., the teleology of the system, not the person. If we turn to
Shklovsky’s analysis of Don Quixote at the beginning of this section, it is, in fact, possible to
infer from it as a certain Weltanschauung (although the Opoyazians had always kept away from

Konstantin Leontiev, Vostok, Rossiia i slavianstvo. Sbornik statei K. Leont’eva. Tom 1.
(Moscow: Tipo-Litografiia I. N. Kushnereva, 1885), 143.
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direct philosophizing, lest literariness be abandoned). The unarticulated philosophy of Shklovsky
would postulate that the urge to creation (if not procreation, as Yarkho might add) is the causa
causarum of art. The weaving of the novel in Don Quixote’s case and the kaleidoscope of skaz in
that of “The Overcoat” are more important than the threads or pieces of colored glass
themselves, and even the embroidery and kaleidoscopic images. Such an interpretation can be
supported by the following two excerpts from Shklovsky’s other texts included in Theory of
Prose together with the Cervantes article. In “The Structure of the Story and the Novel,”
Shklovsky writes that the seemingly “content”-driven use of brothers, sisters, and other relatives
by various novelists is, in fact, motivated by the need of parallelism in the plot. “Here, as always
in art, everything is a motivation of the craft (motivorka masterstva),” he writes.741 It looks as
though Shklovsky implies the author’s semi-conscious, almost instinctive, will to realize his
craft, which is somewhat reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s irrational and all-consuming will to life.
Unlike Schopenhauer, however, not only does Shklovsky celebrate such will—he, it could be
argued, also believes in its aesthetic and ethical good for the person.742
Finally, all of this brings us to the Opoyaz theory of humor discussed in the next section.
So far, we have seen how humor acted as an ally of the Opoyazians, when it helped them wrest
meaning from psychologism; in return, as it were, the Opoyazians acknowledged the perfect
compatibility of the comic (and not the “serious”) with literariness and its objectively-cultural
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The word “ethical” may take one by surprise when applied to an Opoyaz Formalist, but the
antiwar potential of ostranenie, this central concept of Opoyaz Formalism, the very nature of
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(formed), non-psychic, mode of perception. Moreover, such phenomena, in one way or another
associated with the comic, as parody, stylistic play, and purposelessness, helped the Opoyazians
make an argument for the formal cause as the dominant one (finality being not superior but
subservient to it). And yet the moment the Opoyazians began to tackle the comic as such, they
found themselves at odds with it, unable, or perhaps unwilling, to draw a straight line between
humor and its opposite. This, as stated in the next section, could be seen as a failure of the
Opoyazians—or a great heuristic contribution of their theory, in which humor turned its
liberating and destructive sword on itself.

5.4. Literature as a Joke
“It would do us good to introduce, in addition to the notion of a working hypothesis, that of a
working error.”743
—Lydia Ginzburg
“I was forced to recall [. . .] that vision of the old wiseacre when he laughed so inhumanly and
played his joke on me in the fashion of the immortals. For the first time I understood [his]
laughter, the laughter of the immortals. It was a laughter without an object. It was simply light
and lucidity. It was that which is left over when a true man has passed through all the sufferings,
vices, mistakes, passions and misunderstandings of men and got through to eternity and the
world of space. And eternity was nothing else than the redemption of time, its return to
innocence, so to speak, and its transformation again into space.”744
—Hermann Hesse
An avid reader of the Opoyaz Formalists is likely, sooner or later, to chance upon an
interesting contradiction in their general tone.745 On one hand, Viktor Shklovsky, as well as Yuri
Tynianov and Boris Eikhenbaum, seem to write lightly of literary works and their authors. That
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is, they make light of, or treat as less important at best, that which other critics, however unalike,
consider to be the essence of literature. This essence has to do with authorial design and some
noble and serious purpose to which it was directed, co-determining the place the work and its
author, and readership occupy in the general evolution of ideas, as well as the socioeconomic and
other anthropological practices, within a civilization. On the other hand, the Opoyazians sound
serious when literature and art are discussed as such. Everything is in question to the
Opoyazians: the authors’, characters’, and readers’ beliefs and values—everything but the import
and primacy of literary interplay, everything save the gaiety of literature.
The previous sections exemplified this trait of Opoyaz theory by juxtaposing the
Opoyazians’ ideas with those of their opponents, including perhaps the greatest among them:
Mikhail Bakhtin. Teleology-oriented, Bakhtin approaches jokes seriously. Humor’s breaking free
from the tyranny of society’s values and responsibilities is the most eloquent confirmation of the
axiological and the purposeful, which underlie Bakhtin’s theory. His own words serve as a
testimony: “Someone among our composers said: do you know merry (veselyi) music? I don’t
know merry music, and essentially, there is and can be no merry poetry. [. . .] Otherwise, it will
be silly, childish glee (teliachii vostorg).”746 Mark the word veselyi (gay, merry), discussed at
length in the beginning of this chapter.
Conversely, it is the merry play of literature with itself that is the essence of Gogol’s
“The Overcoat” according to Eikhenbaum and of Cervantes’s Don Quixote according to
Shklovsky (cf. 5.3). All else—psychological and ideological—is only attendant. An unwitting
reader with a clear but practical mind may, upon following Shklovsky and Eikhenbaum’s
arguments, frown or, better yet, begin to laugh—so unexpected and whimsical these arguments
Mikhail Bakhtin in Besedy V.D. Duvakina s M.M. Bakhtinym (Moscow: Izdatel’skaia gruppa
“Progress,” 1996), 161–162.
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should seem to him. That, however, has to do with the fact that humor to the Opoyazians is selfvaluable, while to a practical mind, it is not.747 From the Opoyaz point of view, humor and gaiety
need not be rooted in something “serious” because they already are that.
This, however, creates a problem when the Opoyazians theorize about the comic itself.
For an Opoyazian takes humor so seriously that he does not dispense with the humorous attitude
when he turns to humor as an object of his analysis. This may be reminiscent of a vicious circle,
but it is not, logically speaking; rather, that is a case of auto-reflexivity,748 so typical of the
Opoyazians. To paraphrase Oscar Wilde’s preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray, the Opoyaz
theory of humor is “the [out]rage of Caliban seeing his own face in a glass.”749 This said, it is
now time we turned to the special Opoyaz theory of humor.
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While a sociologist describes social life as he objectively observes it, the
humorist, armed with his sharp intuition, shows and reveals how appearances are
vastly different from what goes on in his associates’ unconscious. Indeed we lie
psychologically just as we lie socially. Lying to ourselves by living consciously
only on the surface of our psychological being is a result of the social lie. [. . .]
The humorist knows well that the pretense of logic is much greater in us
than real logical coherence, because if we feign logic, the logic of our actions
reveals the logic of our thoughts by showing that it is fiction to believe in its
absolute sincerity. [. . .]
And is the rapport that we make with reason always sincere, when with it,
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ideals? Is the pure, the unselfish reason always the only and true source of ideals
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Shklovsky’s “Towards a Theory of the Comic”750 is the sole Opoyaz study exclusively
devoted to humor. As always, the thing for which Shklovsky is looking is literature’s literariness.
Meanwhile, with humor there is always a danger of diverging from the specificity of the text and
lapsing into reader-response psychologism, for humor can easily be evoked by the peculiar
psychological predisposition of an individual rather than the specific features of the object. As
Aaron Smuts aptly put it, “What amounts to a humor response is different from what makes
something humorous.”751 Consequently, Shklovsky’s first task in writing about the comic is to
separate the wheat of construction from the chaff of personalized perception.
Yet, Opoyaz dismissal of “psychologism” notwithstanding, Shklovsky initially supports
his claims by referring to people’s reactions, and, in doing so, like Eikhenbaum, seems to betray
(albeit temporarily so) his bias against tears and in favor of laughter. Thus, Shklovsky begins
with an anecdote about Russian peasants’ watching Hamlet staged by the poet Alexander Blok,
who also played the leading role. During the performance, the peasants burst out laughing
repeatedly at the grimaces of the Prince of Denmark, especially during the most gripping
moments. No lesson is drawn from the anecdote at this point. Instead, Shklovsky mentions other
similar instances: “I’d heard this laughter many times in Petersburg theaters of 1919-1920.
People laughed at the most dramatic moments. For example, when Othello was strangling
Desdemona. Meanwhile, theater had its visitors, people were fond of theater, and theater was
discussed in the barracks.”752
At the end of the essay, Shklovsky returns to Hamlet and, unsurprisingly, draws a

“K teorii komicheskago” (mark the prerevolutionary orthography) was published in 1922 in
Andrei Bely’s Moscow and Berlin literary journal Epopeia.
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surprising conclusion: “I do not think that the peasants laughing at Hamlet misunderstood it. /
They perceived the artistic form of the drama but in a different key (v inom kliuche).”753
The musical analogy makes more sense should we compare it with an excerpt from
Shklovsky’s earlier text “Cinema as Art” (Kinematograf kak iskusstvo; 1919). In it, he says that
J. S. Bach wrote obscene couplets for the same music he had set to the psalms (it should be
added many of these drew on traditional, popular tunes). “It shows,” Shklovsky continues, “that
a sequence (riad) of sounds, arranged in a certain way and called music, is not endowed with
some emotional content, and when someone attaches that to music, music has nothing to do with
it.”754 Shklovsky develops this thought in his 1923 book Literature and Cinema:
A work of music consists of a series of sounds of different pitch and timbre, i.e.,
high and low sounds following one another. These sounds are brought together in
groups, and the groups have a certain relationship to each other. There is nothing
else in the work of music. So what did we find in it? We did not find form and
content but only material and form, i.e., the sounds and the disposition of sounds.
Of course, there will be people who will say that there is also content in music, and
that that is its sad (grustnyi) or gay (veselyi) mood. But there are facts that prove
that in the musical work itself, there is no sadness or joy—these feelings are not the
essence of music, and they are not what the composers hold dear.755
Of course, the issue of form and material in music is a problem for a separate study.756 What is of
Ibid., 66. Surely, common sense suggests that laughing at “the slings and arrows” of the
hero’s “outrageous fortune” is shallow, of not asinine—though, it may be argued, the twentieth
century did exactly that, in Beckett’s Endgame, for example. Yet the preceding analysis of
Eikhenbaum’s and Shklovsky’s essays about “The Overcoat” and Don Quixote, respectively,
should have established already the kind of meaning that is literary and does not hinge on a
variety of extra-textual meanings considered as commonsensical in our everyday life. Moreover,
if we accept and even favor the Romantics’ “posthumous” interpretation of Don Quixote as a
predominantly tragic hero, why cannot Hamlet as a character be considered if not entirely
comedic, then at least partially that? Aren’t his desperate puns just a step away from Mercutio’s
eccentric ones? Furthermore, what if someone finds Molière’s plays to be sad? Isn’t it sad, for
instance, that the main hero of The Imaginary Invalid pays for his stupidity by losing a wife, with
whom he is besotted?
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paramount import here, as far as the topic of this chapter is concerned, is the fact that Shklovsky
does not place the sad or the gay in form.757 Following this logic, one is likely to conclude: the
comic and the tragic are both exterior to form—yet the problem is that Shklovsky writes about
the form of the comic, as will be demonstrated in a moment. We have thus run into another
Opoyaz contradiction in which habitual terms are employed outside of their general use.
One thing is certain: the comic in literature is at stake for Shklovsky, not the comic in and
of itself—be it the author’s or the reader’s. But is it possible to separate one from another? A
metaphor, say, or a synecdoche will always remain itself, even when there is no one to recognize
it as such, not a living soul. But if, let us assume, the comic is not recognized as comic at all
(from the standpoint of functional, stimulus, or response theories of humor),758 can we still speak
of a certain construction or device as comic because of its construction? Had Shklovsky defined
the comic, this question would be much easier to answer, but evading exhaustive definitions is
typical of the Opoyazians, whose core concept of ostranenie (defamiliarization, estrangement)
fundamentally withstands systematization. With provocative audacity and negligence, Shklovsky
concerned, cf. Alexander Brent-Smith, “Humour and Music,” The Musical Times, vol. 68, no.
1007 (1927). Cf. Mary Eva Grew, “Humour in Music: I,” The Musical Times, vol. 75, no. 1091
(1934); “Humour in Music: III (Continued),” The Musical Times, vol. 75, no. 1092 (1934);
“Humour in Music (Continued),” The Musical Times, vol. 75, no. 1093 (1934); “Humour in
Music. VI (Continued),” The Musical Times, vol. 75, no. 1095 (1934); “Humour in Music. VII
(Concluded),” The Musical Times, vol. 75, no. 1097 (1934). Cf. Helen K. Mull, “A Study of
Humor in Music,” The American Journal of Psychology, vol. 62, no. 4 (1949). Cf. Laning
Humphrey, The Humor of Music and Other Oddities in the Art (Boston: Crescendo, 1971). Cf.
Rossana Dalmonte, “Towards a Semiology of Humour in Music,” International Review of the
Aesthetics and Sociology of Music, vol. 26, no. 2 (1995). Cf. Maurice Hinson, Humor in Piano
Music: 20 Pieces from the Baroque to Modern Periods (New York: Alfred Publishing Co., Inc.,
2000). Cf. Enrique Alberto Arias, Comedy in Music: A Historical Bibliographical Resource
Guide (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001).
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refuses to give a definition of the comic already at the very beginning of the essay: “Should a
joke (anekdot) be funny? / What is the difference between the comic (smeshnoe) and tragic? / I
don’t know.”759 It could, however, be added that Shklovsky is reluctant to answer these questions
prior to analyzing humor in literature; doing this would be an aesthetic act, fraught with violating
the supremacy of literature’s literariness; instead, Shklovsky proceeds from particular texts and
examples, whose implicit questions may be very different from the ones we form a priori. But let
us return to the original problem and see where Shklovsky is led by his attempt to subtract
psychologism from the comic in literature.
Shklovsky writes that “the tragic and comic perception are closer to one another than
thought” and that the same work “may be conceived as tragic and perceived as comic, as well as
the other way round.”760 To prove this point about a blurry line between “the tragic and comic
perception,” Shklovsky tells the bloodthirsty jokes of the Russian Civil War: “A man is being led
to the firing squad. It’s raining and cold outside. He says, ‘What nasty weather.’ / The escort
answers, ‘You should worry! I’m the one to walk back in it.’”761 Another joke is as noir: “A Jew
is being led to the firing squad. He asks, ‘What day is it?’ ‘Monday.’ ‘You don’t say! And that’s
just the start of the week.’”762 Of course, one could speak here about Jewish, or gallows, humor
and revisit Freud’s treatment of the subject, which could be reconciled with Shklovsky’s
interpretation, but Shklovsky is after something other than psychology or anthropology. As we
already know, he is interested in the construction of the joke as such. What matters to him is that,
as far as the literary function of these jokes is concerned, they are not fundamentally different
from some others that, unlike these, are not bloodthirsty. Such is the joke Shklovsky tells about
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two Soviet profiteers who decide to talk about money on the phone by referring to millions as
horses, for secrecy’s sake: “‘Send me three horses, please.’ ‘I have not one horse.’ ‘But I can’t
go on living without horses.’ ‘All right, I’ll send you a horse and a half.’”763 In the joke about
horses and millions, the principle is the same; Shklovsky calls it “semantic (smyslovoi)
contradiction.”764 Horses and millions are of different semantic orders, yet we cause them to
collide, like words in a pun765—and, one could add, this evokes aesthetic enjoyment in us, the
feeling of play, while fascination with play makes us disregard the details. That is why we are
likelier to laugh than cry at the joke with a Jew led to the firing squad. The reason is the same: it
is not the individual that interests us but the situation (again, Bergson’s theory comes to mind).
Indeed, Shklovsky’s special treatment of humor pursues the same objective as in his other works.
The objective is to take our eyes off the tenor and see the vehicle, off content and see the
medium, which now is considered the true message.
However persuasive and coherent, this train of thought creates a bigger problem that
threatens the Opoyazians’ theory of humor, nay, their entire doctrine. The logic goes as follows.
First, without defining it, the Opoyazians celebrate humor in works of literature, largely because
they want to downplay the psychologically-motivated meaning gravitating towards the
seriousness of the work. Then it is humor’s turn to be dissected: once again, the constructive
essence of literature has to be demonstrated, and so humor has to be treated accordingly, without
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any “psychology.” Finally, when Shklovsky strips humor of everything else but its construction,
it turns out that his definitions of a humorous construction and any other construction are the
same.
Thus, he writes the following about the abovementioned jokes (or anecdotes, as Russians
call them): “Jokes [. . .] operate not with things but the relationship of things (otnoshenie
veshchei). [. . .] / Things by themselves do not mean anything in a joke. / The juxtaposition
(sopostavlenie) of things is what matters.”766 Suffice it to compare this quotation with
Shklovsky’s definition of the literary work (also discussed in 2.2):
A literary work is pure form; it is not a thing, nor material, but a relationship of
materials (otnoshenie materialov). And, as any relationship, this one, too, is a
relationship of the zero dimension. That is why the scale, the arithmetic significance,
of the work’s numerator and denominator, is unimportant. Comic (shutlivyi), tragic,
universal, and indoor works of art—the juxtapositions of a world with a world or of
a cat with a stone—are all equal to each other.767
Thus, both definitions—that of the comic and that of literature—boil down to the
abovementioned Opoyaz idea of relationality, interplay (to read more about the category of
interplay, cf. 6.6). Of course, we see the difference between a text that is funny and a text that is
not, but whether we laugh or cry is elective from the standpoint of literature; it is not of utmost
importance whether Hamlet should be taken as a tragedy; let it be taken otherwise, as long as its
unique organization remains intact. Humor and its opposite, in the psychological sense, are
perfectly reversible; humor understood as a construction is but a lever that makes the reversion
possible; for different reasons (psychological ones), we react to certain instances of leverage with
laughter, but this does not change how the lever of literature works—be it a joke or an elegy.
This reversibility, which is latent in the Opoyaz definition of literature, is the reason why

766
767

Shklovsky, K teorii, 66.
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Tynianov writes about parody (overwhelmingly associated with the comic) as a certain ratio, a
“dialectical play with the device,” when “a tragedy can parody a comedy” just as well.768
However unorthodox, the Opoyaz Formalists were not alone in approaching humor
geometrically, as it were. An approach to the comic with a similar outcome, albeit very different
premises, can be found in the work of Yarkho. Yarkho’s 1937 paper Corneille’s Comedies and
Tragedies. A Study in Genre Theory (Komedii i tragedii Kornelia. Etiud po teorii zhanra) is
based on a statistical analysis of dozens of tragedies and comedies (obviously, not only
Corneille’s), for brilliant insights alone do not sate Yarkho’s scholarly appetite. The goal of the
Opoyazians is to demonstrate the formal autonomy of literature, whatever topic they write on—
in this case, humor. Yarkho’s aim is not simply to demonstrate but to prove numerically the
difference between comedy and tragedy.769
768

Tynianov, PILK, 201. Even such a devotee of Opoyaz theory as Vladimir Novikov, the author
of a well-known monograph on parody, objects to the possibility of “humorless” parody.
Novikov agrees with Tynianov in that a parody may have “comicality” in it merely as an
“entertainment side dish” (Vladimir Novikov, Kniga o parodii (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel’,
1989), 87), whereas the main, hidden, intent of a parody, the one that has to do with the aesthetic
quality of its object, is often “clever” and “serious” (ibid., 86). Yet, unlike Tynianov, Novikov
believes that parody still remains comic, even when it evokes “a smile” instead of rumbustious
laughter (ibid.). Novikov writes about parody proper; that is why he singles it out by insisting on
the comic; as for Tynianov, even when examining parody, it is literature as such that he writes of
eventually. Apparently, Novikov thinks so too when he acknowledges that “Tynianov was
primarily interested in parody as a mirror of literary evolution” (ibid., 88).
769
According to Mikhail Gasparov (“Nauchnost’ i khudozhestvennost’ v tvorchestve
Tynianova,” in Tynianovskii sbornik. Chetvertye, 14), the difference between the Petrograd
Moscow Formalists consisted in that the former believed in convincingness (ubeditel’nost’) and
the latter, in demonstrability (dokazatel’nost’):
Yarkho proceeded from the methodology previously elaborated by positivism with
regard to folkloristic, ancient, and mediaeval materials: the singling out of
distinctive traits, statistics, systematization—all of this resulting in statistically
describing some particular relics of the past and in reconstructing the process
underlying them. Conversely, the Opoyazians proceeded from the lively sensation
of the literary process contemporary to them [. . .] Why did Tynianov [. . .] become
an Opoyazian? Simply put, he had a good artistic intuition and too little of [. . .]
punctilious diligence [. . .] There are two different things: convincingness and
269

Yarkho may be not as radical as the Opoyazians to deny outright the commonplace
psychological distinction between tragedy and comedy: “Generally speaking, we all agree with
Aristotle in that the attribute of tragedy is ‘seriousness’ and that of comedy, ‘the laughable’
(smeshnoi).”770 Yet he is not satisfied with this explanation, and the questions he asks show how
shaky the foundation for the distinction actually is. Given the fact that Yarkho is yet to be fully
translated into English, a lengthy quotation may be pardoned:

What is to be serious in a tragedy? Setting serious goals and overcoming
serious obstacles [. . .]? Yet the aim of many tragedies is coming together with the
beloved woman and the obstacle, the parents and rivals’ resistance, but that is also
what constitutes the plot of most comedies. The seriousness of the social or
psychological question at issue? But what can be more serious than the social theme
of The Inspector General?771 [. . .]
Perhaps seriousness is determined negatively, as an absence of the
laughable? But, to a certain extent, the laughable obtains in many tragedies (in
Shakespeare, in A[leksey Konstantinovich] Tolstoy) and is rather unevenly
represented in comedies. [. . .] This teaches us first and foremost that, apart from
qualitative changeability, quantitative one matters, and that [literature’s] properties
are to be studied not only for their nature but also for their measurements
(proportsii).
Moreover, the presence of the comic has not always been considered the
attribute of comedy. Thus, the French Academy calls Corneille’s Le Cid in its
demonstrability. Convincingness appeals to intuition, to general impression;
demonstrability appeals to the rational mind.
It has to be remembered that Gasparov considered himself a follower of the Moscow Formalists.
Meanwhile, this is what Lydia Ginzburg, a famous student of the Opoyaz Formalists, wrote on
the same topic in a private letter: “The thoughts expressed in your last letter are largely
convincing. I only do not agree with your belief in the ‘coefficient of demonstrability.’ It seems
to me that literary history cannot be demonstrable (dokazatel’nyi) (the factual aspect put aside);
it ought to be convincing (ubeditel’nyi). This is very different” (E. F. Shafranskaya, ed.,
“Perepiska Korneia Chukovskogo s Isaakom Gurvichem. Pis’ma Lidii Ginzburg k Isaaku
Gurvichu,” Zvezda, no. 1 (2017): 165).
770
Yarkho, Metodologiia, 412.
771
This famous work of Gogol’s begins as a comedy about a provincial town visited by a rake
whom local authorities mistake for an inspector general (awaited at any minute to arrive) and
who later passes himself off as the said inspector. The last scene is in stark contrast with the rest
of the play: the characters in it freeze and lapse into silence, in awe at the news of the real
inspector general’s arrival. Gogol wanted this scene to be reminiscent of the moment of truth
during the last, fateful, day of Pompeii (as painted by Karl Bryullov).
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review, a “tragi-comedy,” even though there is not a single laughable situation in
that play and not one laughable expression either.772
Whether we should agree with Yarkho is a separate question; what matters now is that this
excerpt compels a conclusion somewhat similar to Shklovsky’s assertion that King Lear’s being
a tragedy “is the least significant thing about it.”773 Likewise, it could be said that gaiety and
laughter are only typical of comedy but do not constitute its distinctive feature. Without delving
into Yarkho’s study, suffice it to give his conclusion, which is as follows. The difference
between comedy and tragedy hinges on such formal features as the vivacity of action (the
personages’ dialogues, their exits and entrances); these features are variable in number but retain
the kind of proportion that, as a rule, makes comedies livelier. This proportion need not exclude
the feeling of the tragic or comic, but, according to Yarkho, such feeling is not permanent but
changes over time, whereas the formal distinction that he makes, can be tracked across different
epochs.
One could object, on the grounds that Yarkho’s method is akin to studying smoke by
observing fires: fire is conducive and even essential to smoke, as is the vivacity of action to
comedy (though there are examples to the contrary, as in David Lynch’s manifestly static comic
scenes in Twin Peaks); but we will not know the chemical composition of smoke unless we
analyze it directly—and the same could be said about the comic. Unlike Yarkho, the Opoyazians
do not try to study a phenomenon by its features (the comic, by “semantic contradiction”); they
say that the features are the phenomenon: the comic is a case of “semantic contradiction”;
meanwhile, its comicalness is attendant; it is no more essential to that which we call the comic
than the vernacular Romance origins are to le roman, the novel.
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The fact that such different Formalists as the Opoyazians and Yarkho overlapped in their
understanding of humor testifies to a common Formalist stance, more outwardly daring in the
case of Shklovsky and his allies and more academically corroborated and reserved in Yarkho’s.
Needless to say, this stance on humor may be regarded as a violation of humor’s meaning. Yet
the history of the term “humor” does allow one to insist on a purely constructive, non-comic,
understanding of it based on ancient medicine, in which humors referred to the four bodily
fluids. With time, the term evolved to mean something comic as when one is whimsical, being
unable to keep his humors in balance—the condition of physical and mental health.774 Such
whimsicality may, of course, be considered as comic, but it may also be expressed as a chart, so
to speak.775
That is exactly what we find in the 1927 article of Evgeniya Zhurbina,776 a student of the
Opoyazians. Her article is devoted to the genre of the feuilleton, extremely popular at the time.
Zhurbina explains the deliberately disjointed composition of the often not-so-witty Soviet
feuilletons (with a riddling title, with sudden switching from one topic to another) as a remnant
of the play of wit, historically characteristic of this genre. Zhurbina’s article (focused, organized
Cf. Scott-Warren (“When Theaters Were Bear-Gardens; Or, What’s at Stake in the Comedy
of Humors,” Shakespeare Quarterly, vol. 54, no. 1 (2003): 74–75):
774

At the end of the sixteenth century, dramatists discovered [. . .] the comedy of
humors. The Galenic medical theory of the four humors, bodily substances that in
their various combinations determined personality, remained extremely influential.
Conscripted for the purposes of creating theatrical characters, Galenism issued in
the “humorist,” the individual marked out by a single trait or habit of speech.
Johnson defines humor as “when some one peculiar quality / Doth so possesse a
man, that it doth draw / All his affects, his spirits, and his powers, / In their
confluctions, all to runne one way. . .”
775
It can be argued that relying on etymology is begging the question. The objection is most
legitimate and ought to be kept in mind. The acceptability of etymological arguments is a great
theoretical challenge that requires a separate study.
776
Cf. Evgeniya Zhurbina, “Sovremennyi fel’eton. (Opyt teorii),” Pechat’ i revoliutsiia, no. 7
(1926).
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as a typical academic text) is different from those written by the three Opoyazians, but the same
logic underlies it. The article suggests that wit (which, it may be added, had not always been
interpreted as comic)777 only served as a motivation for the emergence of the construction used
in the Soviet feuilleton.
The objections to the Opoyaz take on humor are easy to predict; they will be the same as
those already considered earlier in this chapter (in the sections devoted to zaum’ and teleological
motivation). It is possible to rebuke Shklovsky and his allies for a degree of equivocation in their
treatment of humor, which they sometimes use in the colloquial, psychological, sense and in
other cases, in that of a construction.778 This is characteristic of the Opoyaz Formalists, who
constantly play with commonsensical terms, first seemingly assuming them and then turning

Cf. the old meaning of the word “wit” in English, with the same sense as “to know”; also cf.
such synonyms of wit as “sharpness” and “perspicuity.” Finally, in one of the greatest treatises
on wit, Baltasar Gracián’s 1648 Agudeza y arte de ingenio, not all kinds of wit are described as
humorous. Thus, Gracián recounts how “[t]he Roman Fabius was drinking a glass of milk one
day when a hair that had fallen into it stuck in his throat, and he was choked to death” (Leland
Chambers, “Baltasar Gracian’s The Mind’s Wit and Art” (PhD diss., University of Michigan,
1962), 505). The milk given to him by the mother had her hair. There is nothing witty about it,
but here is what the imagination of the poet Pablo de Rajas, whom Gracián calls ingenious, made
out of it: “Our life! O fragile happiness! Life’s fête / Brings death. Why do we live when life
depends / Upon a hair that’s fallen in the milk?” (qtd. in ibid., 506). This is witty but not
necessarily comic.
778
Already at this point, Shklovsky could be accused of the same logical fallacy that Bakhtin
imputed to the Formalists in general, namely, quaternio terminorum, or the fallacy of four terms,
which goes against the rule of only three terms requisite for a categorical syllogism. In
Shklovsky’s case, the problem is that we have two kinds of humor discussed: (1) exterior,
psychological, humor; (2) humor qua construction, hence not necessarily humorous, in the first
sense. Cf. Bakhtin (Art and Answerability, 268):
777

The failure to distinguish the three moments [. . .] (a) the aesthetic object, (b) the
extra-aesthetic, material givenness of a work, (c) the teleologically understood
composition of a given material—introduces into the work done by material
aesthetics [i.e., Opoyaz Formalism] [. . .] a great deal of ambiguity and confusion. It
leads to a constant quaternio terminorum in its conclusions: what one has in view is
sometimes the aesthetic object, sometimes the external work, and sometimes the
composition.
273

them inside out. Adversaries will see it as methodological sloppiness and adherents, as a
paradox, a summersault typical of essayistic writing and thinking, to which the Opoyazians’ texts
doubtless belong. The truth of the matter, meanwhile, is that the Opoyaz interpretation of humor
qua construction cannot be completely refuted because the jokes explored by Shklovsky or the
parodies analyzed by Tynianov are indeed constructed in a certain way. The conclusions the
Opoyazians draw from these observations can be disputed, of course, but they cannot be rebutted
either because these conclusions sprout from the Opoyaz Formalists’ Weltanschauung, which, in
turn, comes from their implicit values. Therefore, a question to ask at this point is not whether
the Opoyaz Formalists were correct. The question is whether humor was of independent value to
them or merely a handy illustration. Simply put, did they care about humor, and should we care
about their thoughts concerning it?
My answer is that humor was valuable to them, but not as an object or an outcome; it was
of value to the Opoyazians as a behavioral attitude. The Opoyazians wanted to approach the
(meaning of the) material in literature as humorously as literature itself approached it in their
eyes. However, approaching humor with humor, whose main weapon, one could argue, is that of
the deconstruction (or reduction) of its object, was akin to firing fire with fire.
Thus, it has been shown that after having associated literary evolution with parody, the
Opoyazians reconsidered the latter as not necessarily humorous, from the standpoint of literary
evolution. The same was true of ostranenie. It has already been said that for the Opoyazians
qualitatively new works, charged with the energy of ostranenie, are often humorous: they are so
unusual that one will likely laugh at them, similar to a person who, having never seen ballet,
laughs at the movements of ballerinas. But, as Aage A. Hansen-Löve demonstrates, this leads not
to the ultimate celebration of humor but to the opposite result. He writes that, in compliance with
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the principle of ostranenie, the Formalists “aesthetiz[ed]” “the devices usually [. . .] employed as
comic ones”; he mentions as an example “the joke, the funny story, satire,” and other comic
forms that previously “were [. . .] exhausted by the gaiety and laughter they evoked”; but from
the Opoyaz standpoint, he says, these lose “the incipient communicative function” and now
“serve [. . .] the exclusively artistic and immanent ends, so that the ‘comic coloring’ of these
devices [. . .] is canceled out.”779
In fact, literature’s merry play, of which the Opoyazians wrote, is the less humorous the
more dominant it becomes. Two contemporaries of the Opoyazians described this phenomenon.
Andrei Bely wrote about it with regard to Gogol, when in his very long and detailed book he
decided not to discuss Gogol’s humor separately. Andrei Bely discusses Gogol’s craft instead.
Yet this is not done to slight humor in Gogol; on the contrary, Andrei Bely writes: “[I]t can be
said about Gogol’s humor: it is all; it is everywhere; therefore, is it humor after all?” (Bely 1934,
p. 236) Another example is from José Ortega y Gasset’s 1925 essay:
[T]he modern inspiration—and this is a strange fact indeed—is invariably waggish
[la nueva inspiración es siempre, indefectiblemente, cómica]. The waggery [la
comicidad] may be more or less refined, it may run the whole gamut from open
clownery to a slight ironical twinkle, but it is always there. And it is not that the
content of the work is comical—that would mean a relapse into a mode or species
of the “human” style—but that, whatever the content, the art itself is jesting.780
The “inhumanity” that Ortega writes about resonates with a quotation from Hesse’s Steppenwolf,
which served as an epigraph to this section. “[L]aughter without an object,” laughter, or humor,
as an attitude, is as ethereal and elusive as light; from a message, it turns into a medium, and is
no longer noticed by itself.781
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Hansen-Löve, 192, emphasis mine.
Ortega y Gasset, 47, emphasis mine.
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Hesse, 154. Cf. McLuhan (who could justly be called one of the greatest formalists in
history): “The instance of the electric light may prove illuminating [. . .] It is a medium without a
780
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What the Opoyazians did was, in fact, cross the line beyond which humor lay and
identify themselves with humor. They thereby violated the principle that Mikhail Bakhtin called
vnenakhodimost’ (translated as outsideness). In Bakhtin’s theory, outsideness describes the
relationship of the author to his hero and his work. The precondition of the hero and the work’s
fulfilment is the author’s existence outside of his text, or his transgredience to it. Bakhtin writes:
The author is the bearer and sustainer of the intently active unity of a consummated
whole (the whole of a hero and the whole of a work) which is transgredient to each
and every one of its particular moments or constituent features. [ . . .] The author’s
consciousness [. . .] encompasses and consummates the consciousness of a hero by
supplying those moments which are in principle transgredient to the hero’s
consciousness and which, if rendered immanent, would falsify this
consciousness.782
The Opoyazians write about humor while also identifying with it and writing on its behalf; this
annuls transgredience, outsideness; when humor is not only the “hero” but also the “author,” who
interferes with the hero’s autonomy, what happens is that “[a]ll of the moments that actively
consummate the hero render the hero passive, the way a part is passive in relation to the whole
which encompasses and consummates it.”783 The violation of vnenakhodimost’, which led to
firing fire with fire as far as the Opoyazians’ theory of humor is concerned, could be regarded as
their fundamental failure, a monument to their scientific error (cf. chapter 3). However, it may
equally be considered one of their greatest discoveries, one of their greatest lessons, this
particular one yet to be learned.
The Opoyazians let humor loose; they let it do everything it was wont to: strip and
displace, make light of, reverse and subvert. In the Opoyaz hands, humor first defeated
everything serious in literature, and literature as such became humorous, but then, irreverent and
message, as it were, unless it is used to spell out some verbal ad or name” (Marshall McLuhan,
UM, 19).
782
Bakhtin, Art and Answerability, 12.
783
Ibid., 14.
276

unrestrained, humor turned on itself. The Opoyaz Formalists released the destructive potential of
humor, so that their ratiocination resulted in the destruction of humor by humor, and that, no
matter whether one welcomes it, was not humorless. The Opoyazians showed us how humor sees
itself, how art sees itself, how the ever-becoming system (form) sees itself. The Opoyazians let
art outwit them and then ventriloquized its message of constant alienation of everything we
humans create.
However, it would be unjust to accuse the Opoyaz Formalists of unanimously siding with
alienation and slighting the writer, nay, the person. As writers themselves, they insisted on
alienation not to celebrate but to shun it. Thus, later Shklovsky wrote that “the non-inclusion of
meaning into literature is cowardice”—the words uttered by someone who knew all too well how
easily the writer is robbed of his meaning.784 Shklovsky and his allies admired the merry
playfulness of art, but they also understood that mortals cannot outplay art by turning into
simple-minded relativists who have no personal values. Furthermore, the lives of Shklovsky,
Tynianov, and Eikhenbaum show that this faith in the merry nature of art was dearly paid for.
Suffice it to cite the following autobiographical timeline from Eikhenbaum’s My Chronicle:
The war (one month prior to it—mother’s death).
The revolution (one month prior to it—father’s death).
The October coup.
Hunger, the cold, son’s death. [. . .] Blok’s death, the death of Gumilev.
Viktor Shklovsky, who stopped me walking down the street; Yuri Tynianov,
whom I noticed already at the Pushkin Seminar.
The “Opoyaz.”
All these were historical chance and unexpectedness.
This was history playing its muscles (myshechnye dvizheniia istorii).785
No matter how terrifying the price, the Opoyaz Formalists did not turn to art to seek banal,
psychologist, causation in it. Art with its own meaning—making this world ever strange, again
784
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Shklovsky, OTP 1983, 74.
Eikhenbaum, Moi vremennik, 48.
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and again, at the cost of our suffering, at the cost of taking away our most cherished expressions
committed to it—art was worth it.

Appendix A
For all their substantial differences with the Opoyaz Formalists, Moretti and like-minded
scholars also seek to see how the system of literature functions at large, which is why it can be
argued that, though they may not want to defy the agency of the author, they try to do without
him eventually. Hence, Moretti’s opposition of close reading to “distant” one. Moreover, just as
with the Opoyaz Formalists, humor helps to bring to light the strengths and weaknesses of
Quantitative Formalists (i.e., Moretti and his counterparts). This is especially evident when it
comes to Matthew Jockers’s Syuzhet package (mark the Russian word for plot taken from
Shklovsky’s work). The Syuzhet package helps to single out and compare plots from hundreds
and thousands of texts—the number of texts one person cannot read (to have the machine deal
with the so-called “great unread” is what motivates Moretti and his colleagues). Jockers’s idea is
to contour a text’s plot by looking for positive and negative spikes in it, based on tracking words
and sentences with a positive or a negative connotation. He acknowledges himself that the end
result (the graph the program produces) is not the plot itself but rather a “proxy for the plot”—in
his opinion, “a pretty darn good one.”786
It could be said that Jockers tries to portray a person by looking at his shadow. But if a
person were smiling? One could hardly tell based on a shadow. But, then, would it matter as far
as the construction of the work is concerned? It may, not in terms of the mood but rather in terms
of the text’s play with different (emotional) registers, as in Gogol’s “Overcoat.” Jockers

Matthew L. Jockers, “The Rest of the Story” (2015), accessed March 12, 2020,
http://www.matthewjockers.net/2015/02/25/the-rest-of-the-story/.
786
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recognizes this problem:
The most spectacular example of failure [in the work of the Syuzhet package] was
discovered by my son. He’d just finished reading one of the books in my corpus,
and I showed him the plot shape from the book and asked him it (sic!) it made
sense. He said, ‘well, yes, mostly. But this spike here is all wrong.’ It was a spike in
good fortune, positive valence, at precisely the place in the novel where the villains
had scored a major victory. The positive valence was associated with a several page
long section in which the bad guys were having a very good time. Readers, of
course, would see this as a negative moment in the text, Suyzhet does not. Nor does
Suyzhet understand irony and dark humor and so on.787
Jockers adds that “[o]n a whole, however, Suyzhet gets it right, and that’s because most books
are not sustained satire, or sustained irony.”788 But the latter is debatable if irony is considered as
one of the driving principles of literature as such—a view close to the Opoyazians.789

Appendix B
The example with music raises numerous questions, answers to which can only be
outlined here. I am most thankful for the consultation of Jeffrey L. Prater, composer and
Professor Emeritus in the Department of Music at Iowa State University.
First of all, it is necessary to say that Shklovsky did not write much about music. He did
not play it either, unlike Eikhenbaum, who had some education in the field. There are many
musical metaphors in Eikhenbaum, but he does not theorize about music. Tynianov, as
Shklovsky, was not very keen on music. Pointing this out is of import because literature and
cinema, of which Shklovsky wrote profusely, he was involved in as a practitioner, as was
Tynianov. This fact does not automatically dismiss Shklovsky’s arguments but is a reminder that
he was less invested in music; after all, that which he wrote of music was largely an analogy.
As for Shklovsky’s particular example, the unavoidable question is about the boundaries
787
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Cf. Steiner, The Praxis.
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of the specifically musical. Does a melody played in major instead of the original minor remain
itself, or no longer? One may want to compare the famous French folk tune Frère Jacques (a
major-mode canon) with its slightly decorated minor-mode version in the first movement of
Mahler’s Symphony No. 1. Without answering this question here, it may be added that using the
major or the minor key presupposes a certain reaction in the majority of the melody’s recipients,
who listen to this melody, whereas the literary text is usually read to oneself, and the autonomy
of an average reader is greater than that of an average music lover. Of course, a musician can
perceive the score visually, and the question, then, is whether he or she will still associate
sadness with the minor and gaiety with the major key. This said, such a distinction between the
two can be primitive—thus, Klezmer music written in minor tends to sound merry. Another
example, this time from classical music, is J. S. Bach’s Little Fugue in G Minor. In fact, the
distinction between major as merry and minor as sad took root after the Baroque and flourished
already during the Romantic period. Finally, one would commit an injustice by reducing music
to the gay or the sad, when there are so many other feelings in between. Besides, one will have to
distinguish the emotions of the soul in music from these of the spirit (to use Eikhenbaum’s
terminology); then the constructive sadness of a melody may be different from that perceived by
a listener, but one, of course, could rightly ask why call it sadness in the first place.
What Shklovsky says about the pattern (of a melody) remaining itself no matter the key is
a problem not only of abstract theory but also of the kind of theory that accounts for historical
change. Particular forms have a tradition (and perhaps a biological suggestiveness, but that is
already a separate question) of being perceived in a certain way, since different keys (not only
major and minor but also keys based on particular central notes) were considered to possess
distinct affections during the Baroque era, and later. In fact, the Opoyazians acknowledged and
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studied this phenomenon as far as literature was concerned (consider the Opoyaz notion of
orientation (ustanovka)). It was at the same time with the Opoyazians that Bakhtin developed
this problem with regard to genre theory, hence his notion of genre memory.
As far as Shklovsky’s particular example is concerned, it could be said that, albeit there
may be nothing essentially sad or merry in a melody, the meaning a particular key (or a
particular alteration of tones) developed in a particular community may signal one emotion or
another. (After all, however possessed by the constructively essential and objective we may be,
is it possible to do without this signaling, which presupposes a degree of conventionality and
consensus? Otherwise, no sort of reaction, purely intellectual, privately emotional, or spiritually
emotional, would be possible.) It should be remembered that Brik studied the meaning of meter
in poetry, his studies reflected in the notion of a meter’s semantic halo (semanticheskii oreol
metra), later developed by Mikhail Gasparov and Kiril Taranovsky.790 What this study showed
was that trochaic pentameter, for example, is associated with the theme of solitude and journey
in the Russian tradition. Yet the Opoyaz take on this would be that such “sadness” or “gaiety” are
only masks but not the essence of the melody. The essence is that of the formal cause, in which
the personal aspect (usually implied when one mentions sadness or gaiety) is the subservient one.
As far as the meaning of form is at issue, that again is the major difference between the
Opoyazians and Bakhtin, even though their genre theories have important overlaps. The
difference is eloquently summarized by Igor Shaitanov: “As always in his argument with the
Formalists, Bakhtin is against substituting the contents (soderzhatel’nost’) of the sound, the
device, and even the constructive factor, for the meaning of the formed aesthetic event (sobytie)

Cf. Mikhail Gasparov, Metr i smysl. Ob odnom iz mekhanizmov kul’turnoi pamiati (Moscow:
RGGU, 1999).
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[between the creator and the perceiver], which took place thanks to it.”791
A knowledgeable but insensitive critic may also associate Shklovsky’s stance with that of
Joseph Schillinger, which is especially tempting given some resemblance of their metaphors:
Music [. . .] is man-made illusion of actuality, and so is every art. [. . .] Music
makes one believe it is alive because it moves and acts like living matter. [. . .] The
common belief that “music is emotional” has to be repudiated as a primeval
animism, which still survives in the confused psyche of our contemporaries. This
erroneous conception can be easily justified as “naive realism.” Music appears
emotional because it moves—since everything that moves associates itself with life
and living. Actually, music is no more emotional than an automobile, locomotive or
an airplane, which also move. Music is no more emotional than the Disney
characters that make us laugh, but whose actual form of existence is not organic,
but mechanical (a strip of pictures drawn on celluloid and projected on a screen).792
However, this is an example of that which Shklovsky called “the dissimilarity of the similar” (the
subtitle of his book Bowstring (Tetiva)). The difference is that Shklovsky believed that
mechanical movement is opposed to art, in which duration reigns—he says the latter openly
drawing on Bergson.793 Moreover, Schillinger believed that, having construed form, it is possible
to reproduce it, creating different works of art scientifically. The Opoyazians were averse to such
logic. Form is fundamentally unpredictable according to them.
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Igor Shaitanov, Komparativistika i/ili Poetika: Angliiskie siuzhety glazami istoricheskoi
poetiki (Moscow: Izdatel’skii tsentr Rossiiskogo gumanitarnogo universiteta, 2010), 96.
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Schillinger, 5.
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Cf. Shklovsky, Literatura i kinematograf.
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CHAPTER SIX
VIKTOR SHKLOVSKY AND MARSHALL MCLUHAN: BEYOND COMMON
SENSE794
“If we want to understand the system in its entirety, we must accept losing something.”795
—Franco Moretti
6.1. Paradox as a Trade-off
In the nineteenth century, God died (whether definitively, we do not know), and the
burden of agency shifted onto humanity—or so it seemed. For soon humanity’s own creation, the
machine (cf. 3.1), forsook its maker, just as humanity had forsaken its own.796 Liberation from
God granted humanity neither agency nor a clearer vision of identity. In fact, agency shifted not
onto but past humanity—from God to the machine, nay, to the realm of things, hitherto unheard,
or rather unhearkened to, such as lanterns, teapots, and houses, talking to us and to one another
in Anderson’s fairy tales.
After the demiurge’s demise, poets and philosophers, their worldviews notwithstanding,
This chapter is a revised version of my article—cf. Basil Lvoff, “Viktor Shklovsky and
Marshall McLuhan: Beyond Common Sense,” New Zealand Slavonic Journal, vol. 49/50 (20152016 [2018]).
795
Moretti, DR, 49.
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This whole chapter attempts to determine how Shklovsky and McLuhan understood agency.
There are many interpretations of agency—cf. Markus Schlosser, “Agency,” The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), accessed March 12, 2020,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/agency/. Agency, as used here, means
exercised, rule-making, control over physical and/or mental (in)activity of an entity.
Often, when agency is at issue, a subject-object relation is implied: an agent is an entity upon
which the other entity acts; the latter may be referred to in grammatical terms, as a patient, or
else as a target or undergoer. Thus, in the sentence “Shklovsky and McLuhan were preoccupied
with the problem of agency,” the grammatical agent is “Shklovsky and McLuhan” and the
grammatical patient is “the problem of agency.”
However, with McLuhan’s emphasis on mediality and Shklovsky’s understanding of the
literary work and literature as such as a certain relationship of components within a system (see
below), it is possible to define the two scholars’ take on agency as relational. Agency lies with
the network as a whole, not one of its participants. The sense in which I use the term “relational
agency” is different from the definition given in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and is
closer to the interpretation put forth in Megan M. Mcintyre’s dissertation “Relational Agency,
Networked Technology, and the Social Media Aftermath of the Boston Marathon Bombing”
(PhD diss., University of South Florida, 2015).
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had been vocal about “the tragedy,” or as others saw it, the triumph “of material culture.”797 It is
hard to think of a major twentieth-century intellectual who did not deal with this problem.
Suffice it to say that most of the schools and names can be subsumed under two approaches. The
first, consciously or not, accepts the agency of the material world and—at different times, in one
way or another—has been represented by some of the orthodox Marxists, the Italian Futurists,
and a new wave of techno-progressivists at the turn of the last century. The second approach,
which has no lack of famous thinkers in its ranks, from Walter Benjamin to Heidegger, expresses
concern, if not distress, over humanity’s loss of agency. This last chapter of the dissertation is
devoted to neither of the two approaches but to a third, trailblazing one. Far from a simple
compromise between the two, it is often mistaken for the first, “inhumane,” one, while in actual
fact it went beyond the realm of the human yet in the ultimate interest of the individual, as this
chapter argues at the end. The two world-famous thinkers who ushered in this third way were
Shklovsky, one of the founders of contemporary literary theory, and Marshall McLuhan, a father
of modern media studies. The Russian and Canadian thinkers are seldom mentioned together,
and, to my knowledge, have not been systematically compared, set apart as they were by time,
geography, and their immediate subject matter.798 And yet the scarcity of superficial biographical
overlaps between the two only brings out their common bent for paradox and the ability to see
the great degree to which the material world, which we people expect to follow our will, ordains
our patterns of thought, meaning, and value.
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Cf. Voloshin. In this chapter, his insightful and underappreciated poem The Ways of Cain:
The Tragedy of Material Culture serves as an example of the Modernist reevaluation of agency,
to which Shklovsky’s and McLuhan’s projects belong—a reevaluation prompted by the
technological revolutions of the twentieth century.
798
There are some exceptions. Cf. Paul Jones, “Raymond Williams & Bruno Latour: ‘formalism’
in the sociology of culture and technology,” Sociologie de l’Art, vol. 15, no. 1 (2010), in which
the name of Shklovsky appears several and that of McLuhan multiple times.
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For good or ill, common sense still dominates the way Shklovsky and McLuhan are read:
both are highly esteemed but also considered eccentric in their theoretical claims. Eccentric is
how people view their famous mottos, secured in the titles of Shklovsky’s and McLuhan’s essays
“Art as Device” and “The Medium Is the Message.” The majority seem to have made their peace
with these formulae by taking them as an important “point” but not a qualitatively new principle.
The majority have found a way to return to the status quo by regarding Shklovsky’s and
McLuhan’s uncompromising statements as partly true, in spite of their apparent falsity.
Meanwhile, to state that the medium is also a message and that art is, among other things, also a
matter of technique is not a moderation but a repudiation of that which the two thinkers
maintained. Shklovsky and McLuhan did not take the colloquially-defined content and form to
mean that the latter dominates the former; they argued for the identity of the two, thereby doing
something more radical than simply inverting centuries-old categories: upending them.
The truth of the matter is that Shklovsky’s and McLuhan’s paradoxes still remain in
opposition to the orthodoxy of various scientific paradigms799 extant in our academe and society.
It can be, nevertheless, objected that Shklovsky and McLuhan have been so influential that each
has effected a paradigm shift: one in literary scholarship and the other in media studies—but this
paradigm shift seems incomplete if we look at a great many, if not the bulk, of modern critics of
art and technology.800 Contemporaneity gives a new ring to the definition of RF as “an
799

Cf. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1996).
800
That is because Terence’s “homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto” applies to critics of
any generation, and in every generation there will be someone to argue against it, like Susan
Sontag in 1965, for instance: “Even in modern times, when most artists and critics have
discarded the theory of art as representation of an outer reality [. . .], the main feature of the
mimetic theory persists. [. . .] content still comes first. [. . .] it is still assumed that a work of art is
its content. Or, as it’s usually put today, that a work of art by definition says something” (Susan
Sontag, Against Interpretation and Other Essays (New York: Picador, Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
1966), 4).
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‘interparadigmatic stage’ in the evolution of Slavic literary scholarship,” provided by such a
perspicacious critic as Peter Steiner.801 It may be added, as an invitation to argument, that RF is
more relevant today than Structuralism precisely thanks to being “interparadigmatic” while
Structuralism became a paradigm too easily, having fallen victim to its own popularization.
It could be further argued that the terminology Structuralism developed hardly requires a
“translation”: even when complex, it speaks to us in the language of established categories.
Shklovsky and McLuhan do not; when the former talks about devices and the latter about media,
these mean something different than in everyday life. Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, in his response
to McLuhan’s essay, was able to appreciate this untranslatability, yet he also betrayed a
misunderstanding typical of a clever person reading McLuhan through the lens of preMcLuhanite categories: “Dr. McLuhan’s writing is contrived to make people think, not match up
his conclusions with their own.”802 Saying that “Dr. McLuhan’s writing is contrived to make
people think,” however, can easily be misread to mean that its novelty is more in the wording
than its ideas. Often, we cannot decide whether it is one or another, and that is the moment when
we treat such a statement as a paradox, which immediately places the statement in a different
league—that of art rather than scholarship. For art seeks new, dynamic, modes of expression,
whereas our academic standards tend to require that scholarship be susceptible of formulating
itself in commonly intelligible terms. That, however, was not the scholarship McLuhan and
Shklovsky practiced; theirs was in proximity to art in so far as intuition and writerly creativity
were concerned. McLuhan pledged his allegiance to this kind of scholarship in the section “The
Artist Precedes the Scientist” in the essay “Causality in the Electric World,” while Shklovsky
801

Steiner, 269, emphasis mine.
Marshall McLuhan and Eric McLuhan, Media and Formal Cause (Houston: NeoPoiesis
Press, 2011), 63. Hereafter Eric and Marshall McLuhan, MFC. Cf. Marshall McLuhan: “[T]hings
have to be approached on their own terms if any understanding is to be attained” (ibid., 51).
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referred in his own theory more to writers than scholars.803 The premise of this chapter,
therefore, is that to be understood, if not accepted, Shklovsky’s and McLuhan’s statements ought
to be taken at face value, discussed in their prima facie paradoxical language.

6.2. Miscommunication
Shklovsky and McLuhan share a major understanding, whence all other of their
conclusions follow: the division of content and form should be abolished; the essence of a
phenomenon is contingent on its mode of existence.804 The what is contingent on the how: the
artwork is contingent on its devices and the message, on its medium.805 Soon, we will see that the
title of formalist duly belongs not only to Shklovsky but also to McLuhan.806
First, however, it is necessary to mention the elephant in the room: unlike McLuhan,
whose discussion of media was part of his inquiry into human communication, RF, especially at
the beginning, insisted on the minor importance of the communicative aspect of literature, i.e.,
the connection between the author and readers. Shklovsky only reinforced this stereotype when
he wrote passages such as in the preface to his Theory of Prose: “My task in the theory of
803

Thus, Shklovsky draws on Leo Tolstoy in inaugurating the idea of ostranenie; on Laurence
Sterne in writing about the principles of the novel; and on Vasily Rozanov when defining the
essence of the literary work. Cf. respectively “Iskusstvo, kak priem,” “Parodiinyi roman.
Tristram Shendi Sterna,” and “Literatura vne siuzheta,” in Viktor Shklovsky, OTP 1929.
804
This is equally true for bigger and smaller phenomena, be it a single artwork and TV program
or literature and television in general.
805
Yarkho (“Granitsy nauchnogo literaturovedeniia,” Iskusstvo, no. 2 (1925): 50) expressed it
eloquently: “‘How?’ is the same question as ‘what?,’ but only related not to the fact but to the
act. However, in art, which we have defined as labor (rabota), the fact and the act are one.”
806
It may be added, biographism put aside, that McLuhan was a student of I. A. Richards, who
inspired the Anglo-American variation of formalism: New Criticism. For a comparison of RF
and New Criticism, cf. Ewa M. Thompson, Russian Formalism and Anglo-American New
Criticism: A Comparative Study (The Hague: Mouton, 1971). The author of this chapter,
however, is loath to associate RF, particularly Opoyaz Formalism, with New Criticism, one of
the major distinctions being the historicity of the former, having to do with such core concepts as
ostranenie and automatization, literary evolution, the literary fact, and others.
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literature is to study its inner laws. To draw a parallel with a factory, I am interested not in the
state of affairs on the world cotton market, and not in the policy of its trusts, but only in the count
of yarn and the ways of weaving it.”807 There is no mention of the factory workers, let alone
customers, either. Needless to say that Shklovsky and his allies got attacked for this stance with
special vehemence.
Neither the justification nor the rejection of such attacks, however, falls within the scope
of this chapter; nevertheless, the following provisos ought to be made, at the cost of reiterating
some of the statements made in the previous chapters of this dissertation. The Opoyazians’
unwillingness to discuss the communicative aspect of literature emanated from their eagerness to
establish the kind of literary theory that would study literature in its artistic specificity. They
faulted the scholars and critics who preceded them for ever discussing something else at the
expense of literature: the author’s life, social history, philosophy, ethnography, psychology, a
multitude of readers’ impressions, and so on.808 The Opoyazians wanted finally to discuss
literature in terms of its literariness. Hence the radicalism with which early Shklovsky wrote
about art in the late teens and early twenties of the last century—arguing that “art is a means of
experiencing the making of the thing, while that which is made in art is unimportant.” 809 One
may, of course, observe that the words about “the means of experiencing” (sposob perezhit’
delan’e) imply perception and, therefore, the ones who perceive, as does the principle of
ostranenie. However, as Hansen-Löve pointed out, even such forms as “the joke, the funny story,
satire,” associated with traditionally-understood perception, were stripped in RF of their
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Shklovsky, OTP 1929, 5–6.
Cf. Erlich, RF, chapters “The Forerunners,” “Approaches to Formalism. From the ‘Forest of
Symbols’ to the ‘Self-Valuable Word,’” and “The Emergence of the Formalist School.” Cf.
Depretto.
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“incipient communicative function,” placed at the disposal of “the exclusively artistic and
immanent ends [of literature],” to such a degree that the very “‘comic coloring’ of these devices
[. . .] was canceled out.”810
And yet, sometime around 1924, Shklovsky and his allies turned to the sociology of
literature, without, however, sacrificing the principle of literariness (cf. chapter 3). Their texts
that accounted for the social factor in the system of literature (or literaturnyi byt –cf. 3.2) bring
to light the Opoyaz take on the laws of communication in literature. As the rest of this chapter
should demonstrate, Shklovsky and his allies’ understanding of the work and of literature as
such, dependent on the category of perception as it was, did have a place for the individual (be it
the author or the reader); however, they reconsidered the individual as a continuation, and no
longer the master, of form.

6.3. Content as Pretext
The difficulty of McLuhan’s statements (the same is true for Shklovsky) is the result of
his use of words associated with old categories to denote new ones. Categories presuppose a
certain hierarchy, and hierarchy presupposes certain modi operandi et vivendi. Depending on the
function of a phenomenon, its place in the (hierarchically organized) system can change together
with the category to which it should be attached. The word “message,” analyzed below, should
substantiate both of these claims.
McLuhan reconsidered the message of any public communication as something dynamic
and not static, belonging to the category of action rather than substance. The etymology of the
word “message” allows of this interpretation. “Message” is the cognate of “mission” and goes
810

Hansen-Löve, 192. The problem of humor in Opoyaz theory is part of that of emotion in art,
which, in turn, has to do with the question of art vis-à-vis teleology, as chapter five shows.
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back to Latin missus, the past participle of mittere (“to send”). Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that
in the language of Shklovsky, the word for “message” is soobshchenie, which literally means the
same as “communication.” The word “communication” morphologically implies that something
is held in common. Likewise, the Russian word for common (obshchii) is of the same root as the
soobshchenie.811 Moreover, just as the word “communication,” which is used to mean public
transportation (as in “rail communications”), so is the Russian word soobshchenie. What for an
Anglophone person is rail communications, for a Russian-speaking one is, literally, rail message
(zheleznodorozhnoe soobshchenie). McLuhan’s example of the railway as the medium qua
message could not be more apposite:
The railway did not introduce movement or transportation or wheel or road into human
society, but it accelerated and enlarged the scale of previous human functions, creating
totally new kinds of cities and new kinds of work and leisure. This happened whether the
railway functioned in a tropical or a northern environment, and is quite independent of
the freight or content of the railway medium.812
This shows that the significance of the railway, the medium, is in the new kind of
communication, or message, that it establishes. The content of the railway (be it freight or
passengers) is of minor importance as far as that message is concerned. The railway is the
vehicle, and the passengers are the tenor, but the meaning of the railway is in the way in which
this vehicle transforms human society. The vehicle is no longer empty; transformative, the
vehicle as such is information and meaning.813 Meaning is no longer passive; it is not tenor but
Whereas the Russian word for soobshchenie (“message”) morphologically means the same
thing as the English “communication,” the Russian word to denote communication proper, in the
everyday sense of the word, is kommunikatsiia. According to Max Vasmer’s etymological
dictionary, it is a calque of the Polish komunikacja, having been first used in Russian by Feofan
Prokopovich in the times of Peter the Great.
812
Marshall McLuhan, UM, 20.
813
No medium is empty for McLuhan; even when it seems to carry nothing, it carries out itself,
so to speak. McLuhan chooses electric light to illustrate it: “The electric light is pure
information. It is a medium without a message, as it were, unless it is used to spell out some
verbal ad or name” (Marshall McLuhan, UM, 19, emphasis mine). In reality, however, the
811
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vehicle, not that which is carried but that which carries out.814
That is why one could be confused by Sing-Nan Fen’s otherwise insightful analysis
because of its use of old categories to discuss McLuhan’s new ones: “By message McLuhan
means the ‘content’ for which the media serve as the vehicles to carry and deliver.”815 The
inverted commas do not help much; hopefully, the previous paragraph has shown why meaning
qua message should no longer be associated with content in the McLuhan galaxy. The message is
the specific way in which the vehicle exists, functioning; the content (like fuel) is needed for the
vehicle to work, but it does not take away its agency.816 Likewise, though the railway was
created for trains to transport passengers and freight, the unique effect of this medium on human
society manifested itself not in transportation (the idea of transportation being an old and familiar
one) but by changing the lives of those participating in the railway “message.” There was a logic,
of course, as to why people created the railway, but it did not determine the railway; on the
contrary, it was the systemic logic of the railway that determined people’s lives, changing their

message of electric light is the transforming effect this medium, by being itself, has on the entire
human society—the problem McLuhan addressed throughout his writings—cf. Marshall
McLuhan and Bruce R. Powers, The Global Village: Transformations in World Life and Media
in the 21st Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
814
One faithful to colloquial speech may of course point out a contradiction in the simultaneous
diminishing of content and accentuation of meaning. However, meaning is separated from
content in the example of the railway, as well as in the forthcoming examples from Shklovsky’s
work. Apparently, Shklovsky and McLuhan derived great joy in the double entendre of meaning,
when, similar to Shklovsky’s claim that “that which is made in art is unimportant” (Shklovsky,
OTP 1929, 13), McLuhan argued that the meanings and intentions which an individual
communicates through a medium are insignificant to this communication. (Cf. the example with
a telephone conversation, cited below in the body of the chapter.)
815
Sing-Nan Fen, “Marshall McLuhan’s Understanding Media,” The Journal of Educational
Thought (JET) / Revue de la Pensée Éducative, vol. 3, no. 3 (1969): 162.
816
McLuhan writes: “We are the content of anything we use, if only because these things are
extensions of ourselves” (Eric and Marshall McLuhan, MFC, 6). The contradiction between the
agency of the individual and that of the system is indubitably important, yet the annihilation of
the human is not at issue. After all, whatever happens to us does in our perception for both
McLuhan and Shklovsky (cf. the penultimate section of this chapter).
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organization.
It is a similar train of thought (pun unintended) that one may find in Shklovsky’s writing
about the metaphors of Andrei Bely. Shklovsky says that they are significant to Russian
literature only because of their artistic novelty, not the anthroposophical meaning imparted to
them by Andrei Bely, who was a follower of Rudolf Steiner: “Anthroposophy was needed as a
pretext for reinforcing the system of metaphors (metaforicheskii riad) in Russian prose. To
become dominant for a time, this system made the author leaning towards it turn to the teachings
about the simultaneous existence of several parallel worlds.”817 That is to say, Bely wanted to
employ these metaphors to develop his anthroposophical beliefs, but instead the system of
metaphors employed Bely’s beliefs to develop itself, and, from literature’s standpoint, that is the
only thing that matters. The real message of Andrei Bely’s writing, therefore, was not the
anthroposophical underpinnings of described experience (content) but the transformative effect
of the manner of writing about this experience. What Shklovsky wrote elsewhere—“[M]y craft is
cleverer than I”818—applies to Andrei Bely and, by and large, any other author analyzed by the
Opoyazians.
In the same vein, McLuhan contrasts the logic of the medium with the logic of people’s
actions. He writes that “brain surgery” and “night baseball” “are in some way the “content” of
the electric light, since they could not exist without” it—the reason why which of them “the light
is being used for […] is a matter of indifference.”819 Therefore, the meaning of the medium for
McLuhan and the meaning of the literary work for Shklovsky are inseparable from the medium
and from the work. The meaning of the medium is the effect of its form, and the meaning of the
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artwork is in its medium of communication. Meaning is the medium, meaning is the work
(defined by Shklovsky as “a relationship of materials”820). That is why any attempt to express the
meaning of a medium or artwork without replicating the logic of its organization will lead to
misapprehension.
The Opoyazians liked to illustrate this point by citing Leo Tolstoy’s famous letter about
Anna Karenina addressed to Nikolay Strakhov: “Your judgement about my novel is correct but
not entirely, that is, everything is right, but what you have said does not express everything I
wanted to say. [. . .] Had I wanted to say in words everything I meant to express with my novel,
then I should have written the same novel that I wrote from the very beginning.”821 In the same
letter, Tolstoy at least partially acknowledged the autonomy that the author’s work formally
possesses: “In everything […] I wrote, I was guided by the need of collecting my thoughts linked
together to express myself, but every thought particularly expressed in words loses its meaning
and sinks tremendously when taken all alone out of that linkage (stseplenie) where it belongs.”822
For Tolstoy, meaning is predicated on form so much that “looking for [separate] thoughts in the
work of art,” whose “essence” is precisely in the “endless labyrinth of linkages and […] those
laws that underlie these linkages,” is sheer “meaninglessness.”823
Of course, if Tolstoy, especially in his later years, had heard a Formalist speak about the
insignificance of the religious theme in Anna Karenina, for example, he would have ardently
objected. However, it is important to remember: whatever the Opoyazians said about particular
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works they said sub specie litterarum, from the standpoint of the literary system and not that of
the individual who wrote the work. Meanwhile, they did not deny the existence of other systems,
such as the social and economic ones, just as they did not deny the author his private life.824 It
may be said that in a linkage of thoughts, thoughts are the tenor and linkage the vehicle; the tenor
is of primary import to those interested in Tolstoy the person and the vehicle to those who care
about the “vehicular” meaning of Tolstoy’s art. This is not to say that Tolstoy’s thoughts are of
zero interest to the Opoyazians; they matter but as a pretext for creating linkages, not on their
own. This is why Shklovsky was not rash to quote in his “Art as Device” not only such a heavily
moralistic work as Tolstoy’s “Kholstomer” (Strider: The Story of a Horse) but also his highly
moralistic article against whipping. Choosing morally charged texts only helped Shklovsky to
state his point, which, without being immoral, went beyond the good and evil.

6.4. From the Bone to the Spacecraft
In Shklovsky’s recategorization of art and in McLuhan’s recategorization of
communication, form changed its status in such a way that, metaphorically speaking, the
wrapping paper and the motionless bank turned into the gift and the river. For McLuhan, the
meaning of the medium is in the effect of this medium’s nature on people who partake of its
communication, its message.825 The use of the medium is itself meaningful; one need not pay
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Thus, Eikhenbaum did not deny Tolstoy his inner life but argued that even his diaries should
be regarded as the fact of literature and analyzed accordingly, without being confused with
Tolstoy’s inner life, which cannot be accessed directly in the diaries but only beyond them. Cf.
Eikhenbaum, Molodoi. Cf. Carol Any, Boris Eikhenbaum: Voices of a Russian Formalist
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), chapter 2 “Demythologizing Tolstoy.”
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Only this effect is not separated from the medium as from its cause. The medium and the
message are one as the same system. The structural laws of this system (the message) let it exist;
they cause the existence of this system (not its appearance) and, by making it what it is, they are
also accountable for the effect this system has on everything which enters it. Thus, the passenger
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attention to what the TV set is saying, working in the background, to experience this medium’s
meaning-effect, which is information.826
Information no longer has to be associated with content; even the electric light, though
uninformative to conventional wisdom, is nothing but “pure information.”827 Once again, a
closer look at the etymology of the word should rationalize such an understanding.828 The root
“form” stands out in this word, which is derived from Latin informare (“to shape,” “to fashion,”
and “to inform” in the sense of imbuing something with a particular quality). That is to say, the
message of the medium (i.e., the functioning of this medium) is meaningful to human society in
so far as this medium informs it. In McLuhan’s own words, “‘the medium is the message’
because it is the medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and
action.”829
Shklovsky displays similar reasoning. In 1931, already after his official disavowal of
Formalism, Shklovsky was no longer that hesitant to use the word “content,” but the quotation to
come clearly shows that he remained true to the old logic: “In every epoch, in every art, there are
people who think that they express their thoughts without words, who think that they have
overcome the resistance of form. / Meanwhile, content is the transformation of form into content,

getting on a train or an airplane enters this system, and, becoming part of this communication,
this message, is now informed by it in a certain way.
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McLuhan remarks: “Some might quibble about whether or not [Shakespeare] was referring to
TV in these familiar lines from Romeo and Juliet: / But soft! what light through yonder window
breaks? / It speaks, and yet says nothing” (Marshall McLuhan, UM, 21).
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Ibid., 19.
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Eric McLuhan attaches great importance to etymology. He shares the “ancient understanding”
whereby “[n]aming a thing” was “tantamount to defining it, […] giving it a structure and an
existence” (Eric and Marshall McLuhan, MFC, 96). Eric McLuhan reminds the reader that, as a
consequence, “the ancients ever regarded etymology and the study of names as high science,”
and his multiple etymological excursus show that he is in favor of this method because of his
predisposition to morphology (ibid., 97).
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and, without this transformation, it does not come into existence (stanovit’sia).”830 Before that,
Eikhenbaum wrote the same thing: “The facts of art testified that its specificity expresses itself
not in the very elements comprising the work but in the peculiar employment of them. Thereby,
the concept of “form” assumed a different meaning and no longer required any other concept
next to it, no correlation.”831
Thus, Shklovsky and McLuhan rejected not content as such but formless, unmediated,
content. For that reason, Shklovsky and his allies preferred to speak about form and material (as
against form and content) in an artwork, the roots of which dichotomy are Aristotelean. The
Greek philosopher wrote about the material cause of things (what they are made of) and their
formal cause (the shape in which they exist). The material cause of a thing cannot be realized
without the formal one, which orders matter, allowing it to “come into existence,” to use
Shklovsky’s phrase again. This is not to say that Shklovsky and his group of Formalists were a
sort of neo-Aristotelians though there are mentions of Aristotle in Shklovsky’s oeuvre: it should
be remembered that the Formalists of Shklovsky’s group, loyal to the principle of literature’s
literariness, did not want to abandon the specificity of art by delving into the depths of
philosophy. Yet this does not mean that we cannot read them as philosophers, especially if we
remember that the latter, by definition, need not be university professors but only those who lean
towards wisdom. Late in his life, Shklovsky even confessed, thereby revealing his philosophical
inclination: “I missed the time for studying philosophy. Traveled without a map. [. . .] As an old
man, I can tell you that you still have time to discover philosophy.”832
Unlike the Opoyazians, McLuhan had no reason not to engage philosophy in his work,

830

Shklovsky, Poiski, 63.
Eikhenbaum, O literature, 384.
832
Shklovsky, Pis’ma vnuku, 277.
831

296

and he also had time to develop his ideas gradually—the privilege the Opoyazians did not have
given the suspicious and later hostile attitude of the Soviet government towards them. Later in
his career, McLuhan turned to the problem of formal causality proper, and his son, Eric
McLuhan, already after his father’s death, put these essays together in the book Media and
Formal Cause, to which he contributed as well by writing an essay on Aristotle’s philosophy
with an eye to the formal cause.
In Aristotle’s system, there are two more causes of all things in addition to the formal and
material: the efficient cause (i.e., the maker of the thing, its author, so to speak) and the final
cause (that for whose sake the thing is made). As far as the efficient cause is concerned, it can be
argued that Shklovsky and McLuhan identified it with the material one in most of the cases.
Andrei Bely, for example, is the efficient cause of his texts, and his thoughts and feelings used in
them are their material cause, whereas the literary specificity of these texts, uniquely organized,
is formal. The same is true for McLuhan: people create a medium (the efficient cause), and then
this medium subsists on people’s perception (the material cause) albeit originally created to
extend this perception in their interaction with the outside world.833 Therefore, though the
material and the essential causes are to be theoretically distinguished from the formal one, in
reality they are inseparable from it as parts of its transforming and informing system.
Analogous to the material and essential causes, McLuhan considered the final cause as
part of the formal:
The trouble with the final cause is that it so often tends to be inseparable from the formal
cause; for unless some extrinsic purpose can be found for a natural change—some end
beyond itself which the change serves—the final cause, or that for the sake of which the
change took place, is no other than the quality or form which the matter assumes as a
result of its transformation.834
Cf. Marshall and Eric McLuhan’s polemic with Northrop Frye in Eric and Marshall
McLuhan, MFC, 118–119.
834
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Accepting this identification of the formal and final causes is perhaps even harder than
with the other two causes, for common sense suggests that the final cause lies not within but
ahead of the formal one. Thus, the purpose of using the house (the final cause) lies ahead of the
design of that house (the formal cause), and the aim of the hammer is ahead of it and may change
(driving nails and pulling them out, serving as a lever, etc.) while the design of the hammer
remains intact. And yet it may be argued that this design presupposes all of the aims it may meet,
just as the egg presupposes the chicken. An apt illustration would be the famous match-cut from
bone to spacecraft in Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey.
In the case of literature, the final cause is the goal the author would like to achieve by
writing, but in art there is an even stronger tendency of not separating the plan and the aim of
writing. There are countless examples of writers who had one idea in mind but ended up
changing it in the process of writing; that is to say, their final cause changed influenced by the
formal one.

6.5. The Value of Meaning
However logical, this still begs the question of meaning, that of a certain literary work or
technology. The majority of people still believe that the meaning of something is its content
(what it says), not to be identified with the medium or the art form itself. A good illustration of
such resistance on the part of common sense is the question addressed to McLuhan by Robert
Moore, the host of his televised 1977 Australian lecture:
RM: “When you say that the medium is the message, does that leave any room at all for
criticism of individual, say, television programs?”
MM: “Or content.”
RM: “Yes.”
MM: “You see, it doesn’t much matter what you say on the telephone. The telephone as a
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service is a huge environment, and that is the medium. And the environment affects
everybody—what you say on the telephone affects very few. And the same with […] any
other medium. What you print is nothing compared to the effect of the printed word. The
printed word sets up a paradigm—a structure of awareness—which affects everybody in
very, very drastic ways, and it doesn’t very much matter what you print as long as you go
on with this form of activity.”835
McLuhan is talking here about the information of communication as its meaning,
information understood not as some judgement or opinion but the transformative effect of the
medium’s organization. To this, one may object that even neutral, non-judgmental, statements,
made in a telephone conversation (e.g. “See you at five”) or printed in a newspaper (“The US
President Wages a Twitter War”), by stating certain facts and not others, communicate the
interests, attitudes, and aspirations of the senders and the receivers of this communication (the
final cause). Yet this may be parried by saying that the medium of the telephone presupposes
time-fixing conversations just as Twitter, this gossip-tool of the new age, does disgraceful online
altercations.
But then it matters to us as a community who precisely is involved in a Twitter war: some
celebrity of ill repute or a high-ranking statesman. It matters to us because we ourselves are
matter, i.e., the material cause of the media we use. Meanwhile, it is too often that we follow,
“‘The Medium is the Message.’” Cf. Marshall McLuhan, UM, chapter “The Telephone:
Sounding Brass or Tinkling Symbol?” Also cf. section “Teleaction” in chapter “The Operations”
in Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).
It should also be added that the telephone stirred the imagination of Modernist writers.
Cf. poem “Telefon-№ 2В-128,” in Vasily Kamensky, Tango s korovami. Zhelezobetonnye poemy
(Moscow: Tipografiia M. Iakovleva, 1914) and poem “Zvezdnyi katalog” in Arseny Tarkovsky,
Sobranie sochinenii v trekh tomakh: Stikhotvoreniia, poemy (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia
literatura, 1991). Also cf. Alexander Kiklevich [Aleksander Kiklewicz], “Stereotipy
telekommunikatsii i khudozhestvennaia simvolika telefona,” Wiener Slawisticher Almanach, vol.
48 (2001); Denis Ioffe, “Poeticheskii razgovor na rasstoianii transgressii. Kreativnaia
rasshifrovka ‘Telefon-№2B-128’ i ‘Shli my uzkoi stezhkoi’: Vasily Kamensky i Dmitry Prigov,”
in Ben Dhooge and Michel De Dobbeleer, eds., Uslyshat’ os’ zemnuiu: Festschrift for Thomas
Langerak on the Occasion of His Retirement (Amsterdam: Pegasus Oost-Europese Studies, vol.
26 (2016)); Vladimir Khazan, “Tele-radiovlast’ i literatura,” Russian Literature, vol. 62, no. 2
(2007).
835
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unwittingly and slavishly, the dictate of one medium or another, unaware of the fact how much
our desires and behavior are informed by it. This is not to say that we should forget about our
preferences, ideological, ethical, or aesthetic, but it will suffice to look at history to see how
much these were shaped by a certain epoch and its technology. One of the most vivid examples
is the era of the sword, of which Voloshin wrote:
The sword created justice.
By violence forged together
And whetted keen for vengeance—
It soaked up with their blood
The spirit of the saints
Whom it had pierced,
And so its hilt became the shrine
Of their relics.
[. . .]
Thus, from a highway robber
The sword carved out a knight.836
With the transition from the sword to the pistol, the three causes out of four largely remained: the
material cause of steel, the efficient cause of armorers, and the final cause of self-defense or
attack, but the structure of the device, its formal cause, changed the very notions of honor and
justice in our society.
We may, of course, decide that of the utmost importance to us is our personal meaning,
but it should be remembered that this sort of meaning is our attitude towards facts rather than the
facts themselves. After all, such is the etymology of “meaning,” which is the cognate of “mind,”
going back to an Indo-European root that is also found in the Russian mnit’ (“to think,” “to
deem”) and mnenie (“opinion”). It would, therefore, be naïve to mistake our meaning for the
maker of our destinies. But one may pose: perhaps there is also something else we imply when
we mention meaning? Are we certain of what meaning is? Shklovsky, for one, was not, when he
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wrote: “Who told you that we have forgotten meaning? We just do not discuss that which we do
not (yet) understand.”837
An insightful treatment of this problem can be found in C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards’s
book The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the
Science of Symbolism. The authors single out no fewer than sixteen interpretations of meaning,
some of which have subdivisions. The conflict described above between our personal “agenda”
and that of the media we use could be formulated as that between meaning as “An event
Intended” and “A Volition” vs. “The Place of anything in a system.”838 The intentional or
volitional kind of meaning manifests itself in such phrases as “They meant no harm,” “I meant to
go,” etc.839 Similarly, the meaning of “See you at five” uttered on the phone will reside not in the
statement of facts but in the confirmation of the speaker’s intention to meet his interlocutor. “The
intention of the speaker,” Ogden and Richards write, “may very naturally be used in conjunction
with reference in order to provide complex definitions of meaning for special purposes.”840
However, they also warn against the possibility of misinterpretation of the intentional meaning,
both on the part of the listener and the speaker—the problem of doubt. As well as they do warn
against the deliberate mismatch between the intention and the reference of the utterance, for
example, when the speaker is lying.
This introduces the problem of irony, which could be defined as the sophisticated
discrepancy between the reference and the intention. If systemic analysis of communication

Viktor Shklovsky, “Iz filologicheskikh ochevidnostei sovremennoi nauki o stikhe,” Germes
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networks can possibly avoid this problem, either disregarding it completely or considering it as a
kind of noise (cf. Claude Shannon’s noisy-channel coding theorem), it seems inevitable in art.
Shklovsky, much more than McLuhan, was urged by his area of study to address irony, hence
intention and, potentially, volition. Besides, he knew irony very well, having resorted to it so
frequently in both his theory and belles-lettres.
It is possible to identify at least three irony-related problems in the patterns of literary
development analyzed by Shklovsky and his allies. Some of them, they managed to dodge,
others, not so much. The first danger of irony lay in the realm of emotions, the work’s gaiety or
sadness, its major or minor key, to use Shklovsky’s metaphor from “Towards the Theory of the
Comic.” In that article, as the previous chapter demonstrates, Shklovsky made a claim similar to
that of Eikhenbaum’s “How Gogol’s Overcoat Is Made” and of Tynianov’s “Dostoyevsky and
Gogol: Towards a Theory of,” namely, about the reversibility of the comic and tragic, which
reversibility falls under one of the systemic properties of literature and no longer has to follow a
certain emotional-volitional key, predetermined by the author. Thus, Shklovsky wrote that King
Lear’s being a tragedy “is the least significant thing about it.”841
Matters became more convoluted when the Opoyazians dealt with parody. They
considered the latter a driving force of literary evolution: parody allows one to overcome the
influence of the predecessor, pushing off his art towards one’s own, so that even when the same
techniques recur in art’s history (which is unavoidable), they do so under the banner of different
canons, each with its own artistic form actualizing its own version of ostranenie. The problem
lurking in the Opoyazians’ acceptance of parody was that by recognizing a particular work as a
parody we thereby acknowledge as its inalienable feature the intent of its author, who meant that

841

Shklovsky, Gamburgskii 1990, 109.
302

work to be a parody.
There are two answers to this that can be found in the works of Shklovsky and his allies.
First of all, writing a parody to break with one’s predecessors is a major regularity of literary
evolution; one decides to talk on the phone or write a tweet, but this is within the range of the
outcomes these media presuppose: content is still there, but it falls into line with the laws of
form. Secondly, something may or may not work as a parody in spite of the authorial intent;
most importantly, it has to be registered by other people participating in that same system (of
literature or of a certain medium). To be brought into existence (which is possible only within
the system), the individual’s tendencies should meet these of the system—such is the thought
one may infer from the following statement of Shklovsky’s: “And since it [Shklovsky’s writerly
manner] is probably needed for today’s moment in literature’s development, this peculiarity,
which is solely mine, is not ousted from literature but introduced into it by me.”842
The problem with this answer is that it replaces the will of the person with that of the
system, as it were. Having just put individual meaning to rest, we have taken it to the second
power by bestowing it upon the system. Moreover, ascribing any intentionality to the system can
easily outgrow the boundaries of verifiable scholarly inquiry and lead to a more speculative and
at times idealist (if not metaphysical) treatment of the subject: a sentient system.
McLuhan did not deny it. “It turns out […] that my communication theory is Thomistic to
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the core,”843 he wrote, meaning Aquinas, and then, in one of his letters: “I am not a ‘culture
critic’ because I am not in any way interested in classifying cultural forms. I am a metaphysician,
interested in the life of the forms and their surprising modalities.”844 Traces of idealism are also
found in (Opoyaz) Formalism, despite Tynianov’s letter to Shklovsky in which he wrote that
they successfully “dispensed with the geist of the Germans,” the German word deliberately spelt
with a lowercase “g.”845 In Opoyaz theory of literary evolution, literature appears as a selfdeveloping system with its inner logic—“art develops [literally, “self-develops” (razvivat’sia)]
by the logic of its technique,”846 as Shklovsky put it—a system to which authors and readers
alike are rather pawns than chess players. An insightful article that had to do with this idealist
tendency of Opoyaz Formalism was written by Boris Paramonov, still during Shklovsky’s life:
“Formalism: A Method or a Worldview?” The article compared Opoyaz theory of literary
evolution with Hegel’s dialectic, whose method, as Paramonov reminds by quoting Hegel, “is the
recognition of the form of the inner self-motion of the content of [the science of philosophy].”847
However, there is a resistance to these idealist tendencies in Shklovsky’s and McLuhan’s
theories: their materiality-centered dialectical understanding of the way in which the system (of
literature or of media) functions. To repeat, this dialectic is rooted not in some abstract forms,
akin to Plato’s ideas.848 Rather, it is formed of the interaction between the material world and the
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person. This interaction is contingent on literary devices or media of which people avail
themselves, while literary devices and media should be regarded not as simple tools separated
from the individual but as a certain system of the individual’s perceptual activity, which
dynamically sustains the connection between the individual and the world.

6.6. Things and Men Are the Measure of One Another
Most of Shklovsky and McLuhan’s predecessors underestimated the degree to which the
artistic form and various media are autonomous, because of the established understanding of
these as defined by people, their masters. For a long time, it had been thought that man, as
Protagoras said, is the measure of all things. Shklovsky and McLuhan disputed it, and yet,
instead of insisting on the opposite, namely, that things are the measure of all men, Shklovsky
and McLuhan believed that things and men are, as it were, commensurate. As McLuhan writes,
“[t]he meaning of the pencil, or the chair I use is the interplay between me and these things.”849
Accordingly, the individual’s perception is the battlefield—for Shklovsky as well, with
such perception-related notions of his as ostranenie and automatization. Shklovsky and
McLuhan do not study things by themselves; neither do they study the individual in abstracto;
what they study is the ever-changing formula between the individual and the world, with which
the individual medially interacts. Eric McLuhan traces this understanding back to Aristotle,
citing the following excerpt from him:
… the soul is in a way all existing things… Within the soul, the faculties of
knowledge and sensation are potentially these objects … They must be either the things
themselves or their forms. The former alternative is of course impossible: it is not the
stone which is present in the soul but its form.
It follows that the soul is analogous to the hand; for as the hand is a tool of tools,
formal causality by discussing the Greek notion of logos (word, order, etc.), largely relying on
words’ etymologies (Eric and Marshall McLuhan, MFC, 95).
849
Ibid., 6, emphasis mine.
305

so the mind is the form of forms and sense the form of sensible things.850
It is noteworthy that Shklovsky’s example is the same when he writes in “Art as Device” that “to
restore the sensation of life, to make the stone stony, [. . .] art exists.”851 This does not mean that
the stone is not stony in real life; what is at issue is the perception of the stone, given that the
materiality of the stone, its sensation (oshchushchenie), mediated and enhanced through
particular devices, is at work here as well.
The materiality of perception is of great importance for both Shklovsky and McLuhan.
McLuhan accounts for the material side of perception; he defines all media as the “extensions of
man” (the subtitle of his Understanding Media). Radio, television, or the Internet are the more
advanced types of extension, but there are also the ones people seldom regard as their extensions
at all, so accustomed they are to them, whereas “[a]ny extension, whether of skin, hand, or foot,
affects the whole psychic and social complex,” as McLuhan writes.852 It is hard not to marvel at
the resemblance between McLuhan’s words and those Shklovsky wrote in his novel Zoo:
Man is changed by his craft.
The tool not only extends man’s arm but is extended in him itself.
People say that the blind man locates the sense of touch on the end of his stick.
I am not particularly attached to my shoes, but they are still an extension
(prodolzhenie) of me, a part of me.
For a little cane already changed the student and was forbidden him.
An ape on a branch is more sincere, but the branch also affects the psychology.853
This understanding may also be summarized in the anonymous stanza McLuhan cites in
Understanding Media: “In modern thought, (if not in fact) / Nothing is that doesn’t act, / So that
is reckoned wisdom which / Describes the scratch but not the itch.”854 For Shklovsky, too, the
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question of what life, Don Quixote, or an automobile is, is the question of “how life is made, and
how Don Quixote is made, and how the automobile is made.”855
One may argue that Friedrich Engels anticipated this treatment of the problem in his
Dialectics of Nature. Shklovsky does not cite it though there are many mentions of Engels in his
post- Opoyaz works. McLuhan, however, cites two extensive fragments from Dialectics of
Nature in his and Barrington Nevitt’s essay “Causality in the Electric World.” But doing it, he
also points out the crucial distinction between him and the Marxist tradition: “Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels […] turned Hegelian dialectics upside down by postulating the primacy of
‘matter-in-motion’ asymptotically reflected by mental processes.”856 In McLuhan’s opinion,
Marx and Engels underestimated the interplay between the tools people use and these people’s
mental life.
It would be at least as promising to look for overlaps between McLuhan and Shklovsky,
on one hand, and, on the other, Bruno Latour, one of the founders of actor-network theory. The
latter is compared with Shklovsky in Serguei Oushakine’s preface to an anthology of RF, and
with McLuhan by Graham Harman, whose main project has to do with object-oriented ontology.
Oushakine adduces the same excerpt from Zoo as cited above, pointing out “the
aspiration of the Formalists not to lose sight of the thing, not to overshadow it, not to push it into
the background.”857 In the section titled “Shklovsky’s Latour,” Oushakine writes:
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The fervor of Bruno Latour’s activity [. . .] in the last two decades boils down to making
his audience accustomed to the thought that things can “authorize, allow, afford,
encourage, permit, suggest, influence, block, render possible, forbid, and so on.” Eighty
years prior to Latour, Shklovsky wrote more or less the same in his Zoo: “[T]hings guide
man. Things have transformed (pererodit’) man.”858
May one more quotation from Oushakine’s text be permitted; written with Latour in mind, it
could not apply better to McLuhan’s legacy:
[F]or Shklovsky the material thing becomes an invitation to a renewal of the vocabulary
of the means of expression, a change of established devices and the modes of description,
and, eventually, a reevaluation of the methods of “the linkage of thoughts” [a phrase from
Shklovsky’s Literature and Cinema]. Thus, the one in the spotlight is not so much the
reader with his sensations, as much as it is the “work” of the medium (medium), with its
possibilities for expressivity and its limitations.859
In “McLuhan as Philosopher,” Harman takes up the problem of causality. Inspired by McLuhan
and Latour, as well as Heidegger (with whom McLuhan is also compared), Harman says that to
understand the mechanisms of this world, it is necessary “to avoid all privileged causal lords; all
causation must be local, not solely divine or solely human”; all “actors are to be placed on equal
footing (and this notion lies at core of Latour’s thinking [. . .]),” so that “we cannot grant magic
causal powers to [. . .] God or the human mind”; “[w]e need mediators between mediators
between mediators.”860 This, however, creates a special philosophical problem that, given its
complexity and universality, can only be roughly outlined here, namely, the fact that “all things
are deeper than any possible contact with each other.”861 “Recent philosophy,” Harman writes,
“already loves to say that ‘relations are external to their terms,’ yet [. . .] if relations can never
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make full contact with that which they connect, if colliding billiard balls or two shaking hands
can never fully touch one another, then we ought to ask how they can relate at all.”862 “The thing
is different from any touching of the thing,” he continues; thus, “flames” do not “exhaust the
reality of what they strike,” for “[t]he fire interacts with the flammability of the cotton, not its
whiteness and softness”; hence, not only humanity but “even lights, flames, cotton balls, and
cosmic rays are also cut off from access to the thing-in-itself.”863 Yet it was McLuhan, Harman
writes, who pointed out the way from the dead-end. In his discussion of human communication
contingent on media, McLuhan singled out what he called using the terms of Gestalt psychology:
the figure (≈ the manifestation of a phenomenon, something we notice) and the ground (≈ the
context, the never-fully-known underlying reason of a system). McLuhan’s accomplishment,
according to Harman, was the discovery of how the grounds of different media may be
influenced by our, human, manipulation of the figures, and it is here that the solution to the deadend lies:
Only by abandoning flat ontology in favor of a frank dualism of figures and grounds do
we preserve both the ban on Causal Lords and the possibility of direct contact somewhere
in cosmos. Only by allowing grounds to emit superficial figures do we enable any
retroactive transformation of those grounds. We can call this principle the McLuhan
Supplement to the Latourian Breakthrough.
Meanwhile—and here we return to Shklovsky and the Opoyazians—the one to manipulate the
figures, coming closer to the ground than anyone else, is the artist.864 In the words of Marshall
and Eric McLuhan (Harman cites this paragraph as well),
the study of ground “on its own terms” is virtually impossible; by definition it is at any
moment environmental and subliminal. The only possible strategy for such study entails
constructing an anti-environment: such is the normal activity of the artist, the only person
862
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in our culture whose whole business has been the retraining and updating of sensibility.865
As the last section of this chapter argues, the artist’s ability to create anti-environments, in the
language of McLuhan, or to defamiliarize the word and the world, in that of Shklovsky, is an
antidote to determinism, of which both McLuhan and Shklovsky can be accused, given their
emphasis on systemic and not individual meaning.

6.7. Overcoming the System
In both Shklovsky and McLuhan, the insistence on the overpowering nature of the system
coexists with the desire to overcome it. This can be seen in Shklovsky’s concept of ostranenie
and McLuhan’s notion of anti-environment. In Shklovsky’s case, ostranenie breaks the
established order of things—as people perceive them in life and through art. Thus, Shklovsky
argues in “Art as Device” against Herbert Spencer’s interpretation of rhythm in poetry as “the
economy of effort” (ekonomiia sil) when the reader knows what to expect from the poem.866
“But the rhythm of poetry is not such,” says Shklovsky.867 The rhythm of poetry is always
unexpected, faithful to the fundamental principles of art: labored form (zatrudnennaia forma)
and ostranenie, these two tendencies withstanding the automatization of life in human
perception. But since even defamiliarizing and labored art forms themselves become automated
with time, poetry in its rhythm (as well as on all other levels of its organization) keeps constantly
evolving by interrupting the established poetic norm. That is why, defying the omnipotence of
the system (which, one would think, has a steady, and possibly deducible, plan of future
alterations), Shklovsky contends that “the attempts to systematize these violations” of rhythm
865
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(i.e., to inscribe the anti-systemic in the system) will never succeed. These attempts will fail
because the problem which is at stake for art is not that of “complicated (oslozhnennyi) rhythm
but the kind of violation that cannot be anticipated.”868 What has been said of rhythm is also true
for literature as a whole, with its alteration of canons, effected by the underdogs with a “new
vision”869 (as Tynianov called it) who later themselves become the kings of the hill, only to be
overthrown by the next innovative generation.
McLuhan’s concept of anti-environment, as developed in the essay “The Relation of
Environment to Anti-Environment,” echoes Shklovsky’s ideas in its aspiration to withstand the
blinding system, the latter revolving around the latest and consequently most powerful medium,
imposing its logic on people, who are unaware of it. An example of such a medium is television
when it first appeared and became the new environment of civilization, determining people’s
perception and their actions, its transformative power unbeknownst to the viewers. At that
moment, the anti-environment of television became the radio. Before television, radio itself was
the dominant environment, but now it became an asylum for those trying to escape from the
tyranny of television.870 Aware of the helplessness of human logic before the effects of the new
media that cannot be foreseen, McLuhan famously avoided value judgements, but, speaking of
anti-environments, he revealed the ethical potential of this notion in his example from the realm
of politics: “The party system of government affords a familiar image of the relations of
environment and Anti-Environment. The government as environment needs the opposition as
Anti-Environment in order to be aware of itself. The role of the opposition would seem to be that
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of the arts and sciences in creating perception.”871 Drawing on Shklovsky’s theory, it could be
said that the gift of ostranenie is precisely what makes the artist capable of creating an antienvironment. Shklovsky writes: “The purpose of art is to give the sensation (oshchushchenie) of
the thing, as something seen, not recognized. Art’s device is the device of the “defamiliarization”
of things and the device of laborious form, increasing the difficulty and the endurance of
perception.”872 McLuhan elaborates on it, as it were: “Art as an anti-environment is an
indispensable means of perception, for environments, as such, are imperceptible. Their power to
impose their ground rules on our perceptual life is so complete that there is no scope for dialogue
or interface. Hence the need for art or anti-environments.”873
Likewise, it can be said that in Shklovsky art is the anti-environment of the automated
environment. Moreover, according to Shklovsky and his intellectual companions, old, longforgotten art forms can also withstand the current one, which has lost its defamiliarizing
potential. This sounds exactly like McLuhan’s definition of the anti-environment. An example of
it is what the Opoyazians wrote about Russian nineteenth-century writer Nikolai Leskov,
namely, his manner oriented towards oral narration, resurrected in the innovative work of
Russian twentieth-century authors Aleksey Remizov and Mikhail Zoshchenko (e.g., cf. “Art as
Device”).
For both McLuhan and Shklovsky, the future media environment or art form is like the
conqueror who will first free people from the preceding order only to hold them in captivity
himself. But this is when the previous system of a given medium or an art form, instead of
tyrannizing people as before, will protect them, pretending to its old rights, which it cannot fully
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reclaim. This means that the only way to bypass the system is not rescuing the individual
elements within it (a futile task) but placing oneself between the combatting systems. This means
that whatever is personal can manifest itself between the tides, and, by definition, only for an
infinitesimally instantaneous period of time (cf. chapter 4).
This understanding has a decisive effect on the theories of McLuhan and Shklovsky. Or
rather, the effect is simultaneously the cause, if we agree with McLuhan in that, sub specie
formalitatis, the chicken and the egg are one. The cause and the effect of this dialectical, vigilant
and ironic, understanding of the system is the style of Shklovsky and McLuhan. The simplest
way to define it is to say that they both were masters of the essay, the latter so keenly defined by
another great practitioner, Robert Musil, as “the strictest form attainable in an area where one
cannot work precisely”874 (for knowing the world is unbounded); the form that borrows its
“method from science” and “its matter from art” (or vice versa, I would add); finally, the form
which, for all its intuitivism, remains “in the purely rational sphere,” walking the fine line
between the visibility of the figure and the concealment of the ground.875 However scholarly
Shklovsky and McLuhan got at times, they never gave up their essayistic form of thinking. Thus,
McLuhan subscribed to the tradition of Francis Bacon, who juxtaposed “[w]riting in ‘methods’
or complete packages […] with writing in aphorisms.”876 And it was a similar logic that guided
Shklovsky, who put forth ostranenie as the antidote to the “algebraic method of thinking” in
which things are “prepackaged” for the thinker.877 Thus, as behooves a true formalist, the two
scholars formally fulfilled their ideas in their writing so that the message resounded in the
874
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medium, their aphoristic wit ever looking for the ground and not the figure and their
essayistically suggestive and fragmentary style bespeaking their reluctance to consummate and
package their theories by creating an orthodox doctrine.
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CONCLUSION
The first part of the dissertation considered the theoretical problems concerned with
literary development, while also reconstructing the institutional history of RF vis-à-vis DR,
RF seen as the precursor of DR, as well as its “sparring partner”: both an ally and rival.
The first chapter of this dissertation demonstrated that RF and DR share a great many
theoretical concerns having to do with literary development; moreover, that they share the
same evolutionary ground, Yarkho’s methodology (expounded in chapter one) largely
anticipating the questions and the answers of Distant Readers. The chapter also contrasted
the quantitative model of distant reading (that of the Distant Readers and Yarkho) with the
qualitative model of distant reading, represented by Shklovsky’s Opoyaz group of RF.
The second chapter zeroed in on Opoyaz Formalism: the Opoyazians’ theory of
literary evolution and their own evolution as a theoretical movement. The chapter
reevaluated the Opoyaz doctrine as a dialectical struggle of the nomothetic and idiographic
principles. In the following chapters, this contradiction was extrapolated to the whole set of
problems analyzed in the dissertation, not just those having to do with Opoyaz Formalism
alone.
The third chapter concentrated on the Russian Formalists’ (mainly Opoyaz) theory of
mass literature, comparing and contrasting it with Moretti’s approach to the matter. Some
fundamental similarities between Shklovsky and Moretti were revealed.
Chapter four developed the leitmotifs of the third chapter, focusing on such key
problems ensuing from it, as literary success qua the survival of the “fittest” / ”weakest”
(e.g. the mass popularity of Conan Doyle vs. the popularity of Khlebnikov as a writer for
writers); and authorial literature vs. mass literature and folklore. These and other oppositions
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showed that the antinomies originally identified in Opoyaz Formalism, characterize the
entire field shared by RF and DR, and reflect the tectonic shift between what Marshall
McLuhan termed the Gutenberg galaxy (= logocentrism) and the post-Gutenberg reality of
today.
The second part of the dissertation dealt with the problems going beyond the
boundaries outlined in the first part. Thus, chapter five dwelt on humor as a particularly
recalcitrant object of study for any kind of formalism, given the tendency of formalism to
abstraction, which is in conflict with the highly contextual nature of humor, especially
challenging to quantitative formalisms, which are by and large blind to irony. Humor made
it possible to demonstrate how meaning can be reconsidered and thereby accounted for by
the formalists and distant readers.
The final, sixth, chapter of the dissertation introduced a fundamental comparison
between Opoyaz Formalism and the theory of Marshall McLuhan, entailing such issues as
causality and the relationship between form and person; determinism overcome through the
principle of anti-environments/defamiliarization; and said principle practiced through
performative scholarship, viz., essayistic writing (a wonderful practitioner of which is also
Moretti).
The significance of McLuhan’s theory for this dissertation had to do with his
prophetic awareness of the paradigm shifts of contemporaneity, as well as his refusal to take
the data of our information society at face value, indulging in a positivist analysis thereof.
Instead, the theories of McLuhan and the Opoyazians’ reach the highest degree of reflexivity
by showing why our theoretical concerns gain and lose their cash value. As this dissertation
argued at the very beginning, in the introduction, we can no longer afford to simply reiterate
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the questions posed one hundred years ago by the Russian Formalists: despite the significant
and palpable contributions of Distant Readers, one should remember that, without going
wrong, they may lose their currency just as Structuralism did. The example of the
Opoyazians and McLuhan shows that it is necessary 1) to remember about the relativity of
literature, its inherent contradictions withstanding “progress” in literary scholarship; 2) and
at the same time, to take a stake in studying literary development (for, without being
axiologically involved in it, one does not really have an object of study, for history is always
a process of selection).
Today the literary market is greater and the status of the canon weaker than ever, while
our world continues to be inundated with data. Hundreds of thousands of books are published
every year in the U.S. alone; entire continents, such as Africa and Asia, make their presence felt
on our literary map more and more, and alongside established forms of high and mass literature,
we have new ones emerging on the Internet—from self-publishing to social networks. The
current state of affairs challenges our understanding of canon-formation and of literary evolution,
and this calls for the elaboration of existing theories and the invention of new ones.
Accordingly, this dissertation proposed not to “make progress” but to animate the
perennial contradictions, involving both the author and his readers in the debate begun by
RF and continued by DR—the debate about our evolution as a society and as individuals,
through literature—this medium of media.
Defiant as it may sound, Distant Readers’ quantitative innovation, albeit a most
significant contribution, does not matter more than the consequent defamiliarization of
literary scholarship, hence literature. This defamiliarization gives literature and its
scholarship their currency, without which the questions that scholars raise lose their import.
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After all, both Shklovsky’s and Moretti’s projects were motivated by the problem of the
canon, which is a value problem. The same necessity as that of art—to ever recreate itself in
order to remain “necessary and merry”— is of equal importance for the discipline that
studies art.878
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